GREGORY A. PRESNELL, District Judge.
This cause comes before the Court on a Motion to Tax Costs and Fees (Doc. 176) filed by Defendants Mayo Group Development, L.L.C. ("Mayo") and LHB Realty, L.L.C. ("LHB"); and a response (Doc. 183) filed by Plaintiffs Patrick North, Reynaldo Antunes Padilla, Jr., Elia Padilla Mungia, and Reynaldo Antunes Padilla, Sr.
Trial was held in this case beginning on April 22, 2013 and a jury verdict was entered on April 25, 2013. (Doc. 171). The jury found in favor of Plaintiffs and awarded $46,265.00 in medical and funeral expenses, but it also found that Plaintiffs' decedent was 80% responsible for such damages. The court entered a final judgment on April 26, 2013, ruling that Plaintiffs were entitled to recover damages from Defendant LHB Realty, LLC and J.M. Realty Management, Inc. ("JM"), in the amount of $4,626.50 (Doc. 172). Defendants now move for attorney's fees pursuant to Florida's "offer of judgment" statute which provides, in relevant part,
Fla. Stat. § 768.79(1). LHB served Plaintiffs with a written Proposal for Settlement (the "Proposal") on January 10, 2012. It states, in relevant part,
Plaintiffs contend the Proposal is invalid and Defendants' costs and fees are not recoverable.
Plaintiffs first argue that the Proposal fails to differentiate the settlement amount among each of the Plaintiffs. It is true that each party who receives an offer of settlement is entitled to evaluate the offer as it pertains to him or her, and when a lack of apportionment between offerees prevents them from evaluating the offer independently, the joint offer is unenforceable. C & S Chemicals, Inc. v. McDougald, 754 So.2d 795, 797 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). However, a defendant need not apportion a proposed settlement when a personal representative is acting on behalf of the estate and survivors. Dudley v. McCormick, 799 So.2d 436, 441 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001). Since Plaintiff Patrick North is the personal representative of the estate, LHB was not required to apportion the settlement amount among the Plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs insist that the Proposal was a "joint proposal" by all the Defendants, since it expressed that LHB, Mayo and JM would be dismissed with prejudice. See Arnold v. Audiffred, 98 So.3d 746, 749 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (finding offer was a joint proposal since it offered both appellees to dismiss their claims against appellant). Plaintiffs also argue that since the Proposal was a joint proposal, it should have specified the settlement amounts contributed by each of the Defendants. However, the Proposal was not a joint proposal. The Proposal was made by LHB and the dismissal of claims against JM and Mayo were merely conditions of the Proposal, not an attempt to modify the Proposal to be a joint proposal by LHB, JM and Mayo. See Alioto-Alexander v. Toll Bros., Inc., 12 So.3d 915 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (concluding that dismissal of the entire suit, including claims against employee, was simply a condition of the settlement proposal and did not serve to transform the proposal into one made by multiple offerors).
Plaintiffs further contend that the Proposal is ambiguous. Under Florida law, a proposal for settlement must "state with particularity all nonmonetary terms of the proposal." Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.442; State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. v. Nichols, 932 So.2d 1067, 1078 (Fla. 2006). A release included in such a proposal must "eliminate any reasonable ambiguity about its scope." Id. at 1079; Lucas v. Calhoun, 813 So.2d 971, 973 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002). The Florida Supreme Court explained, however, that,
Nichols, 932 So. 2d at 1079.
Plaintiffs rely on Saenz v. Campos, which involved a clearly ambiguous settlement proposal, because one paragraph stated the proposal was intended to "resolve all claims" and another paragraph stated "in full settlement of the claims raised in the suit." Saenz v. Campos, 967 So.2d 1114, 1115 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (emphasis added). However, there is no such ambiguity in the Proposal in this case. LHB's intentions to settle "all claims of Plaintiff Patrick North . . . arising from the above-captioned lawsuit" are clear from the Proposal.
Plaintiffs also rely on Nichols, which involved an insurance dispute between State Farm, and its insured Nichols. Nichols, 932 So.2d 1067, 1078. Nichols was injured in a car accident and sued State Farm for unpaid personal injury protection (PIP) benefits. While the suit was pending, State Farm served Nichols with a proposal for settlement which included a release. The proposal required that Nichols "execute a General Release in favor of State Farm, which will be expressly limited to all claims, causes of action, etc., that have accrued through the date of Nichols's acceptance of this Proposal." Id. at 1071. At the time of the proposal however, Nichols "also had an outstanding uninsured motorist ("UM") claim arising from the same accident . . . . Fearing that the release would extinguish both the PIP claim and the UM claim, Nichols rejected the offer. State Farm later claimed that it did not intend for the release to extinguish the UM claim." Id. The Florida Supreme Court held that the proposal was ambiguous because it did not clarify which outstanding claim would be extinguished. Id. at 1080. This case is different. Plaintiffs failed to cite any outstanding claims that would have affected their decision to accept or reject the Proposal.
Plaintiffs argue that pursuant to Nichols, the mere use of broad phrases such as "all claims, causes of action, etc." is ambiguous. While such general releases can be broad when read in isolation, the question is whether a fair reading of the Proposal as a whole is ambiguous. U.S. Specialty Ins. Co. v. Burd, 6:09-CV-231-ORL-31, 2012 WL 3242997 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 8, 2012). As a whole, the Proposal is sufficiently clear and definite. There is no ambiguity that could have reasonably affected the Plaintiffs' decision.
It is therefore,