OPINION AND ORDER

GREGORY K. FRIZZELL, CHIEF JUDGE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT.

In the early twentieth century, large quantities of oil and gas were discovered on lands belonging to the Osage Nation. Shortly thereafter, Congress enacted the Osage Allotment Act of 1906, see Act of June 28, 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-321, 34 Stat. 539 ("Osage Allotment Act" or "1906 Act"), which severed the mineral estate underlying Osage lands from the surface estate, placed the mineral estate in trust, and directed the Secretary of Interior to collect and distribute royalty income every quarter to persons on the 1906 tribal membership roll. The right to receive such royalty payments is called a "headright."

The sole remaining claim in this long-running case concerns the federal government's duty to account to individual Osage headright owners. Certified as a class in 2014, plaintiffs are Osage Indians who receive headright payments pursuant to the 1906 Act. They brought this claim pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq., against the United States of America, the Department of Interior, Sally Jewell in her official capacity as Secretary of the Interior, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and Kevin Washburn in his official capacity as Assistant Secretary of the Interior-Indian Affairs (collectively, "the government"), seeking an accounting of tribal trust funds held on their behalf. In particular, plaintiffs request an accounting of the Osage tribal trust account — an account within the United States Treasury which holds Osage royalty income prior to its distribution to the headright owners. In response, the government maintains that the account at issue is held in trust for the Osage Nation only and that, as such, plaintiffs are not entitled to the accounting they seek. For the reasons stated in this Opinion and Order, the court holds that the plaintiffs are entitled to accounting of the Osage tribal trust account in accordance with the requirements set forth herein.

I. Background

"In 1872, Congress established a reservation for the Osage Nation in present day Oklahoma." Osage Nation v. Irby, 597 F.3d 1117, 1120 (10th Cir.2010) (citing Act of June 5, 1872, ch. 310, 17 Stat. 228). In 1904 and 1905, large quantities of oil and gas were discovered on the reservation. See Cohen's Handbook of Federal Indian Law § 4.07[1][d][ii], at 311 (Neal Jessup et al., eds., 2005) [hereinafter, "Cohen's Handbook"]. To manage the Osages' newfound wealth, Congress enacted the Osage Allotment Act which, as previously mentioned, placed the mineral estate underlying Osage lands in trust, directed the Secretary of Interior to collect royalty income, and required the Secretary to distribute such income (with interest) to tribal members on a quarterly, pro rata basis. See 1906 Act, § 4.1 The government's trusteeship over the Osage mineral estate was originally set to last twenty-five years, see 1906 Act §§ 3, 4, but has since been extended "in perpetuity," see Pub. L. No. 95-496, § 2(a), 92 Stat. 1660 (1978).

As previously mentioned, the right to receive quarterly trust distributions is referred to as a "headright." Taylor v. Tayrien, 51 F.2d 884, 886 (10th Cir.1931). Under the 1906 Act, there are 2,229 headrights — one for each person on the 1906 tribal membership roll. See Big Eagle v. United States, 300 F.2d 765, 765 (Ct.Cl.1962); see also 1906 Act §§ 1, 4. Today, "[m]ost persons of Osage Indian ancestry own no headrights, and thus receive no tribal income. Some persons own more than one headright, or own fractional shares of headrights, and some headrights are owned by non-Osages." Cohen's Handbook, supra, at 313. "This fractionalization is a result of succession to headrights by inheritance and devise. Succession by non-Indians is now severely limited, but during earlier periods there were fewer restrictions." Id. at 313 n.873 (citation omitted).

Prior to distribution, royalty income collected under the 1906 Act is held in a U.S. Treasury account, titled the Osage tribal trust account. The tribal trust account "was established by the 1906 Act," Osage Tribe of Indians of Okla. v. United States, 81 Fed.Cl. 340, 348 (2008), and is the means by which the government carries out its duties to collect, hold, and distribute funds pursuant thereto, [see Dkt. #1212-1, Administrative Record, p. 2]. Although some distributions from this account are made by direct check to headright owners, the vast majority are done via transfers to Individual Indian Money ("IIM") accounts. An IIM account is "an interest bearing account for trust funds held by the Secretary that belong to a person who has an interest in trust assets." 25 C.F.R. § 115.002. Unless restricted in some way, an account holder may freely withdraw funds from his or her IIM account. See id.

II. Procedural History

This case has a long and complicated history. Originally filed in 2002 as a dispute over the tribal voting rights of non-headright-owning Osage Indians [see Dkt. #1, p. 6], the case later evolved into an action over the government's allegedly wrongful distribution of Osage royalty income to non-Osages and its failure to account to the headright owners, [see Dkt. #985-1, pp. 27-31, 33]. Today, however, plaintiffs' only remaining claim is their request for an accounting.

Plaintiffs first asserted their accounting claim in 2006, as part of their First Amended Complaint. [See Dkt. #24, pp. 9, 11]. In May 2011, after litigating issues related to plaintiffs' other causes of action, the government moved to dismiss this claim along with, what was then, the plaintiffs' Third Amended Complaint.2 [Dkt. #1126]. As to the accounting claim, the government argued that dismissal was warranted because (1) there was no trust relationship between the federal government and headright owners and (2) the statutes on which plaintiffs relied did not afford them the right to an accounting. [Id. at 8-12].

This court rejected the government's first argument, but accepted its second. As an initial matter, the court concluded that the 1906 Act created a limited trust relationship between the federal government and the Osage headright owners but that this relationship "differ[ed] from the trust relationship between the federal government and the Osage Nation." [Dkt. #1162, p. 10 n.6]. Specifically, the court determined that the government's trust relationship with the Osage headright owners only took effect upon distribution and that, prior to distribution, royalty funds were held in trust for the Osage Nation only. [See id. at 10 n.6, 11, 13]. Based on this limited trust relationship, the court held that plaintiffs could not seek an accounting:

[Id. at 12-14 (footnotes omitted) ].

On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed. It agreed with this court's holding that the 1906 Act creates a trust relationship between the federal government and the individual Osage headright owners but rejected this court's determination that plaintiffs could not seek an accounting under 25 U.S.C. § 4011(a):

Fletcher v. United States, 730 F.3d 1206, 1209-10 (10th Cir.2013) (hereinafter, Fletcher II) (alternation in original) (emphasis in original).

The court of appeals rejected this court's interpretation of § 4011(a) as limiting the government's accounting responsibilities to funds which are deposited or invested. "[Section] 162a(a) through (c)," the court explained, "speak to the Secretary's investment options, not to the nature of scope of the Secretary's accounting obligations." Id. at 1212. In other words, nothing in § 162a limits the Secretary's fiduciary obligations to the Osage headright owners, "let alone circumscribe[s] the accounting promised by § 4011(a)." Id. at 1211. The court stressed that its understanding of the statute was informed not only by its text and structure, but also by its overarching purpose:

Id. at 1212-13.

Although not an issue on appeal, the circuit court's opinion did offer guidance as to what the government must do to discharge its accounting duty. It emphasized that this court has "considerable discretion to mould the nature and scope of the accounting" that is due and that the court "must seek to balance ... considerations of completeness and transparency on the one hand, and speed, practicality, and cost, on the other." Id. at 1214 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court of appeals concluded by noting the possibility that the government could discharge its accounting duty by providing the headright owners with the same accounting it had provided the tribe. See id. at 1215-16 ("It may very well be within the district court's considerable discretion simply to order the government to share with the plaintiffs something like it has already shared with the Nation.").3

On remand, the government submitted an administrative record containing, among other documents, statements from the IIM accounts for plaintiffs William Fletcher and Charles Pratt from 2006 to 2013 as well as redacted monthly statements of the Osage tribal trust account for that same period. Since the Tenth Circuit's remand, the court has received two rounds of briefing on the scope of the government's accounting duty and, on October 23, 2015, held its final hearing on the merits.

III. Discussion

As previously mentioned, plaintiffs brought this case pursuant to the APA. "Under the APA, [this court] cannot set aside an agency decision unless it fails to meet statutory, procedural or constitutional requirements, or unless it is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." Sac & Fox Nation of Missouri v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1250, 1260 (10th Cir.2001).

The parties' briefs raise three issues for consideration. First, the parties disagree over whether the plaintiffs are entitled to an accounting of the Osage tribal trust account (as plaintiffs contend) or are limited to an accounting of their respective IIM accounts (as the government contends). Second, assuming plaintiffs are entitled to an accounting of the tribal trust account, the government submits that the Osage Nation waived the headright owners' rights to seek such an accounting based on the tribe's settlement agreement with the federal government in the Court of Federal Claims. Finally, assuming that plaintiffs are not barred from seeking an accounting, the court must determine the scope of the accounting that is due. The court addresses these issues in turn.

A. Determining the Relevant Account

Fletcher II clearly dictates that plaintiffs are entitled to an accounting. On remand, the parties disagree over whether this means an accounting of the Osage tribal trust account or the plaintiffs' respective IIM accounts. For their part, plaintiffs request an accounting of the tribal trust account which, they contend, holds funds on their behalf pursuant to the 1906 Act. The government disputes this assertion. It contends that funds while in the tribal trust account are held in trust solely for the Osage Nation and that it is only upon distribution that those funds are held for the benefit of the headright owners. Consequently, in the government's view, only the Osage Nation may seek an accounting of the tribal trust account, whereas plaintiffs are merely entitled to an accounting of their respective IIM accounts.

Although the Tenth Circuit's opinion does not specifically address this issue, its analysis suggests a clear result. "[T]he 1906 Act creates a trust relationship running directly between the government and individual Osage headright owners...." Fletcher II, 730 F.3d at 1213. The plaintiffs' right to an accounting arises from the application of 25 U.S.C. § 4011(a) to this trust relationship.4 See id. at 1209-10, 1213. Under § 4011(a), the government must account "to the tribe when ... funds are held for its benefit and to the individual tribal members when ... funds are held for their benefit." Id. at 1209 (alterations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). As the court's opinion makes clear, funds "collected and disbursed under the terms of the 1906 Act ... are ... held for the benefit of individual members of the Osage Nation." Id. at 1209-10. Put differently, "the 1906 Act requires the Secretary to hold Osage mineral wealth in trust for individual Osage headright owners." Id. at 1213 (emphasis in original). Accordingly, under § 4011(a), plaintiffs are entitled to an accounting of funds "collected and disbursed under the terms of the 1906 Act." See id. at 1209-10.

The Osage tribal trust account fits this description.5 The tribal trust account "was established by the 1906 Act," Osage Tribe, 81 Fed.Cl. at 348, and is the means by which the government carries out its duties to collect, hold, and distribute funds pursuant thereto, [see Dkt. #1212-1, Administrative Record, p. 2 ("[P]ursuant to the 1906 Act the revenues from the Osage Mineral Estate are ... placed in the Osage Tribal Trust Account.... [P]ursuant to the 1906 Act the revenues in the Osage Tribal Trust Account are ... distributed to the Headright Holders.") ]. No other account exists to carry out these functions. [See Dkt. #1266, Defendants' Brief, p. 7 ("[T]here is just one tribal trust account related to this case, and funds are segregated from this account when they are distributed to the headright holders on a quarterly basis." (internal quotation marks omitted)) ]. Thus, it necessarily follows that plaintiffs are entitled to an accounting of the tribal trust account.

The government's alternative proposal is unpersuasive. First, the 1906 Act does not say anything about IIM accounts. Nothing in the Act contemplates or requires the existence of such an account, nor does the Act impose any management obligations on the government after trust distributions are made. As just mentioned, plaintiffs' right to an accounting arises from the application of § 4011(a) to the trust relationship created under the 1906 Act. See Fletcher II, 730 F.3d at 1209-10, 1213. It thus makes little sense to say that this right applies only to accounts having nothing to do with the 1906 Act.6

Second, the government's position here merely revives an argument that the Tenth Circuit has already considered and rejected. In the government's view, only the Osage Nation may seek an accounting of the tribal trust account because, while in that account, funds are held in trust for the Osage Nation only. The Tenth Circuit rejected this same argument in Fletcher II:

Id. at 1213 (emphasis in original). As this analysis makes clear, plaintiffs and the Osage Nation are entitled to the same accounting privileges. Both derive their accounting rights from the same combination of § 4011(a) and the 1906 Act. See id. at 1209 (noting that the 1906 Act "creates a trust relationship [both] ... between the federal government and the Osage Nation, [as well as] ... between the federal government and the individual Osage headright owners who are plaintiffs in this case"). Nothing in these provisions, or the Tenth Circuit's opinion, suggests that plaintiffs and the tribe stand on a different footing in this regard or that somehow their respective accounting rights differ.7 See id. at 1213. Indeed, the Tenth Circuit held exactly the opposite, see id., at one point even suggesting that the court could resolve this matter simply by ordering the government to provide plaintiffs with the same accounting it had given the tribe, see id. at 1215-16.

Finally, the government's contention fails for the basic reason that leaves the headright owners with an "almost useless" accounting right. See id. at 1213. Fletcher II rejected any interpretation of § 4011(a) or the 1906 Act that would render "pointless" the accounting received by the individual Osage headright owners. See id. at 1212. In particular, the court rejected the idea that "the government's accounting obligations extend only to trust fund deposits but not withdrawals." Id. "Half of an accounting," the circuit court reasoned, "may be closer to no accounting at all." Id.

Here, if this court were to follow the government's approach, the individual Osage headright owners would only be entitled to a summary of their respective IIM account statements. Such a right is virtually pointless. As a practical matter, IIM accounts are nothing more than a conduit for facilitating trust distributions to the headright owners. See Cobell v. Kempthorne, 532 F.Supp.2d 37, 39-40 (D.D.C. 2008) (noting that "IIM accounts exist to receive [trust] income ... and then to distribute it to account holders when account balances reach a certain threshold (usually fifteen dollars)"), vacated on other grounds by 573 F.3d 808 (D.C.Cir.2009); 25 C.F.R. § 115.002 (noting that an IIM account holder with an unrestricted account "may determine the timing and amount of disbursement from the account"). Funds deposited in such accounts generally are disbursed (via check or direct deposit) as soon as they are received. [See, e.g., Dkt. #1212-3, Administrative Record, p. 77 (showing that headright income deposited in Charles Pratt's IIM account was paid to him by check on the same day it was received)].8 Thus, the accounting proposed by the government often will accomplish nothing more than telling each plaintiff the dollar amount of his or her quarterly distribution. Such an accounting gives plaintiffs no meaningful way of determining whether the government has paid them the correct amount or whether it has mismanaged funds prior to distribution.9 In short, limiting plaintiffs to an accounting of their respective IIM accounts results in the same "useless halfway measure" that the court roundly rejected in Fletcher II.

For the foregoing reasons, the court concludes that plaintiffs are entitled to an accounting of the Osage tribal trust account.

B. Effect of Osage Nation Settlement Agreement

The court next considers whether the Osage Nation's settlement agreement with the federal government bars plaintiffs from seeking an accounting of the Osage tribal trust account. In March 2000, the Osage Nation filed a lawsuit against the United States in the Court of Federal Claims, alleging that the government had failed to collect and invest Osage royalty income in breach of its duties under the 1906 Act. In November 2011, the tribe and the federal government settled the case for $380 million. As part of the settlement agreement, the Osage Nation, "on behalf of itself and the Headright Holders" waived "all claims regarding the United States' obligation to provide a historical accounting or reconciliation of the Osage Tribal Trust Account." [Dkt. #1212-1, p. 11].

Based on this language, the government asserts, as an affirmative defense, that plaintiffs are barred from seeking an accounting of the tribal trust account. In response, plaintiffs submit that they were not a party to the settlement agreement at issue and that the Osage Nation has no authority to settle accounting claims on their behalf.10 Although the settlement agreement states that the Osage Nation "has the authority to act for ... and to bind Headright Holders with respect to matters relating to the Osage Mineral Estate," [id. at 2], the government here offers no evidence or authority to substantiate this assertion. Rather, the government contends that to the extent plaintiffs wish to challenge the effect of the settlement agreement, they must first join the Osage Nation as a necessary and indispensable party under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19.

The court starts with the government's Rule 19 argument. That provision reads, in relevant part, as follows:

Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)-(b). "Rule 19 provides a three-step process for determining whether an action should be dismissed for failure to join a purportedly indispensable party. First, the court must determine whether the absent person is `necessary.'... If the absent person is necessary, the court must then determine whether joinder is `feasible.'" Citizen Potawatomi Nation v. Norton, 248 F.3d 993, 997 (10th Cir.) opinion modified on reh'g, 257 F.3d 1158 (10th Cir.2001) (citations omitted). "Finally, if joinder is not feasible, the court must decide whether the absent person is `indispensable'...." Id. Here, joinder of the Osage Nation is not feasible because the Nation possesses sovereign immunity. See id. Accordingly, the court will consider whether the tribe is necessary and, if so, whether it is also indispensable.

Starting with Rule 19(a), the government does not offer any explanation as to why the Osage Nation is a necessary party. The tribe certainly is not needed to "accord complete relief among [the] existing parties." Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1)(A). Plaintiffs are seeking a historical accounting of the Osage tribal trust account. The Osage Nation has already waived its right to seek such an accounting. A decision that plaintiffs are not bound by the tribe's settlement agreement with the federal government accords them all the relief they have requested. The opposite conclusion results in dismissal. In either event, complete relief is accorded.

As for the latter joinder provision, the Osage Nation does not appear to have an interest in this litigation. This case is about plaintiffs' accounting rights, not the tribe's. Providing plaintiffs with an accounting in no way undermines or affects the Osage Nation's separate right to an accounting. Based on the record before the court, it appears that the only possible tribal interest at stake in this litigation is the Osage Nation's interest in enforcing the waiver provisions of its settlement agreement against the headright owners. It, however, is by no means clear that the tribe would even claim such an interest. As the government itself acknowledges, the headright owners were included in the waiver provision at issue "in a belt and suspenders manner." [Dkt. #1279, p. 52]. Moreover, it is unclear what the Osage Nation would lose if this provision were found to be unenforceable against the headright owners. Finally, even if claimed, such an interest appears entirely baseless. See Citizen Potawatomi Nation, 248 F.3d at 998 (noting that "Rule 19 excludes ... `claimed interests that are patently frivolous'" (emphasis omitted) (quoting Davis v. United States, 192 F.3d 951, 959 (10th Cir.1999)). As Fletcher II makes clear, § 4011(a) grants both the Osage Nation and the headright owners the right to an accounting of funds held under the 1906 Act. See 730 F.3d at 1209. Nothing in this statutory scheme allows the tribe to waive the separate accounting rights of the headright owners, nor does any provision of the Osage Constitution purport to grant such authority. Accordingly, the court concludes that the Osage Nation is not a necessary party under Rule 19(a)(1).

In any event, even if the Osage Nation were a necessary party, it certainly is not indispensable. In making this determination, the court must consider the four factors set forth in Rule 19(b). As to the first factor, even if the Osage Nation could claim an interest in enforcing its settlement agreement against the headright owners, "the potential of prejudice to that interest is offset in large part by the fact that the [government's] interests in defending [the settlement agreement] is substantially similar, if not virtually identical, to those of the [Osage] Tribe."11 Sac & Fox Nation of Missouri v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1250, 1260 (10th Cir.2001). Further, "[b]ecause the potential for prejudice is minimal, `[the court] need not be concerned with the second factor, which addresses the availability of means for lessening or avoiding prejudice.'" Id. at 1260 (quoting Rishell v. Jane Phillips Episcopal Med'l Med. Ctr., 94 F.3d 1407, 1412 (10th Cir. 1996)).

Turning to the third factor, the court must consider "whether a judgment rendered in the [tribe's] absence would be adequate." Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(b)(3). This "factor is intended to address the adequacy of the dispute's resolution. The concern underlying this factor is not the plaintiff's interest but that of the courts and the public in complete, consistent, and efficient settlement of controversies, that is, the public stake in settling disputes by wholes, whenever possible." Davis ex rel. Davis v. United States, 343 F.3d 1282, 1293 (10th Cir.2003) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, it is difficult to see how a judgment rendered in the Osage Nation's absence would be any less adequate than a judgment rendered with the tribe as a party. As previously mentioned, this case involves a dispute over the plaintiffs' accounting rights. Because the Osage Nation has already waived its own separate accounting right, the risk that a judgment rendered in the tribe's absence would generate further litigation appears minimal. Accordingly, this factor also weighs against dismissal.

Finally, the court must consider "whether the plaintiff[s] would have an adequate remedy if the action were dismissed for nonjoinder." Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(b)(4). Here, there does not appear to be any alternative forum in which the plaintiffs could pursue their accounting claims if this case were dismissed. The government does not offer any argument to the contrary. Thus, this final factor also weighs against dismissal. In sum, all of the Rule 19(b) factors favor allowing this case to proceed among the existing parties. Accordingly, the court holds that the Osage Nation is neither necessary nor indispensable under Rule 19.

Turning to the merits, the court finds no evidence or authority to support the government's contention that plaintiffs are bound by the Osage Nation's purported waiver of their accounting rights. As previously mentioned, § 4011(a) grants both the Osage Nation and the headright owners the right to an accounting of funds held on their behalf under the 1906 Act. See Fletcher II, 730 F.3d at 1209. Nothing in these provisions, or any other statute cited by the parties, gives the tribe authority to waive the individual accounting rights of the headright owners. The government contends that the tribe possesses such authority as the "elected representative" of the headright owners, [Dkt. #1279, Oct. 2014 Hearing Transcript, p. 86], but nothing in the Osage Constitution purports to confer such authority, see Osage Nation Const. art. 15. Further, even if it did, such a grant would conflict with — and thus be preempted by — federal law, which assigns separate accounting rights to the plaintiffs and the tribe. See Winton v. Amos, 255 U.S. 373, 391, 41 S.Ct. 342, 65 L.Ed. 684 (1921) ("Congress has plenary authority over the Indians and all their tribal relations, and full power to legislate concerning their tribal property."); N.L.R.B. v. Pueblo of San Juan, 276 F.3d 1186, 1191 (10th Cir.2002) ("Congress in the exercise of its plenary power over Indian affairs may divest Indian tribes of their inherent sovereign authority.").

The individual Osage headright owners were not a party to the settlement agreement at issue. Indeed, the Court of Federal Claims denied them the opportunity to intervene in the case. See Osage Tribe, 85 Fed.Cl. at 166-79. Because the Osage Nation lacks authority to waive the plaintiffs' individual accounting rights, they are not bound by the tribe's settlement agreement with the federal government.

C. Scope of the Accounting Due

Having concluded that plaintiffs are entitled to an accounting of the Osage tribal trust account, the court must determine the specific parameters of the accounting that is due. Although this was not an issue on appeal, the Tenth Circuit's opinion in Fletcher II offers useful guidance. As the court of appeals explained, plaintiffs are entitled to an accounting with "some degree of information about both receipts and disbursement," but it need not involve "[a] green eye-shade death march through every line of every account over the last one hundred years." Fletcher II, 730 F.3d at 1214. Rather, this "court may focus the inquiry on ways designed to get plaintiffs what they need most without imposing gratuitous costs on the government." Id. In doing so, the court "must seek to balance the often warring (and admittedly incommensurate) considerations of completeness and transparency, on the one hand, and speed, practicality, and cost, on the other." Id. From these principles, it logically follows that plaintiffs

Id. at 1215 (alterations omitted) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

With this guidance in mind, the court turns to the specifics of plaintiffs' request. The plaintiffs' stated purpose for seeking an accounting is to obtain information that will enable them to prove that the government has paid headright distributions to ineligible recipients and, in that way, improperly diminished their pro rata share.12 Neither party, however, has provided the court with a specific accounting proposal reasonably calculated to get at this information without imposing gratuitous costs on the public fisc. The government's briefs do not address the issue, and the plaintiffs' proposals are either overly broad or so generalized as to be unhelpful.

Adding to the difficulty, the nature and scope of the accounting sought by the plaintiffs has expanded dramatically over time. Originally, plaintiffs only requested an accounting of trust distributions going back to 2002.13 They now seek an accounting of both receipts and distributions going back one-hundred and nine (109) years, to 1906. [See Dkt. #1262, Plaintiffs' Brief, p. 12, 16]. Further, their most recent request for trust receipts is not limited to information about the amount and source of money coming into the account, but rather includes such detailed information as the volume of oil and gas sold, the unit price, and the amount of mineral acreage that is not currently generating income. [See Dkt. #1262-1, Affidavit of S. Christopher Lopp, pp. 7-9; Dkt. #1279, Oct. 2015 Hearing Transcript, pp. 73-74].14 In short, the scope of the accounting requested by the plaintiffs has grown over the course of this litigation to a point where it is now almost completely unmoored from the original purpose for which the accounting was sought.15

The circumstances here do not warrant an accounting so broad. Having considered the plaintiffs' stated purpose for seeking an accounting along with the Tenth Circuit's guidance on the issue, the court concludes that an accounting running from 2002 to the most recent quarter strikes the appropriate balance in this case. An accounting spanning this period accords with plaintiffs' prior requests and gives "plaintiffs what they need most without imposing gratuitous costs on the government." Fletcher II, 730 F.3d at 1214. Although plaintiffs now demand an accounting reaching back to 1906, they have not explained why such information is needed to pursue their misdistribution claim. Plaintiffs may hope to use such information to trace the transfer of headrights over time. [Cf. Dkt. #231, Sept. 2009 Hearing Transcript, p. 22 (noting that plaintiffs are seeking an accounting "to be able to tell when a particular headright may have been transferred") ]. To the extent that this is their objective, the ends do not justify the cost and burden on the government. The likelihood that plaintiffs will be able to successfully attack these transfers in such a way as to meaningfully increase their beneficial interest is remote.16 See Fletcher II, 730 F.3d at 1215 (noting that plaintiffs "are not entitled to information that only loosely relates to their own personal beneficial interests, or to information that is unlikely (because it is so old, or so de minimis, say) to have a meaningful effect on their beneficial interests"); cf. Alan Newman et al., The Law of Trusts and Trustees § 962 (3d ed. 2010) (stating that a trustee's duty to comply with a beneficiary's request for information about the trust "is subject to several limitations," including that "the duty extends only to information requests that are reasonable"). Given the time and costs involved with producing a one-hundred-and-nine-year-long accounting, the court concludes that it would be inequitable to order such relief for the purpose of pursing a claim with such a slight chance of success.

As for content, the court holds that the accounting must include a description of each receipt and distribution for the relevant accounting period. In particular, the accounting must include the following information: the date and dollar amount of each receipt and distribution; a brief description of the source of each trust receipt; the name of the beneficiary to whom each trust distribution was made; for headright distributions, the respective headright share of each headright owner at the time of distribution; and finally the amount of interest income generated from the tribal trust account and the date at which such interest was credited to the account.17

The accounting set forth above provides plaintiffs with sufficient information to pursue their misdistribution claim and to enforce their rights under the 1906 Act.18 It allows the plaintiffs to check the government's math, and gives them "some sense of where money has come from and gone to." Fletcher II, 730 F.3d at 1215. Most importantly, such an accounting strikes an even balance between the "considerations of completeness and transparency, on the one hand, and speed, practicality, and cost, on the other." Id. at 1214.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the government provide plaintiffs with an accounting of the Osage tribal trust account in accordance with the following requirements:

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, in accordance with the parties' earlier agreement, all documents, data, and other material obtained pursuant to this accounting shall be considered confidential and subject to the protective order previously entered in this case on August 30, 2006 [see Dkt. #52].

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the government's Motion to Strike Extra-Record Material [Dkt. #1265] is granted in part and denied in part. The motion is granted to the extent the government requests that the court not rely on the extra-record material contained in Dkt. #1262-1 as evidence, but denied to the extent it request that the document be stricken entirely. See supra note 14.