REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

G.R. SMITH, District Judge.

Eduardo Cruz-Camacho moves for 28 U.S.C. § 2255 relief. CR413-129, doc. 181. A jury convicted him of conspiracy to deal in firearms without a license, in violation of 18 U.S.C. H 371, 922(a)(1)(A), dealing in firearms without a license, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(A), and being an illegal alien in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5)(A). United States v. Cruz-Camacho, 2014 WL 5011118 at * 1 (11th Cir. Oct. 8, 2014). Upon preliminary review under Rule 4(b) of the Rules Governing Proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, his motion must be denied.

Defendant's § 2255 motion exemplifies the flaw common to many § 2255 motions: It is comprised almost exclusively of conclusory assertions like those deemed deficient in cases like Holland v. United States, 2014 WL 5241531 at * 2 (S.D. Ga. Oct. 13, 2014) (citing Chavez v. Sec'y Fl. Dep't of Corrs., 647 F.3d 1057, 1061 (11th Cir. 2011) ("The allegations must be factual and specific, not conclusory. Conclusory allegations are simply not enough to warrant a hearing."); Borden v. Allen, 646 F.3d 785, 810 (11th Cir. 2011) (applying a heightened pleading requirement in habeas cases and noting that "[t]he evidence supporting an [IAC] claim is available following the conviction, if not before. Whatever the claim, though, the petitioner is, or should be, aware of the evidence to support the claim before bringing his petition."); Gerwald v. United States, 2014 WL 1681506 at * 3 n. 5 (S.D. Ga. Apr. 28, 2014)).1

Just one example is Claim Two. In it Cruz-Camacho alleges that his attorney, Anne Pannell Rodman, provided ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) by "affirmatively misadvis[ing]" him to proceed to trial when she knew "there was virtually no chance he could prevail at trial due to overwhelming weight and quality of the government's evidence." Doe. 181 at 20.2 He cites no plea offer, much less explains the offer's terms. Under the pleading and IAC standards set forth in n. 2 supra, this claim fails because it is demonstrably speculative and conclusory. Diaz v. United States, 930 F.2d 832, 835 (11th Cir. 1991) (affirming a district court's denial of an evidentiary hearing for an ineffective assistance claim, and noting that "after the fact testimony concerning [a] desire to plead, without more, is insufficient to establish [prejudice]"), quoted in Hill v. United States, 2014 WL 6773045 at * 2 (N.D. Ala. Dec. 2) 2014) (rejecting similar claim because, inter alia, movant "does not allege that any such agreement was offered").

Claim Three ¶ 2 (doc. 181 at 20-22) also fails because it is essentially a rehash of Claim Two. Claim Three ¶ 3, id. at 22-23 ("Counsel unprofessionally failed to investigate or present the strongest issues available . . . for his direct appeal and failed to preserve viable issues for collateral review") also fails as conclusory (what issues?). See Tejada v. Dugger, 941 F.2d 1551, 1559 (11th Cir. 1991) (a petitioner is not entitled to relief under an IAC claim when "his claims are merely `conclusory allegations unsupported by specifics' or `contentions that in the face of the record are wholly incredible'" (quoting Stano v. Dugger, 901 F.2d 898, 899 (11th Cir. 1990)); Hill, 2014 WL 6773045 at * 2. The same must be said for Claim Three ¶ 4 (conflict of interest claim), doe. 181 at 23, as well as Claim Three ¶ 5, id. at 24 (IAC for a "multiplicity of errors"; again, he never explains what those errors are).

That leaves Claim One, doe. 181 at 17-19, which contains a little more detail yet still misses the mark. Here Cruz-Camacho faults Rodman for failing to "cite available authority to demonstrate to the Court at sentencing that [the sentence enhancement that he received] for [his] `role in the offense' was improper in his case because the [sentencing hearing] evidence established nothing more than a relationship between [movant] and another individual." Id. at 17. With the case law defendant supplies, he reasons that Rodman would have convinced the judge that it was erroneous to find Cruz-Camacho "more culpable than others who participated in the crime." Id. at 18. Rodman thus failed to research the law on that score. Id. at 19. Had counsel done those things, "there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of his sentence process would have been different." Id.

The record shows that Cruz-Camacho raised an entrapment defense at trial and lied about his involvement in the conspiracy — a point which led to the Probation Officer, as well as the prosecution, to urge an enhanced sentence on "Obstruction of Justice" grounds. PSI at 9; doc. 175 at 11-16. The sentencing judge, after the prosecution cited record evidence (quoted the trial transcript) showing that movant lied under oath, expressly found that he had obstructed justice in that manner, doe. 175 at 17-19, and did so while advancing a "patently absurd entrapment defense." Id. at 19.

Cruz-Camacho thus would have this Court find Rodman ineffective merely because she failed to convince the judge that he was not part of the conspiracy, which is basically what he means by his "role in the offense" argument. But the judge enhanced his sentence not because he believed that Cruz-Camacho "was more culpable than others who participated in the crime," to use movant's words. Rather, he did so because defendant lied while on the witness stand — a point Rodman contested both in her PSI Objection (see "Addendum to the Presentence Report") and at sentencing. Doc. 175 at 8-11, 16-17. Hence, this claim fails outright.

Eduardo Cruz-Camacho's § 2255 motion therefore must be denied. Doc. 181. His motions for discovery and appointment of counsel (doc. 181 at 26 are DENIED. Applying the Certificate of Appealability (COA) standards set forth in Brown v. United States, 2009 WL 307872 at * 1-2 (S.D. Ga. Feb. 9, 2009), the Court discerns no COA-worthy issues at this stage of the litigation, so no COA should issue. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). And, as there are no non-frivolous issues to raise on appeal, an appeal would not be taken in good faith. Thus, in forma pauperis status on appeal should likewise be DENIED. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3).

SO REPORTED AND RECOMMENDED.