GREGORY J. KELLY, District Judge.
Christopher Young (the "Claimant"), appeals to the District Court from a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (the "Commissioner") denying his application for disability insurance benefits filed on March 3, 2010, and his application for supplemental security income benefits filed on November 3, 2010. Doc. No. 1; R. 16.
The Commissioner's findings of fact are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla — i.e., the evidence must do more than merely create a suspicion of the existence of a fact, and must include such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support the conclusion. Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1560 (11th Cir. 1995) (citing Walden v. Schweiker, 672 F.2d 835, 838 (11th Cir. 1982) and Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)); accord Edwards v. Sullivan, 937 F.2d 580, 584 n.3 (11th Cir. 1991).
Where the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence, the District Court will affirm, even if the reviewer would have reached a contrary result as finder of fact, and even if the reviewer finds that the evidence preponderates against the Commissioner's decision. Edwards, 937 F.2d at 584 n.3; Barnes v. Sullivan, 932 F.2d 1356, 1358 (11th Cir. 1991). The District Court must view the evidence as a whole, taking into account evidence favorable as well as unfavorable to the decision. Foote, 67 F.3d at 1560; accord Lowery v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1992) (the court must scrutinize the entire record to determine reasonableness of factual findings); Parker v. Bowen, 793 F.2d 1177, 1180 (11th Cir. 1986) (the court also must consider evidence detracting from evidence on which Commissioner relied). The District Court "`may not decide the facts anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute [its] judgment for that of the [Commissioner].'" See Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1240 n.8 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983)).
Claimant argues that the ALJ did not develop a full and fair record because he did not obtain a neuropsychological report referenced in the record and medical records from his podiatrist. Doc. No. 26 at 2-3. The Commissioner argues that Claimant waived his right to be represented at the hearing, and, therefore, the ALJ did not have a "special duty" to develop the record, nor did the ALJ promise Claimant that he would obtain the records at issue. Doc. No. 28 at 6-8. Further, the Commissioner argues that Claimant has failed to demonstrate prejudice since the record contains ample evidence concerning his physical and mental impairments, which the ALJ considered in rendering his decision. Doc. No. 28 at 9-11.
The claimant bears the burden of proving that he or she is disabled, and, thus, is responsible for producing evidence to support his or her claim for disability. Ellison v. Barnhart, 355 F.3d 1272, 1276 (11th Cir. 2003) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.912(a), (c)). Nevertheless, since a hearing before an ALJ is not an adversarial proceeding, the ALJ has a basic obligation to develop a full and fair record. Graham v. Apfel, 129 F.3d 1420, 1422 (11th Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (citing Cowart v. Schweiker, 662 F.2d 731, 735 (11th Cir. 1981)). This obligation requires the ALJ to develop the claimant's complete medical history for at least the twelve (12) months preceding the month in which the application was filed. Ellison, 355 F.3d at 1276 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.912(d)). Further, this obligation applies regardless of whether the claimant is represented by counsel, but it rises to the level of a special duty when the claimant is unrepresented. Brown v. Shalala, 44 F.3d 931, 934-35 (11th Cir. 1995). By implication, where counsel has been waived, the special duty to develop the record does not take effect. Robinson v. Astrue, 235 F. App'x 725, 727 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing Brown, 44 F.3d at 934). In determining whether it is necessary to remand a case for development of the record, the Court considers "whether the record reveals evidentiary gaps which result in unfairness or clear prejudice." Brown, 44 F.3d at 935 (quotations and citations omitted).
On May 6, 2010, Dr. Malcolm J. Graham, III, performed a one-time mental health examination of Claimant. R. 419-21. In his report, Dr. Graham did not diagnose Claimant with any mental health impairments, noting that "there were no problems . . . in his attention or concentration, and there were no problems . . . in his recent or remote memory, although his response time on some of his attention and concentration tasks was somewhat slow." R. 421. Dr. Graham did not opine that Claimant has functional limitations caused by his mental health. See Id.
On June 8, 2010, Claimant's treating psychiatrist, Dr. Karl Isaacs, conducted a mental health evaluation, and referred Claimant to a neuropsychology specialist, Dr. Leonard Briscoe, Psy. D., to rule out dementia. R. 443.
Id.
Id.
Under the circumstances of this case, the Court finds that the ALJ did not develop a full and fair record.
The evidentiary gap created by the absence of the neuropsychological report results in clear prejudice. In May 2010, Dr. Graham performed a one-time mental health examination of Claimant and essentially opined that Claimant does not suffer from any mental impairments or functional limitations as a result of any mental impairments. R. 419-21. However, a month after Dr. Graham's examination, Claimant's treating psychiatrist referred him for a neuropsychological evaluation to rule out dementia. R. 443. The stated purpose of the evaluation was to "assess [Claimant's] current neurocognitive functioning due to reported progressive cognitive changes." R. 634. Though the neuropsychological report is not in the record, the summary of the results of the neuropsychological evaluation detailed above stand in stark contrast to Dr. Graham's findings and opinions concerning Claimant's mental health, as well as the opinions contained in the PRT's performed on June 24, 2010 and October 22, 2010. Compare R. 622 with R. 419-21, 449-62, 583-96. Given the summary of the neuropsychological evaluation, the Court finds that the neuropsychological report will more than likely contain medical opinions relevant to Claimant's functional capabilities and indicate that his functional capabilities are more restricted than those found by the ALJ. Accordingly, the Court finds that the ALJ's failure to obtain the neuropsychological report results in clear prejudice to Claimant.
For the reasons stated above, it is
