ORDER

ROY B. DALTON, Jr., District Judge.

This cause is before the Court on the following matters:

BACKGROUND1

This insurance bad faith action is currently set to be retried during the August trial term. (See Doc. 297.) A retrial is required because Geico's litigation misconduct prevented Plaintiff from fully and fairly presenting her case to the jury at the first trial. (See Doc. 267 ("New Trial Order"), pp. 36-40; see also Doc. 291, pp. 11-12, 36.) The prejudicial misconduct was initially revealed at trial when Geico elicited false testimony from its own attorney ("Formella Testimony"). (See Doc. 267, p. 4; Doc. 201, p. 3.) Plaintiff promptly objected and advised the Court that the Formella Testimony was contradicted by a privileged document that Geico inadvertently disclosed during discovery ("$20K Communication"). Upon a necessarily limited review, the Court agreed with Plaintiff that the $20K Communication directly contradicted the Formella Testimony and found that Geico had waived its attorney client communication privilege ("ACCP") concerning Plaintiff's claim for underinsured motorist benefits ("Waiver Finding").

After a post-trial hearing (Doc. 266 ("First PTH")) and in camera review of the waived documents,2 the Court determined that Geico's litigation misconduct also included: (1) withholding and redacting non-privileged material during discovery based on improper assertions of ACCP; (2) submitting false statements to the Court during discovery to avoid in camera inspection of its improperly withheld and redacted documents; (3) eliciting the false Formella Testimony; and (4) substantially prejudicing Plaintiff's case by using ACCP as a sword at trial after aggressively employing it as a shield in discovery. (See Doc. 267, pp. 7-9, 16-17, 23-25, 34-40, n.49; see also Doc. 291, pp. 11-12, 35-36.) The Court further determined that a fair retrial would not be possible until Plaintiff had access to all of Geico's improperly withheld and waived documents. (See Doc. 270 ("Production Order"), p. 2.) Thus, the Production Order required Geico to produce to Plaintiff:

(See Doc. 270.) The only limitation on these production obligations concerned documents dated or created after October 10, 2011 ("State End Date"). (See Doc. 270, p. 1.)

On December 4, 2015, Geico produced documents from: (1) Geico's Regional Claim File ("RC File") at Bates numbers GLC 1 through GLC 611; (2) Geico's Claims Home Office Legal File ("GHOC File") at Bates numbers GHOC 1 through GHOC 541; (3) Geico's Extracontractual Regional File ("ECRO File") at Bates numbers ECRO 1 to ECRO 1395; and (4) Geico's Extracontractual Home Office File ("ECHO File") at Bates numbers ECHO 1 through ECHO 448 (collectively, "PT Production"). (See Doc. 273; Doc. 275, pp. 5-6.) Geico also produced a forty-two page amended privilege log ("Second APL"), which combined Geico's own thirty-two page privilege log with a ten page privilege log describing certain documents in the possession of Geico's attorneys in this action—Young, Bill, Roumbus & Boles, P.A. ("YPL")—("YPL Documents"). (See Docs. 273, 275-1.)

On March 14, 2016, Plaintiff moved: (1) for in-camera inspection of the YPL Documents; (2) to compel production of improperly withheld documents listed on the Second APL; and (3) for entry of a default judgment against Geico as a sanction for Geico's "willful" violations of the Production Order ("March Motion"). (See Doc. 275.) Geico responded (Doc. 276 ("Response")), and—after another hearing (see Docs. 279, 291 ("Second PTH"))—the Court directed Geico to submit the YPL Documents for in camera review. (See Doc. 281.) On May 11, 2016, Geico provided the Court with Bates-stamped copies of the YPL Documents and filed a Third Amended Privilege Log ("Third APL"), which included the new Bates numbering. (See Docs. 282, 282-1.)

Upon consideration of the Third APL and in camera review of the documents identified thereon, the Court finds that the March Motion is due to be granted in part and denied in part.3 As detailed below, the Court will compel Geico to produce additional documents to Plaintiff on or before Wednesday, July 6, 2016.

DISCUSSION

I. Document Production

According to the Response, the Court should deny the March Motion in its entirety because: (1) the March Motion was improperly filed because Plaintiff did not comply with Local Rule 3.01(g); (2) Plaintiff's request for sanctions and its arguments concerning pre-trial discovery misconduct are foreclosed by the New Trial Order; (3) Geico properly withheld non-responsive and privileged documents from the PT Production; and (4) although the Second APL included minor errors and Geico inadvertently withheld a few responsive documents, it has corrected these errors. (See Doc. 276.) Finally, Geico assured the Court that it "has not engaged in any improper conduct with respect to the discovery in the instant action." (See id. at 17-21; see also Doc. 291.)

The Court rejects Geico's first two arguments.4 Only jaundiced eyes bathed in Lethe could—as Geico does—read the New Trial Order as a victory for it based on purported findings that: (1) "GEICO properly asserted" ACCP prior to trial; and (2) no sanctions of any kind should be imposed on Geico. (See Doc. 276, pp. 4-5, 17.) The Court made no such findings.5 To the contrary, the Court has consistently and repeatedly found that Geico's conduct in discovery was improper and resulted in prejudice to Plaintiff. (See Doc. 267, pp. 7-9, 16-17, 23-25, 34-40, n.49; see also Doc. 291, pp. 11, 12, 35, 36 (noting that many of Geico's pre-trial redactions to its "A-log" were not "justified").)

The Court also rejects Geico's third argument. Importantly, the New Trial and Production Orders were entered so that: (1) Plaintiff would have a fair opportunity to present her claim to a jury; (2) Geico would reap no reward for prejudicing Plaintiff and causing unfair and wasteful judicial proceedings; and (3) Geico would be deterred from future litigation misconduct. (See Doc. 267, p. 5 n.20; Doc. 271, pp. 5-8 (discussing Plaintiff's post-trial discovery needs); see also Doc. 291, pp. 35-36 (explaining that the Court intended to sanction Geico for its litigation misconduct).) Apparently indifferent to such concerns, Geico again denied Plaintiff access to discoverable documents based on its own view that the documents do "not pertain to coverage, benefits, or damages stemming from" the Plaintiff's claim for underinsured motorist benefits. (See Doc. 276.)

Notably, the Court lacks confidence in "Geico's representations" in this action—particularly, "anything that Geico might say with respect to what is or is not" in its files.6 (Doc. 291, pp. 12-13; id. at 36 ("Geico has lost credibility in this case with respect to what they call things," and "how they categorize, classify, and file" their records).) Accordingly, after conducting another in camera review of the withheld documents, the Court finds that Geico should have included the following documents in its Post-Trial Production:

Subject to limited redactions, Geico also should have produced ECRO 0693 through ECRO 0697 and ECRO 0691.

II. Sanctions

Geico's response to Plaintiff's request for sanctions adheres to it modus operandi of denying and downplaying the Court's findings,7 while insisting that it is faultless8 and Plaintiff is debauched.9 Although perplexed and concerned by Geico's response, the Court declines to entertain the distinct and complex issue of what sanctions—if any— should ultimately be imposed on Geico for its extensive and apparently ongoing litigation misconduct.10

ADDITIONAL PROCEEDINGS

Previously, the Court granted the parties' motion to extend the expert report deadline (Doc. 278) and vacated the deadline previously set (Doc. 274). (Doc. 281.) Although the Court has granted the March Motion in part and directed Geico to produce additional documents, the Court finds that no additional fact discovery is warranted, and the parties should be able to complete expert discovery within a month of the deadline for Geico's additional production. Unfortunately, the extension will place the expert discovery deadline in early August—which is when the trial is set. Given this fact, the Court will move the trial back one more month—to September 2016. Only the most extraordinary circumstances would justify another extension; accordingly, the Court does not anticipate that either party will file a motion to extend the final deadlines set in this Order.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:

DONE AND ORDERED.