GROSS, J.
We affirm the procedure the circuit courts utilized in the final foreclosure judgments on appeal, where the courts allowed the plaintiff to pursue its remedy at law and authorized the initiation of the equitable
These consolidated appeals involve loans that PNC Bank made to corporate entities associated with Anthony V. Pugliese III. In a representative case, PNC sued Pugliese, Royal Palm Corporate Center Association, Ltd., and Royal Palm Corporate Center, Inc. in a two-count complaint. According to the complaint, PNC lent Royal Palm Corporate Center Association over $3 million. Royal Palm Corporate Center Association put up a piece of real estate as security for the loan; this was not a loan for the purchase money of the real estate. Royal Palm Corporate Center, Inc., the general partner of Royal Palm Corporate Center Association, and Pugliese each executed commercial guaranties for security.
In count one of the complaint, PNC sought a foreclosure judgment on the mortgaged property and, if necessary, a deficiency judgment. In count two, PNC sought money damages for breach of the note and guaranties. The case went to a non-jury trial.
The trial court found in favor of PNC. On the foreclosure count, the court determined that the defendants owed PNC $4,753,786.19. The final judgment did not set a sale of the mortgaged property, but provided:
The court reserved jurisdiction to handle any remaining issues, such as a deficiency judgment. On the damages count, the trial court repeated that the defendants owed PNC $4,753,786.19, and ordered that PNC "recover from the defendants" that amount, "for which let execution issue."
The defendants moved for reconsideration and rehearing, among other things. They attacked the structure of the final judgment, which allowed PNC to attempt collection on the money judgment before setting a foreclosure sale. It does not appear that the court ruled on the motion prior to the filing of the notice of appeal.
The above summary of the facts in PNC Bank, N.A. v. Royal Palm Corporate Center Association, Ltd., is similar to the resolution of the other cases. In each case, PNC sued Pugliese and an associated corporation for foreclosure and damages. In each, the trial court found for PNC and implemented the two-step structure of the final judgment described above. The judgments are nearly identical.
Defendants first contend that the trial courts contravened section 45.031, Florida Statutes (2008), by granting foreclosure without scheduling a foreclosure sale. They argue that subsection 45.031(1)(a) requires that the foreclosure sale be set within a certain time and that it was an abuse of discretion to indefinitely stay the sale. We reject this argument.
In relevant part, subsection 45.031(1)(a) provides:
The defendants rely on the above language.
However, the plain language of the statute demonstrates that the procedure set forth in section 45.031 is not the exclusive procedure for setting a foreclosure sale and that a judge has the discretion to use a different procedure. The introductory paragraph of section 45.031 states:
(Emphasis supplied.) By the use of the term "may" and the suggestion that section 45.031 procedure is an "alternative to any other sale procedure," the statute plainly gives a circuit judge discretion to tailor the procedure for a foreclosure sale. See The Fla. Bar v. Trazenfeld, 833 So.2d 734, 738 (Fla.2002) ("The word `may' when given its ordinary meaning denotes a permissive term rather than the mandatory connotation of the word `shall.'" (citation omitted)).
The nature of mortgage foreclosures lends support to this interpretation. Mortgages are "foreclosed in equity." § 702.01, Fla. Stat. (2008). "Historically, courts of equity came into being in order to provide a forum for the granting of relief in accordance with the broad principles of right and justice in cases where the restrictive technicalities of the law prevented the giving of relief." Hedges v. Lysek, 84 So.2d 28, 31 (Fla.1955). While section 45.031 contains a ready-made procedure for a court to adopt, the statute does not mandate that a court utilize that procedure; rather, the judge may fashion a different sale procedure after considering the equities in the case.
The defendants cite a line of cases to argue that a trial court's indefinite stay of a sale constitutes an abuse of discretion. Those cases are distinguishable because they involve courts working within the structure of a section 45.031 sale procedure and mortgagees that are prevented from realizing the benefits of a foreclosure judgment, without an equitable basis which justifies the bar.
An exemplar is First Nationwide Savings v. Thomas, 513 So.2d 804 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987). There, a trial court issued a final judgment of mortgage foreclosure, apparently setting the sale date for the property. Id. at 804-05. The sale was stayed, reset, and subsequently postponed. Id. at 805. In the order on the second delay, the trial court cancelled the sale and stated "the sale of subject property shall not be reheld." Id. On appeal, we held that "[t]his permanent cancellation of the sale without explanation is reversible error." Id. (emphasis supplied). We reasoned that "[a] lender has the right, under the statutes, except under extraordinary circumstances not found in this record, to proceed with the sale of any real estate on which it has successfully foreclosed its mortgage." Id. Thus, we reversed and instructed the trial court to set a sale date. Id.
Thomas presents a scenario different than this case. There, the trial court in the final judgment set a date for the sale and adopted the alternative procedure set out in section 45.031, rather than fashioning its own procedure. Once it adopted the statutory procedure, the court's discretion to indefinitely delay the sale sought by the plaintiff was limited, in the absence of circumstances justifying the delay. In the
The other cases in the line likewise involved situations where sales were actually set, and where the failure to reschedule the sales unjustifiably frustrated the rights of the plaintiffs to the sale of the foreclosed property. See Bankers Trust Co. v. Edwards, 849 So.2d 1160 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (citing Thomas); Bankers Trust Co. of Cal., N.A. v. Weidner, 688 So.2d 453 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997); Chem. Mortg. Co. v. Dickson, 651 So.2d 1275 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (citing, inter alia, Thomas); A Mortg. Co. v. Bowman, 642 So.2d 123 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994) (citing, inter alia, Thomas); Admin. of Veteran's Affairs v. Bertsche, 574 So.2d 320 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991) (citing, inter alia, Thomas). Only after the setting of the sale according to the statutory procedure would the trial court's discretion to control the timing of the sales fall under the limitations described in the Thomas line of cases.
In addition, the defendants rely on LR5A-JV v. Little House, LLC, 50 So.3d 691 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010). However, the case does not support the defendants' contention that the statute is a procedural straightjacket for a circuit court. Instead, it supports the notion that, even within the section 45.031 procedure, the circuit court "has reasonable discretion within the statutory framework to set or reset the date for such sale," which is "consistent with the equitable nature of such proceedings," id. at 693-94; a circuit court has the ability to "consider the interests of all of the parties in determining the matter of the judicial sale," id. at 695.
Finally, the defendants base an argument upon Rule of Civil Procedure Form 1.996(a), "Final Judgment of Foreclosure."
In sum, because section 45.031 gives a circuit court discretion to fashion the foreclosure sale procedure, and limits that discretion only after the court uses the statutory procedure to set a sale date, the trial courts in these cases did not abuse their discretion in withholding the setting of the sale of the subject properties until PNC certified that its money judgments were unsatisfied.
In their second issue, the defendants contend that the trial courts abused their
It has long been the common law that, to collect money owed on a note, a mortgagee may pursue its legal and equitable remedies simultaneously, until the debt is satisfied. In the early case of Booth v. Booth (1742) Eng. & Wales Chancery, 2 Atk. 242 (3d. ed. 1754), the plaintiff brought an action against the defendant for the accounting of an estate owned by the plaintiff's brother, for which estate the defendant had been the guardian and on which he had obtained a mortgage. Id. at 242-43. The defendant brought the action of ejectment for possession of the estate
More than 200 years later, the supreme court of New Mexico articulated the complete rule, its rationale, and the minority view:
Kepler v. Slade, 119 N.M. 802, 896 P.2d 482, 484-85 (1995) (footnote omitted) (citations omitted).
The traditional common law rule is the majority rule in the United States; it has been recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States on at least three occasions.
We have found no Florida statute, and none has been called to our attention, that would prevent a mortgagee from pursuing legal and equitable remedies at the same time. The statute concerning deficiencies, section 702.06, Florida Statutes (2008), is more limited in nature than the statutes in the minority of states. Although the reporters of the Restatement seem to believe that section 702.06 is something of a one-action rule, see Restatement (Third) of Property (Mortgages) § 8.2 cmt. b (1997), neither its language nor its history or purpose support that reading.
Section 702.06 binds a plaintiff to a deficiency decree once the plaintiff sets the deficiency process in motion, but expressly provides that "the complainant shall also have the right to sue at common law to recover such deficiency," except against an original mortgagor when the mortgage was for the purchase price of the subject property, the original mortgagee buys the property at the foreclosure sale, and the original mortgagee obtains a deficiency decree against the original mortgagor.
With regard to the statute's history, the legislature enacted what is now section 702.06, which took the place of an old equity rule of like effect, to grant a court the power to enter deficiency decrees; "[b]efore the adoption of [the equity rule] in 1873 ... no deficiency was authorized in equity courts, and the only remedy for a balance due was a suit at law."
It appears we have not seen these remedies pursued at the same time in the same action because, before 1967, a suit at law on a note and a suit in equity to foreclose a mortgage proceeded in separate courts. In 1967, Florida adopted rules of civil procedure which gave circuit courts jurisdiction to hear cases in which counts at law and counts in equity could be set forth in the same complaint as alternative grounds for relief. In re Fla. Rules of Civil Procedure 1967 Revision, 187 So.2d 598, 600 (Fla.1966); Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.040, 1.110(g). In fact, Rule 1.110(g) provides that claims may be "stated in the alternative," "regardless of consistency and whether based on legal or equitable grounds or both."
As alluded to by the Kepler court, the reason that an action at law on a note may be pursued simultaneously with the equitable remedy of foreclosure is that the two remedies are not inconsistent. Junction Bit & Tool Co. v. Village Apartments, Inc., 262 So.2d 659, 660 (Fla. 1972). "[P]ursuit of one without satisfaction is not a bar to the other." Klondike, Inc. v. Blair, 211 So.2d 41, 43 (Fla. 4th DCA 1968), approved, Junction Bit, 262 So.2d at 660; see also Gottschamer v. August, Thompson, Sherr, Clark & Shafer, P.C., 438 So.2d 408 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983) (an action on a note and an action to foreclose on a mortgage are not inconsistent remedies). Klondike is distinguishable but instructive. In Klondike, the plaintiffs first obtained a judgment on the note, did not cause execution to issue, and never received any payments; over a year after the issuance of the final judgment on the note, the plaintiff sued in foreclosure.
Defendants rely heavily on Farah v. Iberia Bank, 47 So.3d 850 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010), to argue that PNC was limited to the deficiency process if it sought to obtain judgments beyond foreclosure. However, Farah is factually distinguishable. Though the opinion is light on facts,
Affirmed.
MAY, C.J., and STEVENSON, J., concur.