MARC T. TREADWELL, District Judge.
This matter is before the Court on United States Magistrate Judge Charles H. Weigle's Report and Recommendation. Doc. 18. The Defendant moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim (Doc. 13), and the Magistrate Judge recommends denying the motion. The Defendant has objected to the Recommendation. Doc. 19. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the Court has considered the Defendant's objections and made a de novo determination of the portions of the Recommendation to which he objects. As discussed below, the Recommendation is
The Recommendation does not address the Defendant's argument that he is entitled to qualified immunity, and the Defendant objects. Doc. 19 at 3. A government official acting within the scope of his duties is entitled to qualified immunity unless (1) the plaintiff alleges facts that constitute a violation of a constitutional right by the official and (2) the constitutional right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009) (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)). The Defendant argues that his actions as stated in the Plaintiff's complaint were not unconstitutional, and the constitutional right was not clearly established at the time the alleged violation occurred. Id. at 3-4.
For the reasons discussed in the Recommendation, reviewed de novo and adopted by the Court, the allegations state a claim for violation of the Plaintiff's rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Doc. 18 at 2-6. Further, the right was clearly established in the specific context of this case when the alleged violation occurred. Imposing an "atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life" constitutes a violation of the inmate's Due Process rights. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483-84 (1995). The Supreme Court in Wilkinson v. Austin held that factors such as restrictive conditions, severe limitations on human contact, and indefinite administrative segregation created a Due Process interest. 545 U.S. 209, 223-24 (2005). As discussed in the Recommendation, the Plaintiff alleges the same kinds of deprivation. Doc. 18 at 4. Accordingly, the right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation, and the Defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity at this stage.
The Plaintiff's handwritten filing is difficult to read, and his reasoning is difficult to follow. As a response to the Defendant's objection, the Plaintiff's filing is untimely. Compare Doc. 20 (Plaintiff's Response, filed October 28, 2016) with Doc. 19 (Defendant's Objection, filed August 22, 2016). Accordingly, the Court does not consider the response in its analysis of the Defendant's objection. But the Plaintiff also writes (in the Court's best attempt to read his handwriting):
Doc 20 at 2-3 (errors and punctuation in original). The Court construes this portion of the response as a motion for reconsideration of the Court's dismissal without prejudice of the Plaintiff's claims against other Defendants. Doc. 16. Pursuant to Local Rule 7.6, "Motions for Reconsideration shall not be filed as a matter of routine practice." M.D. Ga. L.R. 7.6. "Reconsideration is appropriate only if the movant demonstrates (1) that there has been an intervening change in the law, (2) that new evidence has been discovered which was not previously available to the parties in the exercise of due diligence, or (3) that the court made a clear error of law." Bingham v. Nelson, 2010 WL 339806, at *1 (M.D. Ga.) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "In order to demonstrate clear error, the party moving for reconsideration must do more than simply restate his prior arguments, and any arguments which the party inadvertently failed to raise earlier are deemed waived." McCoy v. Macon Water Auth., 966 F.Supp. 1209, 1223 (M.D. Ga. 1997).
The Plaintiff appears to argue that the Court should not have dismissed his claims against the other Defendants because qualified immunity does not apply for the same reasons it should not apply to the remaining Defendant. If so, the Plaintiff misstates the reasons for those dismissals. The Court did not dismiss the other Defendants because of qualified immunity; rather, the Court agreed with the Magistrate Judge's Recommendation to find that the Plaintiff failed to state a claim as to those Defendants. Doc. 16 at 1; Doc. 8 at 5-9. Whatever his intended argument, the Plaintiff does not point to, and the Court does not find, any intervening change in law, new evidence not previously available to the parties, or clear error in the Court's prior Order.
For the reasons discussed above, the Court