CHARLES F. LETTOW, Senior Judge.
Plaintiff L. Ruther, also known as Larry Ruther, has brought suit seeking damages and equitable relief against the United States, mentioning the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky, a judge of that court, and the Department of Veterans Affairs. Compl. at 4-5.
The United States ("the government") has moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Rules of the Court of Federal Claims ("RCFC"). See Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss ("Def.'s Mot."), ECF No. 8. Because this court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the complaint, the government's motion to dismiss Mr. Ruther's complaint is GRANTED.
Mr. Ruther is no stranger to the federal courts. "Ruther has a longstanding history of filing frivolous lawsuits in this court," noted a federal district court, 17 years ago. Ruther v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., No. 01-671-A, 2001 WL 34360376 (E.D. Va. June 18, 2001), aff'd, 21 Fed. Appx. 230 (4th Cir. 2001). Since then, Mr. Ruther has filed at least 35 cases in 13 federal district courts, although this appears to be his first foray into the Court of Federal Claims.
Of relevance here, in 2007 Mr. Ruther filed a complaint in federal district court against Commonwealth Collections. Ruther v. Commonwealth Collections LLC, No. 07-cv-10-KKC, 2007 WL 914190 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 22, 2007). That court interpreted his complaint as a potential contract claim, but due to illegibility, could not discern subject-matter jurisdiction and dismissed. Id., at *1. The complaint contained what appeared to be a contract labeled as a "Purchase Order" that referenced "Barry Gash," seemed to be dated October 16, 2006, and provided that Mr. Ruther would pay $59,000 for a guaranteed profit of $59,000, or a total return of $118,000. Id., at *2. The district judge ordered that the case be dismissed on March 22, 2007. Id., at *4.
In the present complaint, it appears that Mr. Ruther takes issue with the dismissal of Commonwealth Collections. His complaint narrative opens with "Judge . . . USD Court Lexing KY 07 CV Ruth v. Common Collect, Barry Gash, $118,000." Compl. at 4. The complaint includes a purchase order with the same information as in Commonwealth Collections. Compl. at 3. Mr. Ruther then states that "[c]ourt take asset, no pay value, no jury trial, summon, subpoena, [illegible] hearing." Compl. at 4 ¶ 1. He requests damages of $118,000 or $8,000,000, and asks this court to order the Department of Justice to initiate a special counsel investigation of the federal courts. Compl. at 4; Pl.'s Mot. ¶ 1.
The Tucker Act provides this court with jurisdiction over "any claim against the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort." 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1). To invoke this court's Tucker Act jurisdiction, "a plaintiff must identify a separate source of substantive law that creates the right to money damages." Fisher v. United States, 402 F.3d 1167, 1172 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc in relevant part) (citing United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 216 (1983); United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 398 (1976)). If a plaintiff fails to raise a claim under a money-mandating provision, this court "should [dismiss] for lack of subject matter jurisdiction." Jan's Helicopter Serv., Inc. v. Federal Aviation Admin., 525 F.3d 1299, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting Greenlee Cty. v. United States, 487 F.3d 871, 876 (Fed. Cir. 2007)).
A claim in this court is "barred unless the petition thereon is filed within six years after such claim first accrues." 28 U.S.C. § 2501. This six-year statute of limitations is jurisdictional. John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130 (2008).
Mr. Ruther, as plaintiff, must establish jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. Trusted Integration, Inc. v. United States, 659 F.3d 1159, 1163 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing Reynolds v. Army & Air Force Exch. Serv., 846 F.2d 746, 748 (Fed. Cir. 1988)). When ruling on a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, the court must "accept as true all undisputed facts asserted in the plaintiff's complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff." Id. (citing Henke v. United States, 60 F.3d 795, 797 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). "If a court lacks jurisdiction to decide the merits of a case, dismissal is required as a matter of law." Gray v. United States, 69 Fed. Cl. 95, 98 (2005) (citing Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1868); Thoen v. United States, 765 F.2d 1110, 1116 (Fed. Cir. 1985)); see also RCFC 12(h)(3) ("If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.").
For this court to exercise jurisdiction over any of Mr. Ruther's claims, it must do so under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a). Other statutory grants of jurisdiction to this court appear to be inapplicable.
The government characterizes the complaint as a contract dispute and contends that Mr. Ruther has failed to establish jurisdiction because he "does not legibly allege the existence of any express or implied-in-fact contract with the United States." Def.'s Mot. at 1.
Nonetheless, reading Mr. Ruther's complaint liberally, Mr. Ruther appears to base his suit not in contract, but on the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Compl. at 4 ("Court take asset, no pay value," in reference to the dismissal of his contract suit in 2007). While Fifth Amendment Takings Claims are cognizable in this court, an adverse judicial ruling is not a governmental taking.
Mr. Ruther also mentions the Sixth Amendment, Compl. at 4 (header) ("suit 1791 U.S. 5, 6, 7"), but this amendment applies to a criminal defendant, U.S. Const. amend. VI, which Mr. Ruther is not. He mentions a deprivation of a right to a jury trial, possibly in reference to the dismissal of his contract suit in 2007. Compl. at 4 ("No jury trial . . . 1791 U.S. 7 Contract $20 . . ."). He additionally cites the Thirteenth, Compl. at 4 ("1865 U.S. 13 US Slave I stop jury trial"), and Fourteenth Amendments, Compl. at 4 ("1868 U.S. 14 Equal Protect"). Even aside from Mr. Ruther's failure to explain his reasoning for citing these amendments or to allege facts to support any claim under them, claims under the Seventh, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendments are not money-mandating, and this court thus lacks jurisdiction over claims based upon them. See Jaffer v. United States, No. 95-5127, 1995 WL 592017, at *2 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 6, 1995) (Seventh Amendment); Smith v. United States, No. 11-436C, 2012 WL 676709, at *3 (Fed. Cl. Feb. 27, 2012) (Thirteenth Amendment); Stanwyck v. United States, 127 Fed. Cl. 308, 315 (2016) (Fourteenth Amendment).
Mr. Ruther's complaint also notably fails to set out "a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction" or "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." RCFC 8(a). His suit would be, and is, unavailing on that basis alone. See, e.g., Ruther v. Sequential Brands Grp. Inc., 707 Fed. Appx. 3 (Mem.) (D.C. Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (ruling that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Ruther's complaint for failure to comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)); Ruther v. Gash, 707 Fed. Appx. 3 (Mem.) (D.C. Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (same).
Finally, any claim Mr. Ruther might have had based on events in 2007, when the District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky dismissed his contract complaint, would have expired more than five years ago.
For the reasons stated, the government's motion to dismiss Mr. Ruther's complaint is GRANTED. Mr. Ruther's complaint shall be DISMISSED.
No costs.
It is so
