REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

ELIZABETH M. TIMOTHY, Chief Magistrate Judge.

This cause is before the court on Petitioner Michael Aponte-Pinto's ("Aponte-Pinto") petition for writ of habeas corpus, filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (ECF No. 1). Aponte-Pinto is an inmate of the federal Bureau of Prisons ("BOP"), currently housed at the Federal Prison Camp in Pensacola, Florida ("FPC-Pensacola"). Respondent Woods, the Warden of FPC-Pensacola, filed a Response to the § 2241 petition with supporting materials (ECF No. 11). Aponte-Pinto filed a pro se Reply with supporting materials (ECF No. 13). Counsel for Aponte-Pinto filed a notice of appearance (ECF No. 15) and a Supplemental Reply (ECF No. 16).

The case was referred to the undersigned for the issuance of all preliminary orders and any recommendations to the district court regarding dispositive matters. See N.D. Fla. Loc. R. 72.2(B); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), (C). After careful consideration of the issues presented by the parties, it is the opinion of the undersigned that no evidentiary hearing is required for the disposition of this matter. It is further the opinion of the undersigned that the pleadings and attachments before the court show that Aponte-Pinto is not entitled to relief.

I. BACKGROUND

The parties do not dispute the following background facts (see Respondent's Response at 2-5, ECF No. 11; Aponte-Pinto's Reply at 5-8, ECF No. 13). Aponte-Pinto was convicted in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico, Case No. 3:14cr346, of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute at least five kilograms of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). The district court sentenced him on September 9, 2015, to 87 months of imprisonment. Aponte-Pinto's expected release date, via good conduct time, is February 14, 2022.

Under 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b) & (e), the BOP is required, subject to the availability of appropriations, to make residential substance abuse programs available to eligible prisoners. The BOP's Residential Drug Abuse Treatment Program ("RDAP") was developed in accordance with this federal mandate to assist federal prisoners in overcoming their substance abuse problems. Procedures for implementing this voluntary program are set forth at 28 C.F.R. §550.50, et seq., and BOP Program Statement 5330.11, Psychology Treatment Programs (4/25/2016). To encourage inmates to participate in the program, the BOP traditionally offered a number of incentives to inmates. These incentives include financial rewards, consideration for the maximum period of time at a community corrections facility, and local institution incentives such as preferred living quarters. See 28 C.F.R. § 550.57.

If an inmate successfully completes RDAP, the Director of the BOP has discretion to reduce the inmate's sentence by a period not to exceed twelve months. See 18 U.S.C. §3621(e)(2)(B); see also BOP Program Statement 5331.02 (9/27/2017), Early Release Procedures Under 18 U.S.C. §3621(e). Federal regulations and Program Statement 5331.02 establish the BOP's criteria and procedures for evaluating an inmate for early release pursuant to § 3621(e)(2)(B) for successful completion of the RDAP. See PS 5331.02. An inmate is eligible for § 3621(e) early release if, among other things, the inmate successfully completes RDAP, as described in 28 C.F.R. § 550.53. See 28 C.F.R. § 550.55(a)(2).

To successfully complete RDAP, an inmate must complete three components. See 28 C.F.R. § 550.53(a); PS 5330.11, Chp. 2, pp. 8-24 (implementing RDAP regulations and providing implementing instructions). The first component of RDAP is the unit-based component, which involves the inmate completing activities as assigned by drug abuse treatment specialists ("DTS") and the Drug Abuse Program Coordinator ("DAPC") in a treatment unit set apart from the general prison population. 28 C.F.R. § 550.53(a)(1). Successful completion of the unit-based RDAP component requires (1) satisfactory attendance and participation in all RDAP activities, and (2) passing each RDAP testing procedure. Id., § 550.53(f). This component must be at least six months long, but usually lasts nine to twelve months in order to accommodate the minimum number of treatment hours. PS 5330.11, Chp. 2, p. 8.

The second component, if time allows between completion of the unit-based component of the RDAP and transfer to a community-based program, consists of follow-up treatment for inmates who return to the general population. See 28 C.F.R. § 550.53(a)(2); PS 5330.11, Chp. 2, p. 22. An inmate must remain in follow-up treatment for twelve months or until he is transferred to a residential reentry center, whichever comes first. PS 5330.11, Chp. 2. p. 22.

The third RDAP component is Transitional Drug Abuse Treatment ("TDAT"), in which the inmate is transferred to community confinement and must participate in and successfully complete community-based drug abuse treatment. See 28 C.F.R. § 550.53(a)(3).

An inmate may be expelled/removed from RDAP by the DAPC because of disruptive behavior related to the program or unsatisfactory progress in treatment. 28 C.F.R. § 550.53(g)(1). Ordinarily, an inmate must be given at least one formal warning before being removed from RDAP. Id., § 550.53(g)(2). But a formal warning is not necessary when the documented lack of compliance with program standards is of such magnitude that an inmate's continued presence would create an immediate and ongoing problem for staff and other inmates. Id.

The Program Statement implementing the expulsion and warning regulations provides:

PS 5330.11, Chp. 2, p. 18.

On December 17, 2015, Dennis N. Profitt, Ph.D., the DAPC at FPC-Pensacola, conducted Aponte-Pinto's RDAP eligibility diagnostic interview (see Declaration of Dr. Dennis N. Profitt ¶ 9, ECF No. 11-3). As part of this RDAP screening, Aponte-Pinto signed a consent form (Form BP-A0749) titled, "Agreement to Participate in a BOP Residential Drug Abuse Treatment Program" (see Profitt Decl. ¶ 10 and Exhibit B). The Agreement identified RDAP goals, rules, and polices (see id.). By signing the Agreement, Aponte-Pinto acknowledged his understanding that he was expected to follow policies, rules, and regulations of the BOP and RDAP (see id.). Aponte-Pinto also acknowledged his understanding that if he failed to do so, he may be expelled from RDAP (see id.). Aponte-Pinto also acknowledged that he read the Agreement or had it read to him, and that he understood and agreed to the rules and regulations for participation in RDAP as described in the Agreement (see id.). The Agreement notified Aponte-Pinto that his expulsion from RDAP would result in his receiving no consideration for early release (see id.).

Aponte-Pinto entered the residential component of RDAP in March of 2016, and completed it in November of 2016 (Profitt Decl. ¶ 12). On November 11, 2016, Aponte-Pinto was enrolled in the follow-up component (id.). Aponte-Pinto was expelled from RDAP on April 24, 2017 (id., ¶¶ 12-17). Following the expulsion, the Treatment Team made a clinical recommendation that he re-do the residential component of RDAP (id., ¶ 20). Aponte-Pinto chose not to reapply to the residential component (id., ¶¶ 18, 20).

Aponte-Pinto commenced this habeas action on March 20, 2018 (see ECF No. 1). In his habeas petition, Aponte-Pinto contends the BOP's decision to expel him from RDAP violated his substantive and procedural due process rights. He also claims the BOP's decision was discriminatory and arbitrary and capricious (see id. at 7-8). As relief, Aponte-Pinto seeks reversal of the BOP's decision, reinstatement to the follow-up component of RDAP (but in a Spanish speaking program), reinstatement of his provisional early release eligibility, and expungement of the RDAP expulsion from his inmate record (ECF No. 1 at 6, 13; ECF No. 16).

II. ANALYSIS

A. Constitutional Claims

1. Due Process

Aponte-Pinto argues that the decision to expel him from RDAP violated his due process rights, because he was not given a Formal Warning prior to his expulsion; instead, the Formal Warning and expulsion occurred during the same 20-minute meeting with the Treatment Team on April 24, 2017 (see ECF No. 1 at 9-12). Aponte-Pinto further argues that the conduct upon which the expulsion decision was based was minor, and was not of such magnitude that his continued presence created an immediate and ongoing problem for staff and other inmates; therefore, BOP regulations required that he receive a Formal Warning prior to his expulsion (id.). Aponte-Pinto argues that prior to the meeting of April 24, 2017, with the Treatment Team, he was not given notice that he was facing expulsion or the loss of his provisional early release eligibility, and thus had no opportunity to prepare a defense (id. at 12).

Respondent contends BOP inmates do not have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in participation in RDAP or the provisional grant of early release under § 3621 (ECF No. 11 at 12-13).

Respondent is correct. To establish a due process violation, a petitioner must have been deprived of a liberty or property interest protected under the Fifth Amendment. See Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 59, 119 S.Ct. 977, 143 L. Ed. 2d 130 (1999). An inmate has "no constitutional or inherent right" to be released before the completion of a valid sentence. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7, 99 S.Ct. 2100, 60 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1979). Additionally, inmates have no constitutional right to, or other protected liberty interest in, either participating in RDAP or receiving a sentence reduction for completing such a program. See Cook v. Wiley, 208 F.3d 1314, 1322-23 (11th Cir. 2000). Indeed, § 3621(e)(2)(B) provides only that the BOP "may" grant a reduction to a prisoner "convicted of a nonviolent offense," and leaves the decision whether to grant early release to the discretion of the BOP. See Lopez v. Davis, 531 U.S. 230, 241, 121 S.Ct. 714, 148 L. Ed. 2d 635 (2001); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e)(2)(B). "Because the § 3621(e)(2)(B) sentence reduction is left to the unfettered discretion of the BOP, the statute does not create a constitutionally protected liberty interest." Cook, 208 F.3d at 1323; see also Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 249, 103 S.Ct. 1741, 75 L. Ed. 2d 813 (1983) (finding a prison administrator's discretion to transfer an inmate was "completely unfettered" given that Hawaii's prison regulations placed no substantive limitations on official discretion and thus created no liberty interest entitled to protection under the Due Process Clause); Conlogue v. Shinbaum, 949 F.2d 378, 380 (11th Cir. 1991) (concluding no liberty interest arose from possibility of discretionary grant of incentive good time); Venegas v. Henman, 126 F.3d 760, 765 (5th Cir. 1997) ("The loss of the mere opportunity to be considered for discretionary release [under § 3621(e)(2)(B)] is too speculative to constitute a deprivation of a constitutionally protected liberty interest.").

The BOP's expulsion of Aponte-Pinto from RDAP, resulting in the loss of his provisional eligibility for a sentence reduction, did not violate Aponte-Pinto's rights under the Due Process Clause. See Cook, 208 F.3d at 1323.

2. Equal Protection

Aponte-Pinto claims that his expulsion from RDAP was discriminatory because similarly situated inmates received more favorable treatment than he (see ECF No. 1 at 8). He alleges, "[a] careful analysis of disciplinary actions involving other RDAP members will show a pattern of statistical discrimination that disproportionately affects non-white members of the RDAP community" (id.). Aponte-Pinto alleges other inmates who engaged in more serious misconduct, which affected the health and safety of inmates and for which the offending inmates received disciplinary action, were not expelled from RDAP (id. at 10-13). He further alleges his lack of proficiency in the English language was the reason he was expelled (see ECF No. 1 at 12; ECF No. 13 at 11-14, 19-20).

Respondent contends Aponte-Pinto has failed to allege that the BOP discriminated against him based on any constitutionally protected interest, and his conclusory allegations of disparate treatment or discriminatory intent are insufficient to state an equal protection claim (ECF No. 11 at 15).

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires the government to treat similarly situated people alike. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 3254, 87 L. Ed. 2d 313 (1985). To state a claim under the Equal Protection Clause, a prisoner generally must allege "that (1) he is similarly situated with other prisoners who received more favorable treatment; and (2) his discriminatory treatment was based on some constitutionally protected interest such as race." Jones v. Ray, 279 F.3d 944, 946-47 (11th Cir. 2001) (internal quotations omitted). Thus, in order to assert a viable equal protection claim, a plaintiff must first make a threshold showing that he was treated differently from others who were similarly situated to him. See Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 112 S.Ct. 2326, 2331, 120 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1992); Hendking v. Smith, 781 F.2d 850 (11th Cir. 1986). The plaintiff must also allege that the defendant acted with the intent to discriminate against him. See McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292, 107 S.Ct. 1756, 1767, 95 L. Ed. 2d 262 (1987); E & T Realty v. Strickland, 830 F.2d 1107, 1113 (11th Cir. 1987). Conclusory allegations or assertions of personal belief of disparate treatment or discriminatory intent are insufficient. GJR Inv., Inc. v. Cnty. of Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359, 1367-68 (11th Cir. 1998); Coon v. Ga. Pac. Corp., 829 F.2d 1563, 1569 (11th Cir. 1987).

The Equal Protection Clause is also implicated in "class of one" claims. Campbell v. Rainbow City, Ala., 434 F.3d 1306, 1314 (11th Cir. 2006). A "class of one" equal protection claim does not allege discrimination against a protected class, rather it alleges that the plaintiff "`has been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.'" Griffin Indus. v. Irvin, 496 F.3d 1189, 1202 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564, 120 S.Ct. 1073, 145 L. Ed. 2d 1060 (2000)). The same strict "similarly situated" standard applies whether an equal protection claim is brought under a "class of one" theory or a traditional theory of unlawful discrimination. Id. at 1204-05. Indeed, the "similarly situated" requirement must be rigorously applied in the context of "class of one" claims. See Leib v. Hillsborough Cnty. Pub. Transp. Comm'n, 558 F.3d 1301, 1306 (11th Cir. 2009).

The record includes ample evidence of the basis for the BOP's decision to expel Aponte-Pinto from RDAP. On September 29, 2016, while Aponte-Pinto was in the residential component of RDAP, Aponte-Pinto was challenged to improve his participation (see Profitt Decl. ¶ 12). On October 13, 2016, Aponte-Pinto was issued a Formal Warning and advised that he was expected to "demonstrate the actions of a true agent of change" and to participate in all components of the program in full (see id.).

Aponte-Pinto states he was not aware he had received a Formal Warning in October of 2016 (see ECF No. 13 at 8). He acknowledges, however, that he, "along with over 20 other members of the RDAP community, was placed on notice for not sufficiently participating in his and others' treatment in the manner than an RDAP member was expected to participate." (id. at 8-9).

On April 18, 2017, Chief Psychologist Mandy Ramsey randomly searched Aponte-Pinto's locker and the lockers of other inmates in the follow-up component of RDAP (see ECF No. 1-3 at 2, Bureau of Prisons, Psychology Services, Administrative Contact with an Inmate, dated 04/21/2017). Dr. Ramsey identified the following "concerns" during the search of Petitioner's locker:

(see ECF No. 1-3 at 2, Bureau of Prisons, Psychology Services, Administrative Contact with an Inmate, dated 04/21/2017).

On April 21, 2017, three days after the locker search, Dr. Ramsey reported:

(see ECF No. 1-3 at 2, Bureau of Prisons, Psychology Services, Administrative Contact with an Inmate, dated 04/21/2017). On April 21, 2017, Dr. Ramsey issued Aponte-Pinto an assignment "due to RDAP violations noted on 04-18-17" (see ECF No. 1-3 at 3, Bureau of Prisons, Psychology Services, Administrative Contact with an Inmate, dated 04/21/2017). The assignment was to complete 4 hours of RDAP community service by May 10, 2017 (see id.).

On April 24, 2017, Aponte-Pinto received a Formal Warning (see ECF No. 1-3 at 4, Bureau of Prisons, Psychology Services, RDAP-Formal Warning, dated 04/24/2017). The report of Aponte-Pinto's Formal Warning, prepared by Dr. Profitt, stated the following:

(see ECF No. 1-3 at 4, Bureau of Prisons, Psychology Services, RDAP-Formal Warning, dated 04/24/2017).

The BOP's responses to Aponte-Pinto's administrative challenges to the expulsion decision provided further explanation for the Treatment Team's expulsion decision. The warden's response to Aponte-Pinto's formal grievance states the following:

(see ECF No. 1-1 at 6, Response to Administrative Remedy ID Number 901073-F3). Aponte-Pinto appealed the Warden's response to the BOP's Regional Director (see ECF No. 1-1 at 9, Regional Administrative Remedy Appeal No. 901073-R1). The Regional Director denied the appeal, noting, "In the final analysis, the clinical team unanimously concluded you did not have the knowledge, skills, and motivation toward lifestyle change commensurate with someone who had received treatment for well over a year." (id.). Aponte-Pinto appealed to the Administrator of National Inmate Appeals (see ECF No. 1-1 at 11, Administrative Remedy No. 901073-A2). The national Administrator denied the appeal (id.).

The basis for Aponte-Pinto's expulsion are reiterated by Dr. Profitt in his declaration submitted by Respondent in this habeas case. Dr. Profitt states:

(Profitt Decl. ¶¶ 14-17).

With respect to the "similarly situated" element of both types of equal protection claims (i.e., the traditional type and the "class of one" type), Aponte-Pinto cites three examples of comparator inmates who received more favorable treatment than he:

(see ECF No. 13 at 19-20).

Aponte-Pinto has failed to show he was similarly situated with the comparators he identified. Aponte-Pinto has not shown that any comparator's response to the allegations of misbehavior was similar to his; specifically, he has not shown that any comparator failed to demonstrate knowledge and practice of RDAP treatment tools, for example, by accepting responsibility for the behavior by holding themselves accountable or, when being held accountable, showing they are motivated towards better decision making.

Not only has Aponte-Pinto failed to satisfy the "similarly situated" requirement of both types of equal protection claims, he also has not satisfied the intent requirement. Aponte-Pinto does not allege that any BOP official involved in the expulsion decision acted with the intent to discriminate against him.

Additionally, with respect to a traditional equal protection claim, Aponte-Pinto has failed to show that the allegedly discriminatory treatment was based on a constitutionally protected interest. Aponte-Pinto argues that the decision to expel him was a result of his difficulty with the English language (see ECF No. 13 at 11-14, 18, 25; ECF No. 16 at 4).

Immutable characteristics determined solely by the accident of birth such as race, national origin, and gender are typically the basis for finding a suspect class. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 93 S.Ct. 1764, 36 L. Ed. 2d 583 (1973); Williams v. Pryor, 240 F.3d 944, 947 (11th Cir. 2001). Language and national origin are not interchangeable. See Mumid v. Abraham Lincoln High School, 618 F.3d 789 (8th Cir. 2010). Language is not an immutable characteristic and, by itself, does not identify members of a suspect class. See Soberal-Perez v. Heckler, 717 F.2d 36, 41 (2d Cir. 1983); Olagues v. Russoniello, 770 F.2d 791 (9th Cir. 1985) (same); see also Mumid, 618 F.3d at 789 (policy that treats students with limited English proficiency differently than other students does not facially discriminate based on national origin in civil rights action).1

Furthermore, Aponte-Pinto's conclusory allegation that "[a] careful analysis of disciplinary actions involving other RDAP members will show a pattern of statistical discrimination that disproportionately affects non-white members of the RDAP community" (ECF No. 1 at 8) is insufficient to state a claim of discrimination based upon a disparate impact theory. Therefore, Aponte-Pinto has failed to show that the BOP's decision to expel him from RDAP was discriminatory under the traditional equal protection analysis. See Santiago-Lebron v. Fla. Parole Comm., 767 F.Supp.2d 1340, 1349-50 (S.D. Fla. 2011).

Aponte-Pinto's claim of discrimination also fails under the "class of one" analysis. As previously discussed, Aponte-Pinto must allege not only that he was intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated, but also that there was no rational basis for the difference in treatment. Here, Dr. Profitt's declaration states a rational basis for the BOP's expulsion decision, namely, that Aponte-Pinto's attitude exhibited a poor understanding of RDAP treatment concepts and a failure to implement and practice the knowledge and skills he learned in the residential component of RDAP.

For these reasons, Aponte-Pinto has not shown that the BOP's decision to expel him from RDAP violated the Equal Protection Clause.

B. Review of Agency Decision for Abuse of Discretion

Aponte-Pinto and his counsel argue that the BOP's expulsion decision is arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion, based upon false and inaccurate information, unsupported by evidence, and disproportionate to the misconduct of which he was accused (see ECF No. 1 at 8; ECF No. 13 at 2-5; ECF No. 16 at 2-5).2 Aponte-Pinto and his counsel also argue that Dr. Profitt's characterization of Aponte-Pinto's behavior and attitude as "cavalier," "disrespectful," and "aggressive" was erroneous (ECF No. 16 at 4-5).

The standards of review cited by Aponte-Pinto and his counsel (i.e., arbitrary and capricious, abuse of discretion, etc.) are applicable to judicial review of decisions of federal administrative agencies under the Administrative Procedures Act ("APA"). See 5 U.S.C. § 706. Under the APA, a reviewing court must set aside agency decisions that are "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).

Respondent contends the judicial review provisions of the APA are inapplicable to the BOP's expulsion decision, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3625 (ECF No. 11 at 13-14). Therefore, Aponte-Pinto's arguments that the BOP's decision was arbitrary or an abuse of discretion provide no basis for habeas relief (id.).

Respondent is correct. Section 3625 of Title 18 provides that the APA sections governing judicial review (5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706), do not apply to "the making of any determination, decision, or order under this subchapter." 18 U.S.C. § 3625. "This subchapter," i.e., Subchapter C of the Postsentence Administration statute, includes Section 3621, which confers upon the BOP authority to administer and design drug treatment programs such as RDAP. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3621, 3625; Cook, 208 F.3d at 1319.

Where judicial review under the APA is specifically excluded by statute, the United States Supreme Court has found that two questions are still appropriate for judicial review: (1) whether any cognizable constitutional claim has been presented; and (2) whether the agency's interpretation of the statute is contrary to well-settled law. See Santiago-Lebron, 767 F. Supp. 2d at 1351 (citing Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 108 S.Ct. 2047, 100 L. Ed. 2d 632 (1988) and Neal v. United States, 516 U.S. 284, 116 S.Ct. 763, 133 L. Ed. 2d 709 (1996)).

As set forth supra, Aponte-Pinto has failed to present any cognizable constitutional claim. Further, he has not shown that the BOP's interpretation of § 3621 is contrary to established federal law, or that the expulsion decision exceeded the BOP's statutory authority. Therefore, Aponte-Pinto's challenges to the BOP's individualized decision to expel him from RDAP, on the ground that it was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, etc., are foreclosed by § 3625.3 See Standifer v. Ledezma, 653 F.3d 1276, 1279 n.3 (10th Cir. 2011) ("To the extent Standifer challenges only the BOP's decision regarding his eligibility for RDAP participation, his argument is expressly foreclosed by 18 U.S.C. § 3625, which prohibits judicial review under the APA of RDAP placement decisions.") (citing Hunnicutt v. Hawk, 229 F.3d 997, 1000 (10th Cir. 2000)); Reeb v. Thomas, 636 F.3d 1224 (9th Cir. 2011) ("To find that prisoners can bring habeas petitions under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to challenge the BOP's discretionary determinations made pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3621 would be inconsistent with the language of 18 U.S.C. § 3625."); see also Santiago-Lebron, 767 F. Supp. 2d at 1352; see also, e.g., Gaddis v. Taylor, No. 1:15-cv-01155-VEH-TMP, 2018 WL 3800248, at *6 n.13 (N.D. Ala. July 9, 2018) ("To the extent Gaddis contends that BOP's decision to expel him from the RDAP was arbitrary, the `arbitrary and capricious' standard of review ordinarily applicable to decisions of administrative agencies under the Administrative Procedures Act (`APA') is not implicated, as decisions applying § 3621 are explicitly excepted from coverage under the APA."), Report and Recommendation Adopted by 2018 WL 3772850 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 9, 2018).

III. CONCLUSION

Aponte-Pinto has failed to demonstrate that his expulsion from RDAP violated his rights under the Constitution or federal law. Therefore, he is not entitled to habeas relief.

Accordingly it is respectfully RECOMMENDED:

That the petition for writ of habeas corpus filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (ECF No. 1) be DENIED.

NOTICE TO THE PARTIES

Objections to these proposed findings and recommendations must be filed within fourteen (14) days after being served a copy thereof. Any different deadline that may appear on the electronic docket is for the court's internal use only, and does not control. A copy of objections shall be served upon all other parties. If a party fails to object to the magistrate judge's findings or recommendations as to any particular claim or issue contained in a report and recommendation, that party waives the right to challenge on appeal the district court's order based on the unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions. See 11th Cir. Rule 3-1; 28 U.S.C. § 636.