J. MARK COULSON, Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiffs, Anthony Price and Virginia Aldrich, brought this action against Defendant, Berman's Automotive Inc. ("Berman's"), alleging a violation of the Truth in Lending Act ("TILA"), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667f, and various state law claims.
On February 25, 2014, Plaintiffs purchased a 2003 Jeep Grand Cherokee from Berman's. Because they could not pay the full price of the Jeep in cash, they sought financing from the dealership. The Retail Installment Sales Contract ("RISC") that Plaintiffs signed provided for a $2000.00 down payment followed by 12 monthly installments of $882.31.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 instructs that, "[i]f the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action." Fed. R. Civ. P 12(h)(3). A court is deprived of jurisdiction over a case when it becomes moot. Williams v. Ozmint, 716 F.3d 801, 809 (4th Cir. 2013) (citing Iron Arrow Honor Soc'y v. Heckler, 464 U.S. 67, 70 (1983)). In this case, the Court's subject matter jurisdiction is premised upon the federal question implicated by Plaintiffs' TILA claim. No other basis for jurisdiction exists, since Plaintiffs' remaining claims sound in state law and since the parties are not diverse. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332. Plaintiffs' sole remaining claim under TILA is for actual damages equal to the $1,200.00 portion of the down payment they made. After the Court had dismissed and granted summary judgment on all of Plaintiffs' other TILA claims, Berman's sent Plaintiffs an cashier's check equal to the sum of the down payment plus interest, with a letter expressing Berman's continued denial of liability. (Def.'s Mem. 4-5, Ex. 3, ECF No. 40.) Plaintiffs, however, declined to accept the payment and returned the check to Berman's counsel. (Def.'s Mem. 5, Ex. 4.) Berman's now claims that its attempted payment mooted Plaintiffs' TILA claim and eliminated the Court's subject matter jurisdiction over this case. Plaintiffs argue, however, that their claim is not moot because in addition to actual damages, TILA mandates that the Court award costs and a reasonable attorney's fee to a claimant who brings a successful action to enforce liability against a defendant. See 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(3).
"A case is moot when the issues presented are no longer `live' or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome." Simmons v. United Mortg. and Loan Inv., LLC, 634 F.3d 754, 763 (4th Cir. 2011). In order to determine whether a claim has been mooted, courts consider whether it is possible "for a court to grant any effectual relief whatever to the prevailing party." Knox v. Service Emps. Int'l Union, Local 1000, 132 S.Ct. 2277 (2012) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A common factual change that serves to moot a claim occurs "when the claimant receives the relief he or she sought to obtain through the claim." Simmons, 634 F.3d at 763 (quoting Friedman's, Inc. v. Dunlap, 290 F.3d 191, 197 (4th Cir. 2002)). Although the Supreme Court recently held that a Rule 68 offer of judgment does not moot a claim by providing the claimant the relief he sought to obtain, it has never confronted the specific issue raised here: whether a plaintiff's claim is mooted when a defendant tenders actual payment equal to the full amount of a plaintiff's claim. Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, ___ U.S. ___, 136 S.Ct. 663, 672 (2016) ("We need not, and do not, now decide whether the result would be different if a defendant deposits the full amount of the plaintiff's individual claim in an account payable to the plaintiff, and the court then enters judgment for the plaintiff in that amount."). Indeed, the majority of the cases cited by both parties, while somewhat instructive as to mootness generally, are largely inapposite here since they confront whether unaccepted settlement offers or Rule 68 offers of judgment moot a claim. See Simmons, 634 F.3d at 766 (holding that an offer of incomplete relief did not moot a case); Warren v. Sessoms & Rogers, P.A., 676 F.3d 365 (4th Cir. 2012) (holding that a Rule 68 offer of judgment moots a case), abrogated by Campbell-Ewald, 136 S.Ct. 663; Chapman v. First Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015) (holding that an offer of complete relief does not moot a claim). Even the Supreme Court in Campbell-Ewald appeared to concede that cases involving offers of settlement or judgment might be critically distinguishable from those involving actual payment of a plaintiff's claimed damages. 136 S.Ct. at 671 (distinguishing the case before the Court from a trio of railroad tax cases on the ground that the railroad cases had involved actual payment of the taxes which the suits were brought to recover).
When confronting an unconditional tender equal to the full amount of a plaintiff's claimed damages, other courts have found that such a payment serves to moot a plaintiff's claim. See Pakovich v. Verizon LTD Plan, 653 F.3d 488, 492 (7th Cir. 2011) ("[Defendant] paid [Plaintiff] the benefits she requested in her complaint, including the amount she was owed at the time and the proper amount going forward. Since [Plaintiff] had received everything she requested in her benefit claim, that claim became moot and the district court lacked jurisdiction to enter summary judgment against [Defendant]."); see also Gathagan v. Rag Shop/Hollywood, Inc., No. 04-80520-Civ, 2005 WL 6504414, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 10, 2005) ("Defendant's tender of Plaintiff's maximum recoverable damages has rendered her case moot, and the motion to dismiss with prejudice is granted."). As discussed in this Court's prior opinion, Plaintiffs demonstrated an adequate causal link between Berman's alleged TILA violation and their loss of the $1,200.00 down payment to preclude summary judgment. Plaintiffs did not then, nor do they now, point to any "actual damages" they suffered as a result of Berman's alleged TILA timing violation beyond the loss of their down payment. Berman's is thus correct that its unconditional tender equal to Plaintiffs' down payment plus interest provided Plaintiffs the entire relief they stood to obtain through their TILA claim, and had Plaintiffs prevailed on the merits of that claim at trial, the Court would not have been able to award Plaintiffs any relief beyond the payment Berman's tendered.
In several cases, however, courts have reasoned that a judgment itself provides a form of additional relief, such that a settlement offer or payment not paired with a judgment fails to moot a case. See Simmons, 634 F.3d at 766; Winston v. Stewart Title and Guar. Co., 920 F.Supp.2d 631, 635 (D. Md. 2013). As the Eleventh Circuit explained in Zinni v. ER Solutions, Inc., "a judgment is important . . . because the district court can enforce it." 692 F.3d 1162, 1168 (11th Cir. 2012). For example, the defendant in Winston had tendered payment to the plaintiff in the amount of her claimed damages plus interest, but had not consented to an entry of judgment for that amount. This Court reasoned that because the tender in Winston did not include an offer for entry of judgment, the Court would have no basis to compel the defendant to pay, should the defendant's check turn out to be defective.
Plaintiffs' claim of additional relief based on TILA's provision of costs and attorney's fees is unavailing. The Supreme Court has made clear that a potential claim for attorney's fees is insufficient to sustain an otherwise moot case. See e.g., Lewis v. Cont'l Bank Corp, 494 U.S. 472, 480 (1990); Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 107-08 (1998). However, the parties apparently overlook the fact that the dismissal of Plaintiffs TILA claim as moot would not preclude Plaintiffs from seeking or recovering attorney's fees. For example, other courts have found that the question of attorney's fees is ancillary to the underlying action and survives independently under the court's equitable jurisdiction. United States v. Ford, 650 F.2d 1141 (9th Cir. 1981). Moreover, the absence of a judgment in Plaintiffs' favor would not necessarily prevent the Court from finding that their TILA action was successful.
Finally, as a practical matter, Plaintiffs returned the check to Berman's, so the Court cannot presently find that the payment mooted Plaintiffs' TILA claim. Nor can the Court order Berman's to reissue its check. Accordingly, Berman's motion is denied without prejudice. However, if Berman's reissues an unconditional cashier's check equal to the amount of the down payment plus interest, it may re-file its motion and submit to the Court proof of payment and delivery of payment to Plaintiffs. The Court will then dismiss Plaintiffs' TILA claim as moot.
Finally, I note that neither party has addressed whether, in the event that it dismisses Plaintiffs' TILA claim, the Court may properly retain jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' remaining state law claims. "The doctrine of supplemental jurisdiction indicates that federal courts generally have discretion to retain or dismiss state law claims when the federal basis for an action drops away." See Shanaghan v. Cahill, 58 F.3d 106, 109 (4th Cir. 1995) (emphasis in original). Relevant considerations to a court's decision to exercise its discretion include judicial economy, convenience and fairness to the litigants, comity to the states, and the promotion of justice between the parties. See Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 349 (1988) (citing Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966)). This is not, however, a case in which the "federal-law claims have dropped out of the lawsuit in its early stages and only state-law claims remain," such that the balance of factors indicates that the case properly belongs in state court. Carnegie-Mellon, 484 U.S. at 350. Instead, discovery in this case is complete, the dispositive motions have been filed and ruled upon, and had Berman's not filed the instant motion, the parties would now be on the eve of trial. Judicial economy and convenience and fairness to the litigants thus weigh strongly in favor of the Court's continued jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' state law claims, even if the Court's basis for federal jurisdiction drops away. Accordingly, unless Berman's payment would also moot Plaintiffs' MCPA and fraud claims, the Court will exercise its discretion to retain jurisdiction over those claims.
For a private enforcement proceeding under the MCPA, a claimant can recover only for actual injury or loss; punitive damages are not available. DeReggi Const. Co. v. Mate, 747 A.2d 743, 752 (Md. 2000); Mattingly v. Hughes Elecs. Corp., 107 F.Supp.2d 694, 698 (D. Md. 2000). As discussed above, Berman's unconditional payment was equal to the full amount of the actual damages Plaintiff alleges resulted from their transaction with Berman's. It was thus equal to the maximum amount of damages the jury could have awarded Plaintiffs if they prevailed on the merits of their MCPA claim, such that it would also suffice to moot that claim. In light of the practical considerations previously noted, if Berman's reissues and delivers to Plaintiffs the unconditional cashier's check equal to the amount of the down payment plus interest, it may submit proof of payment to the Court. The Court will then also dismiss Plaintiffs' MCPA claim as moot.
The same cannot be said of Plaintiffs' fraud claim. Under Maryland law, if Plaintiffs succeed on the merits of their fraud claim and establish that Berman's acted with actual malice, the jury could properly award them punitive damages in addition to any actual damages they establish. Ellerin v. Fairfax Savs., F.S.B., 652 A.2d 1117, 1126 (Md. 1995).
For the foregoing reasons, Berman's Motion to Dismiss is DENIED without prejudice. Actual and unconditional payment by Berman's to Plaintiffs via cashier's check in an amount equal to their down payment plus interest and delivery of that check to Plaintiffs will moot Plaintiffs' claims under TILA and the MCPA. It will not, however, moot Plaintiffs' fraud claim. If Berman's reissues a check to Plaintiffs, Berman's may re-file its motion and submit proof of its payment to the Court. At that point, Plaintiffs' TILA and MCPA claims will be dismissed. Regardless of whether those claims are dismissed, this case will proceed to trial on at least Plaintiffs' fraud claim. Plaintiffs' claim for attorney's fees and costs under TILA can be separately submitted after the remaining issues have been determined. Counsel are thus directed to notify my chambers no later than