SUSAN C. BUCKLEW, District Judge.
This cause comes before the Court on a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by
Plaintiff Joseph F. Kaminski claims that, in the months following the April 2010 drilling rig explosion and resulting oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, he gave three ideas for stopping the oil leak to Defendants BP Exploration & Production Inc. and BP America Production Co. ("BP") through a series of submissions. Plaintiff believes that BP used all three ideas, that each one helped BP's response efforts, and that BP now owes him millions of dollars.
After highlighting the events and information surrounding the Deepwater Horizon incident, the Court summarizes the facts surrounding Plaintiff's three ideas and their related communications. Because each idea more or less has its own timeline and set of facts, the background summary is organized accordingly.
The Deepwater Horizon was a drilling rig on the surface of the Gulf of Mexico that had been operating on the "Macondo" well in April 2010. Figure A is a basic illustration of the equipment used in the drilling operation:
Generally, a drilling rig supports a riser, which is a long steel pipe connecting the rig to a blowout preventer stack ("BOP stack") that sits on the top of the well in the seafloor. Inside the riser is the drill pipe, which runs from the rig, through the riser, through the BOP stack, and then down into the well. The BOP stack is a line of defense for preventing well blowouts. The BOP stack's lower portion is the blowout preventer, which has several mechanisms for sealing the drill pipe or completely shutting in a well; the upper portion is the lower marine riser package ("LMRP"), which also has devices for sealing the drill pipe or well.
On April 20, 2010, an explosion occurred on the Deepwater Horizon. Two days later, the rig sank; the riser broke off from the rig and fell to the seafloor. Oil began leaking from the broken riser.
A team of BP, government, and third-party engineers formed to develop plans for different containment efforts, including plans to collect oil from the broken riser. [Doc. 39, Ex. D]. The response effort involved different response teams working on multiple solutions. [Doc. 39, Exs. B, D].
On April 23, 2010, the Unified Area Command (
In late April 2010, the Alternative Response Technology (
The ART review process involved four stages, with the idea contributor being updated at each stage. [Doc. 39, Ex. I at ¶ 6, Ex. K at 3-5]. At the first stage of ART review, engineers — BP employees or contractors who were not members of the Deepwater Horizon response teams that would ultimately consider ideas for potential use — conducted a preliminary evaluation by screening submissions for various criteria, such as feasibility, utility, and novelty. [Doc. 39, Ex. I at ¶¶ 8-12]. If a submission was not feasible, not possible, or previously considered, it would not proceed to the next stage for further consideration and the submitter would be sent a notification email. [Id. at ¶ 8; Doc. 39, Ex. K at 4]. However, if a submission passed the preliminary evaluation at the first stage, it would be reviewed further at the second and third stages by a more senior team of engineers on the ART team. [Doc. 39, Ex. I at ¶ 10]. At stage four, the idea would undergo additional review and field testing. [Id.]
Only idea submissions that survived the four-stage vetting process were provided to the response teams for consideration for potential use in the response efforts. [Id.]. A number of ideas survived the ART process and were used in response operations; these submissions were publicly acknowledged. [Id. at ¶ 15; Doc. 39, Ex. J].
Plaintiff's complaint alleges that his "insertion pipe idea [was] to insert a smaller pipe into the broken [riser] pipe past the break and inflate sealing rings" and that "it is imperative that BP add lines to pull the insertion pipe in and hold it in place" (
On May 11, 2010, at approximately 10:00 p.m. EST, BP submitted a document, titled "Flow Containment and Capture Recovery System: Tophat and Riser Insertion Tube
On May 11, 2010, at 10:24 p.m., Plaintiff called the "BP Help Hotline" to propose his insertion pipe idea. [Doc. 2 at ¶¶ 11, 38; Pl. Depo. Tr., Doc. 52-2, 119:03-07]. The call representative requested Plaintiff's email address in order to forward him a form to fill out. [Doc. 2 at ¶¶ 11, 38]. This call lasted about six minutes. [Pl. Depo. Tr., Doc. 52-2, 107:24-108:07].
A few minutes later, at 10:33 p.m., the Horizon Support Team (
[Doc. 39, Ex. M].
On May 12, 2010, at 2:49 p.m., Plaintiff submitted a completed ART form describing the insertion pipe idea that he had discussed on his prior phone call. [Doc. 2, ¶¶ 40, 86; Doc. 39, Ex. N]. The "brief description of technology" field stated, in part:
[Doc. 39, Ex. N]. The "expertise required / expertise offered" field stated, in part:
[Doc. 39, Ex. N]. A few hours later, at 7:19 p.m., Plaintiff received an email from HST notifying him that his idea submission was reviewed but had been determined to be inapplicable (
[Doc. 40, Ex. K].
On May 13, 2010, at 12:46 a.m., Plaintiff replied to the first rejection email, which included the following excerpts:
[Doc. 40, Ex. K]. A few hours later, at 8:13 a.m., Plaintiff received an email that was identical to the first rejection email (
Sometime during the morning of May 13, 2010, Plaintiff also sent a communication to the website of his district's congressman, U.S. Congressman Gus Bilirakis, to complain that BP was automatically rejecting his submissions. [Pl. Depo. Tr., Doc. 52-2, 176:7-10; 76:6-22]. Around 1:30 p.m., Plaintiff received a call from Congressman Bilirakis's staff member, Elizabeth Hittos. [Pl. Depo. Tr., Doc. 52-2, 211:18-22].
At that time, Hittos's position was legislative counsel, and her duties generally involved advising Congressman Bilirakis on pending bills, drafting legislation, and preparing memoranda relating to issue areas that were assigned to her. [Hittos
During his call with Hittos, Plaintiff began explaining his insertion pipe idea and, after a few minutes, Hittos said that she would call him back after getting a "three-way going." [Doc. 2 at ¶ 44; Pl. Depo. Tr., Doc. 52-2, 189:12-13]. A few minutes later, Hittos called Plaintiff back. [Pl. Depo. Tr., Doc. 52-2, 189:12-13].
At this point, Plaintiff believed he was on a conference call with Hittos and BP representatives, during which BP representatives conveyed questions about Plaintiff's insertion pipe idea to Hittos, who would relay the questions to Plaintiff. [Id. at 176:24-180:13]. Plaintiff contends he answered the questions and explained: (1) where to get inflatable seals; (2) readily-available flap seals could be used in lieu of inflatable seals; and (3) at least three, maybe five, seals would be needed. [Doc. 2, ¶ 44; Pl. Depo. Tr., Doc. 52-2, 204:5-207:1].
Plaintiff believes that the conference call with Hittos and the BP representatives lasted about twenty minutes, after which the BP representatives disconnected and Hittos remained on the phone with Plaintiff. [Pl. Depo. Tr., Doc. 52-2, 210:3-18, 211:18-22]. Plaintiff told Hittos that his prior email to HST stated that he wanted two million dollars, and Hittos asked him to forward her the emails that he had sent to HST. [Id. at 210:15-18].
Soon after ending his call with Hittos, Plaintiff heard a press release or an announcement on the radio that BP had decided on a "recent new proposal."
[Doc. 39, Ex. P; Pl. Depo. Tr., Doc. 52-2, 215:2-216:19]. Stating that BP needed him to explain how his idea would work, Plaintiff requested that BP allow him to help. [Doc. 39, Ex. P].
At 3:01 p.m., Plaintiff forwarded to Hittos the email that he had sent HST earlier that day at 12:46 a.m. and a copy of the ART form. [Doc. 2, ¶ 50; Doc. 40, Ex. K]. At 3:23 p.m. and 4:40 p.m., Plaintiff emailed her additional information regarding his insertion pipe idea. [Doc. 40, Ex. K].
At 5:29 p.m., Plaintiff sent Hittos an email stating that BP was "trying to exclude [him] on [his] idea and [was] also making a mistake," and that Plaintiff had "no information of the detail design of what they are doing [and][t]here is no way to know without it if what they are planning will work." [Doc. 2 at ¶ 56; Doc. 39, Ex. Y]. At 7:56 p.m., Plaintiff emailed her again; Plaintiff alleges this email "makes it clear that BP need[ed] to have the lines on the insertion pipe in order to pull the insertion pipe in and hold it in." [Doc. 2 at ¶ 58; Doc. 40, Ex. K].
On May 14, 2010, at 3:10 p.m., Plaintiff received an email from HST that was identical to the first and second rejection emails (
At 10:43 p.m., Hittos emailed Plaintiff, stating: "I'd like to forward you a slide show of BP's plan. Take a look and specifically tell me where they are going wrong. I would like to point out their inherent mistakes in our next conference call." [Doc. 40, Ex. K]. Hittos testified that "if a constituent claim[ed] to have expertise in any particular area[,][she] would often times forward them material and ask for... their opinion." [Doc. 52-1, 24:24-25:12].
At 10:45 p.m., Hittos forwarded Plaintiff an email that she had received from Brian Miller — a congressional liaison for BP that was working with congressional staffers — regarding the "Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill Response Update" from "05/14/2010-3:00pm EST."
[Doc. 39, Ex. C]. Plaintiff alleges that this RITT was his insertion pipe idea. [Doc. 2 at ¶ 61].
On May 15, 2010, at 12:16 a.m., Plaintiff emailed his answers in response to Hittos' May 14th email. [Doc. 2 at ¶ 62]. Later that morning, at 2:50 a.m., Plaintiff sent
[Doc. 39, Ex. KK]. Plaintiff alleges that the email reiterated "that it is imperative that BP add lines to pull the insertion pipe in and hold it in place." [Doc. 2 at ¶ 64].
At 12:54 p.m., Hittos sent an email to Plaintiff, forwarding a May 16, 2010 update, titled "Update on Riser Insertion Tube Tool progress,"
Plaintiff alleges that he submitted an idea to modify the "top hat" by injecting warm upper seawater into the top hat to create a thermal lifting action (
On May 15, 2010, at 5:30 p.m., Plaintiff emailed Hittos regarding his idea to place a top hat over the insertion pipe:
[Doc. 40, Ex. K; Pl. Depo. Tr., Doc. 52-2, 245:14-250:20].
At 8:11 p.m., Plaintiff emailed Hittos to suggest injecting warm upper seawater into the top hat — which would be placed over the RITT, not the LMRP — to create a thermal lifting action. [Doc. 40, Ex. K; Doc. 52-2, 251:1-252:9, 261:23-263:11].
At 9:22 p.m., Hittos emailed Plaintiff, stating "Instead of meeting at 10am next Friday, [May 21, 2010,] let's meet at 230pm. I can then let you listen in to the 300pm conference call with the unified command." [Doc. 2 at ¶ 67; Doc. 40, Ex. K]. Plaintiff testified that he never listened in on that conference call; he believed that because the insertion pipe was working, the conference call was no longer necessary. [Doc. 52-2, 257:10-258:4].
Plaintiff's complaint alleges that, at some time on May 17, 2010, he saw a press release. [Doc. 2 at ¶ 74]. Based on this, Plaintiff allegedly knew that BP had used "precisely the modification suggested by [him] on May 15, 2010." [Id.]. On May 17, 2010, at 11:03 a.m., Hittos emailed Plaintiff, stating:
[Doc. 40, Ex. K].
On May 22, 2010, BP submitted a document, titled "Flow Containment and Capture Recovery System: Top Hat Over Horizon LMRP" ("LMRP Top Hat Procedure") for approval. This document shows the processes and equipment for the LMRP Top Hat to be deployed at the end of the Deepwater Horizon riser, and accurately describes the LMRP Top Hat that was used in the Deepwater Horizon response. [Doc. 39, Exs. DD, F]. The LMRP Top Hat Procedure was approved on May 25, 2010 and May 26, 2010. [Id.].
Plaintiff's complaint alleges that from May 19, 2010 through July 2010, he worked "to develop a viable `remove the riser' plan that would allow for the installation of a BOP on top," which involved: (1) "devis[ing] a stint pipe, later called the `Riser Spool' by BP;" (2) providing plans "to cradle the old riser pipe with surface ship lines and steer it away as it is cut off, blown off, or unbolted;" and (3) providing plans for installing two pins "(one long & one short) in the riser spool to allow it to be mated to the old riser pipe adapter plate" (
Plaintiff testified that he emailed Hittos, on May 19, 2010 at 9:29 a.m., about his riser spool and two-pin design idea. [Pl. Depo. Tr., Doc. 52-2, 269:18-270:24]. On
[Doc. 39, Ex. R]. On June 12, 2010, Plaintiff made another ART submission:
[Doc. 39, Ex. S]. Plaintiff received emails from HST on June 16, 2010 and June 24, 2010, respectively notifying him that his idea could not be applied and that a similar approach had already been considered. [Doc. 39, Exs. T, U].
On May 25, 2010, Hittos emailed Brian Miller regarding Plaintiff, stating that "we have a retired NASA scientist/engineer who lives in our district and has been in constant communication with me since the explosion of the Deepwater Horizon" and that:
[Doc. 40, Ex. K]. Hittos received the following response:
[Id.]. Hittos replied, "Will do. I'll encourage him to click on the below link although that's been my mantra for weeks." [Id.]. At 3:46 p.m., she forwarded BP's responses to Plaintiff. [Id.].
Hittos testified that when she received idea submissions from constituents, she would have likely have directed them to the Deepwater Horizon response website. [Hittos Depo. Tr., Doc. 52-1, 63:9-25, 72:18-75:22]. She also would have likely forwarded their ideas to an email address that BP had set up for congressional staffers, or if more personalized, to Brian Miller. [Id. at 54:13-21; 57:12-15, 63:9-21; 72:18-75:22]. Hittos testified that she forwarded ideas submitted by constituents other than Plaintiff, but she could not recall to whom or how she forwarded Plaintiff's emails. [Id. at 62:16-21, 72:18-75:22].
In his breach of contract implied in fact claims, Plaintiff alleges that BP agreed to compensate him "in the amount of at least two million" dollars if BP used his novel and concrete insertion pipe idea (count I), top hat with thermal lifting action idea (count II), and riser spool and two-pin design idea (count III). Each count alleges that BP in fact used his idea but failed to pay him. [Id. at ¶¶ 115-16, 121-22, 127-28].
In his unjust enrichment claims, Plaintiff alleges that he conferred a benefit to BP — the use of his novel and concrete insertion pipe idea (count IV), top hat with thermal lifting action idea (count V), and riser spool and two-pin design idea (count VI) — and BP knowingly accepted and retained that benefit. [Id. at ¶¶ 130-31, 135-36, 140-41]. Each count alleges that BP's use of Plaintiff's idea has saved BP money by reducing its litigation liability and civil penalties by billions of dollars and that BP's failure to pay the value of his idea is inequitable under the circumstances. [Id. at ¶¶ 132-33, 137-38, 141-42].
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The Court must draw all inferences from the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant and resolve all reasonable doubts in that party's favor. See Porter v. Ray, 461 F.3d 1315, 1320 (11th Cir.2006) (citation omitted). The moving party bears the initial burden of showing the Court, by reference to materials on file, that there are no genuine issues of material fact that should be decided at trial. See id. When a moving party has discharged its burden, the non-moving party must then go beyond the pleadings, and by its own affidavits, or by depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts.
BP makes several alternate arguments as to why summary judgment should be entered in its favor on all of Plaintiff's breach of implied-in-fact contract and unjust enrichment claims, including: (1) federal patent law bars Plaintiff's claims, (2) Florida Statute § 501.972 bars Plaintiff's claims, and (3) Plaintiff's ideas were not used, novel, or concrete. BP also argues that Plaintiff's breach of implied-in-fact
However, the Court need not address all of BP's arguments because the determination of two — that Florida Statutes § 501.972 applies, and that BP never used Plaintiff's ideas — provide alternate bases for granting summary judgment in favor of BP on counts I through VI.
BP argues that Plaintiff's breach of contract and unjust enrichment claims are barred by Section 501.972 of the Florida Statutes, which is titled "Actions based upon use of a creation that is not protected under federal copyright law," and states:
Fla. Stat. § 501.972 (2006).
BP argues that this statute bars Plaintiff's claims because the record shows that BP did not sign (or write) any writing indicating the existence of a contract governing the use of Plaintiff's idea submissions. In response, Plaintiff asserts that BP's argument is wrong because "[a] written contract is not required for" his claims.
The Florida Legislature enacted Section 501.972, effective July 1, 2006. See 2006 Fla. Sess. Law, c. 2006-196, § 4. BP does not provide any cases addressing the statute's scope or otherwise interpreting the statutory language, and the Court's own research has found none. Given that the plain language of the statute requires understanding what would be protected under federal copyright law, the Court reviews relevant sections of the Copyright Act before interpreting Section 501.972 to determine how and whether it applies here.
Section 102(a) of the Copyright Act, titled "Subject matter of copyright," provides in part that copyright protection may extend to "original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression," including, for example, literary, musical, or architectural works.
17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (emphasis added). Thus, "ideas are substantively excluded from the protection of the Copyright Act," even though expression of ideas may be protected. Dunlap v. G & L Holding Group, Inc., 381 F.3d 1285, 1295 (11th Cir.2004) (holding that the plaintiff's "idea to create an Internet-based bank that would cater to the gay and lesbian community" was excluded from copyright protection); id. at 1294 (quoting Nimmer on Copyright, § 1.01[B][2][c] at 1-58 (2004) ("the Copyright Act does not extend protection to ideas as distinguished from their expression") (quotation marks omitted)).
Turning to Section 501.972(1), its language — regarding "use of an idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, discovery, thought," id. (emphasis added) — shows that it applies to items that are excluded from copyright protection under Section 102(b) of the Copyright Act; and its language — regarding "use of ... other creation that is not a work of authorship protected under federal copyright law," id. (emphasis added) — likewise shows that it applies to items that are not protected under Section 102(a). Here, Plaintiff's ideas are not works of authorship and are expressly excluded from protection under the Copyright Act; Section 501.972 therefore applies to BP's use of Plaintiff's idea.
Further, Plaintiff has not asserted any cause of action that is excepted from the reach of Section 501.972(1). His claims are neither "cause[s] of actions based in copyright, trademark, patent, or trade secret" nor "defense[s] raised in connection with" those causes of action. Fla. Stat. § 501.972(2). Thus, BP's use of Plaintiff's ideas cannot support his breach of implied-in-fact contract claims or his unjust enrichment claims, unless Plaintiff and BP "have executed a writing sufficient to indicate that a contract has been made between them governing such use." Fla. Stat. § 501.972(1).
Plaintiff's complaint contains no allegation — and the record lacks any facts reasonably showing — that BP executed any writing, let alone one sufficiently indicating that BP and Plaintiff made a contract governing BP's use of his ideas. To the extent an email from BP to Plaintiff could constitute a "writing," BP's emails lack any indication that BP assented to any contract terms concerning the use of his ideas or that any of the other hallmarks of contract formation were addressed. See St. Joe Corp. v. McIver, 875 So.2d 375, 381 (Fla.2004) (a valid contract requires "offer, acceptance, consideration and sufficient specification of essential terms"). Rather, BP's emails responded to Plaintiff's ART submissions and notified him that his ideas could not be applied or had already been considered. Nor is any email from Hittos a communication from BP, as no facts show that she was BP's agent; and even if she could, no email indicates BP and Plaintiff made a contract governing BP's use of Plaintiff's ideas.
While Plaintiff is correct that a cause of action based on an implied-in-fact contract or an unjust enrichment theory does not require a written contract, statutes may impose limitations on such causes of actions. For example, Florida's statute of frauds limits certain breach of oral contract causations where there is no "note or memorandum ... in writing." Fla. Stat.
Based on the record before the Court, viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding whether BP and Plaintiff executed any writing sufficient to indicate that they made a contract governing BP's alleged use of Plaintiff's ideas. Under Section 501.972, Plaintiff's breach of contract and unjust enrichment claims based on BP's alleged use of Plaintiff's ideas are barred as a matter of Florida law. Accordingly, BP's motion for summary judgment is granted on all counts.
However, even if Section 501.972 does not apply to bar Plaintiff's claims, BP would still be entitled to summary judgment on all counts, because the record shows no genuine issue of material fact as to whether BP used Plaintiff's ideas.
For each breach of implied-in-fact contract claim, Plaintiff must prove: (1) a valid contract existed between BP and Plaintiff, (2) BP materially breached their contract, and (3) the breach caused Plaintiff damages. See Havens v. Coast Fla., P.A., 117 So.3d 1179, 1181 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013). For each unjust enrichment claim, Plaintiff must prove: (1) Plaintiff conferred a benefit on BP, (2) BP had knowledge of the benefit, (3) BP accepted or retained the benefit, and (4) the circumstances show it would be inequitable for BP to retain, without paying the fair value of, the benefit. Commerce P'ship 8098 Ltd. P'ship v. Equity Contracting Co., 695 So.2d 383, 386 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997).
Whether BP used Plaintiff's ideas is a fact material to, and in this case dispositive of, Plaintiff's claims. If BP did not use Plaintiff's ideas, BP did not breach their contract (even if the Court assumes a contract was formed) and was not conferred a benefit. No genuine issue of fact exists as to whether BP used any of Plaintiff's ideas, and BP is therefore entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law on counts I through VI.
Before analyzing each one of Plaintiff's ideas (and its related breach of implied-in-fact contract count and unjust enrichment count), the Court first reviews a set of facts regarding the ART review process. An idea submitted by a member of the general public — whether directly via a designated phone number, email, or Deepwater Horizon website, or indirectly via the constituent's congress member — was screened and evaluated under the four-stage ART review process. Only when an idea survived the four-stage ART process would the Deepwater Horizon response teams consider it for potential use in the response efforts. Thus, the response teams would not have considered an idea submitted by Plaintiff if his idea had not
In counts I and IV, Plaintiff alleges that BP used his insertion pipe idea — to insert a smaller pipe into the broken pipe past the broken riser and to inflate sealing rings. BP argues that it did not use his insertion pipe idea, because: (1) it was never submitted to the Deepwater Horizon response teams, and (2) it is different from the RITT implemented by BP.
BP argues that Plaintiff's insertion pipe idea was never provided to the response teams, because his idea did not proceed beyond ART's first stage of preliminary screening, and because Hittos did not forward Plaintiff's communications regarding his insertion pipe idea. In response, Plaintiff points to Hittos's deposition testimony that she "forwarded all of his emails" containing his ideas, and based on this, he argues that his insertion pipe idea was in fact provided to the response teams. [Doc. 40 at 18].
However, evidence that Hittos forwarded Plaintiff's emails to someone at BP does not create a genuine issue as to whether his insertion pipe idea was submitted to the response teams. No evidence shows that Hittos forwarded Plaintiff's emails to the response teams. While the record, viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, suggests Hittos may have forwarded Plaintiff's emails to UAC, Brian Miller, or some other BP representative, BP's affidavit establishes that BP representatives who received constituent submissions from congressional staff members were instructed to send them to the ART team so that they could be reviewed under the four-stage ART vetting process, and to inform the congressional staff members to direct their constituents to the designated website for ART submissions. This is consistent with the response that Hittos received after her May 25, 2010 email to Miller asking if there is any person at UAC to whom she could direct Plaintiff's emails. She was advised to encourage Plaintiff to submit his ideas through the website designated for submissions for ART review. No evidence indicates that Hittos forwarded Plaintiff's ideas to directly to the response teams. Further, BP has provided an affidavit that Plaintiff's ideas were never submitted to the response teams because they never passed the first stage of the ART review process.
In addition, Plaintiff received emails from HST on May 12, 2010 and May 13, 2010, notifying him that his submissions could not be implemented. As for Plaintiff's assertion that he participated in a 1:30 p.m. conference call with Hittos and BP representatives on May 13, 2010, during which he explained his insertion pipe idea, Plaintiff did not know who those BP representatives were and no evidence suggests that they were members of the response teams.
No genuine issue of fact exists that Plaintiff's insertion pipe idea was not provided to the response teams for consideration for potential use. Accordingly, BP is entitled to summary judgment.
Even if a genuine issue of fact existed as to whether the response teams received and considered Plaintiff's insertion pipe idea for potential use, summary judgment
BP submitted an affidavit and an expert report in support of BP's argument that Plaintiff's idea was different from BP's RITT in multiple, significant ways. For example, Plaintiff's idea used strain lines attached to top hats on the seafloor. [Doc. 39, Ex. KK]. Further, a diverter or safety valve was a critical part of his insertion pipe idea. [Pl. Depo. Tr., Doc. 52-2, 163:24-164:03]. BP's affidavit and expert report show that neither of these aspects were used on the RITT that was implemented, and the expert report concludes that BP's RITT was fundamentally different. [Doc. 39, Exs. DD, E].
Plaintiff argues that the RITT Procedures (submitted for approval on May 11, 2010) do not illustrate the RITT that was ultimately implemented by BP. However, Plaintiff's argument is mere conjecture and is unsupported by facts or evidence. Plaintiff's remaining arguments in response are equally meritless. Plaintiff argues that BP pre-dated or altered their evidence, but he presents no facts to support his claim. Next, pointing to this litigation's pre-trial and discovery procedures, Plaintiff asserts that BP delayed the discovery process by producing documents seven days after the discovery deadline, and argues that the Court should not consider those documents. Plaintiff contends he received the expert report on May 1, 2013. However, this would have been timely under the Court's case management order.
The record, viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, shows no genuine issue of material fact as to whether BP used his insertion pipe idea. It did not. Plaintiff's breach of implied-in-fact contract and unjust enrichment claims therefore fail. Accordingly, BP's motion for summary judgment is granted as to count I and count IV.
In counts II and V, Plaintiff alleges that BP used his idea for a top hat with thermal lifting action, because BP modified all of its top hats to inject warm upper seawater into the top hat. [Doc. 2 at ¶¶ 74, 121, 137].
The record shows that Plaintiff suggested his top hat with thermal lifting action idea in several emails sent to Hittos. As discussed above, that Hittos may have forwarded these to someone at BP does not create a genuine issue of fact as to whether his top hat with thermal lifting action idea was submitted to the response teams for consideration.
Even if the record contained some evidence that the response teams considered Plaintiff's top hat with thermal lifting action idea, BP would still be entitled to summary judgment. BP submitted an affidavit and an expert report supporting BP's argument that Plaintiff's top hat with thermal lifting action idea was fundamentally different from what was implemented by BP. [Doc. 39, Exs. DD, E]. The affidavit and expert report's analysis show the factual differences between BP's top hat method and Plaintiff's top hat with thermal lifting action idea, and the expert report concludes that there are multiple, substantial differences. For example, Plaintiff's idea required injecting warm surface seawater into a top hat; but the mechanism
Plaintiff responds that BP did in fact inject water into the top hat. However, the sole support for his argument is a line taken from an article titled, "BP oil leak setback: `Top hat' removed, oil flow unhindered," from the "McClatchy Washington Bureau" newspaper, reporting on a press release from the United States Coast Guard. [Doc. 40, Ex. H]. This unauthenticated article is impermissible hearsay that is insufficient to create a genuine dispute as to whether BP's top hat method involved injecting water into the riser, rather than the top hat.
Because the record clearly shows that Plaintiff's top hat with thermal lifting action idea was not submitted to the response teams and was not the same as that implemented by BP, there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether BP used it. Thus, Plaintiff's breach of implied-in-fact contract and unjust enrichment claims based on BP's use of Plaintiff's top hat with thermal lifting action idea fail. Accordingly, BP's motion for summary judgment is granted as to count II and count V.
In counts III and VI, Plaintiff alleges that BP's "capping stack" mechanism used his riser spool and two-pin design idea. [Doc. 2 at ¶¶ 110, 127, 142].
The record indicates that Plaintiff sent his riser spool and two-pin design idea by emailing Hittos and by submitting forms for ART review. However, Plaintiff received emails from HST notifying him that his submissions could not be implemented or had been previously considered. The emails from HST show that his idea did not proceed beyond the first stage of ART review and therefore was never submitted to the response teams for consideration. Further, as discussed above, that Hittos may have passed along his idea does not create a genuine issue as to whether it was submitted to the response teams. Plaintiff has offered no evidence indicating that the response teams received and considered his ideas for potential use. Accordingly, no genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether BP used Plaintiff's riser spool and two-pin design idea. It did not.
Summary judgment for BP is also warranted because the record shows that Plaintiff's riser spool and two-pin design idea was not the same as the mechanism implemented by BP. BP's expert report showed the substantial differences between BP's method and Plaintiff's riser spool and two-pin design idea. [Doc. 39, Ex. E]. For example, Plaintiff's submission proposed removing the broken riser by unbolting the riser while it was still intact. [Id. at 15]. However, BP's method was substantially different — BP used a diamond saw and shear to cut the riser into pieces before unbolting the remaining stub. [Id.]. In an email to Hittos, Plaintiff even disagreed with the method of using a shear to cut the riser because it "could result in sustaining a totally unrecoverable situation." [Ex. 39, Ex. NN].
Plaintiff's idea was also significantly different because it required aligning a "stint pipe" using only two pins of different lengths, whereas BP's method aligned the actual transition spool by using a "mule shoe" and rotating it until the guide pins (which did not require one long and one
Plaintiff's breach of implied-in-fact contract and unjust enrichment claims based on BP's use of his riser spool and two-pin design idea therefore fail. Accordingly, BP's motion for summary judgment is granted as to count III and count VI.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants BP Exploration & Production Inc. and BP America Production Co. [Doc. 39] is