BARNES, Presiding Judge.
This case arises out of a complaint for a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief filed by the Georgia Society of Ambulatory Surgical Centers ("GSASC") against the Georgia Department of Community Health and its Commissioner (collectively, "DCH"). GSASC contended that a 2009 annual survey issued by DCH to ambulatory surgery centers sought information beyond the scope of OCGA § 31-6-70, and requested an interlocutory injunction to prevent its members from having to provide the information during the
GSASC and Its Members. The relevant facts are undisputed. GSASC is an organization whose members own and operate licensed ambulatory surgery centers throughout Georgia. An ambulatory surgery center ("ASC") is "a public or private facility, not a part of a hospital, which provides surgical or obstetrical treatment performed under general or regional anesthesia in an operating room environment to patients not requiring hospitalization." OCGA § 31-6-2(1). GSASC's members are primarily physician-owned ASCs that offer outpatient surgery in a single medical specialty, such as orthopedics, ophthalmology, or urology.
The Certificate of Need Program. DCH is the "lead planning agency for all health issues" in Georgia. OCGA § 31-2-1(1). The heart of DCH's health planning duties is contained in the "certificate of need" ("CON") program codified at OCGA § 31-6-40 et seq. The CON program was adopted "to create a system for planning new health service institutions to avoid costly duplication of services where insufficient need existed." Albany Surgical v. Dept. of Community Health, 257 Ga.App. 636, 572 S.E.2d 638 (2002). Under the program, those wishing to provide institutional health services must obtain a CON from DCH. OCGA § 31-6-40(a). A CON is "an official determination by [DCH], evidenced by certification issued pursuant to an application, that the action proposed in the application satisfies and complies with the criteria [of the CON program] and rules promulgated pursuant [thereto]." OCGA § 31-6-2(6).
Certain healthcare providers are exempt from the CON program. OCGA § 31-6-47(a). These exemptions include single-specialty ASCs. OCGA § 31-6-47(a)(18). ASCs must document their exemption from the CON program by obtaining a "letter of non-reviewability" ("LNR") from DCH. OCGA § 31-6-47.1; Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. r. 111-2-2-.10. A majority of GSASC's members operate pursuant to LNRs rather than CONs.
The Annual Reporting Requirement. One of DCH's duties in administering the CON program is to collect data for health planning purposes through annual reports submitted by healthcare providers. See OCGA §§ 31-6-21(b)(5); 31-6-70(a). To effectuate this duty, DCH each year prepares an annual survey that must be filled out by healthcare providers for the prior year. See OCGA § 31-6-70(a); Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. r. 111-2-2-.04.
Based upon 2008 amendments to the CON program, ASCs operating under LNRs are now required to provide the same information to DCH annually as healthcare facilities operating under CONs. See OCGA § 31-6-40(c)(2)(B); Ga. L. 2008, p. 12, § 1-1. Specifically, under OCGA § 31-6-70 as amended, ASCs operating under LNRs must now respond to the annual survey issued by DCH requesting information about their operations. See OCGA § 31-6-70(a). If an ASC fails to submit a survey that is both complete and timely, DCH can impose a fine of up to $500 a day for the first 30 days of noncompliance and $1,000 a day thereafter. OCGA § 31-6-70(e)(1); Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. r. 111-2-2-.04(1)(c). For repeated failures to provide the information requested in a survey, an ASC also is subject to possible revocation of its exemption from the CON program. OCGA § 31-6-47(a)(18).
The 2009 Annual Survey. In early 2010, DCH issued its 2009 annual survey for single-specialty, physician-owned ASCs. Among other things, the survey requested that all ASCs reveal the following information: (1) the number of rooms, procedures, and patients surgically treated by the ASC; (2) the number of patients that were admitted to a hospital before the completion of or
The Instant Lawsuit. On March 4, 2010, GSASC filed the instant lawsuit seeking a declaration that the Disputed Requests went beyond the scope of what DCH could seek in an annual survey under OCGA § 31-6-70.
1. "Generally, the trial court has broad discretion to decide whether to grant or deny an interlocutory injunction. OCGA § 9-5-8." Madonna v. Satilla Health Svcs., 290 Ga.App. 148, 150, 658 S.E.2d 858 (2008). But a trial court abuses its discretion in granting or denying injunctive relief if its ruling is based on an erroneous interpretation of the law. Id. We conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in the present case because its decision to deny interlocutory injunctive relief to GSASC was based on the erroneous legal conclusion that the Disputed Requests were statutorily authorized.
"The test of the validity of an administrative rule is twofold: whether it is authorized by statute and whether it is reasonable." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Dept. of Human Resources v. Anderson, 218 Ga.App. 528, 529, 462 S.E.2d 439 (1995). In applying this test, we have explained that "the interpretation of a statute by an administrative agency which has the duty of enforcing or administering it is to be given great weight and deference." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Dept. of Community Health v. Gwinnett Hosp. System, 262 Ga.App. 879, 882, 586 S.E.2d 762 (2003). "However, an administrative rule which exceeds the scope of or is inconsistent with the authority of the statute upon which it is predicated is invalid." Anderson, 218 Ga. App. at 529, 462 S.E.2d 439. See also North Fulton Medical Center v. Stephenson, 269 Ga. 540, 543(1), 501 S.E.2d 798 (1998); Albany Surgical, 257 Ga.App. at 638(1)(a), 572 S.E.2d 638. Mindful of these principles, we turn to the statute at issue here.
As previously noted, DCH's authority to request information from ASCs in an annual survey is found in OCGA § 31-6-70. That statute provides in relevant part:
OCGA § 31-6-70(a)-(d).
GSASC contends that the Disputed Requests exceeded the scope of information that DCH was authorized to obtain under OCGA § 31-6-70(b) and (d). In this regard, GSASC emphasizes that the Disputed Requests did not limit any of the types of information being sought to "indigent persons" as defined by OCGA § 31-6-70(c), and thus could not be reasonably construed as seeking information that fell within OCGA § 31-6-70(b)(8). GSASC further maintains that none of the disputed information could reasonably be construed as falling within OCGA § 31-6-70(b)(1)-(7), the statutory subsections applicable to non-indigent persons.
It is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that "the literal meaning of the statute prevails unless such a construction would produce unreasonable or absurd consequences not contemplated by the legislature." Johnson v. State, 267 Ga. 77, 78, 475 S.E.2d 595 (1996). "Moreover, in construing language in any one part of a statute, a court should consider the entire scheme of the statute and attempt to gather the legislative intent from the statute as a whole." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Beacon Medical Products v. Travelers Cas., etc. of America, 292 Ga.App. 617, 619, 665 S.E.2d 710 (2008). Statutes also should be construed in a manner that gives all of the words meaning. See OCGA § 1-3-1(b); Porter v. Food Giant, 198 Ga.App. 736, 738(1), 402 S.E.2d 766 (1991) ("It is contrary to the generally accepted principles for construing statutes to `read out' any part of the statute as `mere surplusage' unless there is a clear reason for doing so.").
Applying these principles to the case at hand, we agree with GSASC that the Disputed Requests were overly broad and sought information beyond what was statutorily permitted. By its plain and literal terms, OCGA § 31-6-70(b) contains a detailed list of information that ASCs must annually report to DCH. OCGA § 31-6-70(d) then authorizes DCH to request in its annual survey "further categorical divisions of the information listed in subsection (b)," but it does not allow DCH to go beyond those categories and add additional ones. For example, DCH could request more specific information from ASCs about the "[a]mounts of free care extended, excluding bad debts," see OCGA § 31-6-70(b)(3), such as by requiring providers to break down the amount of free care by type of procedure. What DCH cannot do, and what it clearly attempted to do in the Disputed Requests, is request information from ASCs that fell completely outside the specific categories set forth in OCGA § 31-6-70(b)(1)-(8).
DCH also points to OCGA § 31-6-21(b)(8) as a source of general authority to request information from ASCs. That subsection provides in relevant part:
OCGA § 31-6-21(b)(8). By its plain and literal terms, OCGA § 31-6-21(b)(8) discusses DCH's responsibility to develop certificate of need methodologies; it is silent as to the authority of DCH to request information from ASCs or other institutions. That authority instead is delineated expressly in OCGA § 31-6-70. When read in conjunction with OCGA § 31-6-70, the provisions of OCGA § 31-6-21(b)(8) cannot be construed as endowing DCH with general authority to request any information it chooses from ASCs through its annual survey.
Additionally, while DCH cites to its own administrative rules and regulations to support its contention that it had general authority to seek information from ASCs, "an administrative rule which exceeds the scope of or is inconsistent with the authority of the statute upon which it is predicated is invalid." Anderson, 218 Ga.App. at 529, 462 S.E.2d 439. Thus, DCH's rules and regulations could not empower it to issue an annual survey seeking information beyond what was authorized in OCGA § 31-6-70.
For these reasons, the trial court erred by concluding that DCH had statutory authority to include the Disputed Requests in the 2009 annual survey issued to ASCs. Accordingly, the trial court's denial of GSASC's request for an interlocutory injunction was based on an erroneous interpretation of the law and must be reversed.
2. DCH argues that we should affirm the trial court's denial of GSASC's request for an interlocutory injunction on the alternative basis that GSASC failed to exhaust its administrative remedies. DCH notes that if an ASC is fined, sanctioned, or has its exemption status revoked for failure to fully respond to an annual survey, the ASC is entitled to notice and an administrative hearing under the Georgia Administrative Procedure Act, OCGA § 50-13-1 et seq., before any such fine or sanction is exacted. See OCGA §§ 31-6-40(c)(2); 31-6-47(18). After an administrative hearing, the ASC may appeal to the Commissioner of DCH, and then petition for judicial review. See OCGA § 50-13-19; Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. r. 111-2-2-.05(2)(e). According to DCH, these procedures provide an adequate administrative remedy such that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction in this case. We are unpersuaded.
It is true that "[l]ong-standing Georgia law requires that a party aggrieved by a state agency's decision must raise all issues before that agency and exhaust available administrative remedies before seeking any judicial review of the agency's decision." Cerulean Co. v. Tiller, 271 Ga. 65, 66(1), 516 S.E.2d 522 (1999). But exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required where resorting to the remedy would be futile. See Hall v. Nelson, 282 Ga. 441, 443(3), 651 S.E.2d 72 (2007); Powell v. City of Snellville,
(a) Futility. Our Supreme Court applied the futility exception in Glynn County Bd. of Ed. v. Lane, 261 Ga. 544, 545-546(1), 407 S.E.2d 754 (1991), a case materially similar to the present one. In Lane, the issue was whether the conduct of a county board of education was inconsistent with the plain and unambiguous language of a general statute and local act, and the case turned purely on a question of statutory construction rather than on any factual matters. Id. at 544-545, 546(2), (3), 407 S.E.2d 754. The county board argued that before pursuing a mandamus action in superior court, the appellees were required to seek relief through an administrative hearing before the board. Id. at 545(1), 407 S.E.2d 754. Our Supreme Court disagreed: "The sole issue in this case involves conduct of the [county board]. It is unreasonable to require of appellees the futile act of participating in a hearing before that body on the question of its own conduct." Id. at 546(1), 407 S.E.2d 754. Accordingly, our Supreme Court concluded that the appellees were entitled to pursue an action before the superior court without exhausting administrative remedies. Id. See also 7 Ga. Procedure: Special Remedies and Proceedings § 6:28 (exhaustion not required "where it is unreasonable to expect that resort to the alternative remedy would serve any useful purpose in view of the conduct of the person or persons responsible for providing the alternative relief").
The instant case is controlled by Lane. Here, the issue is whether DCH had statutory authority to include the Disputed Requests in the 2009 annual survey issued to ASCs; as in Lane, the sole issue is whether an administrative agency's conduct was inconsistent with plain and unambiguous statutory language, and the case turns purely on a question of statutory construction rather than on factual matters. DCH and its Commissioner have repeatedly made clear their position that the agency had statutory authorization to request the disputed information and would now have to abandon that position, and thus conclude that the agency's conduct was illegal, for ASCs to prevail before the agency. This, to say the least, seems highly implausible. Similar to Lane, it would serve no purpose, and would only lead to a repeat of the present litigation after further delay and cost, if ASCs were required to participate in an administrative hearing "before [DCH] on the question of its own conduct." 261 Ga. at 546(1), 407 S.E.2d 754. Consequently, GSASC and its members were not required to exhaust administrative remedies because doing so would be a futile and useless act under the reasoning of our Supreme Court's decision in Lane.
The dissent argues that Lane is distinguishable because ASCs are entitled to a hearing before an administrative law judge ("ALJ"), which is then appealable to the Commissioner of DCH, and "nothing in the record suggests that the ALJ that might be assigned to hear the matter or the Commissioner personally has prejudged the issue." But the Commissioner of the DCH is named as a party in this case, joined DCH's brief in opposition to GSASC's request for an interlocutory injunction filed in the trial court, and joined DCH's brief filed in this appeal. It follows that the positions asserted by DCH in this litigation are also asserted by its Commissioner.
(b) Agency's Power to Act. In Hotels.com, our Supreme Court explained that administrative exhaustion is not required where the plaintiff brings a declaratory judgment action challenging the agency's authority or power to act:
Hotels.com, LP, 285 Ga. at 233-234, 674 S.E.2d 898. Here, GSASC brought a declaratory judgment action challenging DCH's authority and power to issue the Disputed Requests to ASCs. Consequently, GSASC was not required to exhaust administrative remedies under Hotels.com and the line of authority discussed in that decision.
Judgment reversed.
SMITH, P.J., MIKELL and ADAMS, JJ., concur.
ANDREWS, BLACKWELL and DILLARD, JJ., dissent.
BLACKWELL, Judge, dissenting.
In this case, the Georgia Society of Ambulatory Surgery Centers represents the interests of members that appear to have adequate administrative remedies, and it is undisputed that these members have not exhausted their administrative remedies. Consequently, I conclude that both this Court and the trial court lack jurisdiction of the subject matter, and for this reason, we ought to dismiss this appeal and remand with instructions to dismiss the case below. Because the majority instead proceeds to address the merits, I dissent.
As our Supreme Court has explained,
Cerulean Companies v. Tiller, 271 Ga. 65, 66(1), 516 S.E.2d 522 (1999). This requirement respects the constitutional prerogatives of the executive branch and its agencies, permits an agency to apply its expertise to the resolution of disputes, promotes a more efficient resolution of disputes, and encourages the uniform and consistent resolution of disputes of a similar nature. See id. at 67(1), 516 S.E.2d 522. When a person aggrieved by agency action has adequate administrative remedies, but files a lawsuit before exhausting his administrative remedies, the courts cannot entertain the suit. See Northeast Georgia Cancer Care v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Georgia, 297 Ga.App. 28, 32(1), 676 S.E.2d 428 (2009); see also Cerulean Companies, 271 Ga. at 68-69(2), 516 S.E.2d 522. "When an adequate administrative remedy exists that has not been taken, dismissal of any declaratory judgment or equitable action is appropriate." USA Payday Cash Advance Centers v. Oxendine, 262 Ga.App. 632, 635, 585 S.E.2d 924 (2003).
I turn now to the adequacy of the administrative remedies available to the Society and its members. The Society is bothered, of course, not so much by the fact that the Department has asked certain questions of its members, but instead by the prospect that the Department might penalize them— by imposing fines or by revoking their exemptions from certificate of need requirements
Here, the administrative remedies available to members of the Society are a hearing before an ALJ and an appeal to the Commissioner. Although some of the Department staff may have prejudged the issue and determined that the Department can sanction members of the Society for failing to complete the questionnaire, nothing in the record suggests that the ALJ who might be assigned to hear the matter or the Commissioner personally has prejudged the issue.
We should view with grave concern the interference with the executive branch that would follow if courts, including this Court on appeal, exercised jurisdiction to make decisions that are committed by law in the first instance to the jurisdiction of administrative bodies. See George v. Dept. of Natural Resources, 250 Ga. 491, 492, 299 S.E.2d 556 (1983). And we should defer to an agency in matters involving the interpretation of the statutes that it is authorized to enforce. See Albany Surgical v. Dept. of Community Health, 257 Ga.App. 636, 638(1)(a), 572 S.E.2d 638 (2002). Because the members of the Society have available administrative remedies that they failed to exhaust, and because the Society has failed to show that these remedies are inadequate or that their exhaustion would be futile, we must, I think, dismiss this appeal. Because the majority does not, I dissent.
To the extent that the Society might be capable of making a showing of inadequacy if this case were remanded, I note that the Society does not ask us to remand this case or suggest that the record on the adequacy of administrative remedies is incomplete. Because the Society does not ask, I would not remand.