ROY K. ALTMAN, District Judge.
In her Motion, the Defendant—who was stopped, and whose car was searched, at the U.S.-Canada border—argues that the search of her cell phone violated her Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. See generally Mot. Specifically, the Defendant contends that the agents had neither probable cause
But, noting the current circuit-split on this issue,
Reasonable suspicion requires that a police officer "be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant [an] intrusion." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968). Reasonable suspicion, in other words, demands a "particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person"—a basis, in short, that regards the "whole picture." United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 695 (1981). Notably, in assessing whether the government agents had reasonable suspicion, the Court must "[look] at the totality of the circumstances from the perspective of an objectively reasonable police officer." United States v. Smith, 448 F. App'x 936, 938 (11th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted).
In United States v. Cotterman, the Ninth Circuit—sitting en banc—held that, based on the peculiar facts of that case, reasonable suspicion was required for a "forensic examination" of a laptop computer at the border. See Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 967-68. In that case, the Defendant, Howard Cotterman, was driving home from a vacation in Mexico when he was stopped at the border. See id. at 956. After conducting a "primary inspection," a border agent ran Cotterman's information and found that, years earlier, he had been convicted of: (i) two counts of use of a minor in sexual conduct, (ii) two counts of lewd and lascivious conduct upon a child, and (iii) three counts of child molestation. See id. at 957. Based on this information—and a tip that Cotterman might have been involved in child-sex tourism, see id.—the agent referred Cotterman to "secondary inspection," see id. The ensuing search of Cotterman's car yielded two laptop computers and three digital cameras—each of which contained a number of password-protected and encrypted files. See id. at 958. The agents seized the devices and sent them to an ICE
Relying on a Supreme Court case that had required reasonable suspicion for a border search involving a 24-hour detention and an invasive body cavity search, see United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531 (1985), the Ninth Circuit concluded that forensic examinations of laptop computers likewise demand reasonable suspicion, see Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 968. As the Ninth Circuit saw it, because computers "are simultaneously offices and personal diaries," id. at 964, which are "capable of storing warehouses full of information," id., they carry with them "a significant expectation of privacy," id. at 966. In sum, the court held, if the government wants to conduct an "exhaustive forensic search of a copied laptop hard drive," it must first establish "reasonable suspicion." Id.
To be sure, the Ninth Circuit's rule does not apply here in Florida. But, even if it did, the Defendant's Motion would be denied. At the hearing on the Defendant's Motion, the Court heard the testimony of four CBP
The testimony, in short, established that the agents searched the Defendant's car and phone—not because of some unjustified "hunch"—but because they were firmly in possession of "specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant[ed] [the] intrusion." Terry, 392 U.S. at 21. And, having observed the agents' testimony, the Court "credit[s] the agents' observations and experience in acting upon significant myriad factors that support reasonable suspicion" here. Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 970. Put simply, even if the Government had been required to demonstrate that it had reasonable suspicion to search the Defendant's car and phone, the evidence the Government submitted was more than sufficient to meet that burden.
Accordingly, the Defendant's Motion to Suppress [ECF No. 73] is