ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS

BETH BLOOM, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court upon Defendant Alain B. Amiel's Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. [49]. The Court has reviewed the Motion, all opposing and supporting filings, and the record in this case, and is otherwise fully advised in the premises. For the reasons that follow, the Court now grants the motion in part, and denies in part.1

I. INTRODUCTION

On May 1, 2014, Plaintiff Tessa Bray ("Plaintiff") commenced this action alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), both individually (Counts I and III), and on behalf of those similarly situated (Counts II and IV), as well as breach of contract (Count V). See ECF No. [1]. Plaintiff worked for Defendants as head chef from January 2013 to June 2013, where she was generally paid an hourly wage of $15.00. See id. According to the Complaint, during one or more workweeks, Defendants failed to compensate her appropriately under the "agreement." Id. at ¶¶ 54. However, Plaintiff does not attach any document containing the terms of the "agreement" named in the Complaint. Accordingly, on October 1, 2014, the Court dismissed Plaintiff's breach of contract count for failure to state a claim. See ECF No. [55].

Presently before the Court is Defendant Alain B. Amiel's ("Amiel") Motion, which alleges that Amiel was never Plaintiff's employer, but rather, a fellow employee of Defendant Artizan Flatbread Company, LLC. See ECF No. [49] at ¶¶ 4-6. Additionally, Amiel avers that because no other person has filed a written consent in this action, Plaintiff may not assert Counts II and IV, which state collective action claims. See id. at ¶¶ 11-14. Ultimately, Amiel seeks to have all counts dismissed with prejudice as they relate to him.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A pleading in a civil action must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). While a complaint "does not need detailed factual allegations," it must provide "more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (explaining that Rule 8(a)(2)'s pleading standard "demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation"). Nor can a complaint rest on "`naked assertion[s]' devoid of `further factual enhancement.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 (alteration in original)). The Supreme Court has emphasized "[t]o survive a motion to dismiss a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to `state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). When reviewing a motion to dismiss, a court, as a general rule, must accept the plaintiff's allegations as true and evaluate all plausible inferences derived from those facts in favor of the plaintiff. See Chaparro v. Carnival Corp., 693 F.3d 1333, 1337 (11th Cir. 2012); Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. S. Everglades Restoration Alliance, 304 F.3d 1076, 1084 (11th Cir. 2002).

III. DISCUSSION

Pointing to Defendant Artizan Flatbread Company's Articles of Organization, Defendant Amiel contends that he was not Plaintiff's employer. However, simply because an individual is not listed on the corporate statement does not indicate that the unnamed individual was not an "employer" within the meaning of the FLSA. In fact, the FLSA defines the term "employer" rather broadly, stating that the term "includes any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee. 29 U.S.C. § 203(d). The Eleventh Circuit has indicated that "[w]hether an individual falls within this definition does not depend on technical or isolated factors but rather on the circumstances of the whole activity." Alvarez Perez v. Sanford-Orlando Kennel Club, Inc., 515 F.3d 1150, 1160 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting Hodgson v. Griffin & Brand of McAllen, Inc., 471 F.2d 235, 237 (5th Cir. 1973)) (internal formatting omitted). Nevertheless, Plaintiff's Complaint contains a mere one paragraph specifically relating to Defendant Amiel: "At all times material hereto, Alain B. Amiel was Plaintiff's employer as defined by law." ECF No. [1] at ¶ 9. The Court is obligated to accept this allegation as true for purposes of a motion to dismiss. However, in an abundance of caution and because this single allegation may appropriately be deemed a "naked assertion devoid of further factual enhancement," Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation and quotation omitted), the Court shall dismiss Counts I and III without prejudice, granting leave to amend.2

With respect to Plaintiff's collective action counts, Defendant Amiel contends that no other individual has sought to add themselves as a party plaintiff, and, therefore, Plaintiff cannot maintain a claim on behalf of other employees "similarly situated." See ECF No. [49] at ¶¶ 11-14. The FLSA provides that

See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (emphasis added). Accordingly, "to maintain a collective action under the FLSA, plaintiffs must demonstrate that they are similarly situated." Morgan v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc., 551 F.3d 1233, 1258 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing Anderson v. Cagle's, 488 F.3d 945, 952 (11th Cir. 2007)). Plaintiff has made sufficient allegations to withstand a motion to dismiss on this issue. To wit, Plaintiff alleges:

See ECF No. [1] at ¶¶ 22-29. Further examination of whether Plaintiff can certify a class may be conducted pursuant to an appropriate motion.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the aforementioned reasons, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:

DONE AND ORDERED.