ORDER

CHRISTOPHER C. CONNER, Chief District Judge.

AND NOW, this 16th day of February, 2018, upon consideration of plaintiffs' motion (Doc. 34) for conditional certification pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., wherein plaintiffs seek the court's conditional certification of an FLSA collective action consisting of all operations managers employed by defendant on or after July 18, 2014, (Doc. 33 at 14-17; Doc. 33-17 at 1), and court-authorized notice of the collective action to said operations managers, (Doc. 33 at 17-18; Doc. 33-17 at 1-7), and further upon consideration of defendant's opposition (Doc. 44), wherein defendant responds that plaintiffs have not met their burden for conditional certification of a nationwide FLSA collective action, (id. at 14-29), and that conditional certification of and required notice to more than 1,900 operations managers would cause defendant substantial harm, (id. at 29-31), and following oral argument on February 15, 2018 with counsel of record in the above-captioned case, and it appearing that certification of a plaintiff's collective action on behalf of "other employees similarly situated" pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), proceeds in two steps: (1) conditional certification and (2) final certification, Zavala v. Wal Mart Stores Inc., 691 F.3d 527, 535-36 (3d Cir. 2012), and that at step one, plaintiffs must make a "modest factual showing" that the putative opt-in employees may be provisionally categorized as similarly situated to the named plaintiffs, id. at 536 n.4 (quoting Symczyk v. Genesis HealthCare Corp., 656 F.3d 189, 192-93 (3d Cir. 2011), rev'd on other grounds, 569 U.S. 66 (2013)); see also Rocha v. Gateway Funding Diversified Mortg. Servs., L.P., No. 15-482, 2016 WL 3077936, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Jun. 1, 2016), for the purpose of "facilitat[ing] the sending of notice to potential class members" and the conducting of pretrial discovery, id. at 536 (quoting Symczyk, 656 F.3d at 194), and it further appearing that the court may set the parameters of such notice to putative opt-in collective action members, Hodzic v. Fedex Package Sys., Inc., No. 15-956, 2016 WL 6248078, at *9 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 26, 2016); see also Hoffmann-La Roche v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 172 (1989), and the court observing that plaintiffs' step one burden is a "fairly lenient standard,"1 Camesi v. Univ. of Pittsburgh Med. Ctr., 729 F.3d 239, 243 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Zavala, 691 F.3d at 536 & n.4), requiring the production of "some evidence, beyond pure speculation, of a factual nexus between the manner in which the employer's alleged policy" affected the named plaintiffs and those asserted to be similarly situated, Zavala, 691 F.3d at 536 n.4 (quoting Symczyk, 656 F.3d at 193 (citations and quotations omitted)), and the court finding that the plaintiffs have produced sufficient evidence that the putative opt-in employees may be similarly situated to justify granting conditional certification, to wit: (1) the existence of a company-wide store operations manual which subjects all operations managers to uniform policies and procedures, training protocols, and pay practices, (see Doc. 33-14); (2) the uniformly applicable job description of an operations manager detailing the supervisory and managerial responsibilities purportedly assigned to said operations managers,2 (see Doc. 33-15); (3) declarations by twelve operations managers, including plaintiffs, who aver that approximately 90 percent of their work consisted of manual labor tasks rather than managerial or supervisory activity,3 (see Docs. 33-2 through 33-13); (4) declarations stating that operations managers were classified as exempt under the FLSA, paid a salary, regularly worked 60 hours or more per week, and received no overtime pay for hours worked in excess of 40 per workweek,4 (see Docs. 33-2 through 33-13); (5) declarations stating that defendant treats all operations managers similarly across stores with regard to pay structure, exempt classification, and job function,5 (see, e.g., Docs. 33-2 through 33-13), and the court concluding that the evidence presented by plaintiffs, including twelve declarants across 10 states and twenty-five stores, is sufficient to warrant conditional certification of a nationwide collective action, see Cambridge, Doc. 41 at 4-6, it is hereby ORDERED that: