OPINION AND ORDER

WILLIAM S. DUFFEY, Jr., District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on Michelle Jones's ("Jones") "Motion Objecting to Opinion and Order" [7] and "Friend of the court motion, requesting the court take judicial notice under Georgia Rule 5-201. Judicial Notice of Adjudicative Facts (a) (b) (d) (e) (f) + 5-301(a) [sic]" [7.5]. The Court construes Jones's filings as her Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's January 8, 2016, Order [5] remanding this dispossessory action to the Magistrate Court of DeKalb County, Georgia.

I. BACKGROUND

On September 14, 2015, Plaintiff Brandywine Homes Georgia, LLC, as the agent of Astor ATL, LLC, ("Plaintiff") filed a dispossessory warrant ("Complaint") against its tenant, Defendant Michelle Steele ("Defendant") in the Magistrate Court of DeKalb County, Georgia. (See [1.2] at 12).

On October 2, 2015, Jones, claiming that she is an "Executrix" and a "Third-party Inventor," and proceeding pro se, removed the DeKalb County dispossessory action to this Court based on federal question jurisdiction. (See [1.2] at 8).

On October 21, 2015, Magistrate Judge Baverman issued his R&R. The Magistrate Judge found that it was improper for Jones, on behalf of Defendant, to sign both the Notice of Removal and the application to proceed in forma pauperis ("IFP Application") because Jones is not an attorney, and she is thus not authorized to represent Defendant in this action. The Magistrate Judge concluded that Jones's Notice of Removal and IFP Application were void as a matter of law and recommended that the IFP Application be denied as moot and that this action be remanded to state court. The Magistrate Judge found further that, even if Jones's representation was proper and Defendant met the requirements to proceed IFP, this action is still required to be remanded because the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction.1

On January 8, 2016, the Court adopted the R&R and remanded this dispossessory action to state court for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. On January 19, 2016, Jones filed her Motion for Reconsideration.

II. DISCUSSION

Here, Jones removed this action based on federal question jurisdiction, and the Court's January 8, 2016, Order remanding this action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction is not reviewable in a motion for reconsideration or on appeal. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) ("An order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise."); Shoals T.V. & Appliance, Inc. v. Auto Owners Ins. Co., 791 F.Supp. 283, 287 (N.D. Ala. 1992) ("Remand orders based on section 1447(c) are unreviewable on `appeal or otherwise'" because Section 1447(d) "has been universally construed to preclude . . . reconsideration by the district court"); Bender v. Mazda Motor Corp., 657 F.3d 1200, 1204 (11th Cir. 2011) (affirming the district court's decision to deny plaintiff's motion for reconsideration because the action was remanded to state court and was no longer pending in federal court, noting that "[e]ven if the district court erroneously remanded the case to state court, § 1447(d) prohibits the district court from reconsidering its remand order because the district court no longer had jurisdiction over the case"); Harris v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Ala. Inc., 951 F.2d 325, 330 (11th Cir. 1992) (citation and quotation omitted) ("Unquestionably, § 1447(d) not only forecloses appellate review, but also bars reconsideration by the district court of its own remand order.").

On January 8, 2016, after determining it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over this dispossessory action, the Court remanded this case to the state court. Because the case is no longer pending before this Court, the Court lacks jurisdiction to consider Jones's Motion for Reconsideration. See Shoals, 791 F. Supp. at 287 ("Once a district court certifies a remand order to state court it is divested of jurisdiction and can take no further action on the case."); Collins v. Fingerhut Co., Inc. et al., 117 F.Supp.2d 1283, 1285 (S.D. Ala. 2000) ("However, it is clear that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to revisit its original remand order whether the opportunity to do so is case in the form of a motion to reconsider or in the form of a second notice of removal."); Davis v. Am. Gen. Grp. Ins. Co., 732 F.Supp. 1132, 1135 (N.D. Ala. 1990) (after remand, a district court lacks jurisdiction to consider a motion to reconsider the remand order).

Even if the Court had jurisdiction to consider Jones's Motion for Reconsideration—which it does not—Jones does not assert the existence of "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect," newly discovered evidence, fraud, or that the judgment has been satisfied or is no longer applicable. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b); Rease v. Harvey, 376 F. App'x 920, 921 (11th Cir. 2010). Jones's Motion for Reconsideration is nonsensical, convoluted and conclusory, and fails to even address the basis for the Court's January 8, 2016, Order, remanding this dispossessory action to state court for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Jones simply reiterates the same illogical arguments asserted throughout her rambling filings in this action.2 Jones has not presented any grounds upon which to support granting her relief from the Court's January 8th Order. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). Jones's Motion for Reconsideration is denied for this additional reason.

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Michelle Jones's "Motion Objecting to Opinion and Order" [7] and "Friend of the court motion, requesting the court take judicial notice under Georgia Rule 5-201. Judicial Notice of Adjudicative Facts (a) (b) (d) (e) (f) + 5-301(a) [sic]" [7.5], construed as a Motion for Reconsideration, is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.