STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, Jr., Chief District Judge.

STIPULATION

Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and the defendant, by and through his counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:

1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on March 6, 2013. The Court on its own motion moved the matter to February 27, 2014.

2. By this stipulation, the defendant now moves to continue the status conference until June 19, 2014, and to exclude time between February 27, 2014, and June 19, 2014, under Local Code T4. Plaintiff does not oppose this request.

3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:

a. The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case includes approximately 973 pages of investigative reports and related documents in electronic form. Discovery from additional related cases is now being requested and reviewed which consists of approximately 4,000 pages. All of this discovery has been either produced directly to counsel and/or made available for inspection and copying.

b. Counsel for the defendant desires additional time to continue conducting investigation, review the discovery and obtain further discovery as necessary, examine evidence as well as consult with her client. We are still trying to locate some of the witnesses we deem relevant to this matter. Since the events took place years ago, and various versions of their names have been reported, many of the witnesses have been difficult to locate. Furthermore, we still need to inspect evidence when convenient for all parties. Finally, counsel for the defendant needs to confer with the defendant about the results of all these tasks before deciding how to proceed with the case.

c. Counsel for the defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny her the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.

d. The government does not object to the continuance.

e. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.

f. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of February 27, 2014, to June 19, 2014, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

ORDER

IT IS SO ORDERED.