VICTOR A. BOLDEN, District Judge.
On August 25, 2017, the Court granted a motion of the Acting Commissioner of the Social Security Administration ("Defendant" or "Acting Commissioner"), on consent, under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), reversing the Acting Commissioner's decision as to Jenifer Jones ("Plaintiff") and remanding the matter to the Commissioner for further proceedings. Order Granting Motion to Remand to Agency, dated Aug. 24, 2017, ECF No. 24. On August 31, 2017, the Court entered a judgment in favor of Ms. Jones against the Acting Commissioner. Corrected Judgment, dated Aug. 31, 2017, ECF No. 27.
Three months later, on November 25, 2017, Ms. Jones moved for attorney's fees in the amount of $7,363.84 under the Equal Access to Justice Act ("EAJA"). Motion for Attorney Fees, dated November 25, 2017, ECF No. 28. More than ten months have passed since Ms. Jones filed her motion, but the Acting Commissioner has failed to respond.
"Failure to submit a memorandum in opposition to a motion may be deemed sufficient cause to grant the motion, except where the pleadings provide sufficient grounds to deny the motion." D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 7(a)(2). As the court entered judgment in favor of Ms. Jones, she is presumptively the "prevailing party" under the EAJA and may, on a timely-filed motion, be awarded reasonable attorney's fees. 28 U.S.C. § 2412. As the rates and hours sought by Ms. Jones are reasonable,
Under the EAJA, a party must move "within thirty days of final judgment in the action" for an award of attorney's fees. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B). The Act defines "final judgment" as "a judgment that is final and not appealable, and includes an order of settlement." Id. § 2412(d)(2)(G).
The Supreme Court has explained that § 2412(d)(2)(G) rewrites the traditional rule that a final judgment is one that is final and appealable. See Melkonyan v. Sullivan, 501 U.S. 89, 95 (1991). Congress added this "unusual definition" to the statute in 1985 "to resolve a conflict in the lower courts on whether a `judgment' was to be regarded as `final' for EAJA purposes when it was entered, or only when the period for taking an appeal had lapsed.'" Id. at 95-96 (citation omitted). Thus, the Court held that a final judgment for purposes of § 2412(d)(1)(B) "means a judgment rendered by a court that terminates the civil action for which EAJA fees may be received. The 30-day EAJA clock begins to run after the time to appeal that `final judgment' has expired." Id.
"In sentence four cases, the filing period begins after the final judgment ("affirming, modifying or reversing") is entered by the court and the appeal period has run, so that the judgment is no longer appealable." Id. at 102. In cases where one party is a United States officer or employee sued in an official capacity, parties have 60 days to appeal a district court judgment. FED. R. APP. P. 4. Ms. Jones thus had ninety days to file her EAJA motion—till November 31, 2017. Accordingly, Ms. Jones's motion was timely filed.
Finally, the Court notes that Nancy A. Berryhill became the Acting Commissioner of the Social Security on January 23, 2017.
Ms. Jones's motion for attorney's fees, ECF No. 28, is