J. MARK COULSON, Magistrate Judge.
This case has been referred to me for all proceedings by the consent of the parties and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Local Rule 301. (ECF Nos. 18, 20, 22.) Presently pending before the Court is Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs. (ECF No. 70.) The matter has been fully briefed (ECF Nos. 69-74), and no hearing is necessary, Loc. R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2014). For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs' motion is DENIED.
This matter was originally filed on March 12, 2014 and stems from the Plaintiffs' purchase of an automobile from Defendant on February 25, 2014. The original Complaint included claims for violations of the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §1601-1667f ("TILA"), the Maryland Consumer Protection Act, Md. Code Ann., Com. Law §§ 13-101-13-501, and the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC") § 2-608. (Compl., ECF No. 1.) Jurisdiction in this Court was premised on 15 U.S.C. § 1640 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367.
The Complaint was amended on May 7, 2014 to add counts for common law deceit by non-disclosure or concealment and negligent misrepresentation, a violation of Code of Maryland Regulations ("COMAR") § 11.12.01.15(A), and a violation of Maryland Code Annotated, Commercial Law § 12-694. The UCC count was dropped. (Am. Compl., ECF No. 6.)
By order dated November 4, 2014, Chief Judge Blake of this Court granted, in part, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. As a result of that order, the remaining counts consisted of: a violation of TILA's "timing" requirement regarding disclosures,
The parties consented to proceed before a United States Magistrate Judge on December 16 and 17, 2014. (ECF Nos. 20, 22.) Defendant moved for summary judgment on the remainder of the Amended Complaint on July 17, 2015. (ECF. No. 27.) This Court granted Defendant's motion in part on September 28, 2015. (ECF No. 33.) As a result of that order, Plaintiffs' claims were further narrowed. Plaintiffs' TILA claim was limited to their actual damages (the failure of Defendant to return their $1200 deposit), and their fraud/deceit, negligent misrepresentation, and Maryland Consumer Protect Act claims remained.
On or about October 21, 2015, Defendant apparently tendered the $1200.00 plus interest to Plaintiffs and, on February 2, 2016, Defendant moved to dismiss based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (ECF No. 40.) By order dated March 21, 2016, this Court denied Defendant's motion without prejudice, instructing Defendant that if it submitted proof of delivery of a cashier's check in the amount of $1200.00 plus interest, the TILA claim, the negligent misrepresentation claim, and the Maryland Consumer Protection Act claim would be dismissed for mootness. (ECF No. 45.) The Court further indicated that it would retain jurisdiction over the remaining fraud claim to the extent it alleged punitive damages, under its supplemental jurisdiction.
On May 4, 2016, Defendant filed another motion to dismiss for mootness, having followed the Court's instructions set forth in its March 21, 2016 order. (ECF No. 49.) By order dated May 27, 2016, this Court dismissed as moot all remaining claims except Plaintiffs' claim for punitive damages under their common law fraud theory.
Plaintiffs now seek costs associated with this litigation. Specifically, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs, claiming that they brought a successful TILA action and, therefore, were eligible for reasonable attorneys' fees and costs. For the reasons that follow, this Court disagrees.
Under the "American rule," which is ordinarily applicable in our legal system, "there is a general practice of not awarding fees to a prevailing party absent explicit statutory authority."
"The TILA requires that a defendant pay costs and reasonable attorneys' fees to any person who brings a `successful action' to enforce liability under the TILA against that defendant."
In evaluating whether Plaintiffs are a "prevailing party," and thus eligible for costs and reasonable attorneys' fees under TILA, we are guided by the United States Supreme Court's decision in
In applying this "prevailing party" standard from
At no point in this litigation has there been an enforceable judgment on the merits of Plaintiffs' TILA claim, nor was there a consent decree that incorporated a settlement agreement between the parties into an enforceable court order.
Admittedly, as Plaintiffs point out, Defendants may have simply paid the $1,200.00 plus interest because they thought they would not have been able to prevail on the TILA and MCPA claims at trial. Thus, by mooting the case, they could walk away without bearing any of the costs or attorneys' fees. But this "tactical mooting" strategy, as the Fourth Circuit has called it, is "simply insufficient to overcome the statutory requirement that a party applying for a fees and costs award must first have been accorded some relief in the district court."
Furthermore, Plaintiffs note that they had opposed Defendant's motion to dismiss the case as moot "because of a concern that the voluntary, unconditional payment by Defendant would preclude this Court from considering a later fee petition." (ECF Nos. 40, 42, 43.). Plaintiffs then highlight a portion of this Court's order granting that motion to dismiss, in which this Court cites case law from the Ninth and Eleventh Federal Circuit Courts, suggesting that Plaintiffs may be eligible to claim reasonable attorneys' fees and costs as a "prevailing party." This, of course, was not a finding that Plaintiffs would be eligible for attorneys' fees; rather it was merely an invitation for Plaintiffs to look at how other Federal Circuit Courts have approached the "prevailing party" standard and to make an argument that somehow distinguishes the binding precedent from our circuit. As has been noted in the foregoing discussion, however, Plaintiffs have not convinced this Court that they meet this standard so as to justify a departure from settled Fourth Circuit law.
For the foregoing reasons, this Court denies Plaintiffs' motion for attorneys' fees and costs.
15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(3).