BETH BLOOM, District Judge.
The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. See ECF Nos. [147] and [179]. On September 7, 2018, the Court held a hearing on the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment. See ECF No. [231]. On September 14, 2018, the Court entered an order denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and granting the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment in full, ECF No. [251] (the "Order"). The Court dismissed Plaintiffs' case with prejudice and granted judgment as a matter of law in favor of the Defendant. Id. On October 15, 2018, Plaintiffs timely filed its Motion for Reconsideration. ECF No. [255]. On October 18, 2018, with the Court's permission, Plaintiffs amended their Motion for Reconsideration and filed the Corrected Motion for Reconsideration, ECF No. [261], which is presently pending before this Court. Plaintiffs argue that the Court erred in its Order because genuine issues of material fact remain, precluding the entry of summary judgment and that "new or more fully developed arguments" should be evaluated to avoid manifest injustice. ECF No. [261], at 1-2.
On October 19, 2018, Plaintiffs then filed a Motion for Leave to Conventionally File Recordings of Margate City Commission Meetings, ECF No. [263] ("Motion for Leave"), which the Court subsequently denied as untimely and improper. See ECF No. [271]. On October 31, 2018, Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Filing Transcript of June 3, 2015 City Commission Hearing, ECF No. [274] (the "Notice of Filing"), which seeks to introduce a transcript of one of the same recordings Plaintiffs previously moved to file conventionally. Compare ECF No. [274] ("Plaintiffs . . . give notice of their filing the attached transcript of the City Commission hearing from June 3, 2015") with ECF No. [263] ("Specifically, the flash drive includes a video recording of . . . the June 3, 2015, City Commission meeting."). Defendant then moved to strike the Notice of Filing, arguing that it was untimely and improper, was a "flagrant disregard for the Court's Order," and was an attempt to run "afoul of the prohibition about raising new evidence in a reply brief." ECF No. [291], at 3. Plaintiffs argue in response, among other grounds, that Defendant's Motion to Strike is untimely. ECF No. [292], at 9.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f)(2) states that a "court may strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter . . . on motion made by a party either before responding to the pleading or, if a response is not allowed, within 21 days after being served with the pleading." F.R.C.P 12(f)(2) (emphasis added). Defendant filed its Motion to Strike on December 6, 2018, thirty-six days after the Notice of Filing was filed. While the Court denies the Motion to Strike as untimely, it nevertheless agrees with the Defendant that the Notice of Filing is an attempt to circumvent the Court's Order denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave. Like Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave, the Notice of Filing is untimely and improper. Moreover, as conceded by Plaintiffs' in their Motion for Leave, the transcript Plaintiffs attempt to introduce is not evidence that is "newly discovered." Indeed, the Plaintiffs were not only present at the June 3, 2015 commission meeting when it took place, but they also admit in their Motion for Leave that the "recordings were downloaded directly from the City's website." ECF No. [263], at 1. It would be improper for the Court to consider evidence that was previously available to a party, but that they elected not to put forward, in support of a motion for reconsideration. Accordingly, while the Court denies Defendant's Motion to Strike, ECF No. [291], it will not consider the transcript attached to the Notice of Filing in considering Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration.
In reviewing a motion for reconsideration, the Court "will not alter a prior decision absent a showing of `clear and obvious error' where `the interests of justice' demand correction." Prudential Securities, Inc. v. Emerson, 919 F.Supp. 415, 417 (M.D. Fla. 1996) (quoting American Home Assurance, Co. v. Glenn Estess & Assoc. Inc., 763 F.2d 1237, 1239 n.2 (11th Cir. 1985). "[R]econsideration of a previous order is an extraordinary remedy to be employed sparingly." Burger King Corp. v. Ashland Equities, Inc., 181 F.Supp.2d 1366, 1370 (S.D. Fla. 2002). "[T]he moving party must set forth facts or law of a strongly convincing nature to induce the court to reverse its prior decision." Id. at 1369. "The three primary grounds that justify reconsideration are: (1) an intervening change in the controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence; and (3) the need to correct clear error or prevent manifest injustice." Delaware Valley Floral Grp., Inc. v. Shaw Rose Nets, LLC, 597 F.3d 1374, 1383 (11th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation omitted). "While a party may seek to correct clear errors in a motion for reconsideration, [a]n error is not clear and obvious if the legal issues are at least arguable." Leonard v. Astrue, 487 F.Supp.2d 1333, 1341 (M.D. Fla. 2007) (internal quotations omitted) (citing United States v. Battle, 272 F.Supp.2d 1354, 1358 (N.D. Ga. 2003)).
Plaintiffs argue that the Court erred in granting summary judgment because 1) the Court misapprehended Plaintiffs' legal arguments and the Court should reconsider these arguments to avoid manifest injustice, and 2) genuine issues of material facts remain precluding the entry of summary judgment.
The Court first notes that Plaintiffs rely on many of the same arguments in their Motion for Reconsideration as they did in their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, ECF No. [147], and in Plaintiffs' Response in Opposition to the City's Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. [195]. In relitigating these arguments Plaintiffs' now claim that the Court "patently misunderstood Plaintiffs' legal arguments." ECF No. [261], at 2. Plaintiffs again argue, for the third time, that they did not have to submit a formal request for an accommodation, despite the City having a clear procedure for doing so, because such application would have been futile. Compare Plfs' Mot. for Partial Summ. J., [147], at 14 ("It is plainly evident that submitting a formal request for a reasonable accommodation under the City's zoning code would have been futile"); with Plfs' Response in Opp'n to Deft's Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. [195], at 13 ("Despite its clear futility, Ms. Jimenez still [informally] requested a reasonable accommodation during the May 3, 2017."); and with Plfs' Mot. for Reconsideration, ECF No. [261], at 33 ("Plaintiffs maintain they had no obligation to make a formal application to open a detox facility because the City's position was made final . . . Plaintiffs are not required to conclusively show that a formal application for a reasonable accommodation would have been futile."). Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration urges the Court to reconsider its ruling "because [they] disagree with the Court's treatment of certain facts and its legal conclusions." Michael Linet, Inc. v. Village of Wellington, Fla., 408 F.3d 757, 763 (11th Cir. 2005). This basis is sufficient to deny the Motion for Reconsideration, as motions for reconsideration cannot be used "to relitigate old matters . . . [or] raise [new] argument[s]." Id. Plaintiffs' Motion requests that this Court rethink what it has already considered. See ECF No. [251] at 37 ("Plaintiffs' futility argument is not supported by the record. Because there is no genuine issue of material fact that Plaintiffs did not submit a request for a reasonable accommodation through Defendant's established procedures, Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."). On this basis alone, the Motion for Reconsideration must be denied. Nevertheless, the Court has carefully considered Plaintiffs' arguments and finds that they are without merit.
The Court is likewise unpersuaded by Plaintiffs' claim that the Court erred in granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment because genuine issues of material fact remain that preclude summary judgment. As noted by the Court in its Order, "cross motions for summary judgment may be probative of the nonexistence of a factual dispute, but this procedural posture does not automatically empower the court to dispense with the determination whether questions of material fact exist." Georgia State Conference of NAACP v. Fayette Cty. Bd. of Comm'rs, 775 F.3d 1336, 1345-46 (11th Cir. 2015). Plaintiffs argue that the Court "erred in many demonstrative parts of its Order by weighing evidence and deciding fact issues, rather than determining whether factual disputes exist." ECF No. [261], at 3.
To the extent Plaintiffs argue that the Court improperly weighed evidence in rendering its ruling on summary judgment, the Court clarifies that the weight of the
Plaintiffs also argue that the Court's Order is "largely based on Defendant's misstatements of evidence," highlighting in a footnote in its Motion for Reconsideration that "[t]ellingly, Defendant's statement of the facts (ECF [180]) is cited
Plaintiffs have not met their burden on reconsideration to establish that the Court's Order, ECF No. [251], was clearly erroneous. Accordingly, it is