ORDER

DARRIN P. GAYLES, District Judge.

THIS CAUSE comes before the Court on Defendant Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC's Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint [ECF No. 21]. The Court has reviewed the Motion and the record and is otherwise fully advised. For the reasons that follow, the Court grants the Motion.

BACKGROUND

On December 21, 2005, Plaintiff Richard Kurzban ("Plaintiff") and his wife, Dalain Kur-zban, executed a Note and Mortgage in favor of Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., for the property at issue in this action (the "Property").1 [ECF No. 13-3]. On March 22, 2012, the Mortgage was assigned to The Bank of New York Mellon (the "Bank"). [ECF No. 13-4]. Defendant Special-ized Loan Servicing, LLC ("Defendant"), is the loan servicer.

The Mortgage provides in pertinent part:

[ECF No. 13-3].

In 2009, Plaintiff filed for bankruptcy, obtained a discharge of his debt under the Note and Mortgage, and agreed to surrender the Property. On February 4, 2016, Defendant sent Plain-tiff a Notice of Default and Notice of Intent to Foreclose demanding that Plaintiff pay $193,520.77 within 33 days or risk a foreclosure action. [ECF No. 15]. On March 29, 2016, the Bank filed an action seeking to foreclose on the Property. [ECF No. 13-4]. On December 9, 2016, Plaintiff sent Defendant a loss mitigation application.

In Count I of the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant failed to timely acknowledge receipt of the loss mitigation application in violation of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 12 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. ("RESPA"). In Count II of the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant's Notice of Default letter included time-barred debts and other improper fees in violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. ("FDCPA"). Finally, in Count III of the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant failed to properly respond to a Qualified Written Request and Notice of Error in violation of RESPA. Defendant has moved to dismiss on several grounds, including that Plaintiff failed to comply with the terms of the Mortgage and provide Defendant with notice and an opportunity to cure the alleged RESPA and FDCPA violations.2

LEGAL STANDARD

"To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, ac-cepted as true, to `state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Although this pleading standard "does not require `detailed factual allegations,' . . . it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

Pleadings must contain "more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citation omitted). In-deed, "only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss." Iq-bal, 556 U.S. at 679 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). To meet this "plausibility standard," a plaintiff must "plead[] factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). When reviewing a motion to dismiss, a court must construe the complaint in the light most fa-vorable to the plaintiff and take the factual allegations therein as true. See Brooks v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla. Inc., 116 F.3d 1364, 1369 (11th Cir. 1997). In reviewing a 12(b) motion, the Court is largely limited to the allegations in the Complaint and the attached exhibits. How-ever, "a document outside the four corners of the complaint may still be considered if it is central to the plaintiff's claims and is undisputed in terms of authenticity." Maxcess, Inc. v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 433 F.3d 1337, 1340 n.3 (11th Cir. 2005).

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff does not dispute that he did not provide Defendant with notice of the purported RESPA and FDCPA violations and an opportunity to cure those violations prior to filing this ac-tion. Rather, Plaintiff contends that this action does not relate to the Mortgage and that, even if it did, the notice-and-cure provision does not apply to Defendant. The Court disagrees.

"The notice and cure provision of a mortgage bars a plaintiff's claims where it `applies by its terms to [the] action.'" Charles v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co., No. 15-cv-21826-KMM, 2016 WL 950968, at * 2 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 14, 2016) (quoting St. Breux v. U.S. Bank, Nat'l Ass'n, 919 F.Supp.2d 1371 (S.D. Fla. 2013); see also Telecom Italia, SpA v. Wholesale Telecom Corp., 248 F.3d 1109, 1116 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding that a claim "relates to" a contract when "the dispute occurs as a fairly direct result of the performance of contractual duties"). Plaintiff's RESPA and FDCPA claims clearly relate to the Mortgage. Indeed, Count I arises out of Plain-tiff's attempts to modify the Mortgage to avoid foreclosure. Count II arises out of Defendant's notice to Plaintiff that the Mortgage is in default and Count III arises out of alleged errors in the default amounts. There can be no doubt that the notice-and-cure provision applies to these claims. See Sotomayor v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co. et al., No. 15-cv-61972, 2016 WL 3163074, at *2-3 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 5, 2016) (enforcing notice-and-cure provision to bar claims for alleged violations of the FDCPA arising from allegedly inflated property inspection fees and a payoff statement that was inaccurate due to the inclusion of the inflated fees); Charles, 2016 WL 950968, at * 3 (enforcing notice-and-cure provision to bar claims against loan servicer for al-leged violations of the FDCPA and RESPA arising from purportedly inflated property inspection fees); Sandoval v. Wolfe, No. 16-61856-CIV-Dimitrouleas, 2017 WL 244111, at *3-4 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 19, 2017) (dismissing plaintiff's RESPA and FDCPA claims for failure to comply with no-tice-and-cure provision).

Plaintiff also contends that because Defendant is a servicer and not a party to the Mort-gage, the notice-and-cure provision does not apply. However, Courts in this district consistently hold that a notice-and-cure provision in a mortgage applies to actions against a servicer. See Pierson v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, No. 16-cv-62840, 2017 WL 634164, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 16, 2017) ("Contrary to the position taken in Plaintiff's Response . . . the notice and cure provision of the underlying mortgage is applicable to claims against Defendant as servicer of the loan despite Defendant not being a party to the underlying contract."); Sotomayor, 2016 WL 3163074 at *2-3 (holding that notice-and-cure provision applied to action against loan servicer); Charles, 2016 WL 950968, at *3-4. Accordingly, the Court finds that the notice and cure provi-sion of the Mortgage applies to Plaintiff's claims against Defendant. Because Plaintiff failed to provide Defendant with notice of the purported violations and a reasonable opportunity to cure those violations, the action must be dismissed without prejudice.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows: