ORDER

ROY B. DALTON, Jr., District Judge.

This cause is before the Court on the following:

Upon consideration, the Court finds that the motion is due to be granted in part and denied in part.

BACKGROUND

After several rounds of inadequate pleadings, Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed the Third Amended Complaint, alleging one count of "National Origin and Religion Discrimination." (Doc. 23.) Plaintiff, an Arab and a Muslim, worked for Defendant on a temporary basis from November 2009 through June 2010. (Id. ¶ 1.) He claims that during that period, he was subject to unwelcome comments based on his national origin and religion. (Id. ¶¶ 4, 9.)

About two years after Plaintiff's temporary term of employment ended, he went to a job fair hosted by Defendant to seek another job. (Id. ¶ 27.) At the fair, Plaintiff stood in line to apply for the position of Resource Room Technician, for which he claims he was well-qualified. (Id. ¶¶ 36, 42.) Another job seeker, an African-American, stood behind Plaintiff in line. (Id. ¶ 44.) Plaintiff alleges that while he was standing in line, one of the recruiter's colleagues, an African-American, whispered something to the recruiter. (Id. ¶ 37.) The recruiter then took a cursory look at Plaintiff's resume, set it aside, and asked him to come back later. (Id. ¶ 43.) The recruiter proceeded to hire the African-American job seeker standing directly behind Plaintiff in line. (Id. ¶ 44.) When Plaintiff returned, he was told that there were no more open positions. (Id. ¶ 46.)

A few months later, Plaintiff filed an EEOC charge against Defendant, complaining of Defendant's failure to hire him at the job fair. (Id. ¶ 22; see also Doc. 31, pp. 13-15.) The charge did not mention any alleged discrimination during Plaintiff's previous employment with Defendant. (See Doc. 31, pp. 14-15.) The EEOC found that it was "unable to conclude" that Plaintiff's allegations established a statutory violation. (Id. at 13.)

Plaintiff then initiated this case. (Docs. 1, 23.) Defendant moved to dismiss. (Doc. 31.) Plaintiff responded. (Doc. 40.) This matter is now ripe for the Court's adjudication.

STANDARDS

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) provides that a claimant must plead "a short and plain statement of the claim." On a motion to dismiss, the Court limits its consideration to "the well-pleaded factual allegations, documents central to or referenced in the complaint, and matters judicially noticed."1 La Grasta v. First Union Sec., Inc., 358 F.3d 840, 845 (11th Cir. 2004). The factual allegations in the complaint must "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). In making this plausibility determination, the Court must accept the factual allegations as true; however, this "tenet . . . is inapplicable to legal conclusions." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A pleading that offers mere "labels and conclusions" is therefore insufficient. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

DISCUSSION

Despite multiple opportunities, Plaintiff's claims are inartfully pled. Nevertheless, the Court discerns that Plaintiff is complaining of two separate instances of discrimination: the unwelcome comments he received during his employment and the failure to hire him during the job fair.2

As to the unwelcome comments during Plaintiff's initial term of employment, Defendant argues that claims based on that conduct are barred because Plaintiff failed to timely file an EEOC charge about the comments. (Doc. 31, p. 5.) The Court agrees. "[A]s a condition precedent to filing a [discrimination] law suit an individual must exhaust his administrative remedies by filing a charge of unlawful discrimination with the EEOC." Giles v. BellSouth Tellecomms., Inc., 542 F. App'x 756, 758 (11th Cir. 2013). A plaintiff is not permitted to raise "new acts of discrimination" in the lawsuit that he has not administratively exhausted in the EEOC charge. See id. at 759 ("Because [the plaintiff's] hostile workplace claim is a `new act of discrimination' not exhausted in his administrative charge, [the plaintiff] was barred from raising the claim in his complaint."). As the only claim raised in the instant EEOC charge was disparate treatment in hiring, all of Plaintiff's other claims are barred for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.3

As to Defendant's failure to hire Plaintiff at the job fair, the Court finds that Plaintiff has adequately pled a claim for discrimination based on a theory of disparate treatment. The elements of that claim are: (1) the plaintiff is a member of a protected class; (2) he was qualified for the position; (3) he suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) he was replaced by a person outside his protected class or treated less favorably than a similarly situated comparator outside his protected class. Maynard v. Bd. of Regents, 342 F.3d 1281, 1289 (11th Cir. 2003). Here, Plaintiff has alleged that: (1) he is an Arab and a Muslim; (2) he was well-qualified for the position for which he applied; (3) he was not hired for the position; and (4) a person outside of his protected class was hired instead. (Doc. 23, ¶¶ 36-44.) That is all that is required at this early stage of the proceedings. Therefore, this claim—and only this claim—may proceed.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:

3. The motion is GRANTED in all other respects. All of Plaintiff's other claims, including those based on a theory of hostile work environment during Plaintiff's employment and those based on retaliation, are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

DONE AND ORDERED.