SUMMARY ORDER

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the judgments and memorandum-decision and order of the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York (Mordue, J.) are AFFIRMED.

On April 4, 2006, Plaintiff-Appellee United States of America (the "government"), pursuant to its eminent domain powers, initiated a condemnation proceeding against Defendants-Appellants1. Appellants conceded that the government's action was within the scope of its powers and proceeded to litigate the amount of just compensation that the government owed for the property. On August 19, 2010, at the close of trial, the jury returned a verdict to Appellants in the amount of $208,000. Judgment was entered the next day. Soon after, on September 15, 2010, Appellants moved for a new trial. Without ruling on that motion, the district court entered the final judgment for that amount on November 8, 2010. Appellants renewed their motion for a new trial, and, on September 30, 2011, the district court in its memorandum-decision and order denied that motion. This appeal from the verdict, judgment, final judgment, and memorandum-decision and order followed. The panel has reviewed the briefs and the record in this appeal and agrees unanimously that oral argument is unnecessary because "the facts and legal arguments [have been] adequately presented in the briefs and record, and the decisional process would not be significantly aided by oral argument." Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2)(c). We assume the parties' familiarity with the facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

Appellants' central argument is that the district court erred in precluding their expert from testifying as to the value of the land. Here, as they did on their motion for a new trial, Appellants argue that the exclusion of that testimony resulted in a verdict that was manifestly unjust and a miscarriage of justice.

"We review for abuse of discretion a district court's disposition of a motion for a new trial," Nimely v. City of New York, 414 F.3d 381, 392 (2d Cir. 2005), keeping in mind that "[a] motion for a new trial ordinarily should not be granted unless the trial court is convinced that the jury has reached a seriously erroneous result or that the verdict is a miscarriage of justice." Medforms, Inc. v. Healthcare Mgmt. Solutions, Inc., 290 F.3d 98, 106 (2d Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). "The district court's evidentiary rulings, and in particular its determinations regarding the admissibility of expert testimony, are also reviewed for abuse of discretion." Nimely, 414 F.3d at 393 (internal citations omitted). "A decision to . . . exclude expert . . . testimony is not an abuse of discretion unless it is `manifestly erroneous.'" Amorgianos v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 303 F.3d 256, 265 (2d Cir. 2002) (internal citations omitted).

"[T]he district court has a gatekeeping function . . . [and] is charged with the task of ensuring that an expert's testimony . . . rests on a reliable foundation . . . ." Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). "In deciding whether a step in an expert's analysis is unreliable, the district court should undertake a rigorous examination of the facts on which the expert relies, the method by which the expert draws an opinion from those facts, and how the expert applies the facts and methods to the case at hand." Id. at 267. "[W]hen an expert opinion is based on . . . a methodology . . . that [is] simply inadequate to support the conclusions reached, Daubert and Rule 702 mandate the exclusion of that unreliable opinion testimony." Id. at 266.

Here, we are convinced that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the expert's testimony and, subsequently, in denying the motion for a new trial. The district court adopted Magistrate Judge DiBianco's thorough report exposing the unreliability of the expert's methods. We will not repeat that analysis at length here, but we are convinced that the district court competently undertook its gatekeeping function. We do note, however, that the expert was allowed to testify that in his opinion, the highest and best use of the property was a duty-free store. In addition, although the district court precluded the expert from giving his opinion as to the value of the property, which was based on the income-capitalization method of valuation, Appellants' representative was permitted to testify-over the government's objection-about his opinion of the land's value, based on an "income" approach. Largely for the reasons that the district court articulated in its memorandum-decision and order, we affirm the verdict, judgments, and the order denying the motion for a new trial in all respects.

We have considered Appellants' remaining arguments and, after a thorough review of the record, find them to be without merit.

For the foregoing reasons, the memorandum-decision and order is AFFIRMED.