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Omoniyi v. U.S., CR612-009 (2016)

Court: District Court, S.D. Georgia Number: infdco20160812a79 Visitors: 17
Filed: Aug. 10, 2016
Latest Update: Aug. 10, 2016
Summary: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION G. R. SMITH , Magistrate Judge . Having pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a gun in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g), CR612-009, doc. 16 (plea agreement); doc. 15 at 1-2 (judgment imposing a 120-month sentence), and having waived his appeal and collateral appeal rights, 1 doc. 16 at 6, Levert Marquis Omoniyi asked the Eleventh Circuit for leave to file a successive 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion. See Exhibit "A" (attached July 14, 2016 Eleventh Circuit Rulin
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REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Having pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a gun in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), CR612-009, doc. 16 (plea agreement); doc. 15 at 1-2 (judgment imposing a 120-month sentence), and having waived his appeal and collateral appeal rights,1 doc. 16 at 6, Levert Marquis Omoniyi asked the Eleventh Circuit for leave to file a successive 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion. See Exhibit "A" (attached July 14, 2016 Eleventh Circuit Ruling). That Court denied his request because in fact this was his first § 2255 motion, id. at 2-3, so he filed his motion here, doc. 19, where the Court is preliminarily reviewing it under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 Rule 4.

Omoniyi provides no rational thread of a claim, doc. 19, thus impliedly relying on his successive-writ application, attached here as Exhibit B (the Court retrieved it through PACER). Unsurprisingly, he ignores his waiver while invoking Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. ___, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015), to argue that "[t]he predicate sentences that label me an Armed Career Offender should no longer be used to enhance my sentence," and "[m]y sentence is based strictly on a prior conviction that triggered the ACCA residual clause." Exh. B at 5. He concludes: "The ACCA's language is so vague that the residual clause violates due process." Id.

Omoniyi's § 2255 motion is time-barred. After the Court sentenced him to 120 months' imprisonment on March 18, 2013 (doc. 15), he never appealed. His conviction thus became final on March 27, 2013. Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(A) (criminal defendants must file a notice of appeal within 14 days of the entry of judgment). That means he had to file his § 2255 motion by no later than one year later, March 27, 2014. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f). Even were the Court to give him credit for his Eleventh Circuit § 2255 filing, Exh. A. at 7 (signature-filed June 8, 2016), it's clear that he is more than two years beyond the one-year limit.

Additional grounds support denial of his § 2255 motion. The Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA") — the statute Johnson addressed — provides enhanced penalties for defendants who are (1) convicted of being felons in possession of firearms in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and (2) have "three prior convictions . . . for a violent felony or a serious drug offense, or both." It defines "violent felony" as, among other things, a felony that "otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another." Id. at § 924(e)(2)(B). Johnson found that "residual" clause so vague that it violates due process. See Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2557.

Setting aside the fact that a defendant must establish (he has not) that he was sentenced under the ACCA's residual clause,2 this claim is waived. In that regard,

A sentence-appeal waiver is valid if the defendant made the waiver knowingly and voluntarily. Williams v. United States, 396 F.3d 1340, 1341 (11th Cir. 2005). To establish that the waiver was made knowingly and voluntarily, the government must show either that (1) the district court specifically questioned the defendant about the waiver during the plea colloquy, or (2) the record makes it manifestly clear that the defendant otherwise understood the full significance of the waiver. Id.; see also United States v. Bushert, 997 F.2d 1343, 1350-51 (11th Cir.1993). When a valid sentence-appeal waiver is entered into knowingly and voluntarily and contains express language waiving the right to collateral review, it is enforceable and precludes the defendant from collateral attacking a sentence on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. Williams, 396 F.3d at 1342.

Demello v. United States, 969 F. App'x 969, 971-72 (11th Cir. 2015); Taylor v. United States, 2016 WL 742118 at * 3 (S.D. Ga. Feb. 24, 2016). Here there is no guilty-plea hearing transcript in the record, and no government response brief (again, this case is under initial Rule 4(b) review). Cases like this typically necessitate the generation of both the transcript and a government response to determine whether the movant effectively waived his rights to direct and collateral review.

Yet, ordering that up here — where Omoniyi advances no specific plea-invalidity facts (e.g., that he was coerced or tricked into the plea), much less any ineffective assistance of counsel claim — defeats the very bargain that the government secured: It gave him certain benefits in exchange for sparing the taxpayers that expense (government attorney time required to respond to his § 2255 motion, transcript expenses, etc.). To order a transcript and response, then, would gut that bargain.

"That is why the Eleventh Circuit's heightened pleading burden must be honored." Holland v. United States, 2014 WL 5241531 at * 2 (S.D. Ga. Oct. 14, 2014) (explaining that specific, waiver-invalidating facts must be pled, and emphasizing that mere, "I-want-a-do-over" allegations will not suffice). Where that burden is not met, the agreement itself (here the above excerpt, and defendant's affirmation of his understanding and acceptance, doc. 16 at 8), plus the absence of any waiver-invalidating allegations, stops the § 2255 train. Id.

It follows that Omoniyi cannot look to Johnson and § 2255(f)(3) to define when his one-year statute of limitations began to run. Instead, he's relegated to § 2255(f)(1) and, as noted above, his motion is untimely by a long shot.3

Finally, the ACCA was simply not applied to Omoniyi's case. See Presentence Investigative Report at 12-14 (noting that he qualified for ACCA's enhanced penalty but spared himself that through his plea agreement, which itself tilted in his favor due to confusion over a state-court conviction record). His claim thus fails on these additional grounds.

Accordingly, Levert Marquis Omoniyi's § 2255 motion should be DENIED. Applying the Certificate of Appealability (COA) standards set forth in Brown v. United States, 2009 WL 307872 at * 1-2 (S.D. Ga. Feb. 9, 2009), the Court discerns no COA-worthy issues at this stage of the litigation, so no COA should issue either. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1); Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Habeas Corpus Cases Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 ("The district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.") (emphasis added). Any motion for leave to appeal in forma pauperis therefore is moot.

SO REPORTED AND RECOMMENDED.

EXH. A

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

ELBERT PARR TUTTLE COURT OF APPEALS BUILDING 56 Forsyth Street, N.W. Atlanta, Georgia 30303

David J. Smith For rules and forms visit Cleik of Court www.call.uscourts.gov July 14, 2016 Scott L. Poff U.S. District Court 125 BULL ST BOX 8286 SAVANNAH, GA 31402 Appeal Number: 16-13686-J Case Style: In re: Levert Omoniyi District Court Docket No: 6:12-cr-00009-BAE-GRS-1

The enclosed order has been entered. No further action will be taken in this matter.

Sincerely,

DAVID J. SMITH, Clerk of Court

Reply to: Davina C. Burney-Smith/jfc, J Phone #: (404) 335-6183

Enclosure(s)

DIS-4 Multi-purpose dismissal letter

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-13686-J

IN RE: LEVERT OMONIYI, Petitioner.

Application for Leave to File a Second or Successive Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence, 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)

Before TJOFLAT, ROSENBAUM, and JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges.

BY THE PANEL:

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2255(h) and 2244(b)(3)(A), Levert Omoniyi has filed an application seeking an order authorizing the district court to consider a second or successive motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his federal sentence, 28 U.S.C. § 2255. As an initial matter, however, we must determine whether Omoniyi's proposed § 2255 motion would be second or successive.

District court records indicate that Omoniyi has not filed a § 2255 motion. Because Omoniyi has not filed a previous § 2255 motion that was denied or dismissed with prejudice, he does not require our permission to file his proposed § 2255 motion, as it would not be second or successive. See Dunn v. Singletary, 168 F.3d 440, 441 (11 th Cir. 1999) (holding that, when a first habeas petition is dismissed without prejudice, a later petition is not second or successive for purposes of § 2244(b)). Accordingly, Omoniyi's application for leave to file a second or successive motion is DENIED as unnecessary.

JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judge, concurring:

I agree that Mr. Omoniyi does not need our permission to file a § 2255 motion. Because he did not file his application with the benefit of a lawyer's assistance, I write separately to explain his options in more detail. Section 2255 motions give prisoners a mechanism for addressing a sentence that is illegal. These motions must be filed in a district court rather than a court of appeals. The appropriate district court for Mr. Omoniyi case is the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia in Statesboro that sentenced him in 2013.

Last month, Mr. Omoniyi mailed an application for leave to file a second or successive § 2255 motion to this Court in Atlanta, but this type of application is only required in cases where a petitioner has already filed a § 2255 motion and the district court has disposed of it properly. As the majority order says, Mr. Omoniyi has never filed a motion to vacate in any federal court. This means Mr. Omoniyi was not required to file the application he filed with this Court. In denying his application today, we are not denying Mr. Omoniyi permission to file a § 2255 motion. Rather, we are saying he does not need our permission to file a § 2255 motion.

If Mr. Omoniyi chooses to file a § 2255 motion in the district court, he should be aware that he may have very little time left to do so. Mr. Omoniyi's application indicates that he wishes to file a § 2255 motion based on Johnson v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015). The deadline to file § 2255 motions based on the Johnson case technically was June 26, 2016. If Mr. Omoniyi still plans to file a § 2255 motion based on Johnson, he should ensure that he files the motion with the district court in Statesboro (at least by giving it to a prison official—the kind of official he gave his application to earlier in June—for filing) as soon as possible.

I have attached to this opinion a copy of the form that Mr. Omoniyi must use to file a § 2255 motion in the Southern District of Georgia in Statesboro. The form can also be found online at this address: http://www.uscourts.gov/forms/habeas-coipus-petitions/motion-vacateset aside-sentence-motion-under-28-usc-ss-2255.

This is the mailing address for the district court in Statesboro:

United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia Statesboro Courthouse 52 North Main Street Statesboro, Georgia 30458

Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct a Sentence By a Person in Federal Custody

(Motion Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255)

Instructions

1. To use this form, you must be a person who is serving a sentence under a judgment against you in a federal court. You are asking for relief from the conviction or the sentence. This form is your motion for relief.

2. You must file the form in the United States district court that entered the judgment that you are challenging. If you jvant to challenge a federal judgment that imposed a sentence to be served in the future, you should file the motion in the federal court that entered that judgment.

3. Make sure the form is typed or neatly written.

4. You must tell the truth and sign the form. If you make a false statement of a material fact, you may be prosecuted for perjury.

5. Answer all the questions. You do not need to cite law. You may submit additional pages if necessary. If you do not fill out the form properly, you will be asked to submit additional or correct information. If you want to submit a brief or arguments, you must submit them in a separate memorandum.

6. If you cannot pay for the costs of this motion (such as costs for an attorney or transcripts), you may ask to proceed in forma pauperis (as a poor person). To do that, you must fill out the last page of this form. Also, you must submit a certificate signed by an officer at the institution where you are confined showing the amount of money that the institution is holding for you.

7. In this motion, you may challenge the judgment entered by only one court. If you want to challenge a judgment entered by a different judge or division (either in the same district or in a different district), you must file a separate motion.

8. When you have completed the form, send the original and ____ copies to the Clerk of the United States District Court at this address:

Clerk, United States District Court for Address City, State Zip Code If you want a file-stamped copy of the petition, you must enclose an additional copy of the petition and ask the court to file-stamp it and return it to you.

9. CAUTION: You must include in this motion all the grounds for relief from the conviction or sentence that you' challenge. And you must state the facts that support each ground. If you fail to set forth all the grounds in this motion, you may be barred from presenting additional grounds at a later date.

10. CAPITAL CASES: If you are under a sentence of death, you are entitled to the assistance of counsel and should request the appointment of counsel.

EXH. B

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

APLICATION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A SECOND OR SUCCESSIVE MOTION TO VACATE, SET ASIDE OR CORRECT SENTENCE

28 U.S.C. § 2255

BY A PRISONER IN FEDERAL CUSTODY

Name Levert Omoniyi Prisoner Number 15528-021 Institution F.C.I. Estill Street Address P.O. Box 699 City Estill State South Carolina Zip Code 29918

INSTRUCTIONS-READ CAREFULLY

(1) This application must be legibly handwritten or typewritten and signed by the applicant under penalty of perjury. Any false statement of a material fact may serve as the basis for prosecution and conviction for perjury.

(2) ATJ questions must be answered concisely in the proper space on the form.

(3) The Judicial Conference of the United States has adopted the 8k x 11 inch paper size for use throughout the federal judiciary and directed the elimination of the use of legal size paper. All pleadings must be on 8k x 11 inch paper, otherwise we cannot accept mem.

(4) All applicants seeking leave to file a second or successive petition are required to use this form, except in capital cases. In capital cases only, the use of this form is optional.

(5) Additional pages are not permitted except with respect to additional grounds for relief and facts which you rely upon to support those grounds. DO NOT SUBMIT SEPARATE PETITIONS, MOTIONS, BRIEFS, ARGUMENTS, ETC., EXCEPT IN CAPITAL CASES.

(6) la accordance with the "Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996," as codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2255, effective April 24, 1996, before leave to file a second or successive motion can be granted by the United States Court of Appeals, it is the applicant's burden to make a prima facie showing that he satisfies either of the two conditions stated below.

A second or successive motion must be certified as provided in [28 U.S.C] section 2255 by a panel of the appropriate court of appeals to contain— (1) newly discovered evidence that, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have found the movant guilty of the offense; or (2) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.

(7) When this application is fully completed, the original and three copies must be mailed to:

Clerk of Court United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 56 Forsyth Street, N. W. Atlanta, Georgia 30303

FootNotes


1. Under his plea agreement, he agreed that: To the maximum extent permitted by federal law, the defendant voluntarily and expressly waives the right to appeal the conviction and sentence and the right to collaterally attack the conviction and sentence in any post-conviction proceeding, including but not limited to a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 proceeding, on any ground, EXCEPT THAT: the defendant may file a direct appeal of the sentence if it exceeds the statutory maximum or if, by variance or departure, the sentencing court imposes a sentence higher than the advisory sentencing guideline range as found by the sentencing court. The government's right to appeal is not limited, BUT IF the Government appeals the sentence imposed, the defendant may also file a direct appeal of the sentence.

Doc. 16 at 6 (emphasis added).

2. One Eleventh Circuit panel instructs that "the district court cannot grant relief in a § 2255 proceeding unless the movant . . . proves that he was sentenced using the residual clause." In re Moore, ___ F.3d ___, 2016 WL 4010433 at * 3-4 (11th Cir. July 27, 2016). But another labels that command as "dicta" and "wrong." In re Chance, ___ F.3d ___, 2016 WL 4123844 at * 4 (11th Cir. Aug. 2, 2016). The Moore court said: the district court cannot grant relief in a § 2255 proceeding unless the movant meets his burden of showing that he is entitled to relief, and in this context the movant cannot meet that burden unless he proves that he was sentenced using the residual clause and that the use of that clause made a difference in the sentence. If the district court cannot determine whether the residual clause was used in sentencing and affected the final sentence — if the court cannot tell one way or the other — the district court must deny the § 2255 motion. It must do so because the movant will have failed to carry his burden of showing all that is necessary to warrant § 2255 relief.

Moore, 2016 WL 4010433 at * 4. It justified its directive in a preceding passage:

There are many reasons why one who files a collateral proceeding has the burden of proof and persuasion on all of the elements of his claim. Chief among them is the principle that `direct appeal is the primary avenue for review of a conviction or sentence. . . . When the process of direct review . . . comes to an end, a presumption of finality and legality attaches to the conviction and sentence.' Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887, 103 S.Ct. 3383, 3391-92, 77 L.Ed.2d 1090 (1983); see also Jones v. United States, 304 F.3d 1035, 1039 (11th Cir. 2002) (`A fundamental purpose for the [Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act] was to establish finality in post-conviction proceedings.') (citations omitted).

Id. at * 3.

3. Equitable tolling can, in exceptional circumstances, allow untimely motions to proceed. See Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010). So can a "`fundamental miscarriage of justice'" that "`has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent.'" Fail, 2016 WL 1658594 at * 4 (quoting McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S.Ct. 1924, 1931 (2013)). Movant invokes neither tolling nor the miscarriage exception, and offers no new evidence or exceptional circumstances to trigger either.
Source:  Leagle

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