COGAN, District Judge.
Plaintiff Rey C. Patriarca ("Relator") brought this action on behalf of the United States against Siemens Healthcare Diagnostics, Inc. and Bayer Diagnostics Corporation (collectively, "Siemens") to recover damages under the False Claims Act ("FCA") for alleged fraudulent conduct from February 2006 through December 2010 (the "Relevant Time Period"). Relator claims that Siemens marketed a test to measure the levels of a certain hormone knowing that the test was flawed, and that countless medical professionals ordered treatments for patients on the basis of the test's inaccurate results. Through Medicare, the United States reimbursed many of these treatments. In response, Siemens argues that the discrepancies about which Relator complains were, in fact, widely known and, in any event, did not undermine the test. Siemens has moved to dismiss Relator's complaint, and for the reasons discussed below, Siemen's motion is granted.
Patients with Chronic Kidney Disease ("CKD") may have high levels of parathyroid hormone ("PTH"), which can lead to bone disease. More than 26 million Americans suffer from CKD. Vitamin D analogs are used to treat high levels of PTH, but overdosing of these analogs can lead to serious health consequences. Accurate diagnosis of PTH levels is therefore critical. Doctors may also order parathyroidectomies in serious cases when PTH levels exceed a certain threshold.
At the time he filed the complaint, Relator worked as a District Manager for Scantibodies Clinical Laboratories, Inc. ("Scantibodies"), and was responsible for selling and marketing Scantibodies products to dialysis centers and nephrologists' office. Siemens is a major healthcare company, and in 2006 it purchased assets from Bayer Diagnostics Corporation. One of those assets, the "Siemens Test,"
The Siemens Test is what is known as a "Second Generation" PTH test. Second Generation Tests measure both the whole PTH molecule ("1-84" PTH) and large fragments of the molecule ("7-84" PTH). On the other hand, "Third Generation Tests" are designed to report only the level of whole PTH molecules and omit the fragments. For this reason, Second Generation Tests report PTH levels roughly twice that of Third Generation Tests.
In 1987, Nichols Diagnostics ("Nichols") produced a PTH test (the "IRMA Test")
Five years later, Nichols produced a new, automated test, with a reduced incubation period of just 37 minutes. The new test was "aligned" with the IRMA Test, which means that its PTH measurements were consistent with the earlier test's results. Nicholas continued to launch improved tests (together, these subsequent tests are "the Nichols Tests"). The overwhelming majority of dialysis centers in the United States used Nichols Tests by the early 2000s.
By this point, many other companies, including Siemens, produced PTH tests that were purportedly aligned with the IRMA test. In 2002, Bayer sought FDA approval for two PTH tests. Bayer represented that the first, the ACS 180 Test, was 98.5% correlated to the IRMA Test (the only difference between the two was that the ACS 180 Test was automated, and the IRMA test was manual), and that the Siemens test was 99.4% correlated to the ACS 180 Test. Accordingly, Bayer argued, the Siemens test was, through the principle of transference, sufficiently correlated to the IRMA Test to warrant a "substantial equivalence" determination by the FDA.
To determine substantial equivalence, the FDA looks to whether the new device has the "same technological characteristics" as the predicate device, and "does not raise different questions of safety and effectiveness." Such a finding does not necessarily mean that the two devices are the same or return identical results. For its FDA application, Siemens submitted data showing that the Siemens Test was correlated to the ACS 180 Test, which itself was correlated to the IRMA Test, which means that the results from the three tests have a predictable relationship. This is distinct from finding that the tests yield the same results; in fact, they did not, and Siemens did not represent that they did.
Later versions of the Nichols Tests "drifted" upward, consistently overstating patient's PTH levels, leading to medically unnecessary prescriptions and surgeries. After a qui tam action relating to the tests' inaccuracy and a settlement, Nichols withdrew its tests from the market around 2005. The suit was brought by Relator's employer at Scantibodies, Tom Cantor. Competitors — including Siemens — stepped into the space left by the withdrawn Nichols Tests, and aggressively marketed their tests across the country.
In his complaint, Relator alleges that by early 2006 — concurrently with it becoming the dominant PTH test in the United States — the Siemens Test had materially "drifted" from the IRMA test.
Relator bases his allegation primarily on roughly 20 separate "parallel" experiments he conducted between 2006 and 2010. In a parallel experiment, different PTH tests are used to analyze the same patient sample. Relator compared the Siemens Test to the PTH test developed by his own company, the "Scantibodies Test," which is a
Relator also claims that in May and June of 2010, Rubin Dialysis Center ("Rubin"), a dialysis center that sent its blood samples Spectra Laboratories, Inc. ("Spectra"), noticed higher than expected PTH levels. Spectra used the Siemens Test. Rubin then sent samples out to both Spectra and hospitals not using the Siemens Test, and discovered that the Siemens Test generated results indicating higher PTH levels.
Relator similarly describes that in the mid-2000s, Renal Care Group, Inc. ("RCG") (a dialysis chain) used the "Roche Test," which was allegedly "well-aligned with the IRMA Test." In 2006, RCG was acquired by a company that used Spectra for its lab work — and, as discussed above, Spectra used the Siemens Test. Accordingly, former RCG patients were transferred from the Roche Test to the Siemens Test, and their doctors began seeing higher than expected PTH results. Relator claims that Spectra conducted a parallel analysis of the Siemens and Roche tests in 2006, and found that the Siemens Test measured patients' PTH levels 22% higher than the Roche Test. In 2010, Spectra conducted an internal investigation to determine if its laboratory practices played any role in the apparent upward drift of PTH levels. Spectra found that its machinery was working properly.
In the early 2000s, doctors and scientists worked with the National Kidney Foundation to develop clinical practice guidelines to manage CKD. The Kidney Disease Outcomes Quality Initiative ("KDOQI") guidelines were published in 2003, and one of its stated purposes was to inform nephrologists about PTH testing. The guidelines were based on studies involving the IRMA Test. Relator alleges that because of that basis, if a PTH test deviates from the IRMA Test, a doctor making medical decisions in light of the guidelines will be misguided.
Relator claims that during the Relevant Time Period, "the great majority of nephrologists... followed the KDOQI Guidelines," which recommended that they prescribe Vitamin D injections in response to PTH levels above a certain point, and that they order parathyroidectomies in response to PTH levels beyond a higher point. Relator points to statements by Dr. Stephen Z. Fadem, a practicing nephrologist, who claims that providers closely relied on the KDOQI PTH Guidelines in making treatment decisions. He also claims that after the Nichols Tests were removed from the market, the Siemens Test was extensively used, and that most clinicians never considered that the test had migrated upward from the IRMA Test. Dr. Fadem states that, "[i]f the [PTH] test fits the clinical picture, it is accepted as a valid measure, with trust placed on the laboratory to assure the machines are properly calibrated and the methodology is correct."
The KDOQI Guidelines also state that they "are not intended to define a standard of care, and should not be construed as
In 2010, the NKF updated its recommendations. It noted the wide "variability within and across" PTH tests, and acknowledged "analytic problems with PTH measurement." Accordingly, it recommended that therapeutic decisions should be based on trends, and not a single test result. The NKF recommended the use of Second Generation Tests over Third Generation Tests.
In 2006, "a large group of renowned European scientists," studied fifteen commercially available PTH tests, including the Siemens Test, compared them to the IRMA Test, and published their findings (the "2006 Souberbielle Study"). The study made several points relevant to the instant case. First, the levels of PTH at which the KDOQI guidelines recommended specific courses of patient treatment could not be followed without knowing which PTH test was used, because the scientists found that the values yielded by Second Generation Tests varied widely. Second, the study found that most Second Generation Tests — including the Siemens Test — were predicative of PTH levels because they were "highly correlated" with the IRMA Test. Third, the study held that clinicians should monitor a patient's PTH levels over a series of tests, as opposed to making clinical decisions on the basis of a single finding. Fourth, the study showed that neither the Siemens nor the Scantibodies test yielded the same results as the IRMA Test. Furthermore, the study showed that a differential of up to 35% existed between the Siemens and Scantibodies tests.
In 2009, the authors of the 2006 Souberbielle Study published a follow-up study (the "2009 Souberbielle Study"). The authors noted that all PTH tests remained correlated with each other, but yielded different absolute results. Accordingly, they wrote that strict adherence to the KDOQI guidelines could lead to "potentially different therapeutic options." However, the report found no need to switch from Second Generation Tests to Third Generation Tests. The 2009 Souberbielle Study also disclosed that the Siemens Test was yielding absolute results that were 43% higher than the Scantibodies Test, only one percentage point off of what Relator alleges he discovered through his parallels.
A 2007 article published by Dr. Fadem noted that 1) the KDOQI guidelines were based on the IRMA Test; 2) the absolute results obtained from various PTH tests varied from those of the IRMA Test; and 3) the 2006 Souberbielle Study documented this variability. Based on these observations, Fadem recommended that nephrologists "use a single laboratory for results and look at trends in PTH as opposed to single values."
A 2009 study published by Cantor (Relator's former boss who brought a successful qui tam action against Nichols) disclosed the results of parallel testing of various PTH tests. In the study, Cantor concluded that the Siemens Test generated results that were on average 36% higher than the Scantibodies Test. This is nearly the same differential as that disclosed in the 2006 Souberbielle Study.
Relator argues that the upward drift he observed in the Siemens Test caused physicians
Relator's complaint includes statements by several doctors who describe that they relied on results provided to them by labs using the Siemens Test in deciding upon a course of treatment for their patients. The doctors state that they acted consistent with the KDOQI Guidelines, and therefore typically prescribed Vitamin D or ordered parathyroidectomies for patients whose PTH levels hit the relevant levels provided in the guidelines. The doctors also state that had they received test results indicating lower (and, Relator implies, more accurate) PTH levels, they would have ordered a different, lesser course of treatment, which would have involved fewer Medicare payments.
Relator alleges that he shared the results of his parallel experiments with Cantor, the owner of Scantibodies, who was very concerned. After seeing the results, in early 2007, Cantor went to Siemens' headquarters to present slides detailing Relator's experiments. At that time, Relator had compiled evidence from more than ten parallels, which, on average, allegedly showed that the Siemens Test was measuring PTH 51% higher than the IRMA Test. Cantor told Relator that Siemens officials responded with words to the effect of "our customers like the PTH values our test provides."
For the next several years, Relator continued to share the results of his parallels with Cantor. In 2010, Cantor sought to persuade Spectra that it should stop using the Siemens Test because of its alleged upward drift. Cantor described how the allegedly inflated PTH levels recorded by the Siemens Test was leading to a nationwide problem of overdosing Vitamin D. In response, Spectra agreed to jointly conduct a parallel comparing the Scantibodies and the Siemens tests. Spectra conducted a PTH analysis on 250 patient samples using the Siemens Test, while Scantibodies used the Scantibodies Test on the same samples. After the results were analyzed, Cantor wrote to Spectra stating that the Siemens Test "is over estimating total PTH by 45% on patient samples."
During the Relevant Time Period, Siemens conducted studies regarding the accuracy of its test, including by comparing each new lot of the Siemens Test against previous lots. However, Relator alleges that Siemens manipulated the results of these studies so as to continue selling non-conforming lots. As an example, Relator contends that when transitioning Spectra from lot 140 of the Siemens Test to lot 143, Siemens represented to Spectra that lot 143 was sufficiently correlated to lot 140. However, Relator states that in 2009 Spectra conducted its own analysis of lots 140 and 143 and found a difference outside of the range that Siemens had specified as acceptable. When Spectra notified Siemens of the discrepancy, and informed Siemens that Spectra was considering rejecting lot 143, Siemens acknowledged that if the results were accurate, lot 143 should be recalled or rejected.
Relator alleges that Siemens' Director of Quality Control proposed a two-pronged solution to the discrepancy: first, Siemens would "move" its "internal calibrator" so that lot 143 would stay within Siemens'
Relator also alleges that Siemens made a number of false statements in the Siemens Test's Instructions for Use ("IFU"), on its website, in "Customer Bulletins" issued when the Siemens Test was altered, in customer meetings (i.e., with Spectra), and in its product labeling.
As to statements in the IFU, Relator alleges that Siemens communicated that its test was sufficiently reliable to make a quantitative assessment of PTH in a patient sample adequate for "diagnostic" purposes. As to statements on its website, Relator alleges that Siemens stated that its test was "standardized against the gold standard IRMA method." As to statements in its Customer Bulletins, Relator points to Siemens' claim in a June 2010 bulletin that the use of a new antibody pool to develop the Siemens Test did not result in any changes in the test's performance characteristics. Furthermore, Relator claim that Siemens' failure to disclose to its customers the test's alleged upward shift was an omission in violation of its legal obligations. Similarly, Relator contends that in its meetings with customers, including Spectra, Siemens never disclosed the alleged upward shift in PTH readings. Finally, Relator argues that the Siemens' Test's labeling never disclosed an upward shift in PTH readings, but, in fact, disclosed a downward shift in 2008.
In summary, Relator argues that 1) the Siemens Test was initially aligned with the IRMA Test, and remained aligned through roughly 2005, as demonstrated by the 2006 Souberbielle Study; 2) after that, the Siemens test shifted upward from the IRMA Test by approximately 40%, as demonstrated by his parallel testing; 3) Siemens knew of this upward shift through its internal testing, Cantor's meeting, and the Spectra incident; 4) despite the upward shift, Siemens continued to manufacture and sell millions of Siemens Tests; and 5) had the Siemens Test's upward shift been acknowledged, the FDA would have recalled the test and Medicare would not have paid for medically unnecessary courses of treatment ordered based on its findings.
Accordingly, Relator brings claims under the FCA under a number of theories: a lack of medical necessity (insofar as Siemens caused laboratories to submit false claims for defective testing, and caused dialysis centers and physicians to prescribe medically unnecessary courses of treatment); provision of defective and/or non-conforming goods (because the government believed it was paying for a PTH test that worked consistent with the device's FDA approval, while Siemens knew that the device was defective and/or materially nonconforming to its FDA approval); and the interstate transport and sale of misbranded devices (as FDA labels for Siemens Tests did not inform users (laboratories and physicians) that the devices measured PTH more than 40% higher than actual PTH). Relator also pleads conspiracy, although the conspiracy count in his complaint contains no details. In his opposition brief, Relator states that it "rests largely on Siemens' manipulation of the testing and calibration of Lot 143 of the Siemens Test, and its communications with a customer regarding the same."
"The [FCA] imposes liability on any person who `knowingly presents ... a
Claims under the FCA are subject to a public disclosure bar that prohibits a relator from bringing a claim for conduct that has already been made public. The bar is intended to discourage "opportunistic plaintiffs who have no significant information to contribute of their own."
The statute providing for the public disclosure bar was amended in 2010. For a complaint based primarily on pre-2010 conduct, the bar is jurisdictional, and serves as a basis for dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).
"Since the amendment does not mention retroactivity and effects a substantive change in the law, the conduct alleged in [a relator's] complaint must be assessed under the law that existed when the conduct took place."
Under both the pre and post amendment versions of the FCA, courts analyzing the applicability of the public disclosure bar apply a two-step approach.
"Prior to the 2010 amendment, the bar applied where a qui tam action was `based upon the public disclosure of allegations or transactions.'"
The 2010 amendment generally conformed the statutory language to the majority judicial interpretation of the pre-amendment language: the new language articulated the inquiry as whether "substantially the same allegations or transactions as alleged in the action or claim were publicly disclosed."
The Second Circuit has applied a broad view of the public disclosure bar. The Circuit does not require that the relator base all of his allegations on previously disclosed public information for the bar to come into effect.
Furthermore, "[m]erely providing more specific details about what happened does not negate substantial similarity."
The FCA provides a list of sources that count as "public disclosures."
As noted above, Relator seems to have changed the focus of his argument from the unsealing of his Amended Complaint to his opposition to Siemens' motion to dismiss. Originally, Relator claimed that the Siemens Test drifted out of alignment with the IRMA Test between 2005 and 2006. However, in a footnote in opposition to the motion to dismiss, Relator asserts that his "claims do not depend on [] proving `drift.'" Instead, Relator's revised theory turns on his assertion that "starting on or before February 2006 through 2010, the Siemens Test was misaligned with the Nichols Test by a positive bias averaging over 40%."
Relator reached this conclusion by conducting a series of parallel experiments, which measured the relation between the Siemens Test and the Scantibodies Test. Based on his assertion that the Scantibodies Test was consistently correlated to the IRMA Test, Relator inferred from the Siemens Test's deviation from the Scantibodies Test that the former also deviated from
Siemens argues that nearly the exact average differential figure between the Siemens and Scantibodies test at which Relator arrived over the course of his studies was disclosed in the public record. It also claims that the fact of significant differentials between PTH tests was widely known.
First, Siemens points to the 2006 Souberbielle Study, which compared how 14 different commercially available tests detected PTH levels against three different concentration levels measured by the IRMA Test. The Siemens and Scantibodies tests were both included in the study.
When measuring the three concentration levels, the Siemens and Scantibodies tests deviated from each other's results by 25%, 31%, and 35% — close to the 42% average deviation between the two detected by Relator's parallels. The 2006 Souberbielle Study also showed that the Scantibodies and Siemens tests had a -14.5% and 9.5% deviation from the IRMA Test, respectively. In other words, neither test captured the same absolute values as the IRMA Test.
Relator responds to the 2006 Souberbielle Study in three ways: first, he makes several points about the study's methodology, with the presumed aim of distinguishing its findings from those he arrived at; second, he claims that unlike his studies, it represents only a snapshot of a single period, and accordingly has no bearing on his claim that the Siemens Test later departed from a baseline; and third, he argues that the rough correspondence (9.5% deviation) between the Siemens and IRMA tests indicates the significance of the Siemens' test alleged later deviation.
Relator's methodological points are unconvincing. His purpose is plainly to try and set apart the 2006 findings from his own. To do so, he emphasizes the nature of the blood samples tested, the labs that tested them, and the use of blood serum as opposed to blood plasma (which was used in Relator's parallels). But before Siemens offered the study's findings as justification for imposition of the public disclosure bar, Relator himself cited approvingly to the study in his complaint, describing it as "an extensive scientific study [] undertaken by
Next, Relator argues that the study's presentation of just a snapshot of the relationship between the Siemens and Scantibodies tests does not publically disclose his claim of later change. However, regardless of whether Relator relies on the theory in his complaint or in opposition to the motion, the 2006 Souberbielle Study is problematic for him, because in 2006, before any drift or arrival at a final misalignment, the Siemens Test was shown to correspond to the Scantibodies Test with nearly the exact differential that he claims it later arrived at. In other words, the circumstance he claims to have discovered was, in fact, disclosed nearly half a decade earlier.
Relator's final argument against the study — that it discloses close correspondence before 2006 between the Siemens and IRMA Tests against the former's later deviation — is immaterial. As described above, Relator's parallels were not a direct comparison of the Siemens and IRMA tests. Instead, they measured the Siemens and Scantibodies tests against each other, and generated results of the differential between the two. Relator did not calculate what differential between the Siemens Test and the IRMA Test would follow from the differential measured in his parallels between the Siemens and the Scantibodies tests. Therefore, the 42% differential Relator alleges he discovered between the Siemens and Scantibodies tests has only an indirect and undisclosed relationship to the 9.5% bias between the Siemens and the IRMA tests disclosed in the 2006 Souberbielle Study.
Second, Siemens points to a 2009 update to the Souberbielle Study, which reported that the Siemens Test yielded results that were 43% higher than the Scantibodies Test — one percentage off from what Relator claims to have uncovered. Relator levels a series of arguments against the validity and relevance of this study, none of which have any purchase against the inescapable fact that it discloses virtually the same results at which he claims to have uniquely arrived.
Relator claims that the 2009 study used data from 2005, presumably to imply that the results do not bear on his allegation of the Siemens Test's drift or later misalignment against the IRMA Test. But this is not so; the study expressly says that its results are based on data collected in 2008. Relator also argues that the "confidence intervals" (which function akin to margins of errors in public polls) for the Siemens and Scantibodies test results render the reported 43% differential between the two
Relator next focuses on the methodology of the 2009 Souberbielle Study (as he did with the 2006 version), attempting to distinguish it from his own tests. He points out, for example, that the authors "amassed [results] from untold numbers of dialysis centers across 19 geographical regions in France." Relator contends that there exist relevant differences between general patient profiles in France and America, but he puts forth no reason to suspect that the relative, as opposed to absolute, yields of the Siemens and Scantibodies tests would be any different when testing American samples. As with his methodological efforts against the 2006 Souberbielle Study, Relator's points here do nothing to change the fact that the 2009 study disclosed nearly same differential between the Siemens and Scantibodies tests at which he arrived.
Siemens also points to a 2009 study conducted by Tom Cantor (Relator's employer), and others. The study disclosed that as of 2009, the Siemens and Scantibodies tests had a percentage differential of 36%.
Relator's response to the study is disingenuous: he claims that "the differential between the Siemens Test and the [Scantibodies Test] does not disclose the differential between the Siemens Test and the [IRMA] Test." But, as noted above, Relator did not do that either. Siemens correctly notes in its reply brief, "the Cantor study did exactly what [Relator's] complaint did two years later: it analyzed and disclosed the differential between the Siemens Test and the Scantibodies Test..." (emphasis in original). Relator also argues that the article does not count as a public disclosure because it was published in a journal with an annual subscription fee. This argument has no traction: as described above, courts regularly hold that scholarly works published in small-circulation journals qualify as public disclosures.
As he did with the Souberbielle studies, Relator disputes the Cantor study's methodology, and attempts to distinguish it from his own analysis. But just like his arguments against those studies, he makes no showing that the relative performance of the Siemens and Scantibodies tests would be altered with different variables or inputs; in other words, he does not show that the 36% break between the two would be any different. Instead, he only makes some arguments that would, if viable, indicate that the two tests might yield different absolute values under different conditions.
The 2006 and 2009 Souberbielle studies and the 2009 Cantor Study inescapably disclose the key information at the heart of Relator's complaint — that the Siemens and Scantibodies test yielded PTH results with a roughly 42% differential from each other.
The above described studies are independently fatal to Relator's claims under the public disclosure bar because they show that nearly the exact differential between the Siemens and Scantibodies tests that Relator arrived at was publically available for years. Those studies, and others, also contain further disclosures that implicitly and explicitly disclosed the fact of a differential between PTH tests, generally. These conclusions further undermine Relator's contention to have contributed findings not already announced.
First, the KDOQI guidelines established in 2003 that second-generation PTH tests, including the Siemens Test, yield results roughly twice as high as those produced by third-generation tests, including the Scantibodies Test. This finding was repeated in the 2006 Souberbielle Study, which noted, "the [KDOQI] guidelines acknowledge that the third-generation PTH assays provide lower values than the second-generation [] assays." The 2009 Souberbielle Study confirmed this again: "the third-generation assays give lower values than the second-generation assays ..." In light of these repeated findings, divergence between the Siemens and Scantibodies tests could have hardly come as a surprise.
Second, differences in measurements between tests were so well-known (and potentially medically significant) that numerous studies recommended that practitioners use a single test over time. For instance, the 2006 Souberbielle study noted, "[w]e demonstrate here that the [KDOQI] recommended limits are not applicable independently of the knowledge of the PTH assay used," and "it cannot be excluded that the decision to recommend parathyroidectomy in CKD patients may be influenced by this inter-method variability." The same study went on to note that "the different second-generation (`intact') PTH assays recognize synthetic 7-84 PTH with various degrees of cross-reactivity as reported previously with some assays ..." It concluded by stating, "we show important inter-method variation in PTH results. As a consequence, the therapeutic decision based on unique cutoff levels such as those recommended in [KDOQI] guidelines may depend on the PTH assay used."
Similarly, the Cantor study noted that "[t]he demonstrated differences in absolute numbers between the iPTH assays highlight that the type of assay must be considered when therapeutic decisions are made based on serum iPTH results." Even Dr. Fadem, who contributed to Relator's complaint, published a 2007 article advising the use of "a single laboratory for results" and urging doctors to "look at trends in PTH as opposed to single values."
Taken together, these conclusions clearly show that the general fact of divergence across PTH tests was public knowledge, and that practitioners had been encouraged for years in professional studies to adjust their treatment plans accordingly. This further erodes Relator's claim to have provided any novel information.
In sum, before Relator filed his complaint, 1) variation between PTH tests was widely known; 2) physicians were advised to adjust their course of treatment accordingly; 3) Second Generation tests, such as the Siemens Test, were known to yield higher absolute results than Third Generation tests, such as the Scantibodies Test; and 4) the average difference between the
As noted above, a relator's claim will not be dismissed if he can establish that despite earlier public disclosures, he qualifies as an "original source." Under the pre-amendment version of the FCA, an original source was defined as "an individual who has direct and independent knowledge of the information on which the allegations are based and has voluntarily provided the information to the Government before filing an action under this section which is based on the information." 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (2006). Under the 2010 version, and as relevant here, an "original source" is defined as an individual who "has knowledge that is independent of and materially adds to the publicly disclosed allegations or transactions, and who has voluntarily provided the information to the Government before filing an action under this section." 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (2010).
Although the pre- and post-amendment standards for determining if earlier available information counts as a public disclosure are functionally the same, the 2010 amendment effects a change in the rigorousness of the "original source" requirement. The Second Circuit has not yet decided which definition should apply when a relator's allegations include pre and post 2010 conduct.
Other Circuits have addressed this issue, and in so doing, have made clear that the task is not an easy one. For instance, the First Circuit has held that a relator only qualifies as an original source if his "new information is sufficiently significant or essential so as to fall into the narrow category of information that materially adds to what has already been revealed through public disclosures."
Here, Relator is clearly not an original source; his work is neither independent of nor contributes materially to that which was already available.
First, as described above, over the course of years, the Siemens and Scantibodies tests had been repeatedly compared to each other in a number of published studies. Relator's descriptions of his personal involvement in and thoroughness of his parallels notwithstanding, he makes no plausible allegation that his approach was significantly "independent" of these previously conducted studies. Second, his parallels produced results that did not materially depart from those arrived at earlier by others. His findings are not "sufficiently or qualitatively different from the core information" already publicly disclosed.
The fact that Relator has made allegations of fraud does not convert his parallel results — which largely track with information that had been publicly available — into knowledge independent of and materially additive to that which was already disclosed. Accordingly, the original source exception is inapplicable, and the public disclosure bar comes into effect.
Although sparsely pled, it appears that Relator bases his conspiracy claim on his description of Siemens' apparent effort to get one lot of its test to align with a previous lot. Relator alleges that Siemens improperly adjusted various test parameters in order to represent the tests as coinciding, and that as a result, tens of thousands of false claims were submitted to the Government.
Relator argues that the public disclosure bar does not reach this count of his complaint, but he misunderstands the reach of that rule: as described above, it does not come into effect only if a relator's particular allegations were matters of public record, but rather works to block qui tam claims based in any part on publically available information sufficient to put the Government on notice that it was being defrauded. Accordingly, insofar as the gist of this allegation is to show that the Siemens Test deviated from the IRMA Test (through Relator's comparisons with the Scantibodies Test), it is barred.
However, to the extent that Relator intends his conspiracy charge to stand on its own, it is dismissed for failure to state a claim. A plaintiff's complaint must "contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to `state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'"
Here, Relator has alleged conduct that is every bit as consistent with a description of Siemens innocently and routinely
Defendants' motion to dismiss is granted. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment, dismissing the complaint.