WILLIAM C. TURNOFF, Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiff Jeffery Mason is an African American male and former police sergeant with the Miami Gardens Police Department ("MGPD"). Plaintiff alleged that certain policies implemented by the City of Miami Gardens, Florida ("the City"), led MGPD officers to engage in a pattern and practice of police misconduct resulting in race-based and national origin-based stops. Plaintiff alleged further that, as a result of his complaints, he was subjected to frivolous disciplinary actions.
Mason filed a five-count racial discrimination/retaliation action on October 22, 2014. (ECF No.1). The operative pleading was the Fourth Amended Complaint, filed on February 2, 2016, with only two remaining counts for retaliation: Count II for violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 retaliation in violation of§ 1981, and Count IV for retaliation in violation of Title VII and the Florida Civil Rights Act.
Defendant moved for summary judgment on the retaliation counts arguing that Plaintiffs actions, which led to the alleged retaliation, were not protected activity under the statutes, Plaintiff could not establish a causal connection between any protected activity and any adverse employment actions, and Plaintiff could not demonstrate that the City's reasons for its employment actions were pre-textual. The Court granted summary judgment (ECF No. 63), and entered Final Judgment in favor of Defendant. (ECF No. 64). Thereafter, Plaintiff filed an appeal that is currently pending. (ECF No. 65).
Defendant has moved to recover its costs in the amount of$6,454.29. (ECF No. 66). Costs other than attorney's fees are to be awarded to the prevailing party in a civil action unless the Court otherwise directs. Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1). Section 1920 defines which costs are taxable. 28 U.S.C. § 1920. The court has discretion to award the costs that are specifically enumerated therein.
28 U.S.C. § 1920.
When challenging costs, the burden lies with the losing party to show whether the costs are properly taxable, unless the prevailing party has exclusive knowledge regarding the proposed cost.
The costs are comprised of the following: $73.50 for copies of records; $6,220.79 in deposition transcripts; and $160 in fees for service of summons and subpoena. Defendant provided supporting documents, along with a Bill of Costs. Plaintiff filed a response (ECF No. 67), to which Defendant filed a reply. (ECF No. 68).
Although Defendant was billed at a higher rate, it seeks to recover $.35 per page for copies of 210 pages of records. Plaintiff objected to this cost because no supporting documentation was provided. Defendant noted that it provided invoices from Miami-Dade Fire Rescue Department Central Records Bureau, HealthPort, and The Center for Psychological Counseling Services, Inc. The undersigned finds that these costs were properly documented and should be awarded to Defendant. However, the undersigned finds that the rate of$0.35 per page is excessive and will reduce the award to a reasonable rate of$0.14 per page.
Next, Plaintiff objected to deposition costs for expedited transcripts, condensed copies of transcripts, witness packets, and digital transcripts. Moreover, Plaintiff argued that only one of the depositions was relied upon by Defendant in its summary judgment motion-Defendant did not use the depositions of Lewers, Negron, Hunholz, Kinglee, Boyd, Trujillo, and Benson. As Defendant correctly noted, whether a deposition was used in summary judgment is not the standard for recovery of costs. Moreover, the Court notes that most of the depositions were set by Plaintiff. Alternatively, Plaintiff argued that Defendant should only recover $2,348.40, which represents reductions for expedited delivery, other formats produced solely for convenience of counsel, and for copies of exhibits.
With respect to the Mason deposition, Defendant objected to the charge of $819.54 for a 5-day expedited transcript, $39 for the CD litigation support package, $19.50 for a condensed transcript, $45 for expedited delivery, $71.40 in exhibit copies, and $452.50 for the court reporter attendance fee. As such, Plaintiff argued that Defendant should only recover $1,365.90 for the Mason deposition.
Generally, "a deposition taken within the proper bounds of discovery will normally be deemed to be 'necessarily obtained for use in the case' and its costs will be taxed unless the opposing party interposes a specific objection that the deposition was improperly taken or unduly prolonged."
The undersigned agrees that not all of the costs listed on the invoices should be taxable to Plaintiff. With respect to the costs of CD's, electronic and mini transcripts, litigation packages, etc., associated with the transcribed depositions, courts have found that, where such extra services are only for the convenience of counsel, they are not reimbursable under § 1920.
Similarly, many courts have declined to award costs for court reporter delivery fees and handling charges.
However, as numerous courts have ruled, court reporter attendance fees are taxable costs because it is necessary for the court reporter to appear, record the testimony, and then prepare the deposition transcript.
After deducting the costs for exhibits, condensed transcripts, digital transcripts, witness read and sign packets, color exhibits, handling fees, expedited fees, and litigation support packages, the undersigned
Finally, Plaintiff objected to the fees for the service of summonses and subpoenas that were incurred in serving third party subpoenas to Plaintiffs former employers and medical providers arguing that none of the records sought by the subpoenas were used in connection with the summary judgment motion. As Defendant correctly noted, the witness fees are properly taxable to Plaintiff. The cost of service of process is taxable as "fees ofthe marshal" pursuant to§ 1920(1). Although private process server fees are recoverable pursuant to§ 1920,
Based on the foregoing, the undersigned
Pursuant to S.D. Fla. Magistrate Rule 4(b), the parties may serve and file written objections to this Recommendation with Judge Seitz within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. Failure to file timely objections shall bar the parties from attacking on appeal any factual findings contained herein.