UNPUBLISHED

DECISION ON ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS1

MINDY MICHAELS ROTH, Special Master.

On December 11, 2015, Petitioner ("Mr. Nieto," or "petitioner") filed a petition for compensation under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program.2 Petitioner alleges that he suffered injuries, including Guillian-Barre Syndrome ("GBS"), as a result of receiving an influenza ("flu") vaccination on November 24, 2014. See Stipulation, filed Dec. 21, 2016, at ¶¶ 1-4. Respondent denied that the vaccination caused petitioner's injury, or his current condition. Id. at ¶ 6. Nevertheless, the parties agreed to settle the case. On December 21, 2016, the undersigned issued a decision awarding compensation to petitioner based on the parties' stipulations. Decision, ECF No. 26.

On February 22, 2017, petitioner filed a motion for attorneys' fees and costs. Motion for Attorneys' Fees ("Motion for Fees"), ECF No. 31. Petitioner requests attorneys' fees in the amount of $22,599.50 and $5,920.47 in costs, for a total of fees and costs in the amount of $28,519.97. Id. at 1. In accordance with General Order #9, petitioner's counsel represents that petitioner has incurred no out-of-pocket expenses. On March 15, 2017, respondent filed a response to petitioner's Motion for Fees. Response, ECF No. 32. Respondent provided no specific objection to the amount requested or hours worked, but instead, respondent "respectfully recommend[ed] that the special master exercise her discretion and determine reasonable award for attorneys' fees and costs." Id. at 3.

For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned awards petitioner a total of $28,512.37, representing $22,591.90 in attorneys' fees and $5,920.47 in costs.

I. Applicable Legal Standards

The Vaccine Act permits an award of "reasonable attorneys' fees" and "other costs." 42 U.S.C. § 300aa—15(e)(1). A petitioner need not prevail on entitlement to receive a fee award as long as petitioner brought the claim in "good faith" and with a "reasonable basis" to proceed. Id. When a petitioner prevails, as petitioner did in the instant case, the special master must assess whether the fees and costs requested by petitioner are "reasonable." Special Masters have "wide discretion in determining the reasonableness" of attorneys' fees and costs. See Perreira v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., 27 Fed. Cl. 29, 34 (1992), aff'd, 33 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1994); see also Saxton v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., 3 F.3d 1517, 1519 (Fed. Cir. 1993) ("Vaccine program special masters are also entitled to use their prior experience in reviewing fee applications").

A. Reasonable Hourly Rate

The Federal Circuit has approved use of the lodestar approach to determine reasonable attorneys' fees and costs under the Vaccine Act. Avera v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 515 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Using the lodestar approach, the court first determines "an initial estimate of a reasonable attorneys' fee by `multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation times a reasonable hourly rate.'" Id. at 1347-58 (quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 888 (1984)). Then, the Court may make an upward or downward departure from the initial calculation of the fee award based on other specific findings. Id. at 1348.

Counsel must submit fee requests that include contemporaneous and specific billing records indicating the service performed, the number of hours expended on the service, and the name of the person performing the service. See Savin v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 85 Fed. Cl. 313, 316-18 (2008). Counsel should not include in their fee requests hours that are "excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary." Saxton, 3 F.3d 1517 at 1521 (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983)). It is "well within the special master's discretion to reduce the hours to a number that, in his experience and judgment, [is] reasonable for the work done." Id. at 1522. Furthermore, the special master may reduce a fee request sua sponte, apart from objections raised by respondent and without providing petitioners with notice and opportunity to respond. See Sabella v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 86 Fed. Cl. 201, 209 (Fed. Cl. 2009). A special master need not engage in a line-by-line analysis of petitioner's fee application when reducing fees. See Broekelschen v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 102 Fed. Cl. 719, 729 (Fed. Cl. 2011).

In this case, petitioner requests compensation for her attorney, Ms. Durant, at a rate of $350.00 per hour for 2015 through 2016, and $365 per hour for 2017. The undersigned reviewed the fee application and finds the hourly rates for 2015 through 2016 to be reasonable and consistent with the rates at which Ms. Durant and her paralegal, Ms. Raina have been compensated in past cases. See e.g., Terrell v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., No. 13-334V, 2017 WL 1130947, at *2 (Fed. Cl. Mar. 2, 2017); Dipietro v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., No. 15-742V, 2016 WL 7384131, at *4 (Fed. Cl. Oct. 6, 2016); McCloud v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., No. 16-719V, 2016 WL 8077964, at *2 (Fed. Cl. Dec. 23, 2016).

On March 2, 2017, Chief Special Master Dorsey issued a decision setting 2017 forum hourly rates for Ms. Durant at $363. See Terrell, 2017 WL 1130947, at *2. The undersigned finds the Chief Special Master's reasoning to be persuasive, and hereby adopts the rates decided in Terrell as the rates for this analysis. Following the Chief Special Master's analysis, the undersigned will reduce Ms. Durant's requested 2017 rate of $365 per hour to $363. Therefore, Ms. Durant's fees for 2017 are reduced from $1,387.00 to $1,379.40.

B. Reasonable Costs

In this case, petitioner requests a total of $5,920.47 in attorneys' costs. Motion for Fees, ECF No 31 at 1. The requested costs consists of the costs of securing the medical records, analysis of the medical records, and shipping costs. The undersigned finds petitioners requested costs to be reasonable.

II. Total Award Summary

The Vaccine Act permits an award of reasonable attorneys' fees and costs. § 15(e). Based on the above, the undersigned finds that petitioner is entitled to the following award of reasonable attorneys' fees and costs:

For the reasons contained herein, a check, in the amount of $28,512.373 made payable jointly to petitioner and petitioner's counsel, Leah Durant, for petitioner's attorneys' fees and costs, shall be issued. The clerk of the court is directed to enter judgment in accordance with this decision.4

IT IS SO ORDERED.