BRIAN H. CORCORAN, Special Master.
On January 27, 2014, Dawn Nelson filed a petition seeking compensation under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program (the "Vaccine Program"), alleging that she developed pemphigus vulgaris after receiving the influenza vaccine on February 1, 2011.
Ms. Nelson requests $19,870.20 in attorney's fees plus $1,017.57 in costs incurred by Petitioner's counsel and an additional $355.87 for costs incurred by Petitioner directly. Respondent's primary objection concerns the hourly rates claimed by the Homer Firm. The Federal Circuit has endorsed the use of the lodestar approach when determining what constitutes reasonable attorney's fees under the Vaccine Act. Avera v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 515 F.3d 1343, 1347-48 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Utilizing this approach, a special master first designates a reasonable hourly rate for the attorney in question, and then multiplies it by the number of hours that the attorney reasonably expended on the litigation. Avera, 515 F.3d at 1347-48.
Petitioner requests attorney rates that are consistent with those established in McCulloch v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., No. 09-293V, 2015 WL 5634323 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Sept. 1, 2015), reconsid. den'd, 2015 WL 6181910 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Sept. 21, 2015). In that case, Respondent was locked in a battle with the Homer Firm over attorney hourly rates. In resolving that dispute in the above-cited decision, Special Master Gowen extensively considered appropriate hourly rates for the Homer Firm attorneys in Vaccine Program cases, based on (i) the prevailing rate for comparable legal work within the forum of Washington, D.C.; (ii) the prevailing rate for cases in the Vaccine Program; (iii) the experience of the attorney both generally and within the Vaccine Program more specifically; (iv) the quality of their work; and (v) their reputation in the legal community and the community at large. He ultimately arrived at hourly rates for several Homer Firm attorneys.
Respondent has maintained her prior objections to the McCulloch rates, but has also indicated that she will not devote further resources to challenging the wisdom of those rates. See ECF No. 33 at 1. I am persuaded by McCulloch, and will therefore apply those rates herein.
The second part of the lodestar calculation is the reasonableness of the attorney time devoted to this matter. A Vaccine Act petitioner should be compensated only for hours "reasonably expended" on the litigation. Carrington v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 85 Fed. Cl. 319, 323 (2008) (quoting Hines v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 22 Cl. Ct. 750, 754 (Apr. 2, 1991)). It is within the special master's discretion to reduce the number of hours by a percentage of the amount charged, rather than making a line-by-line determination regarding the reasonableness of the charges. Broekelschen v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 102 Fed. Cl. 719, 728-29 (2011) (affirming the special master's reduction of attorney and paralegal hours); Guy v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 38 Fed. Cl. 403, 406 (1997) (affirming the special master's reduction in the number of hours from 515.3 hours to 240 hours); Edgar v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 32 Fed. Cl. 506 (1994) (affirming the special master's awarding only 58 percent of the numbers of hours for which compensation was sought).
Here, Respondent has failed to identify any specific examples of unreasonable billing. Rather, she simply attempts to incorporate the arguments asserted in Dolloff, such as challenges to the numbers of hours billed. See ECF No. 33 at 1. However, special masters are not obligated to evaluate an attorney's billing records on a line-by-line basis in making the reasonableness determination (Saxton v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 3 F.3d 1517,1521-22 (Fed. Cir. 1993)), and certainly need not do so when Respondent has not attempted to highlight any specific alleged inefficiencies. The hours billed by Petitioner's counsel appear to be reasonable, and I therefore see no independent reason to reduce them.
Accordingly, I hereby grant Petitioner's Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs in its entirety. An award should be made in the form of a check in the amount of $20,887.77 representing attorney's fees and costs, payable jointly to Petitioner and Petitioner's counsel, Conway, Homer & Chin-Caplan, PC. In addition, an award should be made in the form of a check in the amount of $355.87 representing costs incurred directly by the Petitioner, payable solely to Petitioner.