KENNETH A. MARRA, District Judge.
This cause is before the Court upon Plaintiff Lynn Garber's Motion to Remand (DE 6). Defendant Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. filed a response memorandum. (DE 7.) No reply has been filed. The Court has carefully considered the Motion and is otherwise fully advised in the premises.
On February 25, 2013, Plaintiff Lynn Garber ("Plaintiff") filed a one-count Complaint alleging negligence against Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. ("Defendant") in the Circuit Court of the Fifteen Judicial Circuit, arising from a slip-and-fall incident on November 26, 2012. (Compl. ¶ 5, DE 1-7, Case No. 13-80306.) On March 7, 2013, Defendant propounded on Plaintiff a Request for Admission asking Plaintiff to admit she was seeking less than $75,000.00 in damages, which Plaintiff denied. (Request for Admission ¶ 1, Ex. A, DE 7-1.) Additionally, on March 21, 2013, Plaintiff's Answers to Interrogatories claimed $88,812.49 in medical expenses. (Answers to Interrogatories ¶ 4, Ex. B, DE 7-2.) On March 27, 2013, Defendant filed its Notice of Removal in case number 13-80306-CIV-MARRA. (Notice of Removal, DE 1, case no. 13-80306.) The parties subsequently entered into a joint stipulation of dismissal without prejudice and the Court dismissed the case. (DE 9-10, case no. 13-80306.)
On November 6, 2013, Plaintiff filed a two-count Complaint alleging negligence against Defendant and Clive Provost-Heron, Defendant's store manager, in the Circuit Court of the Fifteen Judicial Circuit arising out of the same incident. (Compl., DE 1-1.) On December 4, 2013, Defendant filed a Notice of Removal. (Notice of Removal, DE 1.) The Complaint alleges the following:
Defendant owned, operated, maintained or was in control of the Wal-Mart store located at 16205 South Military Trail, Delray Beach, Florida. (Compl. ¶ 4.) Defendant Provost-Heron was the manager of the store. (Compl. ¶ 5.) Plaintiff fell while on the store's premises on November 26, 2012. (Compl. ¶ ¶ 7, 9.) Wal-Mart breached its duty to maintain control of its premises and was negligent in allowing debris to exist on the walkway of its store. (Compl. ¶ ¶ 10-11.) Provost-Heron, individually and as a manager of the store, negligently and carelessly allowed a dangerous condition to exist on its premises, which caused Plaintiff's injuries. (Compl. ¶ 19.) Provost-Heron, individually and as a manger of the store, maintained control of the specific walk-way in question and breached his duty to maintain the premises. (Compl. ¶ 20.) Provost-Heron, individually and as a manager of the store, was negligent by not rectifying the dangerous situation and/or by not providing adequate warnings. (Compl. ¶ 21.)
Plaintiff moves to remand this action, stating that she has asserted a proper claim against Provost-Heron and that Florida law recognizes an individual tort claim against an officer or agent of a corporation when a complaint alleges that individual committed or participated in the negligent actions. Additionally, she contends that Defendant has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy is in excess of $75,000.00. In response, Defendant argues that Provost-Heron was fraudulently joined and that Plaintiff has failed to show that the amount in controversy does not exceed $75,000.00.
The Eleventh Circuit in
Here, the issue turns on whether liability can be imposed on Provost-Heron, the store manager. "Individual officers and agents of a corporation are personally liable when they have committed a tort even if such acts are performed within the scope of their employment or as corporate officers or agents."
After reviewing the allegations of the Complaint, and taking those allegations to be true, the Court finds the Complaint adequately alleges that Provost-Heron individually engaged in tortious conduct. (Compl. ¶ ¶ 19-21.) While it is true that the Complaint alleges Provost-Heron acted as manager, the Complaint also alleges that he individually engaged in tortious conduct. The Complaint provides about the same level of detail in the allegations against the corporate defendant as it does against the individual defendant. These allegations are sufficient to state a claim against Provost-Heron as an individual. Thus, the Court cannot conclude that there is no possibility Plaintiff can establish a cause of action against Provost-Heron. As a result, there is no basis to conclude that Provost-Heron has been fraudulently joined and remand is appropriate.
Accordingly, it is hereby
The Clerk shall close this case and all pending motions are denied as moot.