ORDER and MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

R. STAN BAKER, United States Magistrate Judg.

Petitioner Roy Lee Reinhardt ("Reinhardt"), who is currently incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Institution in Jesup, Georgia, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. 1.) Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss, (doc. 7). For the reasons which follow, I RECOMMEND that the Court GRANT Respondent's Motion to Dismiss, DISMISS Reinhardt's Section 2241 Petition, CLOSE this case, and DENY Reinhardt in forma pauperis status on appeal.

BACKGROUND

Reinhardt was convicted in the Western District of North Carolina of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine and cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. (Doc. 7-1, p. 2; Doc. 7-2, p. 2.) Reinhardt qualified as a career offender based on his prior convictions for assault on a female and assault on a government official. (Doc. 7, p. 2.) His advisory Guidelines range was 262 to 327 months' imprisonment, and Reinhardt was sentenced to 210 months' imprisonment after the government filed a downward departure motion on his behalf. (Id.) Reinhardt did not file a direct appeal or a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence. (Id. at p. 3.)

DISCUSSION

In his current Petition, Reinhardt contends his prior convictions no longer constitute crimes of violence, in light of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (June 26, 2015). (Doc. 1, p. 2.) Specifically, Reinhardt asserts "the Supreme Court has vacated the sentences of offenders who were sentenced under the residual clause of the Sentencing Guidelines[ ]" following the Johnson decision.1 (Id.) Reinhardt alleges he is entitled to the same relief as those offenders who were sentenced under the Armed Career Criminal Act's ("ACCA") residual clause2, and he "demands that he receives (sic) sentencing credit" pursuant to Section 2241 because the language of the career offender provision's residual clause is virtually identical to the language contained in the ACCA's residual clause. (Id. at p. 3.)

Respondent argues Reinhardt cannot proceed under Section 2241 in this Court because he cannot satisfy Section 2255(e)'s savings clause. (Doc. 7, pp. 3-4.) Respondent states that Reinhardt cannot demonstrate that a Section 2255 motion is "inadequate or ineffective" because any Johnson-based claim he makes would be considered and decided in a first Section 2255 motion since Reinhardt has not yet filed a Section 2255 motion. In addition, Respondent asserts, should this Court recharacterize Reinhardt's Petition as a Section 2255 motion, his claims would fail on the merits. (Id. at p. 5.)

I. Whether Reinhardt can Proceed Pursuant to Section 2241

Section 2241 habeas corpus petitions "`are generally reserved for challenges to the execution of a sentence or the nature of confinement, not the validity of the sentence itself or the fact of confinement.'" Vieux v. Warden, 616 F. App'x 891, 896 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting Bryant v. Warden, FCC Coleman-Medium, 738 F.3d 1253, 1288 (11th Cir. 2013) (emphasis omitted)). Ordinarily, an action in which an individual seeks to collaterally attack "the validity of a federal sentence must be brought under § 2255," in the district of conviction. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a); Turner v. Warden Coleman FCI (Medium), 709 F.3d 1328, 1333 (11th Cir. 2013).

Rather than filing a Section 2255 motion in the district of his conviction, Reinhardt filed this petition for habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. To utilize Section 2241 to attack the validity of a federal sentence or conviction, a petitioner must show that the remedy afforded under Section 2255 is "inadequate or ineffective" to challenge the validity of a conviction and/or sentence. Taylor v. Warden, FCI Marianna, 557 F. App'x 911, 913 (11th Cir. 2014).

Under Section 2255(e)'s "savings clause," a prisoner may file a Section 2241 petition if an otherwise available remedy under Section 2255 is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention. Specifically, Section 2255(e) provides:

28 U.S. C. § 2255(e) (emphasis added). The above-emphasized portion of Section 2255(e) is referred to as the "savings clause."

In Bryant, the Eleventh Circuit articulated the requirements a petitioner must meet in order to proceed under the savings clause with a Section 2241 petition that raises sentencing claims. 738 F.3d 1253. The petitioner must establish that: (1) binding circuit precedent squarely foreclosed the claim "throughout his sentence, direct appeal, and first § 2255 proceeding"; (2) "subsequent to his first 2255 proceeding," a Supreme Court decision overturned that circuit precedent; (3) the rule announced in that Supreme Court decision applies retroactively on collateral review; (4) as a result of the new rule, the petitioner's current sentence exceeds the statutory maximum penalty authorized by Congress; and (5) the savings clause reaches the petitioner's claim. Bryant, 738 F.3d at 1274 (synthesizing the savings clause tests discussed in Wofford v. Scott, 177 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 1999); Gilbert v. United States, 640 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 2011); and Williams v. Warden, Federal Bureau of Prisons, 713 F.3d 1332, 1343 (11th Cir. 2013)); see also Jeanty v. Warden, 757 F.3d 1283, 1285 (11th Cir. 2014); Mackey v. Warden, FCC Coleman, 739 F.3d 657, 661-62 (11th Cir. 2014) (approving the Bryant test factors and concluding that petitioner had satisfied all prongs thereof).

A petitioner must satisfy all five of these requirements to obtain relief. Bryant, 738 F.3d at 1274. This threshold showing is a jurisdictional requirement, and where it is absent, federal courts lack authority to consider the merits of a petitioner's Section 2241 claims. Williams, 713 F.3d at 1338; Daniels v. Warden, FCC Coleman, 538 F. App'x 850, 852 (11th Cir. 2013) ("[A] petitioner may not argue the merits of his claim until he has `open[ed] the portal' to a § 2241 proceeding by demonstrating that the savings clause applies to his claim."). Moreover, "[t]he petitioner bears the burden of coming forward with evidence affirmatively showing the inadequacy or ineffectiveness of the § 2255 remedy." Smith v. Warden, FCC Coleman-Low, 503 F. App'x 763, 765 (11th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). "A petitioner may not argue the merits of his claim until he has opened the portal to a § 2241 proceeding by demonstrating that the savings clause of § 2255(e) applies to his claim." Id. (citation omitted).

As noted above, Reinhardt relies upon the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson to support his savings clause argument.3 In Johnson, the Supreme Court held that "imposing an increased sentence under the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act violates the Constitution's guarantee of due process[.]" ___ U.S. at ___, 135 S.Ct. 2551, 2563. However, the Court also emphasized that its "decision does not call into question application of the Act to the four enumerated offenses, or the remainder of the Act's definition of a violent felony." Id.

Reinhardt's Johnson claims do not satisfy the Bryant factors because he cannot show that the savings clause reaches those claims. Specifically, the remedy afforded by Section 2255 is not inadequate or ineffective to raise these claims. Reinhardt has a remedy under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to file a Section 2255 motion in the Western District of North Carolina. On this front, the Court notes that the United States Supreme Court recently decided in Welch v. United States, ___ U.S. ___ 2016 WL 1551144 (Apr. 18, 2016), that Johnson applies retroactively to cases on collateral review. Though the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has yet to address this issue, the Eleventh Circuit has already recognized Welch's holding and Johnson's application to cases on collateral review. In re Robinson, ___ F.3d ___, No. 16-11304, 2016 WL 1583616 (11th Cir. Apr. 19, 2016).

Additionally, a Section 2255 motion is not "inadequate or ineffective" under the savings clause merely because Reinhardt may be unable to comply with procedural restrictions. Jones v. Warden, FCC Coleman Medium, 520 F. App'x 942, 945 (11th Cir. 2013) (noting the mere fact that a Section 2255 motion is procedurally barred does not make that Section's remedy inadequate or ineffective); see also Hill v. Morrison, 349 F.3d 1089, 1091 (8th Cir. 2003) (stating a petitioner "has the burden of demonstrating Section 2255's relief" is `unavailable or ineffective[ ]', and to do so, there must be more than a procedural barrier to bringing a Section 2255 motion. . . . This court has held a § 2255 motion is not `inadequate or ineffective' merely because `§ 2255 relief has already been denied[ ]'") (internal citations omitted)). The fact that Reinhardt's claims could be barred by the statute of limitations does not satisfy Section 2255(e)'s savings clause. Jones, 520 F. App'x at 945. Rather, "[w]hat makes the § 2255 proceeding `inadequate or ineffective' for [a petitioner] is that he had no `genuine opportunity' to raise his claim in the context of a § 2255 motion." Zelaya v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 798 F.3d 1360, 1370 (11th Cir. 2015). Since it appears Reinhardt has available to him the ability to proceed with his first Section 2255 motion, he cannot show that Section 2255's remedy is "inadequate or ineffective" to challenge his sentence. Mays v. United States, ___ F.3d ___, No. 14-13477, 2016 WL 1211420, at *1 (11th Cir. Mar. 29, 2016) (holding that Johnson applies retroactively in the first post-conviction context, reversing the district court's denial of defendant's motion, and remanding for resentencing); Mungro v. United States, 3:15-cv-471, 3:11-cr-370, 2016 WL 183497, at *1 n.1 (W.D. N.C.. Jan. 14, 2016) (assuming without deciding Johnson applies retroactively to cases on collateral review and entertaining a first Section 2255 motion on that basis).

For all of these reasons, Reinhardt has not satisfied the requirements of Section 2255(e)'s savings clause. Consequently, he cannot "open the portal" to argue the merits of his Section 2241claim. Dean v. McFadden, 133 F. App'x 640, 642 (11th Cir. 2005).4

Reinhardt is reminded that the filing of Section 2255 motions is governed by a statute of limitations period, and of particular significance is Section 2255(f)(3). "It is important to note that 28 U.S.C. 2255(f)(3) requires that a § 2255 motion relying on a newly-recognized right must be filed within one year from `the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court[.]'" King v. Werlich, No. 16-CV-300-DRH-CJP, 2016 WL 1583936, at *3 (S.D. Ill. Apr. 20, 2016) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3)). Johnson was decided by the Supreme Court on June 26, 2015. "Further, the one-year period prescribed by 2255(f)(3) runs from the date of the Supreme Court's ruling initially recognizing the right asserted[ ] and not from the date the newly recognized right was found to be retroactive." Id. (emphasis in original) (citing Dodd v. United States, 545 U.S. 353, 358 (2005)).

However, the Court makes no comment on the efficacy of any argument that Johnson applies to a defendant's claim in a first Section 2255 that a sentence based on the career offender provision of the Sentencing Guidelines (rather than the ACCA) is unconstitutional. See United States v. Matchett, 802 F.3d 1185, 1189 (11th Cir. 2015) (rejecting the argument that the definition of "crime of violence" in the Sentencing Guidelines is unconstitutionally vague in light of Johnson, as the vagueness doctrine "applies only to laws that prohibit conduct and fix punishments, not advisory guidelines[ ]"); see also United States v. Foote, 784 F.3d 931, 936 (4th Cir. 2015) (finding that an erroneous application of the sentencing guidelines, including the career offender designation, is not cognizable on collateral review pursuant to Section 2255); but see Lucas v. United States, CIV. 15-5082-JLV, 2016 WL 552471, *3 (D.S.D. Feb. 10, 2016) (noting the "nearly identical language and interpretation of the residual clauses of the ACCA and the sentencing guideline," and finding the residual clause of the career offender provision to be unconstitutionally vague).

Based on these reasons, I RECOMMEND the Court GRANT Respondent's Motion to Dismiss and DISMISS Reinhardt's Section 2241 Petition.

II. Leave to Appeal In Forma Pauperis

The Court should also deny Reinhardt leave to appeal in forma pauperis. Though Reinhardt has, of course, not yet filed a notice of appeal, it would be appropriate to address these issues in the Court's order of dismissal. Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(3) (trial court may certify that appeal of party proceeding in forma pauperis is not taken in good faith "before or after the notice of appeal is filed"). An appeal cannot be taken in forma pauperis if the trial court certifies that the appeal is not taken in good faith. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3); Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(3). Good faith in this context must be judged by an objective standard. Busch v. Cty. of Volusia, 189 F.R.D. 687, 691 (M.D. Fla. 1999). A party does not proceed in good faith when he seeks to advance a frivolous claim or argument. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962). A claim or argument is frivolous when it appears the factual allegations are clearly baseless or the legal theories are indisputably meritless. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989); Carroll v. Gross, 984 F.2d 392, 393 (11th Cir. 1993). Stated another way, an in forma pauperis action is frivolous and, thus, not brought in good faith, if it is "without arguable merit either in law or fact." Napier v. Preslicka, 314 F.3d 528, 531 (11th Cir. 2002); see also Brown v. United States, Nos. 407CV085, 403CR001, 2009 WL 307872, at *1-2 (S.D. Ga. Feb. 9, 2009).

Based on the above analysis of Reinhardt's Petition and the Respondent's Motion to Dismiss, there are no non-frivolous issues to raise on appeal, and an appeal would not be taken in good faith. Thus, the Court should DENY in forma pauperis status on appeal.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, I RECOMMEND that the Court GRANT Respondent's Motion to Dismiss, (doc. 9), DISMISS Reinhardt's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, (doc. 1), CLOSE this case, and DENY Reinhardt leave to proceed in forma pauperis.

The Court ORDERS any party seeking to object to this Report and Recommendation to file specific written objections within fourteen (14) days of the date on which this Report and Recommendation is entered. Any objections asserting that the Magistrate Judge failed to address any contention raised in the pleading must also be included. Failure to do so will bar any later challenge or review of the factual findings or legal conclusions of the Magistrate Judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985). A copy of the objections must be served upon all other parties to the action. The filing of objections is not a proper vehicle through which to make new allegations or present additional evidence.

Upon receipt of objections meeting the specificity requirement set out above, a United States District Judge will make a de novo determination of those portions of the report, proposed findings, or recommendation to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the Magistrate Judge. Objections not meeting the specificity requirement set out above will not be considered by a District Judge. A party may not appeal a Magistrate Judge's report and recommendation directly to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. Appeals may be made only from a final judgment entered by or at the direction of a District Judge. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to serve a copy of this Report and Recommendation upon Reinhardt and Respondent.

SO ORDERED and REPORTED and RECOMMENDED.