JONATHAN GOODMAN, Magistrate Judge.
U.S. District Court Judge Joan A. Lenard referred to the Undersigned, based on the parties' consent [ECF Nos. 26; 94; 213], Claimant Jean Combe-Fritz's ("Claimant") Motion to Obtain Deposition or Exclude Testimony of Customs and Border Protection Witnesses [ECF No. 159]. The Undersigned has reviewed the Motion, the United States' (the "Government") response in opposition [ECF No. 175], and the Claimant's reply in support of his Motion [ECF No. 186]. For the reasons outlined below, the Undersigned
In his Motion, Claimant requests either a court order requiring the Government to produce four Custom and Border Protection ("CBP") witnesses (the "CBP Witnesses")
Claimant attached deposition notices for each of these persons to his Motion. In each case, the certificate of service states that the deposition notice was served on August 5, 2014, and that the deposition would occur on either August 14, 2014 or August 15, 2014. [ECF Nos 159-1, p. 3; 159-2, p. 3; 159-3, p. 3; 159-4, p. 3]. By email dated August 8, 2014, Government counsel notified Claimant's counsel that she would not produce the CBP Witnesses for deposition at the noticed dates and times because she would "not have enough time to prepare." [ECF No. 159-5, p. 1 (emphasis in original)]. Government counsel noted that she would need to review each deponent's testimony, decide whether to assert one of three potentially applicable executive privileges, and then formally assert that privilege if necessary. [Id.]. She also stated that Claimant's counsel still would have time to take the depositions of the CBP Witnesses, presumably for a date and time before the discovery cutoff, but with sufficient notice to allow Government counsel to adequately prepare for the depositions. [Id.].
Per email communications attached to Claimant's reply brief, it appears that the parties then discussed the timing of the CBP Witness depositions, and Claimant agreed to postpone them to a date and time to be determined later. [ECF Nos. 175-1; 175-2]. Claimant suggested at that time that the depositions could occur in late September, after the discovery cutoff. [Id.]. It appears that both parties, at that time, anticipated that this case would either be dismissed or that the fact discovery cutoff would be extended. [ECF No. 186-2]. Fact discovery was extended twice in this case, first to August 18, 2014 [ECF No. 47], and then to September 1, 2014 [ECF No. 105] — but it was not extended again. Needless to say, the depositions never occurred.
Claimant's Motion essentially argues that just because the Government did not have adequate time to prepare these witnesses for deposition, the Government "is not entitled to sandbag Claimant by denying him an opportunity to examine the Government's chief witnesses prior to trial." [ECF No. 159, p. 2]. However, it should be noted that Claimant has not pointed to any evidence that he attempted to later reschedule these depositions or that the Government prevented him from doing so. Instead, he simply allowed the issue to lapse.
"Motions in limine are disfavored; admissibility questions should be ruled upon as they arise at trial." Begualg Inv. Mgt., Inc. v. Four Seasons Hotel Ltd., 10-22153-CIV, 2013 WL 750309, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 27, 2013) (internal citation omitted). "`A court should exclude evidence in limine only when it is clearly inadmissible on all potential grounds.'" Id. (quoting United States v. Gonzalez, 718 F.Supp.2d 1341, 1345 (S.D. Fla. 2010)). Simply because a motion in limine is denied, does not mean that the information at issue in the motion will be admitted at trial. Biscayne Cove Condo. Ass'n Inc. v. QBE Ins. Corp., 10-23728-CIV, 2013 WL 2646828, at *3 (S.D. Fla. June 12, 2013) (internal citation omitted). Instead, denial of a motion in limine "means the Court cannot make the decision about the admissibility of the evidence outside the context of trial." Id. (internal citation omitted).
The Motion at issue here is denied. Claimant's failure to take the depositions of the CBP Witnesses is not grounds for precluding these persons from appearing at trial. The Government has described these persons as "chief witnesses" and Claimant has no one to blame but himself for his failure to take their depositions. [ECF No. 158, p. 2].
Claimant knew about all four CBP Witnesses well in advance of the discovery deadline in this case, as evidenced by his "deposition notices" sent to Government counsel on August 5, 2014.
Claimant's argument that the Government "is not entitled to sandbag [him] by denying him an opportunity to examine the Government's chief witnesses prior to trial," is not well taken. [ECF No. 159, p. 2]. The Government never denied Claimant the opportunity to take the depositions of the CBP Witnesses, it only requested more time to prepare for those depositions, and Claimant agreed to that request. Claimant could have, and indeed should have, re-noticed these depositions for a later time within the discovery period. Claimant's failure to timely take depositions of witnesses under these circumstances is certainly not grounds to grant a motion in limine and exclude the testimony.
Alternatively, Claimant requests leave to take the depositions of the CBP Witnesses now, five months after the close of discovery, and on the eve of trial. The District Court has noted twice in this case that it extends pretrial deadlines only "in the rarest of circumstances such as an interlocutory appeal." [ECF Nos. 93; 137]. Claimant's failure to timely obtain deposition testimony, particularly the testimony of the CBP Witnesses, whose identity Claimant knew well in advance of the discovery deadlines, does not come close to meeting this standard. The Undersigned therefore