BENJAMIN H. SETTLE, District Judge.
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant National Railroad Passenger Corporation d/b/a Amtrak's ("Amtrak") motion for a mistrial.
During discovery, Dr. Richard Seroussi ("Seroussi") produced a report on Plaintiff Aaron Harris's ("Harris") tramatic brain injury, left thoracic injury, and left shoulder injury. In relevant part, Seroussi "defer[red] giving a long-term prognosis for [Harris's] traumatic brain injury." Seroussi also opined that Harris probably had more serious injuries to his chest and shoulder than could be diagnosed with clinical evaluation at that time. He recommended Harris obtain additional, more in-depth tests and evaluation to monitor his progress with the diagnosed injuries.
On September 5, 2019, Harris called Seroussi to opine on the diagnosis and treatment of Harris's injuries. In relevant part, Seroussi testified as follows:
On cross examination, Amtrak asked Seroussi when he evaluated Harris as follows:
Amtrak objected on the basis that it did not receive a report of the most recent examination. After a brief discussion, Amtrak moved on to another subject with the understanding that the issue would be addressed at the next break in trial. Amtrak finished cross before the next break. Harris then started redirect. In relevant part, Seroussi testified as follows:
At this point Amtrak objected and moved to strike the testimony arguing that the opinion was not properly disclosed. The Court excused the jury and heard argument of counsel. As part of that argument, both counsel and the Court asked Seroussi questions about his opinions as follows:
After this testimony and argument, the Court took the afternoon recess and allowed Harris an opportunity to identify support in the record for the proposition that Seroussi's opinions were previously disclosed to Amtrak and were not based on his examination the day before trial. When the proceeding resumed, the Court agreed with Amtrak that Seroussi's testimony must be struck in some way because Seroussi testified as to Harris's injuries up to trial. The Court offered Amtrak the opportunity to explore whether Seroussi's opinion were based on reading other expert's opinions or whether it was based on the pretrial exam of Harris. Amtrak objected arguing that there was no way to unring the bell as to the most recent exam. Harris's counsel then inquired what could be used to bolster Seroussi's testimony. That led to an exchange as follows:
After this exchange, the Court called a recess for the day and requested additional briefing on this issue from the parties. On September 6, 2019, the parties filed supplemental briefs. Dkts. 103, 104. Amtrak argued that mistrial is the only remedy. Dkt. 103. Harris argued that Amtrak did not timely object and that Seroussi disclosed the permanency of Harris's brain injury during discovery. Dkt. 104. Upon review of the briefs and the transcript, the Court concluded that Amtrak's objection was timely and that it could not fashion an appropriate curative or limiting instruction to cure the problem with Seroussi's testimony. The Court then informed the parties that it would recess to allow the parties an opportunity to craft an appropriate instruction and expressed its position that, for various reasons, it was in both party's interest to work out a solution instead of a mistrial. The Court also stated that, if a mistrial was declared, then a written order would follow.
After an approximately one-hour recess, Harris and Amtrak could not agree to a solution. Although a mistrial was not formally declared on the record, the Court advised the parties that failure to reach an agreement would result in a mistrial. Thus, the Court severed the Harris case and trial proceeded with the other plaintiffs.
"Generally, when evidence is heard by the jury that is subsequently ruled inadmissible, or is applicable only to limited [parties] or in a limited manner, a cautionary instruction from the judge is sufficient to cure any prejudice to the defendant." United States v. Escalante, 637 F.2d 1197, 1202-03 (9th Cir. 1980). "This procedure is the preferred alternative to declaring mistrial . . .; mistrial is appropriate only where there has been so much prejudice that an instruction is unlikely to cure it." Id. at 1203.
In this case, the Court found that Amtrak had suffered such prejudice that it was unlikely to be cured. Although initially it seemed to be a matter of conveying to the jury that Seroussi's testimony could not apply up to his last exam on the day before trial, the Court's further evaluation of the transcript established that Seroussi repeatedly testified regarding the current state of Harris's injuries. Harris argues that this is not error or prejudicial to Amtrak because Seroussi disclosed Harris's permanent brain injury during discovery months before trial. Dkt. 104 at 6-11. But, if Seroussi "had already reached [that] opinion before [the Labor Day] meeting," Id. at 9, there would be no need for the Labor Day examination. Moreover, Seroussi could have disclosed all of these facts on direct instead of remaining silent on the matter. Instead, Seroussi provided on direct that Harris had "not made any significant improvement in the last year." Seroussi did not qualify this statement as to which injury or, by stating last year, whether he meant as of the last report that Seroussi read. While this is the most blatant testimony that relied on his Labor Day exam, review of the transcript establishes numerous occasions where his testimony reasonably conveyed an opinion as to Harris's injuries up until the point of his testimony. Even if Seroussi did not intend to convey such opinions as to timing of his prognosis, it became apparent or at least confusing as to timing when he testified that he examined Harris the day before trial. Thus, the Court rejects Harris's argument that Seroussi's opinion as to permanency given at this deposition solves the identified problems with the Labor Day exam.
Regarding a cure for this prejudice, the Court gave due consideration to a curative instruction and allowed the parties an opportunity to provide such an instruction. Neither the Court nor Harris was able to fashion a cure. Therefore, the Court severed Harris from the consolidated trial and now declares a mistrial on the Harris case as the only appropriate option. Escalante, 637 F.2d at 1202-03.
Regarding the timing of the objection, Harris argues that Amtrak waived its objection by failing to timely object. Dkt. 104 at 6 (citing Waitek v. Dalkon Shield Claimants Tr., 934 F.Supp. 1068, 1082 (N.D. Iowa 1996), aff'd, 114 F.3d 117 (8th Cir. 1997); McKnight By & Through Ludwig v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 36 F.3d 1396, 1408 (8th Cir. 1994)). Immediately after Seroussi testified that he conducted an exam on Labor Day, Amtrak objected on the basis of not receiving a report of this examination. The Court stated that the issue would be taken up after the break, and Amtrak agreed to move on. Amtrak then completed cross examination stating that it had nothing further at that time. On redirect, Harris asked Seroussi questions regarding the permanency of Harris's injury and minimizing any reliance on the Labor Day exam. Amtrak objected on multiple occasions, and the Court finally concluded that a recess was necessary. Trial did not resume until after the Court severed the Harris case from the consolidated trial. Under this factual scenario, the Court concludes that Amtrak's objection and motion for a mistrial was timely. The cases Harris cites are distinguishable on the basis that the objecting party did not present the objection while the witness was still on the stand. See Waitek, 934 F. Supp. at 1082 (objection "made at the close of plaintiffs' case"); McKnight, 36 F.3d at 1408 (objection made at the conclusion of the testimony and in a motion for a new trial). Therefore, the Court concludes that Harris has failed to establish that Amtrak's objection was untimely.
In sum, the Court