WARREN W. EGINTON, Senior District Judge.
Plaintiff Jennifer Matava filed a complaint against defendant John W. Collins alleging that he violated her right to be free from malicious prosecution pursuant to the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988.
Specifically, plaintiff claims that she was arrested and charged with conspiracy to commit larceny in the fourth degree pursuant to an arrest warrant issued by a judge of the Connecticut Superior Court on the basis of a misleading affidavit prepared by defendant, who was at the time a Lieutenant in the Police Department of Vernon, Connecticut.
Defendant has filed a motion for summary judgment. For the following reasons, the motion for summary judgment will be granted.
On September 6, 2006, plaintiff was arrested and charged with one count of conspiracy to commit larceny in the fourth degree, in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 53a-125 and 53a-48. The arrest warrant was issued based on a fifteen page affidavit prepared by defendant. The affidavit summarizes accusations against plaintiff and her husband supplied to the Vernon Police Department by Best Buy Oil Company Inc., A&T Auto Parts Inc., Stephen Automall Centre Inc., and Classic Auto Finance Inc. Defendant summarized the charges of wrongdoing as follows:
Plaintiff contends that defendant's affidavit was knowingly and intentionally misleading as to several material facts which were misrepresented by defendant for the specific and unlawful purpose of causing the plaintiff to be arrested, charged and prosecuted. Plaintiff alleges that defendant made the following misrepresentations:
Plaintiff acknowledges that defendant's affidavit is the sole foundation for the misrepresentation claims yet, extraordinarily, six of the eight claims listed above do not exist within the confines of the affidavit. While claims numbered four and eight above do appear, they are not misrepresentations.
With respect to misrepresentation claim number eight, plaintiff has conceded that she handed the oil delivery driver a check that was subsequently stopped. The affidavit reads: "Handfield met Jennifer Matava who handed him a check from J.M. Builders in the amount of $329.25 . . . The check was deposited the following day at New Alliance Bank and was returned to us unpaid on March 13, 2006 after a stop payment was placed on the check." Collins Aff. 2.
With respect to misrepresentation claim number four, plaintiff argues she was unfairly lumped together with her family members. The Matavas (plural) are described as placing a stop payment on checks twice in defendant's affidavit. In the first instance, plaintiff requested delivery of 150 gallons of heating oil by phone. Upon delivery, plaintiff handed a check from J & M Builders to the truck driver in her front yard. The check was deposited the following day but was returned unpaid because a stop payment was placed. In the affidavit, defendant simply wrote that an employee of the oil company "turned over the notice he received from his bank that the Matavas had placed a stop payment on their check." Collins Aff. 3. In the second instance, defendant was merely relaying statements provided by an auto dealership's financial controller when he wrote that "the Matavas had placed a STOP PAYMENT on the check." Collins Aff. 6. Although the check was written by plaintiff's eighteen-year-old son, it was used as a down payment on a vehicle purchased by plaintiff. It was plaintiff who contracted to buy the vehicle and plaintiff who became delinquent when the payment was stopped.
A motion for summary judgment must be granted if the pleadings, discovery materials before the court and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and it is clear that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c);
A dispute regarding a material fact is genuine if there is sufficient evidence that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.
If a nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of his case with respect to which he has the burden of proof, then summary judgment is appropriate.
On summary judgment, the court resolves all ambiguities and draws all permissible factual inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.
"An action for malicious prosecution against a private person requires a plaintiff to prove that: (1) the defendant initiated or procured the institution of criminal proceedings against the plaintiff; (2) the criminal proceedings have terminated in favor of the plaintiff; (3) the defendant acted without probable cause; and (4) the defendant acted with malice, primarily for a purpose other than that of bringing an offender to justice."
"The threshold issue for the Court is whether, on the facts alleged, [the plaintiff's] right to be free from arrest without probable cause was violated. This question is primary both for a § 1983 false arrest or malicious prosecution analysis . . . [because] the existence of probable cause is a complete defense to a civil rights claim alleging false arrest or malicious prosecution."
Plaintiff argues that defendant deliberately or recklessly omitted exculpatory information, such as plaintiff's inability to access bank accounts belonging to her family members. This argument is unavailing because the underlying charge stemmed from alleged conspiracy between plaintiff and her husband. It is uncontested that plaintiff's husband had authority to stop payment on the checks. Assuming defendant knew that plaintiff lacked access to relevant bank accounts, that knowledge would be immaterial to a finding of probable cause for conspiracy to commit larceny because plaintiff's husband was arrested and charged as a coconspirator pursuant to the same affidavit.
Judge Schuman of the Connecticut Superior Court previously determined that there was probable cause for the warrant to issue, and this Court agrees. In the underlying criminal matter, on September 27, 2007, plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss and request for a
Here, plaintiff cannot satisfy either prong of
Even if defendant acted without probable cause, he is entitled to qualified immunity from liability.
Police activity conducted pursuant to a warrant issued by a magistrate normally suffices to establish that a law enforcement officer has acted in good faith.
Indeed, as both the Connecticut Superior Court and this Court have found probable cause to have existed irrespective of alleged misrepresentations, the lower threshold, that officers of reasonable competence could disagree on the legality of the defendant's actions, is easily met. Therefore, defendant is entitled to qualified immunity.
Fore the foregoing reasons, defendant's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. The Clerk is instructed to close this case.