DOUGLAS F. McCORMICK, Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiff Connie Linenberger ("Plaintiff") appeals from the Commissioner's denial of her applications for disability benefits. The Court concludes that the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") erred when he concluded that Plaintiff could perform work in the national economy. Accordingly, this Court reverses the ALJ's decision and remands for further proceedings.
Plaintiff filed applications for Social Security Disability Insurance and Supplemental Security Income alleging disability beginning August 5, 2009. Administrative Record ("AR") 17. After a hearing on August 24, 2011, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff's bipolar disorder, borderline personality disorder, obesity, and asthma were severe impairments. AR 17-21. The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff has the residual functional capacity ("RFC") to perform a full range of work with several nonexertional limitations, including a limitation to "simple one to two step instructions for repetitive and uncomplicated tasks." AR 24.
A vocational expert ("VE") testified at the hearing in response to a hypothetical RFC assessment that did not include the limitation to "one to two step instructions." AR 71-76. The VE concluded that Plaintiff could perform the duties of office helper and mail clerk, referencing the Labor Department's Dictionary of Occupational Titles ("DOT") as she described this work. AR 75. The ALJ relied on the VE's testimony to conclude that Plaintiff was capable of making a successful adjustment to other work that exists in the national economy and accordingly found that Plaintiff was not disabled. AR 27.
The parties dispute whether the ALJ erred when he found that Plaintiff was capable of performing work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy.
Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), a district court may review the Commissioner's decision to deny benefits. The ALJ's findings and decision should be upheld if they are free from legal error and are supported by substantial evidence based on the record as a whole. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g);
At the fifth step of the five-step claims evaluation process, the agency bears the burden of showing that a claimant can perform work that exists in "significant numbers" in the national economy, taking into account the claimant's RFC, age, education, and work experience.
When an expert's testimony conflicts with a DOT job listing, the ALJ "must elicit a reasonable explanation for the conflict before relying on the [expert's] evidence to support a determination or decision about whether the claimant is disabled." SSR 00-4p, 2000 WL 1898704, at *2 (Dec. 4, 2000). Thus, if there is a conflict between the expert's opinion and the DOT parameters, the ALJ must determine that the expert has a "reasonable explanation" for this conflict.
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in determining, based upon the VE's testimony, that she was capable of performing the jobs of office helper and mail clerk because those jobs, as described in the DOT, are incompatible with the ALJ's RFC assessment. JS at 3-13. As relevant here, the ALJ's RFC assessment determined that Plaintiff was able to perform work with a limitation to "simple one to two step instructions for repetitive and uncomplicated tasks." AR 24. Plaintiff contends that this limitation precludes her from work as an office helper or mail clerk because those jobs require Reasoning Level 2 and 3, respectively, on the 6-level General Education Development ("GED") scale used in the DOT. JS at 3-13.
As an initial matter, the Court finds that Plaintiff is entitled to a remand because the VE's testimony did not constitute "substantial evidence" of Plaintiff's capacity to work as a mail clerk or office helper. At Plaintiff's hearing, the ALJ failed to include the "one to two step instructions" limitation in any hypothetical posed to the VE. AR 71-76. Therefore, the VE's testimony did not constitute substantial evidence, and the ALJ's decision must be reversed.
Even if the ALJ had included Plaintiff's "one to two step instructions" limitation in his hypothetical to the VE, the VE's testimony would not constitute substantial evidence because the testimony does not contain a reasonable explanation of the deviation from the DOT's Reasoning Level characterization.
A job involving Level 2 reasoning means that an individual must be able to "[a]pply commonsense understanding to carry out detailed but uninvolved written or oral instructions [and d]eal with problems involving a few concrete variables in or from standardized situations." DOT, App'x C, 1991 WL 688702. The DOT classifies office helper as a Reasoning Level 2 job, and the Court observes that this classification is generally consistent with the DOT's description of the job.
This case thus presents a dispute that has recurred with some frequency in this district: whether an RFC that limits a claimant to tasks with one- or two-step instructions is inconsistent with a job that requires Level 2 or higher reasoning under the DOT. Although the Ninth Circuit has not addressed this issue, many judges in this district have, and it appears that all have decided it against the Commissioner.
The Court has reviewed the DOT description of the responsibilities associated with the jobs of office helper and mail clerk. It is not clear to the Court whether someone limited to one-to two-step instructions would be able to perform these responsibilities. This lack of clarity is exacerbated by the DOT's categorization of these jobs as Reasoning Level 2 and 3, both higher than Reasoning Level 1, which expressly mentions the ability to "carry out simple one- or two-step instructions." 1991 WL 688702. Put differently, the Court would have less reason to think that Plaintiff could not work as an office helper or mail clerk if the DOT categorized the jobs as Reasoning Level 1.
The Court's concern could be put to rest if the VE offered a "reasonable explanation" for how a person with Plaintiff's limitation could perform the job of office helper, a Level 2 reasoning job under its DOT listing, or mail clerk, a Level 3 reasoning job under its DOT listing. But the VE had no opportunity to provide an explanation, because Plaintiff's "one to two step instructions" limitation was not included in the hypothetical posed to the VE. AR 71-76. Nor did the VE provide any other evidentiary basis for the ALJ to justify a divergence from the DOT listing in this particular case.
The disparity between the DOT listing and the ALJ's determination in reliance on the VE's testimony required a "reasonable explanation" from the VE. Where, as here, no such explanation has been given, the Court must remand to the agency for further proceedings.
For the reasons stated above, the decision of the Social Security Commissioner is REVERSED and the matter is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
DOT 239.567-010, 1991 WL 672232 (cross-references omitted).
DOT 209.687-026, 1991 WL 671813 (cross-references omitted).
