MICHAEL A. SHIPP, District Judge.
This matter comes before the Court upon Defendants
This case and the claims asserted herein arise from the same facts and circumstances the Court previously summarized. See In re Valeant Pharm. Int'l, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 15-7658, 2017 WL 1658822 (D.N.J. Apr. 28, 2017). The Court assumes the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts and recites the facts only to the extent necessary to decide the instant motion.
On October 22, 2015, Laura Potter brought a putative class action on "behalf of all persons who purchased or otherwise acquired Valeant stock between February 23, 2015 and October 20, 2015, inclusive ..., against Valeant and certain of its officers and/or directors for violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 [(the "Exchange Act")] ...." (Compl. ¶ 1, ECF No. 1.) On May 31, 2016, the Court consolidated Ms. Potter's action with several other actions, and pursuant to the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act ("PSLRA"), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4, the Court appointed Lead Counsel and Lead Plaintiff in the consolidated action. (Order 3, ECF No. 67.)
On June 24, 2016, Lead Plaintiff and Tucson filed a Consolidated Class Complaint. (Consol. Compl., ECF No. 80.) On April 28, 2017, the Court decided six motions to dismiss filed by Ubben and several other groups of defendants. See generally In re Valeant, 2017 WL 1658822. The Court found that Lead Plaintiff and Tucson had adequately pled a violation of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act against Ubben and other defendants. Id. at *13. On September 5, 2017, the Court denied Deborah Jorn's Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's denial of her previous motion to dismiss the Section 10(b) claim. In re Valeant Pharm. Int'l, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 15-7658, 2017 WL 3880657, at *1 (D.N.J. Sept. 5, 2017).
On June 5, 2018, the Court lifted a stay of the proceedings in this matter. (Order, ECF No. 316.) On September 20, 2018, Lead Plaintiff, Tucson, and IBEW, without leave of Court, filed the First Amended Consolidated Complaint ("FAC") naming additional defendants and bringing additional claims. (See generally FAC, ECF No. 352.) Plaintiffs aver that the FAC "leaves unchanged the prior allegations[,] which were subject to the Court's April 28, 2017 ruling on the motions to dismiss[,]" and "new allegations are contained in ¶¶ 33, 55-62, 560-582 and [the FAC] add[s] insider trading claims (see Counts III and IV)." (Id. at 1 n.1.) On October 10, 2018, the Honorable Lois H. Goodman, U.S.M.J. entered a consent order accepting the filing of the FAC nunc pro tunc. (Order, ECF No. 366.)
Ubben was, at times relevant in the FAC, the Chief Executive Officer and Chief Investment Officer of ValueAct. (FAC ¶ 61.) Ubben also served as a member of Valeant Pharmaceuticals International, Inc.'s ("Valeant") Board of Directors from October 2014 through August 19, 2015. (Id. ¶ 51.) As a director, Ubben served on the Finance and Transaction Committee as well as the Talent and Compensation Committee. (Id.)
Ubben co-founded Value Act Capital Management L.P. ("ValueAct Capital"), an investment adviser, in 2000. (Id. ¶ 55.) ValueAct Capital Master Fund, L.P. and ValueAct Co-Invest Master Fund, L.P. (collectively, the "VA Funds") are two of ValueAct Capital's hedge fund investment vehicles. (Id. ¶¶ 56-7.) VA Partners 1, LLC is the general partner of the VA Funds and "is responsible for the overall management of the VA Funds. (Id. ¶ 58.) ValueAct Holdings, L.P., through its affiliates, owns ValueAct Capital and VA Partners I, LLC. (Id. ¶ 59.)
ValueAct began investing in Valeant in 2006. (Id. ¶ 562.) IBEW's claims against Valeant arise from a "sale of 4.2 million shares of Valeant stock on or around June 10, 2015" (the "June 2015 Transaction"). (Id. ¶ 561.)
In May 2007, Mason Morfit, ValueAct's President, joined Valeant's Board of Directors and served until May 2014. (Id.) When Morfit left the Valeant Board in May 2014, in correspondence to J. Michael Pearson, Valeant's CEO and Chairman of the Board, Morfit stated that "ValueAct wanted to `manage down' its Valeant holdings but, due to Morfit's position on Valeant's [B]oard of [D]irectors, ValueAct had been `restricted from selling any shares in Valeant since 2013.'" (Id. ¶ 565.) Thus, Morfit's departure was a "`portfolio management decision' so ValueAct could sell `later [in 2014].'" (Id.)
Ubben served on Valeant's Board of Directors from October 2014 to August 2015. (Id. ¶ 562.) D. Robert Hale, a ValueAct partner, joined Valeant's Board in August 2015 and remains on the Board. (Id.)
ValueAct has a concentration policy limiting its concentration in any investment to less than 20% of its total holdings. (Id. ¶ 565.) In 2010, despite that policy, ValueAct's holdings in Valeant stock exceeded 20% of its total holdings and ValueAct did not sell Valeant stock to comply with the concentration policy. (Id. ¶ 566.)
"On or around June 10, 2015, while in possession of ... material, nonpublic information, [ValueAct] sold 4.2 million shares of Valeant stock for proceeds of approximately $925 million." (Id. ¶ 568.) Plaintiffs aver that this trade was suspicious because:
(Id.) A Press Release dated June 11, 2015 and released at 9:28 A.M., EST, stated that "Valeant ValueAct Capital Management, L.P. announced today that it has sold 4.2 million shares of Valeant Pharmaceuticals International, Inc. (NYSE: VRX;TSX: VRX) in brokers' transactions on the NYSE." (Id. ¶ 570; Ex. 10, ECF No. 387-12.)
Plaintiffs aver that "although ValueAct initiated the brokers' transactions on June 10, 2015, not all of the shares were sold to purchasers on the open market on that day." (FAC ¶ 570.) Plaintiffs reach this conclusion because "only approximately 2.8 million shares traded on the [New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE")] on June 10, 2015. Thus, the earliest date by which all of the 4.2 million shares could have sold to purchasers on the open market was June 11, 2015 when another approximately 2.8 million Valeant shares traders on the NYSE." (Id.)
IBEW purchased Valeant common stock on June 11, 2015 and in Count Three brings claims for violations of Section 20A of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78t-1, against Defendants "on behalf of itself and the other members of the Class who purchased shares of Valeant common stock contemporaneously with the unlawful insider trading...." (Id. ¶¶ 33, 575.) In Count Four, IBEW also brings claims for violation of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act against ValueAct Capital; VA Partners I, LLC; ValueAct Holdings, L.P.; and Ubben. (Id. ¶¶ 579-82.)
On October 31, 2018, Defendants moved pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to dismiss Count One against Ubben, and Counts Three and Four in their entirety.
On November 19, 2018, Plaintiffs opposed Defendants' motion. (Pls.' Opp'n Br., ECF No. 401.) On November 28, 2018, Defendants replied to Plaintiffs' opposition. (Defs.' Reply Br., ECF No. 404.)
A district court must conduct a three-part analysis when considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). See Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011). The Court must take note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim; review the complaint to strike conclusory allegations; and accept as true all of the plaintiff's well-pled factual allegations while "constru[ing] the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Id.; Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). The Court must determine "whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a `plausible claim for relief.'" Fowler, 578 F.3d at 211 (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009)). A facially plausible claim "allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. at 210 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).
When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court is generally "not permitted to go beyond the facts alleged in the complaint and the documents on which the claims made therein were based." In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1424-25 (3d Cir. 1997) (alterations omitted). The Court, however, may consider "a document integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint," and the Court may consider "items subject to judicial notice, matters of public record, orders, [and] items appearing in the record of the case." Id. at 1426 (internal citations, quotations, and emphasis omitted); Buck v. Hampton Twp. Sch. Dist., 452 F.3d 256, 260 (3d Cir. 2006) (citation omitted).
Defendants seek dismissal on two fronts—dismissal of Count One as to Ubben and dismissal of Counts Three and Four in their entirety. The Court considers each issue in turn.
Defendants argue that the Court should dismiss Count One "because the FAC does not contain sufficient particularized allegations (i) that Ubben made any false or misleading statements or (ii) providing a strong inference of his scienter." (Defs.' Moving Br. 32.) Defendants state "the Court does not appear to have separately or squarely addressed Ubben, and is not precluded from doing so now." (Id.) Defendants aver that "[b]y asserting new insider-trading claims via last-minute amendment, Plaintiffs have opened the door to the Court to revisit its ruling." (Id.)
Plaintiffs oppose dismissal of Count One with numerous arguments, only two of which the Court will address because they are dispositive of the issue. (Pls.' Opp'n Br. 4-10.) First, Plaintiffs argue that Local Civil Rule 7.1(i) imposes a 14-day window on when a party can file a motion for reconsideration and Defendants' motion is outside of that window. (Id. at 4.) Relatedly, Plaintiffs argue that the law of the case doctrine "limits relitigation of an issue once it has been decided in the same case or litigation." (Id. (quoting Scudder v. Colgate Palmolive Co., No. 16-7433, 2018 WL 4188456, at *2 (D.N.J. Aug. 31, 2018)).) Second, Plaintiffs assert that Defendants' argument regarding the Court's April 28, 2017 decision and a lack of specificity therein regarding Ubben is the same argument previously advanced by Deborah Jorn in her Motion for Reconsideration and rejected by the Court. (Id. at 5.) The Court agrees with Plaintiffs on both points.
Local Civil Rule 7.1 provides, in relevant part:
L.Civ.R. 7.1(i). While Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' amendments create an opportunity for the Court to consider Count One as to Ubben, Defendants fail to contend with the fact that the amendments do not alter the allegations against Ubben in relation to Count One. Accordingly, Defendants' motion as to Count One is effectively a motion for reconsideration. Local Rule 7.1 requires that motions for reconsideration be filed within 14 days of the entry of the order. The Court denied Ubben's previous motion to dismiss on April 28, 2017. (See Order, ECF No. 218). The instant motion, filed on October 31, 2018—551 days after the Court's Order—is therefore untimely.
"A court has the power to revisit prior decisions of its own or of a coordinate court in any circumstance, although as a rule courts should be loathe to do so in the absence of extraordinary circumstances such as where the initial decision was `clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice.'" Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 817 (1988) (quoting Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 618, n.8 (1984)). "[A]pplication of the [law of the case] rule is a discretionary, not absolute, process and if, ... a party advances a basis for a court to reach a different result than it did previously the court will not be bound by its earlier decision." Bridges v. Comm'r Soc. Sec., 672 F. App'x 162, 167 (3d Cir. 2016). "The [law of the case] doctrine is designed to protect traditional ideals such as finality, judicial economy and jurisprudential integrity." In re City of Phila. Litig., 158 F.3d 711, 717-18 (3d Cir. 1998)
Defendants raise previously rejected arguments in support of dismissal of Count One as to Ubben. The Valeant Defendants,
Pursuant to the law of the case doctrine, the Court will not reconsider its previous decision regarding Count One. Defendants have not offered a compelling reason why the Court should reconsider the same arguments other than "the common-sense proposition that the Court has a far better perspective to judge the Section 10(b) allegations against Ubben than it did when claims against many other defendants were at issue." (Defs.' Reply Br. 14.) This proposition, however, fails under the weight of the Court's previous rejection of these arguments and the Court's rejection of Deborah Jorn's argument that the Court "did not consider Jorn's specific scienter when deciding the six motions to dismiss in its April 28, 2017 Memorandum Opinion." In re Valeant Pharm. Int'l, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 15-7658, 2017 WL 3880657, at *2 (D.N.J. Sept. 5, 2017).
Defendants advance several arguments in support of dismissal of IBEW's Section 20A claims. Defendants attack (1) the specificity of Plaintiffs' allegations regarding the material nonpublic information Defendants allegedly possessed; (2) whether Plaintiffs' allegations give rise to a sufficiently strong inference of scienter; and (3) whether Plaintiffs traded contemporaneously with Defendants. In opposition, Plaintiffs raise the issue of what type of predicate violation of the Exchange Act they must plead to sufficiently plead a Section 20A claim. The Court first considers the threshold issue Plaintiffs raise and then addresses each of Defendants' arguments.
To state a claim for a violation of Section 20A plaintiffs must allege "(1) a predicate violation of the Exchange Act; (2) that the plaintiff traded contemporaneously with the insider; and (3) that the insider was in possession of material nonpublic information." In re Schering-Plough Corp./Enhance Sec. Litig., No. 08-397, 2009 WL 2855457, at *3 (D.N.J. Sept. 2, 2009). "Section 20A, which provides an express private cause of action for insider trading against contemporaneous traders, requires the alleged insider trader to have committed an independent violation of the Exchange Act or SEC rules and regulations promulgated under that law." City of Edinburgh Council v. Pfizer, Inc., 754 F.3d 159, 175 (3d Cir. 2014).
Plaintiffs argue that in this matter they only need to allege two elements of a Section 20A violation to adequately plead their claim. (Pls.' Opp'n Br. 2-3.) Specifically, Plaintiffs argue that the first element, "a predicate violation of the Exchange Act[,]" also satisfies the third element "that the insider was in possession of material nonpublic information." (Id. at 2.) Plaintiffs aver that because the Court previously found that they adequately plead a violation of Section 10(b) (for making false and misleading statements with scienter) against Ubben, the third element is "satisfied by the same [Section] 10(b) violation because the facts that adequately pled a strong inference of scienter are sufficient to adequately plead possession of material nonpublic information." (Id.) As a result, per Plaintiffs, they "need only allege two things: [a Section] 10(b) violation by Ubben and contemporaneous trading," and the Court has already found the former and the FAC sufficiently alleges the latter. (Id. at 3.) Defendants, on the other hand, argue that the "predicate violation" must be for insider trading. (Defs.' Reply. Br. 4.)
The parties cite extensively to divergent case law that directly supports their respective positions. (See e.g., Pls.' Opp'n Br. 2 (citing In re Able Labs. Sec. Litig., No. 05-2681, 2008 WL 1967509, at *26 (D.N.J. Mar. 24, 2008)); Defs.' Reply Br. 6 n.4 (collecting cases).) The Third Circuit, however, in City of Edinburgh Council v. Pfizer, Inc., held that the plaintiffs "failed to adequately plead an insider trading violation under section 20A of the Exchange Act because they ha[d] failed to adequately plead a predicate section 10(b) violation." 754 F.3d 159, 175-76 (3d Cir. 2014) (emphasis added) (citing In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525, 541 (3d Cir. 1999) ("Liability under section 20(A) is predicated upon an independent violation of this chapter or the rules or regulations thereunder. Hence, claims under section 20(A) are derivative, requiring proof of a separate underlying violation of the Exchange Act.") (internal citation omitted)). Thus, Defendants' argument that the predicate violation must be an insider trading violation is directly contradicted by Third Circuit precedent.
Defendants cite to portions of paragraph 573 of the FAC to argue that Plaintiffs' opposition attempts to inappropriately amend the FAC and make a reckless omission in violation of Section 10(b)(5) the basis of their Section 20A claim. (Defs.' Reply Br. 5.) Defendants, however, do not contend with the allegations of paragraph 572 of the FAC which alleges, in part:
(FAC ¶ 572.) Under a plausible interpretation of the FAC, Plaintiffs allege that (1) Ubben individually violated Section 20A with the predicate violation being a violation of Section 10(b), and (2) Ubben and ValueAct collectively violated Section 20A with the predicate violation being an insider trader violation. (See FAC ¶¶ 572-73.) Thus, Defendants' characterizations of Plaintiffs' allegations regarding the requisite predicate violation are unavailing. Moreover, per Third Circuit precedent, Plaintiffs sufficiently pled predicate violations for both Ubben and the Value Act Defendants. See City of Edinburgh Council, 754 F.3d at 175-76.
Notwithstanding the Court's conclusion that Plaintiffs sufficiently pled predicate violations, the Court must consider whether Plaintiffs sufficiently pled scienter as to ValueAct. Plaintiffs appear to partially rely upon the Court's previous conclusion that scienter as to Ubben and the Section 10(b) claim is sufficient for the scienter analysis for a Section 20A claim. Plaintiffs cite to Thomas v. Magnachip Semiconductor Corp., for the proposition that an individual defendant's scienter can be imputed to the entity for which he or she worked. (Pls.' Opp'n Br. 3 n.2 (citing 167 F.Supp.3d 1029, 1050-51 (N.D. Cal. 2016)).) At the same time, Plaintiffs advance arguments that they sufficiently pled scienter as to the ValueAct Defendants on the Section 20A claims. (Id. 8-9.) Defendants, on the other hand, argue that the Court's previous "ruling on a different cause of action for different conduct in a different context is of no moment on this Motion." (Defs.' Reply Br. 9.) Given the heightened pleading standard imposed by the PSLRA, the Court agrees with Defendants and it will not assume that the Court's previous conclusion regarding scienter for Ubben's alleged Section 10(b) violation is sufficient to sustain Plaintiffs' Section 20A claims against Ubben and ValueAct.
Defendants argue that IBEW does not identify "with any specificity, ... what material nonpublic information [Defendants] possessed when the ValueAct Funds sold." (Defs.' Moving Br. 15.) Specifically, Defendants argue that IBEW only makes a "generalized allegation" regarding material, nonpublic information Defendants possessed, but IBEW does not "identify with the requisite particularity what that information was." (Id. at 17.) Defendants also argue that IBEW's claims rest on Ubben's "access to material nonpublic information (whatever it was) by virtue of his position on the Valeant [B]oard and its committees." (Id. at 19 (emphasis in original).) Defendants argue that access, however, is insufficient because "access to material nonpublic information is very different from actually possessing it[,]" and "[t]he former is not enough to plead an insider trading claim under Section 20A." (Id. at 20-21.)
Plaintiffs respond to Defendants' argument with a simple proposition. Plaintiffs argue that "the material nonpublic information Defendants possessed was that ... Ubben's statements were false and misleading which formed the basis for his [Section] 10(b) liability ...." (Pls.' Opp'n Br. 10.)
Here, the Court finds that Defendants' arguments fail in light of Plaintiffs' allegations regarding Ubben and the material nonpublic information he possessed. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that ValueAct, "through Ubben, had access to and knowledge of Valeant's material, nonpublic information concerning the undisclosed improper business and accounting practices which gave rise to the Restatement, closing of Philidor, cessation of such improper business practices, and resulting corrective disclosures ...." (FAC ¶ 567.) Elsewhere in the FAC, Plaintiffs assert that when Ubben, and other members of the Board signed the 2014 10-K, and other documents, they "kn[e]w or recklessly disregarded" certain facts including:
(Id. ¶ 199.) Plaintiffs also allege that Ubben, and other defendants:
(Id. ¶ 139 (emphasis added).)
Here, Plaintiffs' allegations are distinguishable from, and more specific than, the allegations in the cases Defendants cite in support of their argument that Plaintiffs' allegations are too general. See e.g., Gordon v. Sonar Capital Mgmt. LLC, 962 F.Supp.2d 525, 529-30 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (finding allegations that two parties spoke at least twenty times and alleged insider trading occurred that coincided with these conversations were insufficient). Moreover, Defendants' arguments that Plaintiffs merely had access to certain information fails in light of Plaintiffs' allegation that Ubben, and other defendants, knew certain material non-public information, and knew that information when signing the 2014 10-K which was submitted on February 25, 2015, prior to the June 2015 Transaction.
The PSLRA requires plaintiffs bringing Section 20A claims "to allege facts giving rise to a `strong inference' of scienter, which `must be more than merely plausible or reasonable—it must be cogent and at least as compelling as any opposing inference of nonfraudulent intent.'" City of Edinburgh Council, 754 F.3d at 176 (quoting Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 314 (2007)). This heightened pleading standard alters the Court's analytical approach when considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss a Section 20A claim. See Tellabs, Inc., 551 U.S. at 322-24. The first step—"accept[ing] all factual allegations in the complaint as true[,]"— is unchanged from the normal analysis. Id. at 322. Next, the Court "must consider the complaint in its entirety" and the usual sources and documents the Court would normally consider. Id. At this step, "[t]he inquiry, ... is whether all of the facts alleged, taken collectively, give rise to a strong inference of scienter, not whether any individual allegation, scrutinized in isolation, meets that standard." Id. at 322-23. At the third step, the Court must "determin[e] whether the pleaded facts give rise to a `strong' inference of scienter," and "take into account plausible opposing inferences...." Id. at 323. "The strength of an inference cannot be decided in a vacuum." (Id.) Instead,
Id. 323-34 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
Defendants argue that "the FAC fails to plead facts giving rise to a strong inference that [Defendants] acted with scienter." (Id. at 22.) Defendants state that the FAC fails to allege suspicious trading because the combination of (1) Defendants' trading activity in November and December 2014 (when Defendants purchased 460,000 shares of Valeant stock), (2) a subsequent 65% rise in the value of Valeant stock, and (3) Defendants' sale of Valeant stock in June 2015 is "consistent with an inference that a multi-billion dollar investment fund rebalanced its position." (Id. at 23.) Defendants aver that their December 2014 purchase of shares was days prior to Valeant's purchase of an option to acquire Philidor. (Id.) Thus, if Plaintiffs' allegations are taken as true, Defendants made this stock purchase "knowing that Valeant was purchasing a house of cards[,]" a theory that "makes no sense and cannot support the required cogent and compelling inference of scienter." (Id.) Defendants argue that their retention of approximately 80% of their Valeant holdings "rebuts an inference of scienter from stock sales." (Id. at 24.) Defendants also argue that IBEW does not "explain how [Defendants] could have been plotting to profit through insider trading, when the ValueAct Funds' 15 million-share retained holdings declined by approximately $2.785 billion from the trading price on June 10, 2015." (Id. at 24-25.)
Defendants also argue that the FAC's scienter allegations fail because of the timing of the sale and the lack of trades by other insiders. (Id. at 25-26.) Defendants aver that the FAC alleges that the June 2015 Transaction "was at once too late and too early," because Defendants "knew in December 2014 that Philidor and Valeant were a house of cards," but the first "negative disclosure by Valeant occurred nearly four months after the" June 2015 Transaction. (Id. at 25-26.) Regarding the lack of trades by other insiders, Defendants argue "the absence of such sales further reflects IBEW's failure to plead scienter." (Id. at 27.)
Defendants state that the FAC offers a "cogent and compelling non-fraudulent explanation for the June [2015 Transaction]: `to limit concentration in any particular investment' in the ValueAct Funds." (Id. at 27 (quoting FAC ¶ 565).) Defendants argue that Valeant's stock price had risen 65% from December 2014 through June 2015 resulting in a $4.2 billion position in Valeant stock. (Id.) Per Defendants, "a prudent investment advisor[] would look to `manage down' that enormous stake." (Id. (quoting FAC ¶ 565).) Defendants dismiss Plaintiffs' allegations that they previously failed to follow a strict 20% concentration policy as "quibbles." (Id.). Defendants argue that the June 2015 Transaction reduced their position from $4.2 billion to $3.82 billion—an amount greater than their holdings in December 2014. (Id. at 28.) Thus, the June 2015 Transaction was "(i) ... not inconsistent with the ValueAct Funds' history or previous trading patterns, and (ii) is fully consistent with prudent portfolio management." (Id.)
Plaintiffs maintain that the June 2015 Transaction was "highly suspicious[,]" because:
(Pls.' Opp'n Br. at 8.) Quoting the Court's previous Opinion, Plaintiffs argue that Defendants ignore that "it is plausible that the [Defendants] were caught before they had a chance to sell their shares." (Id. at 9 (quoting In re Valeant, 2017 WL 1658822, at *11).)
The Third Circuit has stated courts should "not infer fraudulent intent from the mere fact that some officers sold stock" but, "sales of company stock by insiders that are unusual in scope or timing may support an inference of scienter." In re Suprema Specialties, Inc. Sec. Litig., 438 F.3d 256, 277 (3d Cir. 2006), abrogated on other grounds by Tellabs, Inc., 551 U.S. at 322-23 (internal quotation and punctuation omitted) (citing In re Advanta, 180 F.3d at 540) (citations and quotation marks omitted). To determine whether a stock sale was "unusual in scope," the Court looks to "factors such as `the amount of profit made, the amount of stock traded, the portion of stockholdings sold, or the number of insiders involved.'" Id. (quoting Wilson v. Bernstock, 195 F.Supp.2d 619, 635 (D.N.J. 2002)). The Court may also look to "whether the sales were `normal and routine,' and whether the profits were substantial relative to the seller's ordinary compensation." Id.
Here, the Court begins its analysis by identifying the quantifiable factors. Defendants offer evidence showing that the June 2015 Transaction consisted of a sale of approximately 22% of the ValueAct Funds' total holdings of Valeant stock. (Defs.' Moving Br. 11, Ex. 6, ECF No. 387-38.)
Defendants' transaction history and the price of Valeant stock also provide additional context. Defendants offer evidence showing that during the class period they purchased Valeant stock in four different transactions on June 19, 2013; November 24, 2014; December 9, 2014; and December 10, 2014. (Defs.' Moving Br. 10; Exs. 2-5, ECF Nos. 387-4 to -7.) The June 29, 2013 purchase was at $85 per share and the November and December 2014 purchases were at approximately $140 per share. (Defs.' Moving Br. 10.) Plaintiffs aver that Valeant's stock price peaked at $262 per share on August 5, 2015. (FAC ¶ 26.)
From Defendants' perspective, the June 2015 transaction was not suspicious because the rapid increase in the value of Valeant stock triggered a necessary sale so that ValueAct would remain in compliance with its concentration policy. Thus, the timing and scope of the sale would not be suspicious because they were mandated by the concentration policy. Defendants also point out that Plaintiffs' theory requires their previous purchase of Valeant stock to have been completed while having knowledge that Valeant's stock was artificially inflated. There is also logical appeal to Defendants' argument that any allegation of scienter is refuted by the fact that Defendants' retained nearly 15 million shares, which lost nearly $3 billion in value.
On the other hand, the FAC offers facts and Plaintiffs argue a theory which would satisfy the scienter requirement. Plaintiffs' position that Defendants' failure to sell Valeant stock in the four years prior to the June 2015 Transaction is compelling in that it highlights that Defendants' trading routine was to purchase, not sell, Valeant stock. In fact, Defendants' transaction history, as provided to the Court by Defendants, shows that during the two years prior to the June 2015 Transaction Defendants had only purchased Valeant stock. From that perspective, a sale of Valeant stock is unusual. While Defendants rely, in part, on the concentration policy to explain the June 2015 Transaction, that reliance is undermined by other facts. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants did not previously follow the concentration policy. Defendants brush this aside as "quibbles," but Defendants' failure to offer any explanation why the policy was not previously followed undercuts their reliance on the policy to explain the June 2015 Transaction. Additionally, Plaintiffs allege that when Morfit left Valeant's Board in May 2014, the stated reason was, in effect, so that Defendants could freely sell Valeant stock. Defendants' transaction history, however, shows that instead of selling, Defendants proceeded to purchase more Valeant stock. Thus, Defendants' trading pattern, as currently presented to the Court, significantly undermines their argument that the June 2015 Transaction was not unusual in timing and scope.
While Defendants' significant losses may suggest a lack of scienter, there are plausible opposing inferences. For example, as the Court previously observed, the fact that Defendants did not sell their shares does not render Plaintiffs' scienter allegations insufficient. There is a plausible inference that Defendants' holdings of Valeant stock—approximately 15 million shares after the June 2015 Transaction—was so large that Defendants were unable to continue selling their shares without being caught. This theory would explain why, despite Defendants knowing that Philidor was "a house of cards," Defendants did not sell more Valeant stock—Defendants could not sell without arousing suspicions in other quarters. Under the totality of the circumstances, the Court concludes that the inference of scienter is equally compelling as the opposing inference. Thus, Plaintiffs have sufficiently plead scienter as to Defendants.
Section 20A limits recovery to those individuals who "contemporaneously" traded with the insider. 15 U.S.C. § 78t-1 ("Any person who violates any provision of [the Exhange Act] ... shall be liable in an action ... to any person who, contemporaneously with the purchase or sale of securities that is the subject of such violation, has purchased ... or sold ... securities of the same class.") (emphasis added). The Exchange Act does not provide a definition of contemporaneous trading, instead, Congress left it to the courts to resolve. See H.R.Rep. No. 100-910, at 27 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6043, 6064 ("The bill does not define the term `contemporaneous,' which has developed through case law."). The Third Circuit has not provided guidance on the scope of contemporaneous trading. See In re Able Labs. Sec. Litig., 2008 WL 1967509, at *26.
Defendants argue that the Court should interpret "contemporaneous" to require IBEW to have purchased Valeant stock on June 10, 2015. (Defs.' Moving Br. 28-29.) Defendants cite several opinions from the District of New Jersey District Court in support of their position that the same-day requirement is uniformly adopted in this District. (Id. (collecting cases).) Defendants also argue that the allegations in the FAC require the Court to speculate that Defendants may have sold Valeant stock on June 11, 2015. (Id. at 30-31.) Per Defendants, Plaintiffs inappropriately rely on the June 11, 2015 Press Release to introduce ambiguity regarding Defendants' actual trade date. (Id. at 31.)
Plaintiffs oppose Defendants' contemporaneous trading arguments on several fronts. Plaintiffs argue that the brokers Defendants utilized "began selling the shares `on the NYSE' on June 10, 2015[,]" and "not all shares were sold that day because the trading volume for all publicly traded Valeant stock on that day was less than 4.2 million." (Pls.' Opp'n Br. 11.) Plaintiffs argue that Defendants dispute the factual allegations of the FAC and those arguments should be rejected because (1) Defendants' Press Release concedes that "the brokers were not buyers in a private sale but mere conduits for Defendants' stock sales on the public market[,]" (2) the law does not require that Plaintiffs purchase directly from Defendants, (3) any factual dispute regarding whether Defendants' shares ever entered the market is appropriately resolved at summary judgment, and (4) even if Defendants' 4.2 million shares were all sold on June 10, 2015, the Exchange Act and the Third Circuit do not require same-day trading. (Id. at 11-15.)
Here, the Court finds that a same-day trading requirement is inappropriate given the alleged facts. In two of the cases Defendants cite in support of a same-day trading requirement, the Court adopted that standard without explanation. See Steamfitters Local 449 Pension Fund v. Alter, No. 09-4730, 2011 WL 4528385, at *12 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2011) ("[S]ome district courts within the Third Circuit have required plaintiffs to plead that they purchased stock on the same dates on which the defendant's sales took place. This Court will do likewise."); Copland v. Grumet, 88 F.Supp.2d 326, 338 (D.N.J. 1999) ("After considering the issue of the appropriate interpretation of the contemporaneous requirement in this context, we find persuasive the reasoning applied in the cases cited by defendant."). In In re Able Laboratories Securities Litigation, the Honorable Joseph A. Greenaway, Jr. suggested that the same-day trading requirement was cabined to that case, or others like it "involving a publicly traded company with millions of outstanding shares." In re Able Labs. Sec. Litig., 2008 WL 1967509, at *27. Notably, the trading at issue in this matter is several orders of magnitude greater than the trading volume in each of the cases Defendants cite.
The purpose of the contemporaneous trading requirement does not require a same-day trading standard. As explained by the Honorable Fern M. Smith in Buban v. O'Brien:
No. 94-0331, 1994 WL 324093, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 22, 1994). Given the underlying purpose of the same-day trading requirement—preserving the notion that only parties injured by the insiders' action can bring suit—and Plaintiffs' allegations that the total volume of Defendants' 4.2 million shares took two days to be reflected on the NYSE, the Court is not convinced that a same-day trading requirement is appropriate in this matter, or at least at this stage in the proceedings. Further, to the extent Defendants offer evidence that contradicts Plaintiffs' allegations that the June 2015 Transaction occurred over two days, the Court finds such a factual dispute is inappropriate for a motion to dismiss and is more properly resolved at summary judgment. Even if the Court were to accept Defendants' proposition that their transactions were exclusively with brokers and complete upon transfer to the brokers, Defendants fail to contend with whether they may still be liable to Plaintiffs if Defendants' brokers sold to Plaintiffs. See Basile v. Valeant Pharm. Int'l, Inc., No. 14-2004, 2015 WL 7352005, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 2015) ("To their credit, Defendants in their Reply acknowledge that a `defendant who makes unlawful insider trades through an agent such as a broker is liable to those with whom the broker places the trades.'"). The Court, accordingly, finds that Plaintiffs sufficiently plead contemporaneous trading with Defendants.
For the reasons set forth above, the Court denies Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration regarding Count One as to Ubben and finds that Plaintiffs sufficiently plead a Section 20A violation. Because Defendants' grounds for dismissal of Count Four are based on the grounds for dismissal of Count Three, the Court does not separately consider dismissal of Count Four. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, therefore, is denied. An order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion will be entered.