ORDER

HARVEY E. SCHLESINGER, Senior District Judge.

I. Status

Plaintiff James Belton (Belton), an inmate of the Florida penal system who is proceeding in forma pauperis, initiated this action on August 6, 2012, by filing a pro se Civil Rights Complaint (Doc. 1) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Belton filed a First Amended Complaint for Money Damages (AC; Doc. 16) on August 11, 2014. In the Amended Complaint, Belton names the following individuals as Defendants in the action: (1) Dr. Long Duy Hoang, M.D.; (2) Dr. Miguel Gonzalez, M.D.; and (3) Nurse R. Fowler, Senior Licensed Practical Nurse.1 He asserts that Defendants Gonzalez and Hoang violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment when they delayed proper treatment for Tuberculosis (TB), and that Defendant Fowler "negligently permitted" him to be housed in general population in a particular dormitory where other inmates were infected with the TB virus. See AC at 4. As relief, Belton requests compensatory and punitive damages.

This cause is before the Court on Defendant Fowler's Motion for Summary Judgment (Motion; Doc. 57), filed September 30, 2015.2 The Court advised Plaintiff of the provisions of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, notified him that the granting of a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment would represent a final adjudication of this case which may foreclose subsequent litigation on the matter, and gave him an opportunity to respond to the Motion. See Order of Special Appointment; Directing Service of Process Upon Defendants; Notice to Plaintiff (Doc. 17); Orders (Docs. 52, 65, 67). Plaintiff has responded. See Plaintiff's Motion in Opposition to Defendant's Summary Judgment (Response; Doc. 60); Sworn Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 69). Thus, Defendant's Motion is ripe for judicial review.

II. Summary Judgment Standard

Under Rule 56(a), "[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." The record to be considered on a motion for summary judgment may include "depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials[.]" Rule 56(c)(1)(A).3 "An issue of fact is material if, under the applicable substantive law, it might affect the outcome of the case[,] and "[a]n issue of fact is genuine if the record taken as a whole could lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party." Harrison v. Culliver, 746 F.3d 1288, 1298 (11th Cir. 2014) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of demonstrating to the court, by reference to the record, that there are no genuine issues of material fact that should be decided at trial. Hickson Corp. v. N. Crossarm Co., 357 F.3d 1256, 1260 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). "When a moving party has discharged its burden, the non-moving party must then go beyond the pleadings, and by its own affidavits, or by depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Jeffery v. Sarasota White Sox, Inc., 64 F.3d 590, 593-94 (11th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). "[A] mere scintilla of evidence in support of the non-moving party's position is insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment." Kesinger ex rel. Estate of Kesinger v. Herrington, 381 F.3d 1243, 1247 (11th Cir. 2004). Substantive law determines the materiality of facts, and "[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, a court "must view all evidence and make all reasonable inferences in favor of the party opposing summary judgment." Haves v. City of Miami, 52 F.3d 918, 921 (11th Cir. 1995) (citing Dibrell Bros. Int'l, S.A. v. Banca Nazionale Del Lavoro, 38 F.3d 1571, 1578 (11th Cir. 1994) (per curiam)).

III. Plaintiff's Allegations

According to Plaintiff, the following facts support his Eighth Amendment claim of deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. He asserts that the Florida Department of Corrections (FDOC) housed him in C dormitory at Columbia Correctional Institution (CCI) for twelve to fifteen months. See AC at 5, ¶ 1.4 On April 16, 2009, the FDOC moved him from C dormitory to an administrative confinement dormitory. See id. The confinement orderly told Plaintiff that C dormitory where he had been housed was infected with the TB virus, and that all inmates in C dormitory were being inoculated. See id. at ¶ 2. Plaintiff immediately wrote the medical clinic to request that testing and inoculation for the TB virus, but received no response. See id. at ¶ 3. When Plaintiff saw the confinement nurse, he explained that he wanted to be tested and inoculated since he had been housed in C dormitory. See id. Shortly thereafter, he was given a skin test with negative results. See id. at ¶ 4. On May 8, 2009, Dr. Nguyen ordered a chest X-ray (performed on May 11, 2009), which was also negative for the TB virus. See id. Despite these findings, Plaintiff complained of symptoms, but medical personnel advised him to visit sick call if his symptoms continued. See id. at ¶ 5.

Upon Plaintiff's release from administrative confinement on May 18, 2009, his symptoms continued, including loss of appetite and weight, vomiting, fatigue, fever, chest pains, pale skin, chills, night sweats, stomach cramps, shortness of breath, dizziness, black-outs, and coughing up blood. See id. at 5, ¶ 6. On May 26, 2009, Plaintiff sought medical assistance through sick call. See id. at ¶ 7. He reported that he was unable to eat the food served in the chow hall; he found that most foods were basically intolerable with the exception of Ramen noodle soups in the canteen since he was able to drink them. See id.

Dr. Gonzalez placed Plaintiff on a high-caloric diet and advised him to consume more food. See id. at ¶ 8. According to Plaintiff, his condition worsened and was readily apparent due to his dramatic weight loss. See id. at ¶ 9. On several occasions, he visited the infirmary with a high fever, was given Tylenol, and then released back into general population. See id. at ¶ 10. On one occasion, when he passed out, he was placed under observation for twenty minutes, and then sent back to general population. See id

On June 16, 2009,5 Dr. Hoang transferred Plaintiff, who was in the CCI infirmary, to the Reception and Medical Center (RMC) for an upper abdominal sonogram. See id. at 6, ¶ 12. After the sonogram (which was negative), the FDOC returned Plaintiff to the CCI infirmary. See id. at ¶ 13. On June 17, 2009, the nurse was instructed to contact RMC and arrange to transfer Plaintiff if his condition did not improve. See id. When his condition did not improve, the FDOC transferred him to a specialist at RMC and admitted him to the RMC infirmary. See id. at ¶ 14.

On June 25, 2009, after a computerized axial tomography (CAT) scan of Plaintiff's chest at RMC, Plaintiff was diagnosed with Miliary Tuberculosis. See id. at ¶ 15. On July 8 and 13, 2009, at Memorial Hospital Jacksonville, Plaintiff underwent two surgical procedures in order to remove the TB virus from his system. See id. at 7, ¶ 17. Thereafter, Plaintiff completed a lengthy medication regimen, which caused some discomfort and tingling in his extremities. See id. at ¶ 18. According to Plaintiff, the Defendant(s) knew that all of the inmates, including Plaintiff, who had been housed in C dormitory had been exposed to the TB virus by being housed with the alleged infected inmate. Id. at ¶ 19. However, the Defendant(s) "chose to merely monitor or even ignore at times" Plaintiff's "worsening and deteriorating condition" before finally transferring him to a specialist at RMC. Id.

IV. Defendant Fowler's Motion for Summary Judgment

Defendant Fowler asserts that there are no genuine issues of material fact in dispute, and therefore requests that summary judgment be entered in her favor. Defendant Fowler argues that summary judgment is appropriate because none of Plaintiff's assertions show that Fowler subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment in that: (1) Plaintiff fails to establish an Eighth Amendment violation against Defendant Fowler for failure to protect Plaintiff from contracting TB, see Motion at 9-14; (2) a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for failure to protect cannot be based on hearsay, rumor, and innuendo, see id. at 15-17; (3) since Plaintiff contracted an atypical TB strain found generally in the everyday environment, Plaintiff cannot state a claim of deliberate indifference for failure to protect under § 1983 because of a lack of causation, see id. at 17-19; (4) even to the extent that Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Fowler was responsible for delaying his TB diagnosis, Plaintiff does not state a sufficient claim for § 1983 relief, see id. at 19-20; and (5) Defendant Fowler is entitled to immunity pursuant to Florida Statutes § 768.28(9) to the extent that Plaintiff asserts a state law claim for negligence.

In support of Fowler's Motion, she submitted the following exhibits: Def. Exs. A, Declaration of Nurse Raycendia Oden (formally Fowler) (Fowler's Declaration); A-1, excerpts of Belton's medical records (filed under seal, see Order, Doc. 61); B, excerpt of Plaintiff's Deposition (Belton's Deposition), dated June 30, 2015; C, Declaration of Dr. Albert Carl Maier, M.D. (Maier's Declaration), dated September 29, 2015; D, excerpts of Belton's medical records (filed under seal, see Doc. 61).

V. Plaintiff's Responses

In Plaintiff's Response (Doc. 60), he asserted that he needed more time for discovery. On January 13, 2016, the Court denied Plaintiff's request to reopen discovery, but granted him until February 17, 2016, to file a supplemental response to Defendant Fowler's Motion. See Order (Doc. 65) at 5; Order (Doc. 67) (granting him until March 9, 2016, to file a supplemental response). On March 10, 2016, Plaintiff requested an additional fifteen days or until March 23, 2016, to file a supplemental response. See Plaintiff's Motion for Extension of Time (Doc. 68). On March 25, 2016, Plaintiff filed a Sworn Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 69); Declaration of James Belton (Belton's Declaration; Doc. 70), dated March 2, 2016; Declaration of Percival Charles Ferris, Jr., Inmate No. 142336 (Ferris's Declaration; Doc. 71), dated March 11, 2016; and Declaration of Herman Wallace, Inmate No. 476821 (Wallace's Declaration; Doc. 72), dated March 20, 2016.

VI. Law and Conclusions

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant deprived him of a right secured under the United States Constitution or federal law, and (2) such deprivation occurred under color of state law. Salvato v. Miley, 790 F.3d 1286, 1295 (11th Cir. 2015); Bingham v. Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171, 1175 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (citation omitted); Richardson v. Johnson, 598 F.3d 734, 737 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (citations omitted). Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit "`requires proof of an affirmative causal connection between the official's acts or omissions and the alleged constitutional deprivation' in § 1983 cases." Rodriguez v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., 508 F.3d 611, 625 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Zatler v. Wainwright, 802 F.2d 397, 401 (11th Cir. 1986)). More than conclusory and vague allegations are required to state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See L.S.T., Inc., v. Crow, 49 F.3d 679, 684 (11th Cir. 1995) (per curiam); Fullman, 739 F.2d 553, 556-57 (11th Cir. 1984). "Moreover, `conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of facts, or legal conclusions masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal.'" Rehberger v. Henry Ctv., Ga., 577 F. App'x 937, 938 (11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (citation omitted). In the absence of a federal constitutional deprivation or violation of a federal right, Plaintiff cannot sustain a cause of action against Defendant Fowler.

The Eleventh Circuit has explained the requirements for an Eighth Amendment violation.

Thomas v. Bryant, 614 F.3d 1288, 1306-07 (11th Cir. 2010).

"To show that a prison official acted with deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, a plaintiff must satisfy both an objective and a subjective inquiry." Brown v. Johnson, 387 F.3d 1344, 1351 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235, 1243 (11th Cir. 2003)). First, the plaintiff must satisfy the objective component by showing that he had a serious medical need. Goebert v. Lee Cty., 510 F.3d 1312, 1326 (11th Cir. 2007). Next, the plaintiff must satisfy the subjective component, which requires the plaintiff to "allege that the prison official, at a minimum, acted with a state of mind that constituted deliberate indifference." Richardson, 598 F.3d at 737; Valderrama v. Rousseau, 780 F.3d 1108, 1116 (11th Cir. 2015) (setting forth the components of deliberate indifference as (1) the official "was aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists," (2) the official "actually drew that inference," (3) the official "disregarded the risk of serious harm," and (4) the official's "conduct amounted to more than gross negligence.") (citation omitted).

The following material facts are undisputed. On April 15, 2009, the FDOC provided Plaintiff with a "Tuberculosis Symptom Questionnaire for Inmates" prior to his pre-confinement medical examination the following day, April 16th. See Maier's Declaration at 1, ¶ 3 (citing Def. Ex. D at 1-2). According to Dr. Maier, "Belton reported having no TB symptoms on the form." See id. However, according to Nurse K. Grega, Plaintiff reported only one symptom related to his stamina. Def. Ex. D at 1-2. On April 16, 2009, Plaintiff was provided a pre-special housing health assessment before he was placed in administrative confinement. See Maier's Declaration at 1, ¶ 3 (citing Def. Ex. D at 3).

On April 30, 2009, a nurse saw Plaintiff in the medical clinic for loss of weight and appetite. See id. at 2, ¶ 4 (citing Def. Ex. D at 6). On May 8, 2009, Plaintiff underwent an x-ray, which gave negative results. See id. (citing Def. Ex. D at 9). That same day, Plaintiff provided a sputum sample, which tested negative for Mycobacterium TB on May 11, 2009. See id. (citing Def. Ex. D at 8).

On May 26, 2009, Dr. Hoang saw Plaintiff in the medical clinic for complaints of weight loss and difficulty swallowing solid foods. See id. at ¶ 5 (citing Def. Ex. D at 12-13). Dr. Hoang treated Plaintiff for indigestion with abdominal pain and gave him Colace and Zantac. See id. According to Dr. Maier, difficulty swallowing is not a symptom of TB, and weight loss alone would be an insufficient basis for a consideration of TB clinically, "although if accompanied by other complaints might rise to the level of suspicion." See id.

On May 29, 2009, Dr. Gonzalez saw Plaintiff in the medical clinic for complaints of a 101-degree temperature, dizziness, weight loss, and shortness of breath. See id. at ¶ 6 (citing Def. Ex. D at 15-16). Dr. Gonzalez treated Plaintiff for dizziness, weight loss, and mild shortness of breath and gave him Colace, Zantac, and antibiotics for an H. Pylori9 gastrointestinal infection and instructed Plaintiff to return to the clinic if his symptoms persisted. See id.

On June 1, 2009, Plaintiff returned to the medical clinic for laboratory tests due to complaints of weight loss. See id. at ¶ 7 (citing Def. Ex. D at 16). Dr. Gonzalez diagnosed Plaintiff with anemia and placed him on a 4,000-calorie diet and prescribed Folic Acid to be taken twice a day for ninety days. See id. On June 3, 2009, the medical staff admitted Plaintiff to the infirmary for observation for two to three hours for complaints of a low grade fever and weakness; the attending nurse gave him Tylenol and Milk of Magnesium and instructed him about the necessity of fluids. See id. at ¶ 8 (citing Def. Ex. D at 17-19). Nurse K. Grega noted that Plaintiff had a negative TB test one month before on May 8, 2009. See id. (citing Def. Ex. D at 18-19). After observation, the staff released him. See id. The next day, on June 4, 2009, Dr. Hoang saw Plaintiff for his complaints of weakness and a low grade fever. See id. at ¶ 9 (citing Def. Ex. D at 20-22). Plaintiff was provided Tylenol and fluid administration, and Nurse K. Grega assisted with the abdominal pain assessment. See id.

On June 11, 2009, Dr. Hoang saw Plaintiff again for a fever, abdominal pain, weight loss, and some cramping. See id. at ¶ 10 (citing Def. Ex. D at 24-25). The medical staff admitted Plaintiff to the infirmary for observation for twenty-three hours and provided Tylenol, medication for a bacterial infection, and a liquid diet. See id. (citing Def. Ex. D at 25). The next day, on June 12, 2009, Dr. Hoang noted that Plaintiff was "doing fine and eating well." See id. at ¶ 11 (citing Def. Ex. D at 26-27). Dr. Hoang checked Plaintiff's gallbladder and documented that he was waiting for blood test results. See id. Plaintiff was released from the infirmary. See id. On June 13, 2009, Plaintiff returned to the medical clinic with complaints of dizziness and black-outs. See id. at ¶ 12 (citing Def. Ex. D at 27-28). The medical staff observed him for twenty minutes in the infirmary and provided hydration and Tylenol, and then released him. See id.

On June 16, 2009, the medical staff sent Plaintiff to RMC's radiology department for an X-ray procedure. See id. at 3, ¶ 13 (citing Def. Ex. D at 29-30). Upon Plaintiff's return to CCI later that day, Dr. Hoang placed him on a twenty-three-hour observation in the infirmary and provided Motrin and antibiotics. See id. On June 17, 2009, Dr. Hoang diagnosed Plaintiff with possible active interstitial pulmonary disease and considerable pericardial effusion. See id. at ¶ 14 (citing Def. Ex. D at 30-31). According to Dr. Maier, Dr. Hoang transferred Plaintiff to RMC due to Plaintiff's pulmonary issues. See id.

On June 18, 2009, Plaintiff was admitted to RMC. See at ¶ 15 (citing Def. Ex. D at 34). According to Dr. Maier, the "medical record reports no surgery at any time was performed on [Plaintiff]." See id. While at Memorial Hospital in Jacksonville, Florida, Plaintiff underwent a bronchoscopic inspection10 on July 8, 2009, followed by a mediastinoscopy11 on July 13, 2009, to secure fluid and tissue isolates to allow a thorough examination of the state of his disease. See id. (citing Def. Ex. D at 36-37). Dr. Maier explains that "[b]oth would have required brief general anesthesia and the mediastinal procedure, in addition would require a small access incision in the anterior neck which [Plaintiff] may be interpreting as `surgery.'" See id at ¶ 15.

First, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Fowler should have: (1) isolated the infected inmate in C dormitory so that Plaintiff and other inmates would not have been exposed to the TB virus, and (2) timely recognized Plaintiff's "obvious symptoms" and referred him to a specialist at RMC for proper medical care and treatment. See AC at 6-7, ¶¶ 16, 19. Undoubtedly, failure to protect an inmate from exposure to TB may be grounds for a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action based on deliberate indifference. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994) (holding that prison officials can only be held liable where an inmate can show that officials knew of and consciously disregarded an excessive risk to the prisoner's health). The Eleventh Circuit has stated:

Brooks v. Warden, 800 F.3d 1295, 1301 (11th Cir. 2015); Ivory v. Warden, Governor of Ala., 600 F. App'x 670, 677-78 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (stating that, even if plaintiff had established an excessive risk to inmate health or safety, liability cannot be imposed solely because of the presence of objectively inhumane prison conditions; plaintiff has not alleged any specific facts or produced any evidence indicating that the named defendants subjectively knew of and disregarded a substantial risk so as to make out an Eighth Amendment claim) (quotations and citations omitted).13

In the instant action, Plaintiff fails to establish that Defendant Fowler knew of an infected inmate who had active TB and who needed to be isolated from other inmates and that she failed to isolate that allegedly infected inmate from Plaintiff. At Plaintiff's deposition, he acknowledged that he did not know whether or not Defendant Fowler was specially tasked with the testing and handling of TB patients. See Plaintiff's Deposition at 24, lines 21-25; 25, line 1.

Defendant Fowler, in her Declaration, avers that she was not the infectious disease nurse in April and May of 2009 when the alleged instance of deliberate indifference occurred. See Fowler's Declaration at 1, ¶ 5. She explains that it is the infectious disease nurse's role to monitor inmates who may pose a medical threat to inmates and staff. See id. As such, the infectious disease nurse is also responsible for "administrative aspects of assessing any alleged tuberculosis outbreak, completing requisite DOC documents, and reporting cases to the Department of Health." See id. at 1-2, ¶ 5. Consistent with Defendant Fowler's assertion, Dr. Maier states that FDOC records show that Fowler obtained her certificate in infectious control in November 2011. See Dr. Maier's Declaration at 4, ¶ 20. Therefore, Fowler could not have been the infectious disease nurse at the time of the alleged events because such "specialized training is mandatory before a nurse may serve as the infectious disease nurse" at any FDOC institution. See id

Insofar as Plaintiff asserts that Fowler should have identified a TB infected prisoner during her regular nursing duties, he fails to demonstrate that Fowler knew of any inmate with active TB that needed to be isolated to prevent any alleged exposure to active TB. Defendant Fowler states that, if she had suspected that a prisoner had active TB, she would have notified the doctor so that those medical professionals responsible for identifying inmates with active TB could take appropriate action. See Fowler's Declaration at 2, ¶ 5.

Morever, Plaintiff fails to demonstrate any causal connection between any action on the part of Defendant Fowler and Plaintiff being exposed to an inmate with active TB. As previously stated, the Eleventh Circuit "`requires proof of an affirmative causal connection between the official's acts or omissions and the alleged constitutional deprivation' in § 1983 cases." Rodriquez, 508 F.3d at 625. At Plaintiff's deposition, when asked why he believed Fowler should have protected him from contracting TB, Plaintiff was unable to state facts demonstrating that Fowler knew of any inmate who posed a serious risk of harm to Plaintiff's health and that she disregarded that risk thereby leading to his contracting TB. At his deposition, Plaintiff asserted that Defendant Fowler was liable under § 1983 because, when he declared a medical emergency in May 2009 and told her that he suspected he had TB, she examined him, determined that the visit was not an emergency, and then directed him to follow the routine sick call procedure. The following deposition excerpts reflect the basis upon which Plaintiff holds Fowler responsible for violation of his federal constitutional rights.

Plaintiff's Deposition at 23-26 (emphasis added).

Plaintiff names Nurse Fowler as a Defendant because she allegedly determined that his declaration of a medical emergency in late May of 2009 did not qualify as an emergency, and therefore advised him to seek medical attention through the FDOC's sick call procedures. See Belton's Declaration ("Without evaluating me[,] Nurse Fowler told me that I had no medical emergency, and that to sig[n] up for sick call."); Wallace's Declaration ("I was in the classification/medical lobby when James Belton came to medical on a medical emergency" and "I witnessed Nurse Fowler" tell Belton to sign up for sick call.). To the extent that Fowler may have told Plaintiff that his needs were not of an emergency nature, she exercised her own medical judgment in referring him to follow-up through the FDOC's routine sick call procedure. According to Plaintiff, he followed Nurse Fowler's advice and requested medical attention through routine channels. See AC at 5, ¶ 7. At most, the summary judgment evidence indicates that Defendant Fowler and Plaintiff disagreed regarding the best wayWha to treat Plaintiff's medical needs and the urgency of those needs. Indeed, a difference in medical opinion between medical personnel and the inmate as to the diagnosis or course of treatment is insufficient to support an Eighth Amendment claim. Harris v. Thicpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1505 (11th Cir. 1991); see Coker v. Corizon Medical Services, Inc., No. 15-11414, 2016 WL 909365, at *1 (11th Cir. Mar. 10, 2016) (per curiam) (citation omitted).

To the extent that Plaintiff complains about Fowler's negligent acts or unprofessional conduct, the law is well settled that the United States Constitution is not implicated by the negligent acts of prison officials or FDOC employees. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1986); Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 348 (1986) ("As we held in Daniels, the protections of the Due Process Clause, whether procedural or substantive, are just not triggered by lack of due care by prison officials."). While Plaintiff's allegations may suggest medical malpractice, "[a]ccidents, mistakes, negligence, and medical malpractice are not constitutional violation[s] merely because the victim is a prisoner.'" Harris v. Coweta Cty., 21 F.3d 388, 393 (11th Cir. 1994) (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106). Consequently, any allegedly negligent conduct of which Belton complains does not rise to the level of a federal constitutional violation and provides no basis for relief in this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action.

Moreover, the medical records refute Plaintiff's assertion that he saw Defendant Fowler in the medical department in late May of 2009. As explained by Defendant Fowler, if she had examined Plaintiff in the medical department, she would have documented the visit in his medical record. See Fowler's Declaration at 2, ¶ 6. The medical records are devoid of any entry showing the alleged visit. See id. at ¶¶ 6, 7 (citing Def. Ex. A-1 at 1-19); see also Belton's Declaration (stating that Fowler never evaluated him, but just told him to sign up for sick call); Wallace's Declaration (witnessing Belton in the classification/medical lobby). The medical records show that Plaintiff did not have contact with Defendant Fowler concerning his medical care until September 2009, after he was already diagnosed and receiving TB treatment. See Fowler's Declaration at 2, ¶ 7 (citing Def. Ex. A-1 at 20-21). At most, Defendant Fowler merely told Plaintiff that he needed to use the routine sick call procedure, which he did. Therefore, Plaintiff has neither shown that Fowler failed to protect him nor that she was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs.

Plaintiff also fails to demonstrate sufficient facts that he was subjected to an inmate with an active case of TB and that even if he had been, that the risk was ignored or that the response was reckless. Plaintiff acknowledged that he did not have any personal knowledge of any inmate with active TB; instead, it appears that his allegations are based on mere rumor or conjecture. Belton's Deposition at 10-14. Dr. Maier explains that his research indicates that there was no dormitory-wide distribution of TB treatment at CCI between April 2009 and June 2009. See Maier's Declaration at 4, ¶ 19; see also Ferris's Declaration (explaining that he and other inmates were "tested by what is called a skin pop test"). Dr. Maier further avers that Plaintiff was the only instance of a confirmed case of M. Abscessus TB that was reported to the Department of Health in 2009. See id.

Even assuming that Plaintiff was exposed to an inmate who had active typical TB, he has not shown an affirmative causal connection between Defendant Fowler's actions or omissions and the alleged federal constitutional deprivation. Upon a review of Plaintiff's medical records documenting the medical care and treatment provided for the relevant time period at CCI and RMC, Dr. Maier avers, in pertinent part:

Maier's Declaration at 3, ¶¶ 17-18 (emphasis added and enumeration omitted).

To the extent that Fowler's action may have delayed Plaintiff's diagnosis and treatment, the delay was not violative of his federal constitutional rights. Dr. Maier opined:

Maier's Declaration at 3, ¶ 16 (emphasis added and enumeration omitted). Moreover, the medical records and Defendant Fowler's averments in her Declaration show that she did not participate in his care until September 2009, well after Plaintiff was diagnosed and started treatment.

Plaintiff states that Dr. Gonzalez and Dr. Hoang, based on their unprofessional comments, "believed" that Plaintiff was "faking the illness." AC at 6, ¶ 11. As to any alleged verbal abuse or unprofessional remarks by Defendant Fowler, see Belton's Declaration (referring to Fowler's "very bad mood"), such allegations do not state a claim of federal constitutional dimension. See Hernandez v. Fla. Dep't of Corr., 281 F. App'x 862, 866 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (citation omitted).

McFadden v. Lucas, 713 F.2d 143, 146 (5th Cir. 1983); Bismark v. Fisher, 213 F.App'x 892, 897 (11th Cir. 2007) ("[I]t is not a violation of the Eighth Amendment for a prison physician to consult with a prisoner concerning a medical condition in an aloof or unfriendly way. Much more is required.") (citation and footnote omitted).

Finally, under 28 U.S.C. 1367(a), a district court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims related to the federal court action. Since Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim has not survived the summary judgment stage, this Court will not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claim, see AC at 3-4.18 See 28 U.S.C. 1367(c)(3) (stating that the district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under 1367(a) when the court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction).

In sum, Plaintiff fails to establish a genuine issue of material fact pertinent to the care he received from Defendant Fowler relating to his above-described medical complaints. The evidence does not provide a basis upon which a jury could find that Defendant Fowler deviated from the standard of care applicable to a deliberate indifference claim. Therefore, Defendant Fowler is entitled to summary judgment on her behalf, and her Motion for Summary Judgment is due to be granted.

Therefore, it is now

ORDERED:

1. Plaintiff's Motion for Extension of Time (Doc. 68) is GRANTED, and his Sworn Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 69), Declaration of James Belton (Doc. 70), Declaration of Percival Charles Ferris (Doc. 71), and Declaration of Herman Wallace (Doc. 72) are accepted as timely filed.

2. Defendant Fowler's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 57), filed September 30, 2015, is GRANTED.

3. The Clerk shall correct the docket to reflect Belton's correct inmate number: J00248.

4. The Clerk shall enter judgment in favor of Defendant Fowler.

5. The Clerk shall close the case.

DONE AND ORDERED.