STEVEN D. MERRYDAY, District Judge.
Childs moves to vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Doc. 1) and challenges the validity of his convictions of both possession with the intent to distribute cocaine and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, for which offenses he is imprisoned for 262 months. Rule 4, Rules Governing Section 2255 Cases, requires both a preliminary review of the motion and a summary dismissal "[i]f it plainly appears from the face of the motion, any attached exhibits, and the record of prior proceedings that the moving party is not entitled to relief. . . ." Accord Wright v. United States, 624 F.2d 557, 558 (5th Cir. 1980)
Childs challenged this same conviction in an earlier action, 8:07-cv-1630-T-23TGW, which was denied on the merits. Childs is precluded from pursuing a second or successive motion without authorization from the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. "Before a second or successive application permitted by this section is filed in the district court, the applicant shall move in the appropriate court of appeals for an order authorizing the district court to consider the application." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A). Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 664 (1996); Dunn v. Singletary, 168 F.3d 440, 442 (11th Cir. 1999). Childs's two earlier actions, 8:08-cv-2417-T-23TGW and 8:14-cv-813-T-23TGW, were dismissed for Childs's failure to obtain permission from the circuit court to file a second a successive motion to vacate.
This new action is, therefore, a second or successive action that is subject to specific restrictions because a district court lacks jurisdiction to review a second or successive motion without the requisite authorization from the circuit court. Burton v. Stewart, 549 U.S.147, 157 (2007) ("Burton neither sought nor received authorization from the Court of Appeals before filing his 2002 petition, a `second or successive' petition challenging his custody, and so the District Court was without jurisdiction to entertain it.").
Citing Welch v. United States, 136 S.Ct. 1257 (2016), Childs asserts entitlement to the retroactive application of Johnson v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015). As a consequence, Childs's proper remedy is a second or successive motion under Section 2255(h)(2), which authorizes a second or successive motion under two circumstances, specifically:
Childs's remedy lies in Section 2255(h)(2), but not in a district court, which, as Burton instructs, lacks jurisdiction to review a second or successive motion without the requisite authorization from the circuit court. Childs's obtaining relief under Johnson starts with an application for leave to file a second or successive motion under Section 2255, which motion he must file with the circuit court.
Accordingly, the motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Doc. 1) is
Childs is not entitled to a certificate of appealability ("COA"). A prisoner moving under Section 2255 has no absolute entitlement to appeal a district court's denial of his motion to vacate. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). Rather, a district court must first issue a COA. Section 2253(c)(2) permits issuing a COA "only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." To merit a certificate of appealability, Childs must show that reasonable jurists would find debatable both (1) the merits of the underlying claims and (2) the procedural issues he seeks to raise. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 478 (2000); Eagle v. Linahan, 279 F.3d 926, 935 (11th Cir 2001). Because the Section 2255 motion is clearly second or successive, Childs is entitled to neither a COA nor leave to appeal in forma pauperis.
Accordingly, a certificate of appealability is DENIED. Leave to appeal in forma pauperis is DENIED. Childs must obtain authorization from the circuit court to appeal in forma pauperis.
ORDERED.