MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

JAY C. GANDHI, Magistrate Judge.

Mercedes L. Cisneros ("Plaintiff") challenges the Social Security Commissioner ("Commissioner")'s decision denying her application for child's survivor benefits. Plaintiff contends that the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") improperly determined that she had failed to establish paternity of the deceased wage earner ("DWE"), Juan H. Cisneros. In particular, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ improperly found that the DWE had not "openly held out" Plaintiff as his own under California intestate law. (See Joint Stipulation ("Joint Stip.") at 3-11, 18-19; Administrative Record ("AR") at 17-26.) For the reasons discussed below, the Court finds that reversal is not warranted.

Preliminarily, as a matter of law, the Court must affirm the Commissioner's decision if it is based on proper legal standards and if its findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence in the "record as a whole." Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1989). Further, "[w]hen the evidence before the ALJ is subject to more than one rational interpretation, [the Court] must defer to the ALJ's conclusion." Batson v. Comm'r Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1198 (9th Cir. 2004).

The Social Security Act provides financial benefits for a child who was dependent on an individual insured under the statute at the time of that wage earner's death. Social Security Act, § 202(d); 42 U.S.C. § 402(d). To determine whether an applicant is a "child" of the insured individual, the statute requires the agency to "apply such law as would be applied in determining the devolution of intestate personal property by the courts of the State" in which the wage earner lived. Social Security Act, § 216(h)(2)(A); 42 U.S.C § 416(h)(2)(A); Astrue v. Capato, 132 S.Ct. 2021 (2012) (upholding this state-by-state scheme for determining federal child insurance benefits).1

The California Probate Code provides several ways that a child can establish a parental relationship between the child and her natural parent for purposes of intestate succession, one of which is showing "by clear and convincing evidence that the father has openly held out the child as his own[.]" Cal. Prob. Code § 6453(b)(2); see Hardy v. Colvin, 930 F.Supp.2d 1196, 1210 (C.D. Cal. 2013). "Holding out," under § 6453(b)(2), requires an "unconcealed affirmative representation of paternity in open view." Estate of Britel, 236 Cal.App.4th 127, 138-39 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015).

Here, the ALJ provided at least seven valid reasons for finding that Plaintiff failed to show that the DWE openly held her out as his own.

First, there was no evidence of financial support.2 (AR at 22, 24-25); see Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 750; California Community Property Law, Expert Series, § 13:57 (2016 ed.) ("[t]he public purpose in [§ 6453(b)(2)] is . . . to provide clear and convincing evidence that the father intends to fulfill his legal obligations of support, as well as the fact of the child's right to succession on his death and intestacy"); cf. In re Wilson's Estate, 164 Cal.App.2d 385, 386-87, 390 (1958) (discussing, as a factor in determining whether decedent publicly acknowledged surviving daughter as his natural daughter, fact that deceased made payments to mother "from time to time" before and after daughter's birth).

Second, there was little evidence that the DWE was involved in Plaintiff's education or medical care. (AR at 24, 29); see Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 750; Britel, 236 Cal. App. 4th at 139 ("[I]t makes sense that a decedent would intend his estate to pass to a child he actively raised and nurtured within his family." (emphasis added; citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). Notably, (1) most school records list "Jaime Orellano" as Plaintiff's step-father, and make no mention of the DWE3; and (2) no medical records mention the DWE. (See AR at 29, 40, 53, 55, 63.)

Third, Plaintiff began receiving benefits for her own disability in 1986, but neither she nor her mother provided a satisfactory explanation as to why additional benefits were not sought from the DWE while he was alive over the next 17 years, and could have acknowledged Plaintiff as his child.4 (AR at 24, 159-60, 259); see Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 750; cf. Britel, 236 Cal. App. 4th at 144 (discussing how mother's decision not to bring a paternity action during deceased's lifetime "carried the risk that [the father] could die intestate while she waited for him to grow into fatherhood"; conversely, had she brought a paternity suit, the father might have chosen to write a will excluding the child).

Fourth, there was no evidence that the DWE listed Plaintiff on his application for benefits. (AR at 24, 159, 186, 188); see Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 750; Estate of Baird, 193 Cal. 225, 276 (1924) ("it would be opposed to the idea of public acknowledgment if [the father] deliberately refrained from declaring his paternity when the occasion would naturally demand it; . . . or remained silent when he would reasonably be expected to announce he was the father of the child"); Britel, 236 Cal. App. 4th at 139 (approving Baird as providing useful guidelines in determining whether § 6453(b)(2) is satisfied).

Fifth, there was no written statement from the DWE.5 (AR at 24-25); see Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 750; cf. In re Estate of Burden, 146 Cal.App.4th 1021, 1030 (2007) (§ 6453(b)(2) satisfied in part because father admitted paternity "on a number of occasions to a number of people, both orally and in writing").

Sixth, the DWE maintained another residence. (AR at 22, 24-25, 59, 266); see Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 75; cf. In re Abate's Estate, 166 Cal.App.2d 282, 290 (1958) (evidence that decedent father rented apartment and lived with mother and child showed, in part, that he had publicly acknowledged child as his own).

Seventh, the only witness to allege that the DWE made statements acknowledging paternity was a former co-worker — evidence that the ALJ reasonably concluded was insufficient to meet the standard under California law. (AR at 23, 25, 144, 206); see Britel, 236 Cal. App. 4th at 138-39 (rejecting argument that purported father "openly held out" child as his own when he only privately conceded that he was the father during pregnancy); In re Spencer W., 48 Cal.App.4th 1647, 1653-54 (1996) (evidence that purported father claimed paternity to friends and family, but was unwilling to proclaim paternity when there might have been some cost to him, insufficient to satisfy requirement that he "openly and publicly admit paternity").

Thus, the ALJ properly determined that Plaintiff did not show by clear and convincing evidence that the DWE openly held her out as his own under California law. See Cal. Prob. Code § 6453(b)(2). Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the ALJ's conclusion that Plaintiff failed to establish a parent-child relationship such as would entitle her to child's survivor benefits under the Act. See Social Security Act, 216(h)(2); 42 U.S.C § 416(h)(2).

Based on the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED THAT judgment shall be entered AFFIRMING the decision of the Commissioner denying benefits.