JAMES R. KLINDT, Magistrate Judge.
Lillian Smith, on behalf of her minor grandchild, S.C.W., is appealing the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration's final decision denying a claim for child's supplemental security income ("SSI"). For purposes of this Opinion and Order, the designation "Claimant" refers to the minor child, S.C.W., who was an "adolescent" when the claim was filed, and the designation "Plaintiff" refers to her grandmother, Lillian Smith. Claimant's alleged disability is a result of attention deficit disorder. Transcript of Administrative Proceedings (Doc. No. 11; "Tr." or "administrative transcript"), filed August 26, 2016, at 51, 59, 172. On October 15, 2012, Plaintiff filed an application for SSI on behalf of Claimant, who was born on August 22, 1999 and alleged to have been disabled as of October 15, 2012. Tr. at 51-57. The application was denied initially, Tr. at 51-57, 58, 69-75, and was denied upon reconsideration, Tr. at 59-67, 68, 77-83.
On August 20, 2014, an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") held a hearing at which the ALJ heard testimony from Claimant, who was represented by counsel, and Plaintiff. Supplemental Transcript of Administrative Proceedings (Doc. No. 12; "Supp. Tr."), filed August 26, 2016, at 416-34. On October 6, 2014, the ALJ issued a decision finding Claimant not disabled through the date of the ALJ's Decision. Tr. at 22-34.
The Appeals Council then accepted additional evidence in the form of a brief authored by Claimant's counsel. Tr. at 4, 5; see Tr. at 250-52 (brief). On March 2, 2016, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review, Tr. at 1-4, thereby making the ALJ's Decision the final decision of the Commissioner. On April 28, 2016, Plaintiff commenced this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3),
Plaintiff makes one argument on appeal: "The ALJ's evaluation of the severity of [Claimant's] limitation[s] in the functional domains is not supported by substantial evidence." Memorandum of Law (Doc. No. 15; "Pl.'s Mem."), filed October 31, 2016, at 12 (some capitalization omitted). Specifically, Plaintiff takes issue with the ALJ's finding that Claimant has no limitation in the domain of acquiring and using information and a less than marked limitation in the domain of attending and completing tasks.
An individual "under the age of 18 [is] consider[ed] . . . disabled if [the individual] ha[s] a medically determinable physical or mental impairment or combination of impairments that causes marked and severe functional limitations, and that can be expected to cause death or that has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 20 C.F.R. § 416.906;
With respect to the analysis conducted at step three, an ALJ considers the combined effect of all medically determined impairments, even those that are not severe. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.923, 416.924a(b)(4), 416.926a(a) and (c). The ALJ then looks to "objective criteria set forth in [the Regulations]" to determine whether the impairment(s) cause severe and marked limitations.
Limitations resulting from a child's impairment(s) meet "the Listings if the child actually suffers from the limitations specified in the Listings for that child's severe impairment."
Even if the child's limitations do not medically equal the Listings, "the ALJ can still conclude that those limitations are `functionally equivalent' to those in the Listings."
20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(b)(1);
The ALJ followed the required three-step sequential evaluation process for children. Tr. at 25-33. At step one, after recognizing Claimant "was an adolescent on October 15, 2012, the date the application was filed, and [was] an adolescent [at the time of the Decision]," the ALJ determined that Claimant had not engaged in substantial gainful activity at any time relevant to the Decision. Tr. at 25 (emphasis and citation omitted). Next, at step two, the ALJ found Claimant suffers from "the following severe impairments: attention deficit hyperactivity disorder [("ADHD")] and depressive disorder NOS." Tr. at 25 (emphasis and citation omitted).
At step three, the ALJ found that "[C]laimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1." Tr. at 25 (emphasis and citation omitted). The ALJ then determined that "[C]laimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that functionally equals the severity of the listings." Tr. at 26. In terms of the six major domains of life, the ALJ ascertained the following: "[C]laimant has no limitation in acquiring and using information," Tr. at 29 (emphasis omitted); "[C]laimant has [a] less than marked limitation in attending and completing tasks," Tr. at 30 (emphasis omitted); "[C]laimant has no limitation in interacting and relating with others," Tr. at 31 (emphasis omitted); "[C]laimant has no limitation in moving about and manipulating objects," Tr. at 32 (emphasis omitted); "[C]laimant has no limitation in the ability to care for herself," Tr. at 33 (emphasis omitted); and "[C]laimant has no limitation in health and physical well-being," Tr. at 33 (emphasis omitted). Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that "Claimant has not been disabled . . . since October 15, 2012, the date the application was filed." Tr. at 34 (emphasis and citation omitted).
This Court reviews the Commissioner's final decision as to disability pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3). Although no deference is given to the ALJ's conclusions of law, findings of fact "are conclusive if . . . supported by `substantial evidence' . . . ."
As noted above, Plaintiff contends substantial evidence does not support the ALJ's finding that Claimant has no limitation in the domain of acquiring and using information and a less than marked limitation in the domain of attending and completing tasks. Pl.'s Mem. at 13-14 (acquiring and using information), 14-16 (attending and completing tasks). The undersigned first sets out the applicable law. Then, Plaintiff's arguments as to these two domains are addressed.
The domain of acquiring and using information is used to consider how well a claimant acquires and learns information, and how well a claimant uses that information. 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(g). Adolescents should be able to: "use what [they] have learned in daily living situations without assistance"; "comprehend and express both simple and complex ideas, using increasingly complex language"; and "apply these skills in practical ways that will help [them] enter the workplace after [they] finish school." 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(g)(2)(v). The Regulations provide examples of limited functioning in this domain that do not necessarily describe a marked or extreme limitation: lack of understanding words about space, size, or time; inability to rhyme words; difficulty recalling things learned in school yesterday; difficulty solving mathematics questions; and talking only in short, simple sentences with difficulty explaining meaning. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(g)(3).
The domain of attending and completing tasks is used to consider how well a claimant is able to focus and maintain attention, and how well the claimant begins, carries through, and finishes activities, including the pace at which those activities are performed. 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(h). Adolescents "should be able to pay attention to increasingly longer presentations and discussions[;] maintain [their] concentration while reading textbooks[;] . . . independently plan and complete long-range academic projects"; "organize [their] materials"; "plan [their] time in order to complete school tasks and assignments"; "maintain [their] attention on a task for extended periods of time"; and "not be unduly distracted by [their] peers or unduly distracting to [their peers] in a school or work setting." 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(h)(2)(v). The Regulations provide examples of limited functioning in this domain that do not necessarily describe a marked or extreme limitation: the claimant is easily startled, distracted, or overreactive to sounds, sights, movements, or touch; the claimant is slow to focus on or fails to complete activities of interest, like games or art projects; the claimant repeatedly becomes sidetracked or frequently interrupts others; the claimant is easily frustrated and gives up on tasks; the claimant requires extra supervision. 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(h)(3).
The ALJ found that Claimant has no limitation in the domain of acquiring and using information. Tr. at 29. In doing so, she specifically noted that "[C]laimant's 2013-2014 school records show that year-to-date[, C]laimant has been able to maintain a 2.938 grade point average in regular classes, grades consistent with those reported during her psychological examinations." Tr. at 29 (citations omitted). Plaintiff argues that, with respect to these findings, "the ALJ completely ignored and failed to even mention the many accommodations that had been made for [Claimant] and the ways she was not functioning every day and in all settings similarly to other children of the same age who did not have impairments." Pl.'s Mem. at 13. Responding, Defendant contends that "Plaintiff . . . does not cite evidence that [Claimant] still receives these accommodations, with her last 504 Plan[
In the domain of attending and completing tasks, the ALJ found Claimant's limitations to be less than marked. Tr. at 30. The ALJ again relied on Claimant's 2013-2014 school records, and observed that "each of her four teachers who completed questionnaires opined that [Claimant] has no more than [a] slight limitation in her ability to attend and complete tasks." Tr. at 30 (citation omitted). In arguing that this domain finding is erroneous, Plaintiff points out that "two of the teachers who completed questionnaires opined that [Claimant] had obvious problems in her ability to attend and complete tasks." Pl.'s Mem. at 15. Responding, Defendant argues that "[s]ubstantial evidence supports the ALJ's finding that [Claimant] had less than a marked limitation in the domain of attending and completing tasks." Def.'s Mem. at 12. According to Defendant, "the ALJ . . . properly considered the questionnaires completed by [Claimant's] teachers" and "there is no evidence [Claimant's] diagnosis resulted in disabling limitations."
The ALJ's findings regarding the challenged domains are supported by substantial evidence. In particular, Claimant's most recent school records, questionnaires completed by four of Claimant's teachers, and the medical evidence indicate the ALJ did not err in making these findings.
Claimant's 2013-2014 report card (eighth grade) indicates she had a 2.938 grade point average. Tr. at 244. In the first semester, Claimant obtained two As, three Bs, and three Cs.
The administrative transcript contains four "Teacher Questionnaires."
Michelle Mallino, Claimant's math teacher, completed a questionnaire on November 16, 2012. Tr. at 177, 184; see Tr. at 177-84 (questionnaire). At the time she completed the questionnaire, she had known Claimant for four months. Tr. at 177. In the domain of acquiring and using information, she rated Claimant's problems as "slight" in five of the ten activities and opined Claimant had "no problem" in five. Tr. at 178. In the domain of attending and completing tasks, she indicated there were "[no] problems observed in this domain[ and] functioning appears age-appropriate." Tr. at 179.
Hope Fox, Claimant's reading teacher, completed a questionnaire on April 16, 2013.
Amanda Emerfoll was Claimant's math teacher.
The fourth questionnaire is anonymous and does not state the date it was completed.
Psychiatric records from Peace River Center ("Peace River") consistently show that Claimant's "[a]ttention/[c]oncentration" is "fair" and that her "[m]emory/[o]rientation," "[t]hought [p]rocess," "[t]hought [c]ontent," "[i]ntelligen[ce]/[f]und of [k]nowledge," and "[t]hought/[j]udgment" are all "[a]ge-[a]ppropriate." Tr. at 278-81, 335-37. Peace River records also indicate that Claimant's recent and remote memory are "[i]ntact," Tr. at 353, 359, her thought process is "[o]rganized," and her thought content is "[l]ogical," Tr. at 353, 359, 364, 407. Some of the records indicate Claimant's concentration is "[l]imited," Tr. at 364, 407, while others state it is "[i]ntact," Tr. at 353, 359. Peace River records, including those reporting Claimant's concentration is limited, also show that Claimant is "doing well." Tr. at 335 (note indicating "[Claimant] is doing well"), Tr. at 353 (note indicating "[Claimant] is doing well on [medication]"), Tr. at 359 (note indicating "[Claimant] is doing well[ and] would like to continue medicine") (internal quotation mark omitted), Tr. at 363 (note indicating "[Claimant] is doing well" and "[m]edicine helps in paying attention, focusing on work") (internal quotation marks omitted), Tr. at 407 (note indicating "[Claimant] is doing well at school") (internal quotation mark omitted).
The undersigned finds the ALJ did not err in finding that Claimant has no limitation in the domain of acquiring and using information and a less than marked limitation in the domain of attending and completing tasks. First, the 2013-2014 school records indicate Claimant's performance is mostly above average.
After a thorough review of the entire record, the undersigned finds that the ALJ's Decision is supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, it is
1. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), as incorporated by § 1383(c)(3),
2. The Clerk is further directed to close the file.
