ORDER ON MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION

URSULA UNGARO, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification (the "Motion to Certify"). D.E. 89. The Court has considered the Motion to Certify, the pertinent portions of the record and is otherwise fully advised in the premises. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiffs' Motion is DENIED.

I. Factual Background

A. The Parties

Defendant Point Blank Enterprises, Inc. ("Defendant") is "one of the world's largest manufacturers of law enforcement and military protective products, including ballistic resistant soft body armor." D.E. 1 ¶ 1. Defendant sells ballistic vests to police officers and others throughout the United States and the world through various channels including, directly to consumers, through sales representatives, and through authorized distributors. Id. This action concerns alleged defects in Defendant's "Self-Suspending Ballistic System" ("SSBS") ballistic vests.

Plaintiff the Ohio State Troopers Association, Inc., (the "OSTA") is a membership organization whose members include the Ohio State Highway Patrol Troopers and others. D.E. 52 ¶ 3. Plaintiff the International Union of Police Association (the "IUPA"), is the only AFL-CIO union chartered exclusively for law enforcement and is organized and licensed in the State of Florida and maintains its headquarters in Sarasota Florida. The IUPA and the OSTA shall be collectively referred to as the "associational Plaintiffs."

Plaintiff Trevor Koontz ("Koontz") is a citizen of the State of Ohio and a Trooper in the Ohio State Highway Patrol. Id. ¶ 5. Koontz purchased one of Defendant's vests manufactured in Florida in December, 2012 through Defendant's sales representative. Id. Plaintiffs allege that Koontz's ballistic vest has manufacturing and design defects and has "fallen apart" in the field as recently as 2016. Id. Plaintiff Steven Eric Rohner ("Rohner") is a citizen of Ohio and a Trooper in the Ohio State Highway Patrol. D.E. 52 ¶ 6. Rohner purchased one of Defendant's ballistic vests manufactured in Florida in May, 2015 through Defendant's sales representative. Id. Rohner's vest also allegedly has manufacturing and design defects and has fallen apart while on duty in the field. Id. Plaintiff Ryan Purpura ("Purpura) is also a citizen of Ohio and a Sergeant in the Ohio State Highway Patrol. D.E. 52 ¶ 7. Similar to Koontz and Rohner, he purchased one of Defendant's ballistic vests manufactured in Florida through Defendant's sales representative in March, 2015. Id. Purpura's vest also allegedly has defects and has fallen apart. Koontz, Rohner and Purpura are all members of the OSTA, and shall be collectively referred to as the "individual Plaintiffs."

B. The SSBS Vests & the Alleged Defects

Plaintiffs allege that ballistic vests generally contain two components, a ballistic panel that stops projectiles and a carrier that holds the ballistics panel in place on the wearer. D.E. 52 ¶ 14. Traditionally, the carrier contains shoulder straps or another suspension system to hold the ballistic panel in place. D.E. 52 ¶ 19. Unlike traditional models however, Defendant's vests contain an SSBS, in which Velcro® "c-clamps" are sewn directly onto the ballistic panel itself, as opposed to the carrier. See D.E. 52 at 10-11. These c-clamps join the two halves of the vest together by closing onto attached Breathe-O-Prene® shoulder straps and the carrier is then placed over the SSBS. See D.E. 52 at 10-11.

Plaintiffs contend that Defendant's SSBS vests are defectively designed and contain defects in material and workmanship. D.E. 52 ¶ 22. Specifically, Plaintiffs claim that the ballistic panels unexpectedly separate from the shoulder straps, causing Defendant's SSBS vests to sink into the user's uniform. Id. ¶ 23. Plaintiffs allege that this is the result of Defendant's attempt to save costs and make their vests lower profile. Id. Plaintiffs allege Defendant switched from using sturdier Velcro® shoulder straps to using Breathe-O-Prene®, a material that lacks the counterpart loops onto which the c-clamps can attach. Id. ¶ 39. Defendant also reduced the amount of material used in the SSBS components, including "reducing the size and length of the Velcro [c-clamps]." Id. Plaintiffs allege that these changes reduced the shear strength of the connections between the c-clamps and the shoulder straps, increasing the likelihood of SSBS failure.

C. The Warranties

Plaintiffs also allege that Defendant made both express and implied warranties regarding the qualities and performance characteristics of its SSBS vests to the individual Plaintiffs and the putative class members. D.E. 52 ¶ 45. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that there are three sources of express warranties: the care and maintenance manuals that are shipped with every SSBS vest, warranties sewn onto the ballistic panel of each SSBS vest, and Defendant's advertisements. D.E. 52 at 19-21.

Plaintiffs allege that each SSBS vest is shipped with a care and maintenance manual, which contains express warranties and a "warranty and customer response card," which class members were asked to return to Defendant in Florida. Id. ¶ 47. The express warranties contained in these manuals include a five-year warranty for any component of the ballistic panel of the SSBS vests. Plaintiffs also allege that Defendant's express warranties "in its Care and Maintenance Manual for all SSBS Vests are the same or substantially similar, regardless of the particular make, model, or threat level of SSBS Vest purchased." D.E. 52 ¶ 51. In addition to the warranties contained in the care and maintenance manual, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant "provides an additional and separate express warranty to Individual Plaintiffs and class members on the labels on the face of the ballistic panels into which the SSBS is directly integrated/sewn." Id. ¶ 52. Plaintiffs interpret this warranty as an unconditional five-year warranty with no limitations, conditions precedent or exclusions. Id. Lastly, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant made express representations and warranties through website advertisements, "the descriptions in State Pricing Lists and State Contracts throughout Florida and the country, and PBE's other sales and marketing materials that were part of the basis of the bargain." Id. ¶ 53. In all of these materials, Defendant allegedly represented that the SSBS vests are warranted to "keep[ ] the ballistic panels completely suspended... throughout the life of the vest." D.E. 52 ¶ 53.

Plaintiffs also allege that there are undisclaimed implied warranties that the SSBS vests are merchantable and fit for the particular purpose for which they are sold. Id. ¶ 56. Plaintiffs argue that Defendants breached the express and implied warranties because "the SSBS Vests do not pass without objection in the trade, are unsuitable for the ordinary and intended uses for which they were sold and are not merchantable," and Defendant did not provide "a product which could provide the benefits described in the labels and advertising." D.E. 52 ¶¶ 58-59.

D. Damages

Plaintiffs allege that the individual Plaintiffs purchased SSBS vests that are defective in that the ballistic panels prematurely detach from the shoulder straps and therefore the individual Plaintiffs, and all class members have "not received the benefit of the bargain," D.E. 52 ¶ 60, and are subject to an increased safety risk. Id. ¶ 62. Thus, Plaintiffs allege that "[a]s a result of Defendant's breach of its contract and warranties, the individual Plaintiffs and class members have been damaged in the amount of the purchase price of their SSBS Vests." Id. ¶ 59. As to the OSTA, Plaintiffs allege that it as an entity suffered "financial loss in time and money, including purchasing and providing replacement vests for the defective SSBS Vests ...." D.E. 52 ¶ 3. Plaintiffs also allege that the OSTA's "members have purchased and/or wear the defective SSBS vests." Id. As to the IUPA, Plaintiffs allege that it has "directly incurred financial loss in time and money in connection with the unacceptable safety risks the defective SSBS Vests have subjected its members to, including many of its members in Florida that have purchased or wear the defective SSBS Vests." Id. 52 at 23.

II. Procedural Background

On April 16, 2018, Plaintiffs filed their amended class action complaint, alleging four counts, individually and on behalf of a class defined as:

Counts One through Three are brought solely by the individual Plaintiffs, individually and on behalf of the class, and assert claims for: (1) breach of express warranty; (2) breach of implied warranty of merchantability; and (3) breach of implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. D.E. 52. Count Four is not precisely pled. While technically pled as one count, it involves two claims for relief: a claim for damages brought by the individual Plaintiffs and the class, pursuant to the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act ("FDUTPA"), Fla. Stat § 501, et seq., and a claim for injunctive relief under the FDUTPA brought by the associational Plaintiffs and the class. D.E. 52.1

Although Plaintiffs only sought to certify one class of purchasers in their amended complaint, in the instant Motion, Plaintiffs move to certify the following classes under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2),(3):

For purposes of Plaintiffs' FDUTPA claims, Plaintiffs define the Class as:

Plaintiffs seek certification of two separate FDUTPA classes: one class for their injunctive relief claim under Rule 23(b)(2), requesting that the Court enjoin sale of all of Defendant's SSBS vests, and one class for their monetary damages claim pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3). D.E. 89 at 18. Alternatively, if the Court declines to certify separate Rule 23(b)(2) and Rule 23(b)(3) classes, Plaintiffs request that the Court certify the class as a Rule 23(b)(3) class. Id. n. 23; see Fabricant v. Sears Roebuck, 202 F.R.D. 310, 316 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (explaining that in claims for injunctive relief and monetary damages, the Court may certify a separate class for injunctive relief claims and monetary damages claims).2

For purposes of the Individual Plaintiffs' warranty claims, Plaintiffs define the class as:

Although Count Three asserts a claim on behalf of the class, Plaintiffs do not seek certification of their implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose claim in Count Three of the amended complaint. Id. Accordingly, the Court construes Count Three as a single claim for breach of implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose by the individual Plaintiffs.

III. Legal Standard

A class action may only be certified if the court is satisfied, after a rigorous analysis, that the prerequisites of Rule 23 have been satisfied. Gilchrist v. Bolger, 733 F.2d 1551, 1555 (11th Cir. 1984). A plaintiff seeking class certification carries the burden of proof and must "affirmatively demonstrate" that all of the requirements of Rule 23 are met. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 351, 131 S.Ct. 2541, 180 L.Ed.2d 374 (2011); Rutstein v. Avis Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 211 F.3d 1228, 1233 (11th Cir. 2000).

As an initial matter, Rule 23(a) contains an implicit, threshold requirement that the proposed class be "adequately defined and clearly ascertainable." See, e.g., Rink v. Cheminova, Inc., 203 F.R.D. 648, 659 (M.D. Fla. 2001) (citing DeBremaecker v. Short, 433 F.2d 733, 734 (5th Cir. 1970) ("It is elementary that in order to maintain a class action, the class sought to be represented must be adequately defined and clearly ascertainable.")).3 Rule 23(a) further contains four explicit prerequisites: "(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class." These four prerequisites are commonly referred to as "numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation." Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 350 F.3d 1181, 1188 (11th Cir. 2003).

In addition to the requirements of Rule 23(a), a plaintiff must also demonstrate that at least one of the three alternative requirements of Rule 23(b) has been met. Pickett v. Iowa Beef Processors, 209 F.3d 1276, 1279 (11th Cir. 2000).

Here, Plaintiff argues for certification under Rule 23(b)(3) on grounds that "the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy." See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). D.E. 89. In other words, "there must be common questions of law or fact among the class relating to ... substantive claims ... [that] predominate such that they have a direct impact on every class member's effort to establish liability that is more substantial than the impact of individualized issues in resolving the claim or claims of each class member. Vega, 564 F.3d at 1270 (internal citations and quotations omitted). "Where, after adjudication of the classwide issues, plaintiffs must still introduce a great deal of individualized proof or argue a number of individualized legal points to establish most or all of the elements of their individual claims, such claims are not suitable for class certification under Rule 23(b)(3)." Klay v. Humana, Inc., 382 F.3d 1241, 1255 (11th Cir. 2004). Plaintiffs also seek certification of a 23(b)(2) class for their FDUTPA injunctive relief claim, which requires that the Court "determine (1) whether Defendant has acted on grounds generally applicable to the class as a whole, and if so, (2) whether declaratory or final injunctive relief is the appropriate and primary remedy ...." Jones v. American General Life and Acc. Ins. Co., 213 F.R.D. 689, 698 (S.D.Ga.2002) (citing In re Managed Care Litig., 209 F.R.D. 678 (S.D.Fla.2002) and 7A Wright, Miller, & Kane, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1775 (2d ed.1986)).

A district court has broad discretion in determining whether to certify a class. Washington v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 959 F.2d 1566, 1569 (11th Cir. 1992). "Although a court should not determine the merits of a case at the class certification stage, the court can and should consider the merits of the case to the degree necessary to determine whether the requirements of Rule 23 will be satisfied." Valley Drug Co., 350 F.3d at 1188 n. 15; see also Hudson v. Delta Air Lines, 90 F.3d 451, 457 (11th Cir. 1996) (stating it is sometimes necessary to probe behind the pleadings before coming to rest on the certification question).

IV. Discussion

A. Standing

1. Standard

"[I]it is well-settled that prior to the certification of a class ... the district court must determine that at least one named class representative has Article III standing to raise each class subclaim." Prado-Steiman ex rel. Prado v. Bush, 221 F.3d 1266, 1279 (11th Cir. 2000). "Only after the court determines the issues for which the named plaintiffs have standing should it address the question whether the named plaintiffs have representative capacity, as defined by Rule 23(a), to assert the rights of others." Id. at 1280. As a threshold matter, Defendant argues that the Court should deny Plaintiffs' Motion to Certify because Plaintiffs lack standing to bring the instant action. D.E. 125-1 at 12. For the reasons discussed below, the Court agrees.

As set forth by the Supreme Court in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, Article III standing requires a plaintiff to have "(1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision." Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, ___ U.S. ___, 136 S.Ct. 1540, 194 L.Ed.2d 635 (2016). "To establish injury in fact, a plaintiff must show that he or she suffered `an invasion of a legally protected interest' that is `concrete and particularized' and `actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.'" Id. at 1548 (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992)). "For an injury to be particularized, it must affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way." Id. (quotations omitted). For the injury to be "concrete," it must be "real," and not "abstract;" however it need not be "tangible." Id. at 1548-49. In addition, when a party seeks injunctive relief, it must show "that the alleged injury is not too speculative for Article III purposes—that the injury is certainly impending." Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409, 133 S.Ct. 1138, 185 L.Ed.2d 264 (2013).

2. Parties' Arguments

In its response to Plaintiffs' Motion to Certify, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs lack standing because they seek to certify classes comprised of purchasers and users of all SSBS vests, "but there is not one monolithic SSBS vest." D.E. 125-1 at 12. Defendant argues that it sells concealable and non-concealable SSBS vests, "and within each of these designations there are "hundreds of different models—with different ballistic packages, carriers, weight, and designs that have changed over time." Id. Thus, Defendant argues that as the OSTA and the IUPA, as entities, have never purchased or used any of Defendants' vests and as the individual Plaintiffs have only purchased and used two models of Defendant's non-concealable SSBS vests, the named Plaintiffs lack standing to bring claims on behalf of purchasers and users of all of Defendant's SSBS vests. Id. at 13; see Dapeer v. Neutrogena Corp., 95 F.Supp.3d 1366, 1373 (S.D. Fla. 2015) (Finding plaintiff lacked "Article III standing to bring claims on behalf of the Neutrogena products he did not purchase because he cannot conceivably allege any injuries from products that he never purchased or used.").

Plaintiffs only briefly address this contention in their reply, arguing that Defendant's assertion that it has thousands of different models of SSBS ballistic vests is immaterial:

Here, all of the classes Plaintiffs seek to certify are defined as including: "All individuals and entities ... that purchased and/or used new SSBS Vests from Defendant... and who continue to purchase and/or use such vests." D.E. 89 at 1 (emphasis added). Plaintiffs' amended complaint alleges that "Trooper Koontz purchased a new PBBA SP + 2LE Vision vest (an SSBS Vest)," "Trooper Rohner purchased a Point Blank AXII Alpha Elite model vest (an SSBS Vest)," and "Sergeant Purpura purchased a Point Blank AXII Alpha Elite model vest (an SSBS Vest)." D.E. 52 ¶¶ 5-7. As to the OSTA, Plaintiffs allege that the OSTA has purchased and paid for replacement vests, and many of its "members have purchased or wear the defective SSBS Vests," id. ¶ 3. Plaintiffs also allege that "many of [IUPA's] members in Florida ... have purchased or wear the defective SSBS Vests." Id. ¶ 4. Thus, the Court must determine whether the named Plaintiffs have standing to maintain a class action for an entire category of products when they only purchased a small subset of those products.

3. Circuit Precedent

Many courts in this district have examined this exact issue in great depth and concluded that the plaintiffs did not have standing to bring claims for products that they did not purchase. In Toback v. GNC Holdings, Inc., No. 13-80526-CIV, 2013 WL 5206103 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 13, 2013), the plaintiff filed a FDUTPA class action complaint seeking damages and injunctive relief and alleged that the defendant's "Tri-Flex" line of products did not actually promote joint health and function as advertised. Toback, No. 13-80526-CIV, 2013 WL 5206103 at *1. However, the plaintiff had only purchased one "TriFlex" product, "TriFlex Vitapak." Id. In holding that the plaintiff only had standing to bring claims related to "TriFlex Vitapak," the court explained that in the Eleventh Circuit "at least one named plaintiff must establish Article III standing for each class subclaim." Id. at *4 (citing Prado-Steiman v. Bush, 221 F.3d 1266, 1279 (11th Cir. 2000)).4 Accordingly, the Toback court reasoned that:

One year later, the court in Garcia v. Kashi Co., 43 F.Supp.3d 1359, 1390 (S.D. Fla. 2014) took up the same issue and, relying partially on Toback, reached the same result. In Garcia, the plaintiffs brought a class action against a food manufacturer alleging breach of express and implied warranties because its products allegedly contained certain chemicals despite being marketed and labelled as "all natural." Id. The plaintiffs sought to certify a class of all purchasers of defendants' products that contained these chemicals. Id. However, like the plaintiff in Toback, the plaintiffs in Garcia had only purchased a small number of these products. Id. Relying partially on Toback, the Garcia court held that the plaintiffs' only had standing as to those products they had actually purchased:

The Garcia court further noted that this holding was in line with both Eleventh Circuit and Supreme Court precedent:

Wooden v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 247 F.3d 1262, 1288 (11th Cir.2001).

Griffin v. Dugger, 823 F.2d 1476, 1483 (11th Cir.1987) (alteration in original) (quotation omitted).

Multiple other courts in this Circuit have since followed suit. See, e.g., Barron v. Snyder's-Lance, Inc., No. 13-62496-CIV, 2015 WL 11182066, at *17 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 20, 2015) ("The Court reaffirms the position it took in Garcia: "a named plaintiff in a consumer class action `cannot raise claims relating to those other products which he did not purchase[.]'") (quoting Garcia, 43 F.Supp.3d 1359); Holliday v. Albion Labs., Inc., No. 9:14-CV-81294, 2015 WL 10857479, at *5 (S.D. Fla. June 9, 2015) (finding plaintiff lacked Article III standing to bring FDUTPA claim as to products he did not purchase and limiting standing to two purchased products).

4. Plaintiffs' Standing

i. Breach of Warranty Claims

These cases are on all fours here. Plaintiffs' amended complaint contains four counts. D.E. 52. Counts One and Two are brought by the individual Plaintiffs, individually and on behalf of the class, and allege breach of express and implied warranties.5 Id. As discussed, Plaintiffs seek to certify one class for these claims, defined as:

The individual Plaintiffs have only purchased and used two different models of Defendant's vests: a "Point Blank AXII Alpha Elite model vest," and a "PBBA SP + 2LE Vision vest." D.E. 52. Accordingly, the individual Plaintiffs only have standing to bring claims arising out of their purchase of the "Point Blank AXII Alpha Elite model vest," and the "PBBA SP + 2LE Vision vest." They do not have standing to bring claims on behalf of "All individuals and entities in California, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, Virginia, and Washington that purchased and/or used new SSBS Vests from Defendant," because they did not purchase or use all of Defendant's new SSBS vests. Toback, No. 13-80526-CIV, 2013 WL 5206103; Garcia, 43 F.Supp.3d 1359; Dapeer, 95 F.Supp.3d 1366; Barron, No. 13-62496-CIV, 2015 WL 11182066; Holliday, No. 9:14-CV-81294, 2015 WL 10857479. As noted above, Plaintiffs' arguments that Defendant's vests all contain identical SSBS systems with the same defect is not persuasive as similarity between products does not confer standing in the Eleventh Circuit. See Garcia, 43 F.Supp.3d at 1393 ([A] named plaintiff in a consumer class action lacks standing to challenge a non-purchased product because there is no injury-in-fact as to that product, even if he purchased a substantially similar product ....) (emphasis added); Leon v. Cont'l AG, 301 F.Supp.3d 1203, 1221 (S.D. Fla. 2017) (finding plaintiffs did not have standing to bring claims against defendant vehicle manufacturer for vehicles plaintiffs did not actually own even though plaintiffs alleged that the "same defective ACU was installed [in the vehicles] ... this `sufficient similarity' argument has not been adopted in the Eleventh Circuit.") (quotation omitted) (emphasis added); cf. Sanchez-Knutson v. Ford Motor Co., 310 F.R.D. 529, 533 (S.D. Fla. 2015) (finding plaintiffs had standing where class included specific models of Ford Explorer.).

Thus, the individual plaintiffs, as the named plaintiffs in Counts One through Three, have not "establish[ed] Article III standing for each class subclaim." Prado-Steiman, 221 F.3d at 1279. As a result, the breach of warranty class cannot be certified, and to the extent Counts One through Three assert claims on behalf of a class they are dismissed without prejudice for lack of standing. However, the individual Plaintiffs have standing to bring these claims individually based on the purchase of the two models of Defendant's vests.6

ii. FDUTPA Claims

As discussed, although plead as one count, the Court construes Count Four as bringing two separate FDUTPA claims: one claim brought by the individual Plaintiffs, individually and on behalf of the class for monetary damages under the FDUTPA, and one claim brought by the associational Plaintiffs, individually and on behalf of the class, for injunctive relief under the FDUTPA. See D.E. 52. Accordingly, Plaintiffs seek to certify one class for monetary damages under Rule 23(b)(3) and one class for injunctive relief under Rule 23(b)(2), jointly defined as:

As to Count Four's FDUTPA damages claim, the amended complaint states that both the IUPA and the OSTA are Plaintiffs "for purposes of injunctive relief sought in the Fourth Claim for Relief." D.E. 52 ¶¶ 3-4; see supra note 1. Accordingly, as neither associational Plaintiff is a named Plaintiff for purposes of the monetary damages claim under the FDUTPA and as the individual Plaintiffs, having only purchased two models of ballistic vests, do not have standing to bring a claim on behalf of a class of "All individuals and entities in the fifty United States and the District of Columbia that purchased and/or used new SSBS Vests from Defendant," D.E. 89 at 1, the FDUTPA damages class must also be dismissed for lack of standing. However, as with the breach of warranty claims in Counts one through Three, the individual Plaintiffs have standing to assert the FDUTPA damages claims individually. See supra note 6.

This leaves the IUPA and the OSTA's claims for injunctive relief under the FDUTPA individually, and on behalf of the class. Despite Plaintiffs' allegations to the contrary, the amended complaint alleges both that the organizations themselves and their members suffered an injury-in-fact:

This implicates both Article III standing and associational standing. See Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advert. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 342-43, 97 S.Ct. 2434, 53 L.Ed.2d 383 (U.S. 1977) (explaining that "[e]ven in the absence of injury to itself, an association may have standing solely as the representative of its members...."). The Court will first determine whether the OSTA and the IUPA have Article III standing to bring Count Four individually and on behalf of the class based on the injury-in-fact they themselves suffered, before turning to their associational standing to bring Count Four individually and on behalf of the class, based on injuries-infact sustained by their members.

5. OSTA & IUPA — Article III Standing

To establish Article III standing a party must allege an injury in fact. Spokeo, 136 S.Ct. 1540. The injury-in-fact that the OSTA alleges it suffered is "financial loss in time and money, including purchasing and providing replacement vests for the defective SSBS Vests ...." D.E. 52 ¶ 3. The injury-in-fact that the IUPA alleges it suffered is:

As the IUPA has not alleged that it, as an entity, has purchased or used any vests, it does not have Article III standing to raise claims on behalf of a class defined as "[a]ll individuals and entities in the fifty United States and the District of Columbia that purchased and/or used new SSBS Vests from Defendant," D.E. 89 at 1. Garcia, 43 F.Supp.3d 1359, 1390.

As to the OSTA, there is no allegation that it as an organization has purchased any specific model of SSBS vest. To be sure, there is a generic statement in the amended complaint that the OSTA incurred financial loss in "purchasing and providing replacement vests for the defective SSBS Vests ...." D.E. 52 ¶ 3. However, in order for the OSTA to have standing to bring Count Four on behalf of "[a]ll individuals and entities in the fifty United States and the District of Columbia that purchased and/or used new SSBS Vests from Defendant," D.E. 89 at 1, the Court would have to construe this allegation as asserting that the OSTA, as an organization, purchased every one of Defendant's new SSBS vest in the class period. See Garcia, 43 F.Supp.3d at 1390 ("[I]n the Eleventh Circuit, a named plaintiff in a consumer class action `cannot raise claims relating to those other products which he did not purchase[.]'") (quoting Toback, No. 13-80526-CIV, 2013 WL 5206103 at *5). Such a broad construction is not warranted given the complete lack of any corroborating allegations in the complaint. The amended complaint does not mention a single model of Defendant's ballistic vest that the OSTA purchased, nor when it purchased such vests, nor who purchased them or from whom they were purchased.

Thus, neither the OSTA nor the IUPA have Article III standing to bring Count Four's claim for injunctive relief on behalf of the class based on injuries-in-fact they sustained as organizations. See Shotz v. Cates, 256 F.3d 1077, 1081 (11th Cir.2001) ("[W]e must evaluate standing based on the facts alleged in the complaint, and we may not `speculate concerning the existence of standing or piece together support for the plaintiff.'") (quotation omitted).

Moreover, unlike the individual Plaintiffs who have standing to bring their individual claims because they alleged that they purchased a particular model of Defendants' SSBS vests, because the IUPA and the OSTA have not alleged that they purchased any such model, they also lack standing to bring Count Four individually.

6. OSTA & IUPA — Associational Standing

i. Associational Standing to Bring Count Four on Behalf of the Class

While the OSTA and the IUPA may not have standing to bring claims based on an injury-in-fact they themselves suffered, they may have associational standing to bring suit on behalf of their members based on injuries-in-fact their members suffered. See Hunt, 432 U.S. 333, 97 S.Ct. 2434. An association has standing to sue on behalf of its members when:

Here, the OSTA and the IUPA lack associational standing. First, as to the OSTA's and the IUPA's associational standing to bring Count Four on behalf of the class, the putative class for FDUTPA injunctive relief in the amended complaint does not limit the class to OSTA and IUPA members. Instead, it includes "All individuals and entities in the fifty United States and the District of Columbia that purchased and/or used new SSBS Vests from Defendant." D.E. 89 at 1 (emphasis added). Nor does the amended complaint allege that all users and purchasers of Defendant's SSBS vests are IUPA and/or OSTA members. See D.E. 52. Accordingly, to the extent the OSTA and the IUPA are suing on behalf of the FDUTPA injunctive relief class, the OSTA and the IUPA are not suing to advance the rights of their members and they therefore lack associational standing. See In re: Takata Airbag Prod. Liab. Litig., No. 14-24009-CV, 2016 WL 1266609, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 11, 2016) (explaining that association lacked associational standing where the "[c]omplaint does not limit the automotive recycler putative classes only to [Plaintiffs] members ... Rather, the automotive recycler putative classes include `[a]ll automotive recyclers in the United States,' `[a]ll automotive recyclers in [27 states],' ... that meet certain criteria unrelated to being [a member of Plaintiffs association]... Nor does the Complaint assert that all automotive recyclers are members of [Plaintiffs association] ... Accordingly, [Plaintiff] is not suing pursuant to the rights of its members and thus, associational standing is not available ...."); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975) ("Even in the absence of injury to itself, an association may have standing solely as the representative of its members.") (emphasis added); cf. Doe v. Stincer, 175 F.3d 879, 886 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that organization could sue on behalf of its constituents because they "possess[ed] all indicia of membership in an organization") (quoting Hunt, 432 U.S. at 344-45, 97 S.Ct. 2434).

Thus, the OSTA and the IUPA lack associational standing to bring a claim for injunctive relief under the FDUTPA on behalf of the class described in the amended complaint. Accordingly, Count Four's FDUTPA injunctive relief claim brought on behalf of the class is dismissed without prejudice for lack of standing and the class cannot be certified. The remaining question is whether the IUPA and the OSTA have standing to sue individually based on injuries-in-fact sustained by their members. For reasons discussed below, they do not.

ii. Associational Standing to Bring Count Four Individually

a. The IUPA

An association has standing to sue on behalf of its members when, inter alia, "its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right ...." United Food, 517 U.S. at 553, 116 S.Ct. 1529 (quoting Hunt, 432 U.S. at 343, 97 S.Ct. 2434). This necessitates an inquiry into whether any member of the IUPA or the OSTA has standing to bring the FDUTPA injunctive relief claim on his or her own. The IUPA lacks associational standing because none of its members have Article III standing to sue in their own right as there is no allegation in the amended complaint that any IUPA member purchased any specific products and no member can allege an injury-in-fact for products they have not purchased. Toback, No. 13-80526-CIV, 2013 WL 5206103. To be sure, the amended complaint asserts that "many of its members ... have purchased or wear the defective SSBS vests," D.E. 52 at 4, but the amended complaint does not allege which IUPA members purchased which vests, when they purchased the vests or from whom they purchased the vests. This is particularly troublesome given that Plaintiffs admit "many SSBS Vests are purchased by departments or agencies that are not the actual user of the vests ...." D.E. 136 at 16. Thus, as a party does not have standing to bring a claim for a product he or she did not purchase, and as the amended complaint does not allege which of Defendants' SSBS vests were purchased by any IUPA member, no member of the IUPA has Article III standing "to sue in their own right." Hunt, 432 U.S. at 343, 97 S.Ct. 2434; see Dapeer, 95 F.Supp.3d at 1373 (explaining that plaintiff lacked "Article III standing to bring claims on behalf of the Neutrogena products he did not purchase because he cannot conceivably allege any injuries from products that he never purchased or used."); see also Garcia v. Clarins USA, Inc., No. 14-21249-CIV, 2014 WL 11997812, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 5, 2014) (explaining that in a FDUTPA claim, "Plaintiff's standing is limited to claims relating to Vital Light Night Revitalizing Anti-Ageing Cream and Body Lift Cellulite Control products because Plaintiff did not purchase the other products and cannot allege an injury in fact as to those products."). Accordingly, the IUPA lacks associational standing to bring Count Four on behalf of the class or individually as a representative of its members.

b. The OSTA

In contrast, certain members of the OSTA, the individual Plaintiffs, have alleged that they purchased specific models of Defendant's vests and therefore the failure to purchase the defective product is not an impediment to their standing under Article III standing to sue "in their own right". See Toback, No. 13-80526-CIV, 2013 WL 5206103.8

In order to establish Article III standing, an individual OSTA member needs to allege that he or she "suffered an injury in fact ..." Spokeo, 136 S.Ct. at 1540. The injuries-in-fact that the OSTA's members suffered as related to the OSTA's claim for injunctive relief in Count Four are not clear. But, the Court construes the injury-in-fact to be the increased risk of serious injury or death from using the defective vests.9 See, e.g., D.E. 52 ¶¶ 103-04 ("Here, the potential life-threatening injury to class members outweighs whatever damage the requested injunction may cause PBE ... If the injunctive relief is not provided, then irreparable injury to some users, i.e., death or serious bodily injury, may result."); D.E. 52 ¶101 ("Plaintiffs and class members show that they are entitled to affirmative injunctive relief requiring Defendant to cease selling the defective SSBS Vests and to notify all class members of the defects in the vests and the life-threatening danger associated with continued use ....") (emphasis added). However:

Houston v. Marod Supermarkets, Inc., 733 F.3d 1323, 1328 (11th Cir. 2013) (quoting Wooden, 247 F.3d at 1284 (11th Cir. 2001)); see also Dapeer, 95 F.Supp.3d at 1373 ("Although the FDUTPA allows a plaintiff to pursue injunctive relief even where the individual plaintiff will not benefit from an injunction ... it cannot supplant Constitutional standing requirements.") (quotation omitted).

While the individual Plaintiffs may have purchased and worn Defendant's defective vests in the past, the amended complaint is devoid of any allegations that the individual Plaintiffs continue to wear the defective vests. And the record evidence is to the contrary: the deposition testimony of the individual Plaintiffs is that they no longer wear Point Blank SSBS vests, and some have no intention of ever purchasing or wearing such vests in the future:

Therefore, as none of the individual Plaintiffs continue to wear the defective SSBS vests Plaintiffs have not shown a sufficient likelihood that the individual Plaintiffs will be affected by the alleged increased risk of serious injury or death from wearing the defective vests in the future. Wooden, 247 F.3d at 1284. Accordingly, the individual Plaintiffs lack standing to bring Count Four's FDUTPA injunctive relief claim "in their own right," and the OSTA therefore lacks associational standing to assert the FDUTPA injunctive relief claim on behalf of its members. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102, 103, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983) ("[P]ast exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief ... if unaccompanied by any continuing, present adverse effects." (second alteration in original) (quotation omitted); see, e.g., Marty v. Anheuser-Busch Companies, LLC, 43 F.Supp.3d 1333, 1354 (S.D. Fla. 2014) (holding plaintiffs lacked standing to seek FDUTPA injunctive relief claim to enjoin defendant from "falsely" labelling its beer where plaintiffs did not allege that they still purchased the beer); Seidman v. Snack Factory, LLC, No. 14-62547-CIV, 2015 WL 1411878, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 26, 2015) ("[P]laintiff lacks standing to pursue the requested injunctive relief because he has not alleged intent to purchase Defendant's Pretzel Crisps in the future."); Coal. for Mercury-Free Drugs v. Sebelius, 671 F.3d 1275, 1280 (D.C. Cir. 2012) ("In light of plaintiffs' avowed intention to refuse thimerosal-preserved vaccines, plaintiffs cannot show that they face a `certainly impending,' or even likely, risk of future physical injury from thimerosal in vaccines."); Colley v. Procter & Gamble Co., No. 1:16-CV-918, 2016 WL 5791658, at *14 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 4, 2016) (holding plaintiffs lacked standing because "Plaintiffs are aware of their purported injuries and attribute those injuries to Old Spice deodorants, it is not plausible that Plaintiffs would purchase the product again."); Tomasino v. Estee Lauder Companies Inc., 44 F.Supp.3d 251, 256 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) ("While Tomasino suggests that she remains a potential Estee Lauder customer and is likely to be misled again ... she has not alleged a sufficient future injury to establish standing to assert her claims for injunctive relief because she has demonstrated that she is, in fact, unlikely to purchase ANR products again.").

The failure to plead a future injury is sufficient to conclude that the OSTA lacks associational standing to bring Count Four. However, even if the individual Plaintiffs had alleged that they continued to wear the vest, the alleged injury from wearing the defective vest is not "certainly impending." Clapper, 568 U.S. 398, 409, 133 S.Ct. 1138 ("Although imminence is concededly a somewhat elastic concept, it cannot be stretched beyond its purpose, which is to ensure that the alleged injury is not too speculative for Article III purposes—that the injury is certainly impending."). The Court finds the First Circuit's discussion in Kerin v. Titeflex Corp., 770 F.3d 978, 983 (1st Cir. 2014) illustrative. In Kerin, plaintiff alleged that the defendant's stainless steel tubing was defective in that it was subject to catching fire if it was struck by lightning, thereby increasing the plaintiffs risk of injury. 770 F.3d 978. The First Circuit explained that:

Id. at 983 (quoting Ctr. for Law & Educ. v. Dep't of Educ., 396 F.3d 1152, 1161 (D.C.Cir.2005)). In holding that the increased risk of injury from fire was too speculative to confer standing, the First Circuit held that while it "agree[d] with Kerin that the risked harm, if actualized, could be severe ... whether a risk is speculative also depends on the chances that the risked harm will occur." 770 F.3d at 983. The First Circuit explained that although the plaintiff cited to 141 instances of fires involving lightning and the tubing, he "failed to allege facts sufficient to even calculate or estimate the risk" because he did not allege any "information that would help [the First Circuit] make sense of this figure, like the frequency of lightning strikes, the proportion of homes struck by lightning, the relevant time frame, or the likelihood of lightning fires in homes without [the tubing]," and it was unclear that any actual injuries were caused by the tubing. Id. Lastly, the First Circuit noted that:

The same considerations are present here. The increased risk of "life-threatening injury" from wearing the defective vests is too abstract and speculative. Firstly, the "life-threatening injuries" themselves are indeterminate and given the variety of situations that police officers encounter, the failure of the vest could result in a multitude of possible injuries from minor to serious. Secondly, whether a "life-threatening" injury will occur depends on a number of external contingencies: it requires the individual Plaintiff to be in an armed conflict or similar situation where the vest failing would lead to an increased risk of serious injury, it requires the vest to fail in that situation, and it requires the injury to have resulted partly from the vest failure as opposed to the dangerous situation itself. As in Kerin the amended complaint lacks sufficient facts to enable the Court to calculate this risk, such as: how many OSTA members have been injured as a result of the defective vests failing, how many OSTA members wear the defective vests, how many of the OSTA's members' vests have failed, how frequently, and in what circumstances.10 Lastly, Defendant's SSBS vests are approved by the National Institute of Justice (the United States Department of Justice's development and evaluation agency), D.E. 122-4 ¶ 15, and "no SSBS vest has ever failed to stop a ballistic threat as far as PBE is aware." D.E. 125-1 at 3 (citing D.E. 125-3 ¶ 5). Thus, the increased risk of future injury is too speculative to be a "certainly impending" injury sufficient to confer standing for the injunctive relief claim. Clapper, 568 U.S. at 410, 133 S.Ct. 1138 (holding that threatened injury must be "certainly impending" and that plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge warrantless wiretapping because the actual injury would require a "highly attenuated chain of possibilities," including the plaintiffs' actual participation in a call that was wiretapped); Kerin, 770 F.3d 978; Gordon v. City of Moreno Valley, 687 F.Supp.2d 930, 937 (C.D. Cal. 2009) ("[C]laims that are deemed too speculative to support the injury component of standing often depend on a chain of speculative contingencies that must occur for the alleged injury to manifest itself.") (quotation omitted) (emphasis added); see also Georgine v. Amchem Prod., Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 636 (3d Cir. 1996) (Wellford, H., concurring), aff'd sub nom. Amchem Prod., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 117 S.Ct. 2231, 138 L.Ed.2d 689 (1997) ("Fear and apprehension about a possible future physical or medical consequence of exposure to asbestos is not enough to establish an injury in fact."); see also Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence v. Brownback, 110 F.Supp.3d 1086, 1093-94 (D. Kan. 2015); ("The Court cannot find that an increased risk of future gun violence in itself is a concrete and particularized injury ... For any particular individual, the likelihood of being injured in a shooting is remote, and the time when any such injury might occur is entirely uncertain.").

Accordingly, as no member of the OSTA has standing to bring the FDUTPA claim for injunctive relief in its own right, the OSTA does not have associational standing to bring Count Four on behalf of its members. Thus, both the IUPA and the OSTA lack both Article III standing and associational standing to bring Count Four's injunctive relief claim and it must be dismissed without prejudice.11

V. Conclusion

A. Claims Dismissed

As Plaintiffs lack standing to bring their class claims in Counts One, Two and Four of the amended complaint, the Court dismisses those claims without prejudice for lack of standing and denies Plaintiffs' Motion to Certify without prejudice. Cone Corp. v. Fla. Dep't of Transp., 921 F.2d 1190, 1203 n. 42 (11th Cir.1991) ("Because standing is jurisdictional, a dismissal for lack of standing has the same effect as a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1)."); Stalley ex rel. U.S. v. Orlando Reg'l Healthcare Sys., Inc., 524 F.3d 1229, 1232 (11th Cir. 2008) ("A dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is not a judgment on the merits and is entered without prejudice."); Vega v. T-Mobile USA, INC., 564 F.3d 1256, 1265 (11th Cir. 2009) ("For a district court to certify a class action, the named plaintiffs must have standing."); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494, 94 S.Ct. 669, 38 L.Ed.2d 674 (1974) ("[I]f none of the named plaintiffs purporting to represent a class establishes the requisite of a case or controversy with the defendants, none may seek relief on behalf of himself or any other member of the class.").

B. Remaining Claims and Jurisdiction

However, the individual Plaintiffs have standing to bring their breach of warranty claims in Counts One through Three and the FDUTPA damages claim in Count Four, arising out of their purchase of two models of Defendant's vests. Nevertheless, the Court does not have jurisdiction over these claims. In the amended complaint, Plaintiffs allege that the Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2) and that the amount in controversy exceeds $5,000,000. § 1332(d)(2) provides:

28 U.S.C. § 1332 (emphasis added).

As the Court has denied Plaintiffs' Motion to Certify without prejudice, the action is no longer a class action; it is a claim for breach of warranty and FDUTPA damages by three individual Plaintiffs. Accordingly, the Court no longer has jurisdiction over the action pursuant to § 1332(d)(2).

There are no other bases for the Court to exercise jurisdiction. Plaintiffs do not allege that the Court has "federal question" jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, nor are there any federal claims that would provide such jurisdiction. As to diversity jurisdiction under § 1332(a), complete diversity is present, but there is no plausible allegation in the amended complaint that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. The amended complaint's assertion that the amount in controversy exceeds $5,000,000 is plainly tied to Plaintiffs' allegation that the Court has jurisdiction pursuant to § 1332(d)(2). See D.E. 52 ¶ 10 ("This Court has original jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2). The matter in controversy, exclusive of interest and costs, exceeds the sum or value of $5,000,000 and is a class action with in excess of 100 class members ...."). Plaintiffs provide no other indication of the amount in controversy sought by the three individual Plaintiffs other than a claim that the average cost for each vest is $700. See D.E. 52 ¶ 66(D) ("[T]he amount which may be potentially recovered by individual members of the Class — up to approximately $700, representing the average purchase price of an SSBS Vest ...."). Accordingly, as Plaintiffs have not adequately pled that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, the Court lacks diversity jurisdiction. Lastly, the Court declines to entertain supplemental jurisdiction over the claims. See Raney v. Allstate Ins. Co., 370 F.3d 1086, 1089 (11th Cir.2004) (explaining that the Eleventh Circuit has "encouraged district courts to dismiss any remaining state claims when, as here, the federal claims have been dismissed prior to trial.") (per curiam). As the Court is "powerless to act beyond its statutory grant of subject matter jurisdiction," Smith v. GTE Corp., 236 F.3d 1292, 1299 (11th Cir. 2001), it must dismiss the action without prejudice. Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514, 126 S.Ct. 1235, 163 L.Ed.2d 1097 (2006) ("[W]hen a federal court concludes that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the complaint in its entirety."); Walewski v. Zenimax Media, Inc., 502 F. App'x 857, 862 (11th Cir. 2012) ("We affirm the dismissal on the grounds that absent certification as a class action, the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over [Plaintiff's] individual claim.") (per curiam); Karhu v. Vital Pharm., Inc., No. 13-60768-CIV-COHN, 2014 WL 1274119, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 27, 2014), aff'd, 621 F. App'x 945 (11th Cir. 2015) (dismissing case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under § 1332(d) after denying motion for class certification); Pop's Pancakes, Inc. v. NuCO2, Inc., 251 F.R.D. 677 (S.D.Fla.2008) (same). Therefore, the Court dismisses the action without prejudice.12 Accordingly, it is

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the action is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. It is further

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Clerk of Court SHALL administratively close this case. All future hearings are CANCELLED and all pending motions are DENIED AS MOOT.

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers, Miami, Florida, this 26th day of October, 2018.