ROSEMARY M. COLLYER, District Judge.
Sufyian Barhoumi, a native of Algeria, is a detainee held by the United States at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. This Court previously denied his petition for a writ of habeas corpus and was sustained on appeal, on the basis that he was "`part of an al-Qaida-associated force engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners and was therefore lawfully detained." Barhoumi v. Obama, 609 F.3d 416, 418 (D.C.Cir.2010). Mr. Barhoumi presents new evidence and argues that he should be relieved from the final judgment against him. The government disagrees. Having considered all of the materials submitted, the underlying record, and the parties' arguments, the Court will deny the motion.
Sufyian Barhoumi was captured in Faisalabad, Pakistan, in February 2002, during the height of the hostilities in Afghanistan after the attack on September 11, 2001.
Mr. Barhoumi fled Afghanistan through the mountains into Pakistan in late 2001. "In his ARB hearing, [Mr.] Barhoumi testified that he traveled to a guesthouse in Faisalabad, Pakistan, in February 2002," where he was arrested approximately 10 days later "along with Abu Zubaydah, who was also staying at the Faisalabad guesthouse." Id. at 419. Mr. Barhoumi was taken into U.S. custody in May 2002 and transferred to Guantánamo. Id.
Mr. Barhoumi filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in July 2005. Although this Court dismissed his case after Congress
As the D.C. Circuit noted on appeal, Mr. Barhoumi does not challenge the AUMF detention standard, under which which the President is authorized "to detain persons who were part of[,] or substantially supported, Taliban or al Qaida forces or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners...." Barhoumi, 609 F.3d at 423. Nor does Mr. Barhoumi contest that the militia headed by Abu Zubaydah was so associated within the meaning of the AUMF. Id. "The only dispute, then, is whether Barhoumi was, as the district court found, `part of Zubaydah's organization." Id. Both this Court and the Circuit on appeal determined that the record demonstrated Mr. Barhoumi's participation by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 422-23 (rejecting Mr. Barhoumi's argument that "a standard of at least clear and convincing evidence" should apply because that argument is "foreclosed by circuit precedent" (citing Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 878 (D.C.Cir.2010)).
After canvassing all of the evidence, the D.C. Circuit focused on: Mr. Barhoumi's own statement that he was "trained at the Khaldan camp, which was associated with Zubaydah;" the statement to the Federal Bureau of Investigation by another detainee that Mr. Barhoumi was "captured along with [redacted] at the Faisalabad guesthouse;" and the statement in the diary of Abu [redacted] al-Suri, which was recovered from the Faisalabad guesthouse, that Mr. Barhoumi was a "Permanent" member of Mr. Zubaydah's militia (recorded under the name Ubaydah Al-Jaza'iri (Ubaydah the Algerian) in the diary). Id. at 425-27.
Mr. Barhoumi now challenges these conclusions on two separate bases: first, that he was so harshly questioned at Guanutánamo Bay in March and April of 2003 that none of his later statements before the ARB or Combatant Status Review Tribunal ("CSRT") is reliable, see Classified Mot. Relief ("R. 60 Mot.") [Dkt. 232]; and second, that the true author of the al-Suri diary was a teenager named [redacted] whose writings are, for various reasons, unreliable and unrelated to Mr. Barhoumi. See Classified Mot. Supp. R. 60 Mot. [Dkt. 239].
Mr. Barhoumi argues that the final judgment against him should be vacated pursuant to Rule 60(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 60(b)(2) provides that "the court may relieve a party ... from a final judgment, order, or proceeding" if the party presents "newly
The Court finds that Mr. Barhoumi presents "new evidence" previously unknown to his counsel and which existed at the time of the hearing on his habeas petition; that the unique circumstances of Guantanamo proceedings explain counsel's earlier lack of knowledge of the interrogations of Mr. Barhoumi;
Mr. Barhoumi presents two kinds of newly-discovered evidence and argument: first, in his Rule 60(b) Motion, that he was subjected to harsh interrogation during March and April 2003 so that no reliance can be placed on his later testimony, and second, in the Motion to Supplement, that the al-Suri diary was authored by a plagiarizing teenager and not an Abu Zubaydah confidant, so it is not reliable. Both certainly require serious consideration and cannot be ignored. With such consideration, however, it becomes evident that neither is of such import to the question of Mr. Barhoumi's role in the Zubaydah militia as to have affected the outcome of this case.
In his Rule 60(b) Motion, filed with the Court Security Officer on August 27, 2010, Mr. Barhoumi sought relief from the judgment against him and for sanctions against the government for its failure to
Mr. Barhoumi contends that his interrogations in March and April 2003 were "severe, cruel, and dehumanizing." Id. at 3. He specifically notes that a high-ranking military officer expressed concern that some aspects of the interrogation "`may have exceeded the scope'" of instructions, particularly as it involved "`threats of transfer to a worse place or transfer to a prison (where a detainee would be subjected to forced homosexual acts),'" which the officer "`ma[d]e clear that [he] disapprove[d].'" Id. at 4 (quoting R. 60(b) Mot., Ex. 3 at 292 (26 May 2006 Memorandum from General Brantz Craddock, United States Southern Command)). Mr. Barhoumi maintained silence during almost all of these interrogations, id. at 4, but he appeared to be affected by the interrogation techniques through obvious signs of stress and agitation. Id.
The Court has reviewed all the Memoranda for Record (MFRs) that recount these interrogations. [Redacted] See R. 60(b) Mot., Ex. 1, at 5 (March 1, 2003 MFR). Mr. Barhoumi had earlier been questioned by the FBI and had answered some questions. During the March-April 2003 questioning [redacted]
While the Court deplores the late production of these documents, see below, it cannot agree with counsel's argument that earlier disclosure would have affected the legal and factual conclusions in the case. It is clear Mr. Barhoumi appeared at times [redacted] R. 60(b) Mot., Ex. 2, at 7-9 (March 2, 2003 MFR); [redacted] id. at 18 (March 8, 2003 MFR); [redacted] id. at 66 (April 3, 2003 MFR). [Redacted] Id. at 79 (April 7, 2003 MFR), 83 (April 8, 2003 MFR). [Redacted] R. 60(b) Mot., Ex. 1 at 17 (March 5, 2003 MFR). [Redacted] E.g., id. at 18 (March 8, 2003 MFR). [Redacted] when Mr. Barhoumi was left alone in the interrogation room with the interpreter, he engaged "in a one hour two-way conversation" in which he advised the interpreter, among other things, that "the only reason he was talking now was to pass a message ... that he would never talk regardless of how bad his life gets" and that "being placed in isolation only serves to make him[] ... stronger against interrogation." Id. at 22 (March 9, 2003 MFR). [Redacted] Mr. Barhoumi again
Mr. Barhoumi refused to talk at all during most of his interrogation sessions in the period under scrutiny. He did speak to interrogators [redacted] but only to try to collect information about the current situation in Iraq and the current disposition of Saddam Hussein. Additionally, he complained about not being treated with respect." Id. at 108 (April 21, 2003 MFR). [Redacted] Id. at 112 (April 22, 2003 MFR). [Redacted] Id. at 114. [Redacted] Id. However [redacted] Id. at 115 (April 23, 2003 MFR) [redacted].
The personal strength of Mr. Barhoumi is evident. [Redacted] Obviously, his statements to the FBI and others before the period of harsh interrogation are not affected by the interrogation in 2003. Counsel offer no evidence that his later statements were affected, either when testifying before the CSRT in September 2004, 17 months after the harsh interrogations ended, or before the ARB in January 2008, 57 months afterwards. To the contrary, the current record does not support a conclusion that Mr. Barhoumi's will was overborne by the interrogation in March and April 2003, much less at any later time.
Counsel for Mr. Barhoumi also seek sanctions against the government
Government counsel argue that they fulfilled their obligations fully, regularly supplementing discovery with arguably exculpatory evidence as the Amended Case Management Order required and as such evidence was identified. See Gov't Opp. R. 60(b) Mot. at 5-8 (explaining history of production of documents in this case). The government notes that Mr. Barhoumi did not seek any discovery relating to questioning in 2003 and never mentioned his interrogation, so government counsel (located in the District of Columbia) did not seek any such documentation from Guantánamo. Further, government counsel's review of materials for exculpatory evidence relating to Mr. Barhoumi did not include review of materials assembled by the Guantánamo Review Task Force pursuant to Executive Order 13, 492, 74 Fed.Reg. 4897 (Jan. 22, 2009), because it was neither sought by Mr. Barhoumi nor ordered by the Court. Gov't Opp. R. 60(b) Mot. at 6 (citing Decl. of Terry M. Henry, Assistant Branch Director, U.S. Dep't of Justice, ¶¶ 5-9). Only in the spring of 2010, when searching Task Force records for information on Mr. Barhoumi because one or more of his interrogation statements was being used in the case of Alhag (ISN 686) v. Obama, No. 05-cv-2199 (HHK), did government counsel discover the instant MFRs and other documents concerning his interrogation. Id. at 7. They then sought authorization to disclose these classified documents to Mr. Barhoumi's lawyers in June 2010 and, upon further searches and evaluation for classification, disclosed a second tranche of documents in August 2010.
A Case Management Order was issued by the Court in all of the Guantánamo cases in 2008, and it was adopted in this case as amended on December 16, 2008. See Amended Case Management Order ("CMO"), [Dkt. 154]. The CMO ordered the government to disclose all "reasonably available evidence," defined to mean "evidence contained in any information reviewed by attorneys preparing factual returns for all detainees" as well as "any other evidence the government discovers while litigating habeas corpus petitions filed by detainees at Guantánamo Bay." Id. § I.D.1. The Court's careful definition recognized that the United States could have information about the detainees spread across the world in various operations of war, to which government lawyers on the habeas cases did not have access. However, all documents on which the government relied to support detention or which it discovered during the litigation of these habeas cases were ordered released so that both parties would have equal knowledge.
This Court agrees with Mr. Barhoumi's lawyers that government counsel were required by the terms of the CMO to search for, locate, and produce the documents in question once they were gathered for purposes of the Task Force. The documents should have been disclosed earlier. The defense that Mr. Barhoumi's lawyers did not specifically request and the Court did not specifically order such disclosure in this case is unavailing. The Task Force was convened under the auspices of the Attorney General, ultimate supervisor of government counsel here, and information known to it could not be ignored as "not reasonably available" to these Department of Justice counsel. See Executive Order 13492, 74 Fed.Reg. at 4898 ("[T]he Attorney General ... shall coordinate the Review...."). Thus, the Court agrees with Mr. Barhoumi's counsel that a violation of the CMO occurred.
Even so, the Court finds that no sanction is appropriate. Even assuming arguendo that the discovery provisions of the Federal Rules provide authority for sanctions in Guantánamo habeas proceedings, justice does not require entry of any of the sanctions available under either Rule 37(b) or 37(c)(1).
On review, the D.C. Circuit stated that "the central issue in this case" is
"To begin with," Mr. Barhoumi "was captured along with Zubaydah at the Faisalabad guesthouse, a fact he acknowledges. Barhoumi also acknowledges that he trained at the Khaldan camp." Barhoumi, 609 F.3d at 425; see also id. ("[T]he government's assertion here that Zubaydah ran the Khaldan camp is backed up by testimony from a self-professed Khaldan trainee who, in proceedings having nothing to do with Barhoumi and which predated the September 11, 2001, attacks, attested to Zubaydah's connection to Khaldan."). According to Circuit precedent, these facts alone may be sufficient to warrant Mr. Barhoumi's detention. Id. at 425, 427.
Beyond these facts, the Circuit identified the last page of the al-Suri diary, listing Mr. Barhoumi as a "Permanent" member of the Zubaydah forces, as "perhaps the most probative record evidence that [Mr. Barhoumi] was in fact `part of Zubaydah's associated force." Id. at 425. In rejecting Mr. Barhoumi's challenge to the diary, the Circuit described it as "more than 65 pages of detailed observations recorded by a self-professed associate of both Zubaydah and Barhoumi." Id. at 428. After evaluating the diary's "internal coherence as well as its consistency with uncontested record evidence," the Court of Appeals "conclude[d] that the al-Suri diary contains sufficient indicia of reliability to justify the district court's reliance on it." Id. In reaching that conclusion, the D.C. Circuit rejected Mr. Barhoumi's attempt to analogize his case to Parhat v. Gates, 532 F.3d 834 (D.C.Cir.2008), in which the Court found intelligence reports "inherently unreliable." Barhoumi, 609 F.3d at 428-29 ("The al-Suri diary is therefore a far cry from the `bare assertions' deemed unreliable in Parhat, 532 F.3d at 847, as it possesses both endogenous and exogenous indicia of reliability.").
In his Supplemental Motion, Mr. Barhoumi contends that "[t]he evidence submitted in conjunction with this Motion is significant and calls into question the reliability of the al-Suri diary." Mot. Supp. R. 60(b) Mot. ¶ 4. Comparing the past lack of information on the identity of the diary's author, Mr. Barhoumi argues:
Id. ¶ 9.
At the outset, it bears noting that the authorship of the al-Suri diary is irrelevant to a large extent. Neither this Court nor the D.C. Circuit relied on the identity of Mr. al-Suri to find his diary persuasive. See Barhoumi, 609 F.3d at 429 ("[A]lthough it is true, as [Mr.] Barhoumi emphasizes, that the government has provided no information about al-Suri, the diary itself suggests that al-Suri possessed first-hand knowledge of Zubaydah and his organization."). It was the diary's "more than 65 pages of detailed observations" with "internal coherence [and] ... its consistency with uncontested record evidence," that lent it authority. Id. at 428. Whether written by a man named al Suri or a man named [redacted], the diary itself carries the same hallmarks of credibility and reliability.
Recognizing this, Mr. Barhoumi's counsel attempt to transform the al-Suri diary into something entirely different. Relying primarily on analyses by unnamed persons working for detainee Abdal Razak Ali (ISN 685), Mr. Barhoumi's lawyers argue that a comparison between English translations of the al-Suri diary and Sheik Azzam's writings demonstrate that the former is, in large part, plagiarized from the latter. Although they cite 56 of the al-Suri diary's 63 pages that allegedly "describe battles and individuals related to the Soviet invasion reflected in Azzam's writings and books," Mot. Supp. R. 60(b) Mot. ¶ 17, counsel provide no expert analysis or other support for their statement. Only in their Reply do counsel for Mr. Barhoumi offer a chart that notes small similarities, such as: references to the name Abu Ubaida (or Ubaydah),
Assuming that this evidence should be considered at all, despite its tardy presentation in a Reply brief, it is not persuasive. The adoption of words, phrases and revelations from early holy works by devout followers writing later commonly demonstrates
Further, however, Mr. Barhoumi cites interview reports that a teenager named [redacted] was staying at the guesthouse in Faisalabad when Mr. Barhoumi and Mr. Zubaydah were apprehended there; that [redacted] was most knowledgeable about computers among those at the guesthouse; and that [redacted] was attempting to upload a book he had written about the life of Sheik Azzam. Mot. Supp. R. 60(b) Mot. ¶¶ 12-16, 19. Mr. Barhoumi contends that these facts demonstrate that the "[redacted] al-Suri, aka [redacted] Al-Suri" — identified by the government in Ali v. Obama as author of the al-Suri diary — is really [redacted], whose written references to Abu Ubaida (or Ubaydah) in the al-Suri diary did not refer to Mr. Barhoumi.
Counsel put too much weight on the name similarity when the real Arabic names contain sounds not readily translated into English and it is doubtful that many records contain persons' true names. See n.12, supra. The instant record contains multiple similar names referencing obviously different persons who were staying in the Faisalabad guesthouse, undercutting Mr. Barhoumi's argument that the teenager [redacted] must have been the author a of the al-Suri diary. An FBI report, for example, reflects an interview of [redacted] a computer specialist. See Mot. Supp. R. 60(b) Mot., Ex. C at 1 (June 13, 2002 FBI FD-302 Report) ("[redacted] advised that he had helped/taught others to use and set up email accounts on the computer.") The computer specialist [redacted] at times used the kunya [redacted] and sustained gunshot wounds in the raid of the Faisalabad guesthouse, during which he was seized. Id. [Redacted] the computer specialist identified a photograph of [redacted] someone clearly other than himself, as "[redacted] from the Faisalabad safehouse." Id. at 4 (referencing photograph [redacted].
In another FBI interview, [redacted] the computer specialist — identified by the FBI as [redacted] see Mot. Supp. R. 60(b) Mot., Ex. D (Investigative Report) at 1 — said that he had been most knowledgeable about the computer among those at the Faisalabad guesthouse, id. at 20, and had been shot in the stomach and his right hand, id. at 26. [Redacted] also described [redacted] arrival at the safehouse, using [redacted] kunya, [redacted] Id. at 16-17. [Redacted] the computer specialist said that he had never seen [redacted] before but that "[redacted] greeted [redacted] as he arrived." Id. Notably, [redacted] the computer specialist also stated that Mr. Barhoumi, identified as Shafiq, greeted [redacted] upon the latter's arrival at the guesthouse. Id.
Additional exhibits submitted by Mr. Barhoumi recount interviews with Ahmed Bin Kadr Labed (ISN 703), in which Mr. Labed referred to both [redacted] the computer specialist [redacted]
Mot. Supp. R. 60(b) Mot., Ex. I (al-Suri Diary, [redacted]) at 6. This particular [redacted] may or may not be, who also was known as [redacted] and who had "recently" joined them. See June 13, 2002 FBI FD-302 Report at 1; Mot. Supp. R. 60(b) Mot., Ex. E (Dep't of Defense Intelligence Report) at 4 ("[Redacted] taught computer training at the safe house ... known to interviewers as [redacted]"); Mar. 3, 2006 ISN 703 Report of Investigative Activity at 1-3; Oct. 24, 2002 FBI FD-302 Report at 6-7. The al-Suri diary names "[redacted] Al-Din Al-Muhtassib Al-Suri" as a permanent member of Abu Zubaydah's force, along with Abu Kamil al-Suri ("Myself, Abu [redacted] al-Suri: Permanent") and Mr. Barhoumi ("Ubaydah al-Jaza'iri: Permanent"). See al-Suri Diary at 67 (lines 2, 5 and 8).
"The party seeking relief from judgment has an onerous standard to meet." Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 247 F.3d at 392. Not only must he present "new evidence," but he must show that his new evidence is so sufficiently material and important that the previous result, had the new evidence been known, would probably be changed.
Confusion about a fact is not evidence that a contrary fact is more accurate. At best, Mr. Barhoumi has offered evidence that a young man known as [redacted] whose name might have been [redacted], had knowledge of computers, was interested in Sheik Azzam, and stayed at the Faisalabad guest house when it was raided. Whether [redacted] was writing a book about Sheik Azzam or merely trying to upload a copy of one of Sheik Azzam's books is unclear. See Mot. Supp. R. 60(b) Mot. ¶ 14 (arguing that Mr. Labed's statement "[redacted] was attempting was placing [sic] a book on the internet, which was written by Abdullah Azzam, so others could read it," from the Mar. 3, 2006 ISN 703 Report of Investigative Activity at 3, shows "[redacted] was ... writing a book about Sheik Abdullah Azzam"). But nothing in the record suggests that [redacted] was keeping a diary and, as explained above, nothing in the commonality of small phrases used in the diary and used by Sheik Azzam demonstrate that the diary is actually plagiarized from Sheik Azzam's books, as Mr. Barhoumi contends.
Mr. Barhoumi argues that his new evidence shows that much of the text of the al-Suri diary comes from the writings of Sheik Azzam and refers to different times, places and people and that the author of the al-Suri diary was really a young man with no attachment to Abu Zubaydah or Mr. Barhoumi. His first challenge fails for lack of substantive support beyond lawyer argument. His second challenge fails for want of persuasive evidence that it is more likely true than not.
The movant under Rule 60(b)(2) must satisfy each part of a rigorous four-part test to gain relief. See Lightfoot, 555 F.Supp.2d at 66-68. This Court has studied Mr. Barhoumi's briefs, exhibits and contentions at length. He has not shown that the evidence he presents now, if available before, would probably have made a difference to the outcome of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Accordingly, his motion will be denied. A memorializing Order will be entered on the public docket, and this Opinion will be submitted to the Court Security Officer for classification review.