ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

DONALD M. MIDDLEBROOKS, District Judge.

THIS CAUSE comes before the Court upon the Report and Recommendation ("Report") (DE 17) issued by Magistrate Judge Dave Lee Brannon on September 2, 2016. Movant Allen Levinson filed Objections to the Report on September 16, 2016. (DE 18). The United States filed a Response on September 22, 2016. (DE 19).

Movant filed a § 2255 Motion to Vacate, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. (DE 1). The Report recommends that the Motion should be denied on the merits. The Report finds that Movant did not establish that his trial counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance by failing to move to suppress or otherwise challenge (1) the Government's use of the Internet Crimes Against Children ("ICAC") database with which Movant's chatroom activity was discovered and (2) the Government's use of administrative subpoenas to obtain Movant's Internet Protocol ("IP") addresses. Specifically, the Report concludes that the Government's use of the ICAC database did not violate Movant's Fourth Amendment rights because the database collects only publicly available information — the IP addresses and screennames of chatroom users — for which there is no reasonable expectation of privacy. The Report also concludes that the Government's use of administrative subpoenas to obtain Movant's IP addresses from third-party Internet Service Providers ("ISPs") did not violate Movant's Fourth Amendment rights because there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in subscriber information provided to third-party ISPs. Upon a careful, de novo review of the record and Movant's Objections, the Court agrees with the Report's recommendation to deny Movant's § 2255 Petition.

Movant objects to the Report. Movant first contends that the Government illegally obtained his IP address from the chatroom administrator to put it into the ICAC database. Movant continues that the Government's use of stolen information in the ICAC database violates the Fourth Amendment, the Wiretap Act, and/or the Stored Communications Act ("SCA"), and that trial counsel erred by not moving to exclude it. Second, as to the administrative subpoenas, Movant argues that the Government's subpoena did not comply with the specificity requirement of 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) of the SCA. Movant contends that the Government therefore obtained his IP address in violation of the SCA, and reasonable trial counsel would have moved to suppress the Government's evidence. Even if the subpoena complied with § 2703(d), Movant contends that trial counsel should have argued that § 2703(d) violates the Fourth Amendment insofar as it permits disclosure of an IP address without probable cause and a warrant.

As an initial matter, Movant cites to no evidence in support of his contention that the Government illegally obtained his IP address from the chatroom administrator or his contention that the administrative subpoenas were invalid. Instead, Movant relies on speculation. Next, the remedy for Movant's complaints regarding the Government's failure to comply with the SCA is not, as he contends, the suppression of evidence. While Movant is correct that §§ 2703(c)1 and (d)2 of the SCA specify procedures that the Government must follow to access non-content electronic records, including IP addresses, from electronic communication service providers, the SCA does not provide an exclusionary remedy for a violation of these provisions.3 See United States v. Steiger, 318 F.3d 1039, 1049 (11th Cir. 2003). Therefore, I adopt the Report's finding that it was reasonable for trial counsel not to move to suppress the Government's evidence under the SCA.4

I also agree with the Report's finding that it was reasonable for trial counsel not to challenge the Government's evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds. The Fourth Amendment does not protect information revealed to a third-party because there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in such information. See United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 508 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 136 S.Ct. 479 (2015) (citing United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976)). Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit has held that non-content cellphone location records, obtained pursuant to § 2703(d), are not protected by the Fourth Amendment because cellphone users voluntarily provide this data to thirdparty service providers. See id. at 511. Although the Eleventh Circuit has not addressed whether the Fourth Amendment protects IP addresses, other courts of appeal have held that it does not. See United States v. Bynum, 604 F.3d 161, 164 (4th Cir. 2010) ("every federal court to address this issue has held that subscriber information provided to an internet provider is not protected by the Fourth Amendment"); United States v. Perrine, 518 F.3d 1196, 1204-05 (10th Cir. 2008) (collecting cases). In addition, the same rationale for denying protection to cellphone location data in Davis applies to IP addresses because Internet users voluntarily provide this information to third-party service providers. See United States v. Christie, 624 F.3d 558, 574 (3rd Cir. 2010) ("no reasonable expectation of privacy exists in an IP address, because that information is also conveyed to and, indeed, from third parties, including 1SPs"). Accordingly, the Report correctly concludes that it was reasonable for Movant's trial counsel not to move to suppress the Government's evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds.

Similarly, I reject Movant's alternative argument that § 2703(d) violates the Fourth Amendment because it allows a subpoena to issue for his IP addresses without probable cause. Movant's argument is foreclosed by my conclusion that IP addresses are not protected by the Fourth Amendment. See Davis, 785 F.3d at 511 ("[W]e hold that the government's obtaining a § 2703(d) court order for production of [the third-party service provider's] business records . . . did not constitute a search and did not violate the Fourth Amendment rights of [defendant].").5

Accordingly, Movant has failed to demonstrate either prong of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and has thus not established ineffective assistance of counsel. Movant's Motion is, therefore, denied.

"[W]hen a habeas corpus petitioner seeks to initiate an appeal of the dismissal of a habeas corpus petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254-55, "the right to appeal is governed by the certificate of appealability requirements . . . found at 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)." Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 478 (2000). Pursuant to § 2253(c)(2), a district court may only issue a certificate of appealability when "the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Because Movant does not meet that standard, the Court declines to issue a certificate of appealability. Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that

DONE AND ORDERED.