ORDER

MARCIA MORALES HOWARD, District Judge.

THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Defendant Randy Rogers' Motion to Dismiss Counts One and Two of the Indictment for Legal Insufficiency (Doc. No. 22; Motion) filed on October 14, 2014. The Government filed the United States' Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Indictment (Doc. No. 27; Response) on October 20, 2014. Accordingly, the Motion is ripe for review.

I. Standard of Review

Under Rule 7(c)(1), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (Rule(s)), an indictment must be a "plain, concise, and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged[.]" The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has articulated a three part test to determine the sufficiency of an indictment:

United States v. Steele, 178 F.3d 1230, 1233-34 (11th Cir. 1999) (internal citation and quotation omitted). An indictment is generally sufficient "if it sets forth the offense in the words of the statute." Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117 (1974); United States v. Adkinson, 135 F.3d 1363, 1375 n.37 (11th Cir. 1998) (noting that an indictment need do little more than track the language of the statute). Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit has explained that an indictment that tracks the language of the statute is sufficient "as long as the language sets forth the essential elements of the crime." United States v. Yonn, 702 F.2d 1341, 1348 (11th Cir. 1983). However, an indictment that follows the statute is nevertheless insufficient if it fails to sufficiently apprise the defendant of the charged offense. United States v. Sharpe, 438 F.3d 1257, 1263 (11th Cir. 2006). Thus, if an indictment tracks the language of the criminal statute, it must include enough facts and circumstances to inform the defendant of the specific offense being charged. United States v. Bobo, 344 F.3d 1076, 1083 (11th Cir. 2003). An indictment does not, however, have to "allege in detail the factual proof that will be relied upon to support the charges." United States v. Crippen, 579 F.2d 340, 342 (5th Cir. 1978).1 Additionally,

Sharpe, 438 F.3d at 1263 (internal citation and quotation omitted).

II. Analysis

Counts One and Two of the Indictment (Doc. No. 1) charge Defendant Randy Rogers (Rogers) with violating 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a),2 which provides:

The statute defines the term "extortion" as "the obtaining of property from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official right." 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2). Tracking the language of § 1951, Count One of the Indictment charges that Rogers, as a Construction Inspector with the St. Johns County Transportation Development Team,

Indictment at 1-2. Similarly, Count Two alleges that Rogers attempted to obstruct, delay, and affect commerce and the movement of articles and commodities in commerce by extortion in that he obtained and sought to obtain property from J.W. in the same manner. Id. at 2. Count One alleges that Rogers committed extortion in or about May 2013, and Count Two alleges that Rogers attempted to commit extortion from in or about July 2013 through on or about April 1, 2014. Id. at 1-2. In the Indictment, the Government alleges that Rogers committed both offenses in St. Johns County, Florida, and elsewhere. Id.

In the Motion, Rogers seeks dismissal of Counts One and Two because he contends they fail to state an offense and/or "allege with sufficient specificity the essential facts relating to the substantive offenses charged." Motion ¶¶ 4, 5. He asserts that these two counts are "so vague and indefinite" that: (1) he cannot understand the charges, prepare a defense, and protect himself against further jeopardy for the same offense; (2) the Court cannot determine the charge and therefore what evidence is relevant, whether the charge has been proven, and how to properly instruct the jury; (3) neither the Court nor the jury can determine Rogers' guilt or innocence; and (4) his Fifth Amendment right to due process of law has been violated. Id. ¶¶ 5-7, 9. Rogers also contends that Counts One and Two violate the Fifth Amendment right to be charged with a felony only upon a grand jury's indictment as well as the Notice Clause of the Sixth Amendment because the Indictment fails to set forth the charged offenses "clearly, specifically, and fully." Id. ¶¶ 10-11. In addition to these generic, broad sweeping arguments, Rogers specifically contends that Counts One and Two of the Indictment do not inform him of what property he allegedly obtained and how he wrongfully obtained that property. Motion at 5. The Government responds that "[t]he Indictment clearly alleges the date, location and conduct that gives rise to the charge" and that it "presents the essential elements of the charged offense." Response at 3.

Upon review of the Indictment, the Court finds Rogers' assertions that Counts One and Two the Indictment are "vague and indefinite" and fail to allege essential facts to be lacking in merit. In Counts One and Two, the Indictment alleges the essential elements of the offense in accordance with the language of the statute, and provides specific facts sufficient to inform Defendant of the offense charged, allow him to prepare a defense, and enable him to plead double jeopardy in any future prosecutions for the same offense. The Court is fully satisfied that the allegations of each count satisfy the Steele test, and thus, the Indictment is sufficient.3 As such, the Motion is due to be denied.

In accordance with the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED:

Defendant Randy Rogers' Motion to Dismiss Counts One and Two of the Indictment for Legal Insufficiency (Doc. No. 22) is DENIED.

DONE AND ORDERED.