PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON, District Judge.
On November 21, 2018, the court held a hearing on the motion of defendant Omar Guzman for release on bail pending appeal. Dkt. no. 81. Guzman was convicted of a single count of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) pursuant to a guilty plea and was sentenced to 21 months of imprisonment, 3 years of supervised release, and $100 special assessment on September 5, 2018. He filed a notice of appeal on September 13, 2018, and seeks release on bail pending appeal pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 46(c) and 18 U.S.C. § 3143(b)(1). The government opposes the motion for release pending appeal. Dkt. no. 84. Having considered the relevant legal authority, the parties' papers, the reports of Pretrial Services, the evidence in the record, and the arguments of counsel, the court DENIES the motion for release pending appeal for the reasons stated on the record and summarized below.
The Bail Reform Act provides, at 18 U.S.C. § 3143(b)(1), that a defendant convicted of a non-violent crime shall be detained pending appeal unless the court finds the following:
United States v. Handy, 761 F.2d 1279, 1283 (9th Cir. 1985). A substantial question is one that is "novel," "has not been decided by controlling precedent," or is "fairly debatable." Id. at 1282 & n.2 (quoting and adopting standard in United States v. Miller, 753 F.2d 19, 22-23 (3d Cir. 1985)).
Guzman contends that he neither is likely to flee nor poses a danger to the safety of any other person or the community if released pending appeal. However, he fails to satisfy this showing by clear and convincing evidence in light of his criminal history and conduct during pretrial release, as shown by both the government and Pretrial Services:
In light of this record, Guzman has not shown by clear and convincing evidence that he is not likely to flee. Guzman's recent revocation of pretrial release for absconding from the halfway house, as well as two previous violations of halfway house rules, his prior felony conviction for Evade Peace Officer: Disregard Safety and numerous traffic violation Failures to Appear, suggest that he presents a likelihood of non-appearance or flight. The mitigating factors in his record, such as lifelong residence in Northern California, employment history, lack of a passport, the lack of recent international travel, and the willingness of defendant's family members to co-sign an unsecured bond on the defendant's behalf, do not outweigh the factors indicating risk of flight.
Guzman suggests that he does not pose a safety risk, noting that during his time at the halfway house, he never threatened anyone, possessed a weapon, or jeopardized safety. Dkt. no. 85 (Reply) at 4-5. However, his criminal history and background, which includes felony carjacking, evading arrest, gang membership, and domestic violence, suggest that he poses a danger to the safety of another person or the community if released. Though Guzman's carjacking conviction is remote in time and holds limited weight, his more recent criminal conduct raises significant concerns that he would pose a danger to others if he were to be released pending appeal. In particular, Guzman's recent domestic violence conviction included a prohibition of the possession of any firearms and he was on two grants of probation at the time of the instant offense, indicating he is not amenable to community supervision. 10/12/17 Pretrial Services Addendum Report. His short history under supervision at the halfway house does not outweigh his history of violent and criminal conduct by clear and convincing evidence.
As to the second Handy requirement for granting bail pending appeal, it is undisputed that Guzman's appeal is not for purpose of delay. But for the reasons discussed above, Guzman fails to satisfy the first Handy requirement to show that he is neither likely to flee nor poses a danger to the safety of another if released.
Guzman asserts that his appeal raises a substantial question of law: whether federal and local authorities may prosecute a defendant for the same crime under the double jeopardy clause of the Sixth Amendment. Guzman's appeal challenges the long-standing dual sovereign exception that recognizes that state and federal governments may prosecute similar conduct without violating the Double Jeopardy Clause. See Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle, 136 S.Ct. 1863, 1871 (2016) ("the States are separate sovereigns from the Federal Government (and from one another)") (citing Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 195 (1959); Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 132-137 (1959); Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 88 (1985)). The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider this question in Gamble v. United States, No. 17-646: Whether the Court should overrule the "separate sovereigns" exception to the Double Jeopardy Clause.
Guzman contends that his appeal, challenging the federal felon in possession prosecution for conduct that was prosecuted by the state court, raises a substantial question in light of the Supreme Court's decision to review the dual sovereign doctrine in Gamble. In Gamble, as here, the defendant was indicted in district court for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), after he was convicted in Alabama state court for the same conduct as a prohibited person in violation of a firearm in violation of state law. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the federal conviction in the Southern District of Alabama, stating "unless and until the Supreme Court overturns Abbate, the double jeopardy claim must fail based on the dual sovereignty doctrine." United States v. Gamble, 694 Fed. Appx. 750, 751 (11th Cir. 2017), cert. granted, 138 S.Ct. 2707 (2018).
As Guzman points out, there is no Ninth Circuit authority addressing the question whether the Supreme Court's grant of a writ of certiorari indicates the presence of a "substantial question" under the Bail Reform Act. The fact that there is binding Supreme Court precedent on the issue raised in Guzman's appeal forecloses a finding of a novel, fairly debatable or fairly doubtful issue, or that the writ of certiorari granted in Gamble, in and of itself, indicates a substantial question. See Handy, 761 F.2d at 1282-83.
With respect to the fourth Handy prong, the parties do not genuinely dispute that the issue on appeal, if determined favorably, is likely to result in reversal. A favorable outcome on appeal, which would be dependent on the Supreme Court setting aside stare decisis to overrule the long-standing dual sovereignty doctrine in Gamble, would certainly result in Guzman's conviction being reversed. However, Guzman fails to make the requisite showing that his appeal, based solely on the grant of certiorari in Gamble, raises a substantial question of law.
For the reasons stated above and set forth in the record, defendant's motion for release on bail pending appeal is DENIED.