JAMES S. MOODY, Jr., District Judge.
Plaintiffs C.P., D.J., and K.R.A. are patients of Tampa Bay Surgery Center, Inc. ("TBSCI"), whose parents provided sensitive information about them to TBSCI. TBSCI's patient database was hacked, and C.P., D.J., and K.R.A.'s information was briefly posted online, along with the information of more than 142,000 other patients. Although no patient has had their information misused as a result of the data breach, Plaintiffs are suing TBSCI. The Court concludes the action should be dismissed because Plaintiffs have not suffered an injury in fact and, thus, lack standing to sue.
C.P., D.J., and K.R.A. are minor children who were patients at TBSCI. (Doc. 4, ¶ 4). As patients, the children's parents were required to provide information to TBSCI, including the children's names, dates of birth, home addresses, and social security numbers (the "Sensitive Information"). (Doc. 4, ¶ 5). TBSCI stored this Sensitive Information electronically in a patient database. (See Doc. 4, ¶ 36).
In May 2017, a hacker breached TBSCI's database and published C.P., D.J., and K.R.A.'s Sensitive Information on a public file-sharing website, along with the Sensitive Information of more than 142,000 other TBSCI patients. (Doc. 4, ¶ 4). Plaintiffs do not allege that any of the Sensitive Information has been used. Instead, Plaintiffs allege they are at an increased risk of having their identity stolen and are compelled to incur the costs of credit monitoring/identity theft protection. (Doc. 4, ¶ 10). At least one Plaintiff, C.P.'s mother Janice Stapleton, purchased identity theft protection. (Doc. 4, ¶ 8).
TBSCI admits that the data breach occurred and that the Sensitive Information was briefly posted online before being removed. (Doc. 12). After the data breach, TBSCI provided free identity protection services to Plaintiffs and other potentially affected patients. (Doc. 12, p. 3-4).
In June 2017, Plaintiffs sued TBSCI in a putative class action suit for negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and invasion of privacy, all under Florida law. TBSCI now moves to dismiss arguing the Court has no jurisdiction because Plaintiffs lack standing.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) allows a complaint to be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. A district court has subject-matter jurisdiction if the claims present a case or controversy under the Constitution and there is standing. Resnick v. AvMed, Inc., 693 F.3d 1317, 1323 (11th Cir. 2012). A plaintiff bears the burden of proving standing, which requires a showing that "(1) it has suffered an `injury in fact' that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant; and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision." Id. (quoting Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81, 120 S.Ct. 693, 704, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000)).
At the pleading stage, the injury element can be satisfied by "general factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant's conduct." Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 2137, 119 L. Ed. 2d 351 (1992). An allegation of imminent injury may suffice if the threatened injury is "certainly impending," or there is a "`substantial risk' that the harm will occur." Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 414 n. 5, 133 S.Ct. 1138, 1150 n. 5, 185 L. Ed. 2d 264 (2013). But "`[a]llegations of possible future injury' are not sufficient." Id. at 409 (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158, 110 S.Ct. 1717, 1724, 109 L. Ed. 2d 135 (1990)). So a future injury will not confer standing if it relies on an "attenuated chain of inferences necessary to find harm." Id. at 414 n. 5; see also Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564, ("Although imminence is concededly a somewhat elastic concept, it cannot be stretched beyond its purpose, which is to ensure that the alleged injury is not too speculative for Article III purposes—that the injury is certainly impending.").
The issue of whether a data breach on its own is an "injury in fact" is novel for this Court and has not been addressed by the Eleventh Circuit. Other circuit courts have reached conflicting conclusions, with the Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits holding data breach victims have standing because they are at a substantial risk of injury, and the First, Second, Third, and Fourth Circuits holding data breach victims lacked standing.
To satisfy standing, Plaintiffs must prove an imminent injury. While Plaintiffs allege two categories of harm—(1) their risk of being victims of identity theft as a result of the data breach and (2) the costs Plaintiff Stapleton has incurred and others may incur for credit monitoring/identity theft protection—both categories require Plaintiffs to show there is at least a substantial risk their Sensitive Information will be used in a harmful manner. That is because the second category—Plaintiff Stapleton's payment for credit monitoring and identity theft protection—would not be an actual injury unless there was already a substantial risk of identity theft. Clapper, 568 U.S. at 416 (holding, "respondents cannot manufacture standing merely by inflicting harm on themselves based on their fears of hypothetical future harm that is not certainly impending."). So Plaintiffs only have standing if their alleged injury is certainly impending or if there is a substantial risk of injury.
The Court concludes Plaintiffs' allegations are insufficient to show that an injury is certainly impending or that they have a substantial risk of imminent injury. First, Plaintiffs are unable to identify a single proposed class member who has had their Sensitive Information misused as a result of the data breach. See Torres v. Wendy's Co., 195 F.Supp.3d 1278, 1283 (M.D. Fla. 2016) (discussing the number of plaintiffs who have experienced fraudulent charges as an "influential factor" in determining whether future harm is "certainly impending"). The lack of a single, identifiable instance of identity theft out of the more than 142,000 patients indicates that there is no substantial risk of imminent injury.
Second, TBSCI has also lessened Plaintiffs' risks of imminent injury by providing free credit monitoring to all of those potentially affected by the data breach. Because the protection locks the credit reports of the affected patients, TBSCI mitigated the risk of Plaintiffs having their Sensitive Information misused in a way that causes them harm.
Finally, Plaintiffs allegations rely on a chain of inferences that is too attenuated to constitute imminent harm. Plaintiffs' argument requires the following chain of events before they would suffer harm: (1) that their Sensitive Information was viewed when made available online for a short period of time, (2) that someone downloaded that Sensitive Information while it was available online, (3) that someone will use the Sensitive Information, and (4) that the protection provided by TBSCI would be inadequate to prevent the misuse of the Sensitive Information. Absent additional allegations indicating the events in the chain are likely to occur, the Court cannot conclude an injury is certainly impending.
For these reasons, the Court concludes Plaintiffs' allegations of harm are too speculative to constitute an imminent injury. While Plaintiffs argue that the mere fact that there was data breach is sufficient to constitute an imminent injury, the Court cannot agree with that sort of ipse dixit reasoning. Something more than the mere data breach must be alleged before Plaintiffs can show they have a substantial risk of injury. Lacking any allegations that would show any harm is certainly impending, Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate standing, and this Court lacks jurisdiction over their claims.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that: