OPINION

POGUE, Judge:

In this action, Plaintiff Viet I-Mei Frozen Foods Co., Ltd., successor in interest to Grobest & I-Mei Industrial (Vietnam) Co., Ltd. (hereinafter collectively referred to as "Grobest"), challenges the U.S. Department of Commerce's ("Commerce") decision not to terminate a court-ordered re-examination of Grobest in the (reconducted) fourth administrative review of the antidumping duty order on certain frozen warmwater shrimp from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam ("Vietnam"), and Commerce's consequent determination to establish an antidumping duty rate for Grobest using adverse facts available.1

The court has jurisdiction pursuant to Section 516A(a)(2)(B)(iii) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a)(2)(B)(iii) (2012),2 and 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c) (2012).

As explained below, because Commerce reasonably determined to continue its re-examination of Grobest, and because the agency properly used adverse facts available, based on the requisite factual findings (which are not contested here), Commerce's final results for this reconducted review with respect to Grobest are affirmed.

BACKGROUND

Grobest is a producer of frozen warmwater shrimp from Vietnam, which is subject to an antidumping duty order.3 In the fourth administrative review of that order, Grobest and the domestic shrimping industry separately requested that Grobest be reviewed.4 Commerce initiated the fourth review but, because the review covered 198 companies, the agency exercised its authority, pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-1(c)(2)(B),5 to limit its individual examination to the two largest Vietnamese exporters/producers of subject merchandise by volume (the "mandatory respondents").6 Although Grobest was not selected as a mandatory respondent, it requested to be individually examined as a "voluntary respondent" pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1677m(a).7 Commerce denied this request. Accordingly, rather than calculating an antidumping duty rate for Grobest based on an individual examination of Grobest's own data, Commerce assigned to Grobest the `all-others separate rate'8 for the period covered by this administrative review.9

Grobest successfully challenged Commerce's decision to deny it an individual dumping margin in this review.10 At the close of that litigation, this Court held that Commerce's refusal to review Grobest's voluntary submissions and establish an individual weighted average dumping margin for Grobest in this review was an abuse of the agency's discretion.11 The court therefore ordered Commerce to individually review Grobest as a voluntary respondent.12 With Grobest's consent,13 the United States requested and was granted entry of final judgment-ordering Commerce to re-conduct its review of Grobest's dumping rate "by individually examining Grobest as a voluntary respondent"14—so that this individual examination of Grobest may be "conducted under Commerce's administrative authority and not under the authority of the Court."15

In accordance with this Court's judgment and order in Grobest II, Commerce initiated a proceeding to re-conduct its fourth administrative review of this antidumping duty order with respect to Grobest.16 Two months later, however, on December 12, 2012, Grobest submitted to Commerce a letter seeking "to withdraw Grobest's request for examination as a voluntary respondent in the fourth administrative review of the order on frozen warmwater shrimp from Vietnam,"17 and asking Commerce to "rescind its October 17, 2012 notice announcing that it would reconduct the 2008-2009 administrative review for Grobest."18 Despite having consistently challenged Commerce's initial denial of Grobest's request for individual examination, despite having litigated this challenge throughout Grobest I and Grobest II, and despite having obtained the judgment in Grobest II ordering Commerce to reconduct this review and individually examine Grobest,19 Grobest maintained that "significant management, personnel and accounting changes that have occurred at [Grobest] since the period of review (which dates back to February 2008) [have made it such that] the administrative and legal costs of this examination are greater than the company wishes to incur at this time."20 The domestic industry opposed Grobest's request to terminate the re-examination.21

Commerce declined to abort its re-examination of Grobest, and issued a supplemental questionnaire requiring Grobest to "address[] certain deficiencies"22 discovered in its original questionnaire responses with regard to, inter alia, Grobest's reported quantity and value of subject merchandise sold to unaffiliated U.S. customers during the period of review.23 In the cover letter sent with this supplemental questionnaire, Commerce stated that a response from Grobest was required, in proper format, "no later than close of business January 29, 2013,"24 and warned that "[u]pon receipt of a response that is incomplete or deficient to the extent that [Commerce] determines it to be non-responsive[,] [Commerce] will not issue additional supplemental questionnaires but will use facts available," adding that "[i]f [Grobest] fail[s] to cooperate . . . by not acting to the best of [its] ability to comply with [Commerce's] request for information, [Commerce] may use information that is adverse to [Grobest's] interest in conducting its analysis."25

On January 29, 2013 (i.e., the due date set for its response to Commerce's supplemental questionnaire), Grobest again requested that Commerce terminate the re-examination, without responding to Commerce's supplemental inquiries.26 Commerce acknowledged and denied Grobest's request, and again required that Grobest submit responses to Commerce's supplemental questionnaire, giving the company until close of business on February 13, 2013, to do so.27 But Grobest again refused to respond to Commerce's inquiries. Instead, on the due date set for its responsive submission, Grobest "reiterate[d] [its] proposal that [Commerce] discontinue examination of Grobest as a voluntary respondent in the fourth administrative review and maintain the Final Results for Grobest as originally issued,"28 again stating only that "the company is unable to continue with the examination of Grobest's voluntary responses due to the significant management, personnel and accounting changes that have occurred at [Grobest] since the period of review,"29 and that "[t]he administrative and legal costs of this examination are greater than the company wishes to incur at this time."30

Responding to Grobest's refusal to cooperate with Commerce's requests for information, Commerce found that Grobest withheld information requested of it and impeded the proceeding, within the meaning of 19 U.S.C. §§ 1677e(a)(2)(A) and (C),31 and concluded that Grobest failed to cooperate, within the meaning of 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(b),32 by not acting to the best of its ability to comply with Commerce's requests.33 Accordingly, the agency employed adverse inferences when selecting from among the facts otherwise available to establish Grobest's individual dumping margin for this proceeding.34 Explaining that its practice in this regard is to ensure that the dumping rate established for the non-cooperative respondent is "sufficiently adverse `as to effectuate the statutory purpose of the adverse facts available rule to induce respondents to provide [Commerce] with complete and accurate information in a timely manner,'"35 as well as to ensure "that the party does not obtain a more favorable result by failing to cooperate than if it had cooperated fully,"36 Commerce assigned to Grobest a rate of 25.76 percent, which represents "the highest dumping margin on the record of any segment of this proceeding."37 Commerce found that this rate "is appropriate for Grobest in that it is sufficient to ensure that Grobest does not benefit from failing to cooperate in [the reconducted] review by refusing to respond to [Commerce]'s request for complete information regarding its affiliations, sales of subject merchandise, and factors of production."38

Grobest now challenges Commerce's decision to deny Grobest's request to terminate its individual examination as a voluntary respondent and reinstate the final results of the fourth review with respect to Grobest as originally conducted.39 Beyond characterizing its rate as "punitive," Grobest makes no argument as to the specific rate assigned to it in the reconducted review.40 Rather, Grobest contends solely that "Commerce exceeded its statutory authority when it refused to permit [Grobest] to withdraw [its] individual review request,"41 which "resulted in an impermissibly punitive" rate for Grobest.42

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The court upholds Commerce's antidumping determinations if they are in accordance with law and supported by substantial evidence. 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i). Where, as here, the antidumping statute does not directly address the legal question before the agency, the court will defer to Commerce's construction of its authority if it is reasonable. Timken Co. v. United States, 354 F.3d 1334, 1342 (Fed.Cir.2004) (relying on Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984)).

Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion," Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S.Ct. 206, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938), and "can be translated roughly to mean `is [the determination] unreasonable?'" Nippon Steel Corp. v. United States, 458 F.3d 1345, 1351 (Fed. Cir.2006) (citation omitted, alteration in the original).

DISCUSSION

Grobest argues that "pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1677m and 19 C.F.R. § 351.213(d), Commerce should have withdrawn [Grobest] as a voluntary respondent from the review at the request of [Grobest]."43 The Government asserts, first,44 that "Grobest's actions in obtaining the final judgment ordering Commerce to examine it individually estop it from challenging Commerce's individual examination now," because it is "well-established that `where a party assumes a certain position in a legal proceeding and succeeds in maintaining that position, he may not thereafter, simply because his interests have changed, assume a contrary position.'"45 In the alternative, the United States argues that Commerce reasonably interpreted the statute and relevant regulations not to require the agency to terminate Grobest's court-ordered re-examination based solely upon Grobest's unilateral decision not to participate in the proceeding,46 and contends that on the record presented here, Commerce reasonably determined to proceed with the re-examination and to use adverse facts available when Grobest withheld information and failed to cooperate to the best of its ability.47 Each argument is addressed in turn.

I. Judicial Estoppel Is Not Appropriate Here.

Judicial estoppel is "an equitable doctrine invoked by a court at its discretion,"48 which is "intended to prevent improper use of judicial machinery."49 Although "the circumstances under which judicial estoppel may appropriately be invoked are probably not reducible to any general formulation of principle,"50 several factors51 may "typically inform the decision whether to apply the doctrine in a particular case."52 Most importantly, "a party's later position must be `clearly inconsistent' with its earlier position."53 In addition, judicial estoppel is appropriate where "the party has succeeded in persuading a court to accept that party's earlier position, so that judicial acceptance of an inconsistent position in a later proceeding would create `the perception that either the first or the second court was misled,'"54 although "it may be appropriate to resist application of judicial estoppel `when a party's prior position was based on inadvertence or mistake.'"55

Here, Grobest contends that it sought to withdraw as a voluntary respondent because "on December 31, 2010, the shrimp processing operation of Grobest & I-Mei was purchased by Viet I-Mei," and "Viet I-Mei was no longer confident of its ability to guarantee the provision of complete and accurate data to Commerce because much of the relevant support documentation would be difficult to obtain due to the change in management and ownership."56 But as Defendant points out,57 this change of ownership occurred nearly two years prior to the entry of judgment, in favor of Grobest, on its initial request for individual examination.58 In that time, Grobest could easily have voluntarily dismissed its litigation in demand of individual examination (thereby obtaining the very result that Grobest now seeks),59 but chose not to do so.60

Nevertheless, Grobest's earlier position—that Commerce's decision to reject Grobest's request to participate as a voluntary respondent pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1677m(a) was not in accordance with law—is not clearly inconsistent with its current position—that Commerce's decision not to terminate the individual examination upon Grobest's subsequent request was also contrary to law. Unlike in New Hampshire,61 acceptance of both of Grobest's positions—i.e., that Commerce erred initially by not granting Grobest voluntary respondent status and then erred again by not terminating Grobest's examination upon the latter's request—would not lead to logically inconsistent court decisions, undermining the integrity of the judicial process.62 Put otherwise, the question in Grobest I and Grobest II was whether Commerce's decision to deny Grobest's voluntary request for individual examination was reasonable on the record presented, whereas the question now before the court concerns the reasonableness of Commerce's separate decision to continue with the examination after Grobest's request to terminate it. Because these are logically discrete issues, and because affirmative answers to both of these questions would not inherently be mutually exclusive, the doctrine of judicial estoppel, which is applicable solely in cases of manifest contradiction,63 is not appropriate here. Accordingly, the court moves on to the merits of Grobest's challenge.

II. Commerce Was Not Required to Terminate Grobest's Individual Re-Examination Upon Grobest's Request.

As Grobest concedes, "[t]he U.S. antidumping statutory and regulatory framework does not expressly contemplate a voluntary respondent's rescission of a request for individual review."64 Commerce's regulations do provide, however, that "[a] voluntary respondent accepted for individual examination . . . will be subject to the same requirements as an exporter or producer initially selected by [Commerce] for individual examination under [19 U.S.C. § 1677f-1(c)(2)], including. . ., where applicable, the use of the facts available under [19 U.S.C. § 1677e] and [19 C.F.R.] § 351.308."65 This regulation subjects voluntary respondents to the same requirements as the mandatory respondents, including specifically to the requirements of Section 1677e—which expressly permits Commerce to resort to adverse inferences in selecting from among the facts otherwise available when the respondent fails to act to the best of its ability to comply with Commerce's requests for information.66 Commerce is therefore correct that voluntary respondents are not entitled to unilaterally dictate their level of participation once accepted for individual examination. As Defendant points out, "[i]f it were otherwise, the voluntary respondent process would be subject to potential manipulation by companies seeking individual review and then declining to proceed if the review started to look unfavorable."67

Nor was Commerce required (as Grobest contends) to discontinue its individual re-examination of Grobest because Grobest's request to terminate the examination was made within 90 days of the judgment order in Grobest II.68 Commerce's regulations provide that the agency will rescind an administrative review if the party that requested such review withdraws its request within 90 days of the date of publication of the notice of its initiation (although Commerce may extend this 90-day limit if the agency "decides that it is reasonable to do so").69 But, as is clear from its context, this regulatory provision concerns the complete rescission of an administrative review with respect to a particular respondent (where all parties who have requested the review withdraw those requests), rather than the cessation of individual examination for a respondent who prefers the all-others rate.70 Here, regardless of Grobest's desire to continue with the review (and regardless of the timing and legal effect of any communication from Grobest to Commerce in this regard), the Petitioners had also requested that Grobest be reviewed and, as this request was never withdrawn, the regulatory provision for rescission is not applicable.71

At oral argument, counsel for Grobest conceded that 19 C.F.R. § 351.213(d)(1) is addressed to the rescission of reviews and is therefore not directly applicable. Instead Grobest argued that the court should look to this regulation by way of analogy, and thereby evaluate Commerce's decision not to terminate Grobest's individual examination upon Grobest's request by using the "balancing test" that Grobest contends is generally used to evaluate Commerce's decisions under 19 C.F.R. § 351.213(d)(1).72 But this argument is also unpersuasive. First, the analogy is strained at best. Grobest seeks to apply the rescission regulation to a situation in which it does not seek rescission of its review, but rather would prefer the allothers rate over an individualized rate—an option that is clearly unavailable to the mandatory respondents upon whom the voluntary respondents' treatment is required to be modelled.73 Next, the "balancing test" to which Grobest refers as a mandatory set of considerations is instead merely part of Commerce's explanation for rejecting proposals to require the agency to rescind under certain conditions. Commerce's practice does not set out a mandatory balancing test; the agency instead concluded that "the decision to rescind a review will be at [Commerce]'s discretion."74 Finally, even if 19 C.F.R. § 351.213(d)(1) were more perfectly analogous, and even if Grobest were correct that Commerce should have applied a mandatory balancing test that weighed, "[o]n the one hand, the respondent's request to withdraw, and on the other hand the amount of resources that Commerce has expended at the moment that request is made and the desire to discourage procedural abuses,"75 the weight of the evidence here supports the reasonableness of Commerce's decision. Contrary to Grobest's contentions, Commerce had not merely issued a notice of initiation for the court-ordered reconducted review when Grobest requested to terminate the proceeding. Rather, as is evident from the agency's supplemental questionnaire—which Commerce sent to Grobest shortly after the latter's withdrawal request (keeping the holiday break in mind)76—upon initiating this proceeding Commerce promptly examined Grobest's submissions. Indeed, Commerce found numerous material discrepancies in Grobest's representations with regard to the company's affiliations, the quantity and value of its sales of subject merchandise, and its factors of production.77 Thus this is precisely the situation contemplated by the example Commerce provided in Antidumping Duties; Countervailing Duties, 62 Fed. Reg. at 27,317—on which Grobest now relies in support of its balancing test—where "a party request[ed] a review, [Commerce] devote[d] considerable time and resources to the review, and then the party withdr[ew] its requests once it ascertain[ed] that the results of the review [were] not likely to be in its favor."

Moreover the issue here, as Grobest concedes, is not whether Commerce should have rescinded its review of Grobest, but instead whether Commerce should have permitted Grobest to elect to keep its `all-others' rate rather than cooperate in the individualized re-examination that Commerce initiated pursuant to the judgment order in Grobest II.78 On this question, Commerce's regulations provide that, as an accepted voluntary respondent, Grobest was subject to the same requirements as the mandatory respondents. Just as "[m]andatory respondents may not dictate their level of participation for the purposes of determining a more favorable separate rate based on another party's data . . . [and therefore] must provide all information that has been requested by [Commerce] and not selectively choose which requests to respond to and which information to submit,"79 voluntary respondents accepted for individual examination similarly may not refuse to respond to Commerce's requests for information in order to obtain a more favorable `all-others' rate.

Grobest argues that, rather than attempting to manipulate the system and obtain a more favorable `all-others' rate, the company realized that, having gone through a messy dissolution of the joint venture that constituted Grobest at the time that it initially requested to be individually examined, it was no longer able to "carry out a proper verification" and certify to the accuracy of its responses to Commerce's inquiries, contending that it alerted Commerce to this as soon as the situation became apparent.80 But the statute provides a procedure for companies experiencing difficulties with responding to Commerce's inquiries, which Grobest neglected to follow. Specifically, "[i]f an interested party, promptly after receiving a request from [Commerce] for information, notifies [Commerce] that such party is unable to submit the information requested in the requested form and manner, together with a full explanation and suggested alternative forms in which such party is able to submit the information, [then Commerce] shall consider the ability of the interested party to submit the information in the requested form and manner and may modify such requirements to the extent necessary to avoid imposing an unreasonable burden on that party."81 But rather than providing a full explanation and suggested alternatives, Grobest simply stated that "the administrative and legal costs of this examination are greater than the company wishes to incur at this time."82 This is not an explanation of any difficulties that Grobest may have had with submitting the information requested, but rather is a conscious decision not to incur the costs of cooperating with Commerce's examination.

Thus, for all of the foregoing reasons, Commerce was not required by any statutory or regulatory authority to abort its court-ordered individual re-examination of Grobest simply because Grobest changed its mind regarding the benefit of such examination.83 In evaluating Grobest's request to discontinue the re-examination, Commerce emphasized the significant resources that the agency had already expended in connection with Grobest's initial demand for individualized review,84 and explained that while "Grobest's principle contention is that it is unwilling to incur the administrative and legal costs associated with participating in the administrative review[,]. . . a company may not impede an antidumping proceeding by refusing to incur administrative and legal costs associated with participating in the proceeding."85 Just as the 90-day limitation on withdrawing requests for review aims to "prevent abuse of the procedures for requesting and withdrawing a review . . . [when Commerce] devotes considerable time and resources to the review, and then the party withdraws its requests once it ascertains that the results of the review are not likely to be in its favor,"86 so too the prevention of abuse where Commerce expends resources to initiate an individual examination—and the respondent seeks to withdraw its participation when it changes its mind about the benefit of such examination and prefers the `all others' rate instead—is a reasonable basis on which Commerce may decline to abort its examination.

Accordingly, because Commerce's determination to continue its re-examination of Grobest notwithstanding Grobest's change of heart was reasonable on the record presented here, it is supported by substantial evidence, and is therefore affirmed.

III. Given Its Uncontested Factual Findings, Commerce Properly Used Adverse Facts Available to Establish Grobest's Antidumping Duty Rate.

Regarding the antidumping duty rate ultimately established for Grobest as a result of Commerce's re-examination, Grobest argues that this rate was "impermissibly punitive."87 But Grobest does not challenge the particular findings on which Commerce based this rate.88 Specifically, Commerce found that "Grobest withheld requested information, and significantly impeded this proceeding," within the meaning of 19 U.S.C. §§ 1677e(a)(2)(A) and (C),89 and that "Grobest has not cooperated to the best of its ability," within the meaning of 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(b).90 Given these uncontested findings, Commerce properly resorted to "the facts otherwise available in reaching [its] determination,"91 and properly "use[d] an inference that is adverse to the interests of [Grobest] in selecting from among the facts otherwise available."92 The statute explicitly provides that "[s]uch adverse inference may include reliance on information derived from . . . the petition,"93 and here Commerce selected a rate derived from the petition.94 Because a dumping margin based on adverse facts available "is not a punitive measure" when determined in accordance with the requirements of 19 U.S.C. § 1677e,95 because Commerce's uncontested findings regarding Grobest's withholding of information and failure to cooperate satisfy Section 1677e's requirements for Commerce's reliance on information derived from the petition, and because, in the absence of a specific challenge, the secondary information relied on appears to have been properly corroborated in accordance with 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(c),96 the rate established for Grobest as a result of its re-examination in this reconducted review is affirmed.

CONCLUSION

For all of the foregoing reasons, Commerce's final results with respect to Grobest in the reconducted fourth administrative review of this antidumping duty order are affirmed. Judgment will issue accordingly.