ORDER

CHRISTOPHER C. CONNER, Chief District Judge.

AND NOW, this 15th day of August, 2016, upon consideration of the motion (Doc. 15) to remand the above-captioned matter to the Court of Common Pleas of Bradford County, Pennsylvania, filed by plaintiff the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania ("the Commonwealth"), and of the supporting and opposing briefs (Docs. 16, 26, 28) submitted in connection therewith,1 wherein the parties dispute whether the Commonwealth's second amended complaint ("SAC") provides a basis for this court's original jurisdiction, see 28 U.S.C. § 1331, by reason of the Commonwealth's references to the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, and the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45, within its Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law ("UTPCPL") claim ("Count III"), (see Doc. 16-2 ¶ 230),2 and the court observing that a state cause of action may "arise under" federal law when a federal issue is "(1) necessarily raised; (2) actually disputed; (3) substantial;" and (4) not disruptive of the federal-state balance if resolved in federal court, see Gunn v. Minton, 133 S.Ct. 1059, 1065 (2013) (citing Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 314 (2005)), that the removing party bears the burden of showing federal jurisdiction is proper, see Manning v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc., 772 F.3d 158, 162 (3d Cir. 2014), and that a court must resolve all doubts "in favor of remand," id., and the court noting that the Commonwealth "expressly . . . disavow[s]" any potential federal claim and pleads that its action is brought "exclusively under the common law and statutes of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania," (Doc. 16-2 ¶ 14) (emphasis added), and that the Commonwealth clarifies that it refers to federal law in Count III merely by "analogy" and for "persuasive value only" as federal jurisprudence relating to the applicable statutory provisions furnishes nonbinding guidance for state courts as to what may constitute a violation under the UTPCPL, (see Doc.16 at 16-18); see also Commonwealth, by Creamer v. Monumental Props., Inc., 329 A.2d 812, 817-18 (Pa. 1974), and the court finding that the Commonwealth may, as master of its complaint, elect to so constrain its own action and leave to the state court the determination of the vitality of its state law theories, cf. Byrd v. Frost, No. 08-4949, 2008 WL 5412088, at *4 n.3 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 29, 2008); In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 166 F.Supp.2d 740, 751 (E.D. N.Y. 2001); Greer v. MAJR Fin. Corp., 105 F.Supp.2d 583, 588, 591-94 (S.D. Miss. 2000), and the court concluding that in light of the Commonwealth's disavowal the SAC does not "necessarily raise[]" a federal issue, Gunn, 133 S. Ct. at 1065, and that the court therefore lacks jurisdiction, see Manning, 772 F.3d at 163, and further upon consideration of the Commonwealth's motion (Doc. 19) for costs and fees, and the court finding that defendants' removal did not "lack[] an objectively reasonable basis," Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 141 (2005); see also In re Processed Egg Prods. Antitrust Litig., 836 F.Supp.2d 290, 302-03 (E.D. Pa. 2011), and that an award of costs and fees is thus unwarranted, see Martin, 546 U.S. at 141, it is hereby ORDERED that: