G.R. SMITH, District Judge.
Another discovery dispute has arisen in this breach of insurance contract case. See doc. 54 (resolving earlier dispute), reported at 2012 WL 1951652.
Doc. 49 at 4 (plaintiffs' recitation of this case). Other remediation efforts were made. Id. State Farm brought in a second-opinion consultant who concluded that only mold, but not also bacteria, was present. Doc. 62 at 3 ¶ 4; doc. 68-3 at 27; 61-1 at 11. Conceding partial coverage, State Farm determined "that [a] broken pipe caused water and mold damage," but not as much as plaintiffs claimed. Doc. 49 at 5. So, it only partly paid out on plaintiffs' claim. Id.; see also doc. 61-1 at 2 ("State Farm denied additional coverage for remediation, applying the fungal (including mold) policy limit of $10,000."); doc. 10 at 4-5.
The parties' dispute is over bacteria. Doc. 70. Bacteria, caused by the water leak, had to be detected or else the policy's $10,000 mold (or "fungal") contamination limit applied. Doc. 71 at 44-49; doc. 71-1 at 19-22, 36, 39, 49-50. If detected, a higher coverage amount would be triggered for more expensive remediation. Doc. 71-1 at 49-50; doc. 71-2 at 1, 5-6, 12-147 25, 27-28, 29-30, 31-32, 36, 37, 38, 47-40. Plaintiffs say bacteria was present, while State Farm says not (it is undisputed that bacteria is always present in homes but only some strains, as tied to a covered occurrence, trigger coverage). Doc. 71-2 at 49; doc. 72 at 1, 10-11, 14-15; see also id. at 16 (there was some bacteria but it was not caused by the water loss), 23-24 (same), 26-28 (same); 33 ("The initial facts of loss stated that this was a slab leak and it's not our experience that a slab leak results in bacteria."). The Southards thus sued State Farm for, inter alia, breach of insurance contract (doc. doc. 10) but a summary judgment ruling has pared their case down to breach of contract plus O.C.G.A. §33-4-6(a) bad-faith damages. Doc, 56.
The Southards want to see four other State Farm, water-leak claim files in which their remediation men, Mock and Martin, participated. doc. 61-1 at 2, 10-11 (seeking info on mold-claim denials); doc. 61-3; doc. 64-1 at 3-6; see also doc. 62 at 3 ¶ 5 (noting that all those cases involved Mock and Martin, mold/bacteria claims fully paid out by State Farm); doc, 62 at 13 (describing the files and noting that the names of policy holders could be redacted). They want to know whether State Farm handled their claim differently from the preceding four, and thus whether State Farm deviated from its usual custom and practices — a bad faith marker. Doc. 62 at 4.
The Southards also, want to review State Farm's "Engineering Firm Selection Applications" to learn "what type of information was in the list." Doc. 61-1 at 3-4; doc. 62 at 13; doc. 64 at 10.
State Farm says that the "similar claims" discovery is irrelevant because this is only a mold, not a mold/bacteria case, so the four claims files the Southards want are not "similar." And just because the Southards say they had bacteria does not mean it's true. Doc. 61-1 at 5-6; doc. 64 at 5-6. In fact, says State Farm, plaintiffs' own tests showed "negative" for bacteria in their home. Doc. 64 at 7; see also id. at 8 (for a while those tests were concealed both from plaintiffs and State Farm). So, State Farm concludes, the plaintiffs have no good relevancy argument for discovering how State Farm has adjusted the four prior mold-bacteria claims. Id.; see also doc. 64 at 6 ("Therefore, there is simply no threshold for relevancy between Plaintiffs' claim and these other claims.").
Parties may discover "any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense," Fed.R.Civ.P, 26(b)(1), and upon a good-cause showing, "any matter relevant to the subject matter" of the litigation. Id.; see Siddiq v. Saudi Arabian Airlines Corp., 2011 WL 6936485 at * 2 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 7, 2011). Proponents must show relevance. Zorn v. Principal Life Ins. Co., 2010 WL 3282982 at *2 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 8, 2010), The information need not be admissible at trial, only "reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." Id.
A party from whom discovery is sought may move for a protective order if it shows good cause "to protect [that] party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense." Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1); Southard, 2012 WL 1951652 at *2 n. 3. Requests for plainly irrelevant information are objectionable.
But the relevancy standard for discovery is not the same as for at-trial evidence. For discovery it is more liberal, though not a fishing license. Ariel Preferred Retail Group, LLC. v. CWCapital Asset Management, 2012 WL 1620506 at * 3 (E.D. Mo. May 9, 2012); Hurley v. State Farm Mut, Auto. Ins. Co., 2012 WL 1600796 at * 2 (D.S.D. May 7, 2012). In insurance cases, for example, bad-faith claimants have been permitted to discover system-based background information like how an insurer trains its employees to minimize losses while adjusting claims, or the reserves that it sets for them.
And some courts have allowed discovery of "evidence of the [insurer's] practices concerning and its treatment of similar claims." Parkdale America, LLC v. Travelers Casualty and Surety Co. of Am., 2007 WL 3237720 at *5 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 30, 2007) (antitrust insurance coverage case), cited in Westport Ins. Corp. v. Wilkes & McHugh, P.A., 264 F.R.D. 368, 372-73 (W.D. Tenn. 2009) (in insurer's action to determine coverage of legal malpractice policy, insured law firm's request for discovery of insurer's handling of other policyholders claims was reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence relevant to firm's state law counterclaim alleging unfair trade practices as required for motion to compel; scope of discovery was limited to preceding five years, which would avoid excessive burden on insurer). Others not.
Plaintiffs' quest for similar mold/bacteria claims must be viewed in context of the facts spread throughout the record. They insist that State Farm's representative admitted that if bacteria was found in their home, they would receive the higher limits coverage under the subject policy. Doc. 70 at 1. They are correct. But the very deposition pages that they cite show State Farm's position that yes, bacteria was found but no, it was not related to the water-leak that caused their claim.
Next, plaintiffs tender Mock principal Alan Mock's affidavit in support of their discovery, doc. 62-1, but he simply does not attest that he found bacteria in the Southard home. However, his subcontractor — Martin — also was deposed. While he found no bacteria on the first round of testing that he performed at the Southards' home (possibly, be says, because Mock had applied biocide and cleaned the area up before Martin got there), he later found bacteria on a follow-up test, though perhaps not enough to definitively support a claim. Doc. 68-3 at 22-3, 30 (conceding he initially tested for but found no bacteria); doc. 68-3 at 11; doc. 68-2 at 16-17, 20-23, 26, 38-40, 43; see also 68-2 at 48-49 (acknowledging that he advised different remediation for claims where bacteria was and was not present, and conceding that none was initially present for the Southard's home); doc. 68-3 at 2 (admits he had no initial test showing bacteria); doc. 68-3 at 50 (but he says a later test showed bacteria present); doc. 68-3 at 40-41 (still, he conceded that such bacteria is present everywhere, so it was not dispositive here); id. at 42 (yet, based on the second-test results he told Mock "to go ahead with taking up [the leak-affected] floor and treat[ it] with some kind of biocide. ..."); id. at 43 (nevertheless he concedes the second test results he obtained said nothing of the bacteria's source); id. at 43-44 (nor did he determine whether the bacteria was "pathogenic"); doc. 68-4 at 6 (he concedes that that it "would be difficult' to link the bacteria to the broken pipe because the bacteria could come from any source).
No doubt the Court would find the Martin testimony tenuous were it resolving this case on the merits, but plaintiffs properly remind the Court that the discovery standard is more liberal than the at-trial evidence standard. And State Farm, they say, has "repeatedly implied" that Mock and Martin, "conspired to unduly enhance the expense of Plaintiffs' damages in an effort to create a more expensive claim." Doc. 62 at 8.
While the question is reasonably close,
Here the request extends to just the four "Mock/Martin mold cases" in question, not "all" prior bad-faith cases or some similar open-ended request. It is not beyond the realm of possibility that in at least one of the prior mold/bacteria cases State Farm or a claimant's agent conducted a follow-up test, then altered the claim's disposition in a manner relevant to the way the contract performance (and, in turn, any bad-faith conduct) unfolded in this case. And plaintiffs are correct that State Farm is essentially misapplying the at-trial relevance standard here; the proper standard is more akin to citing inferential smoke that could reasonably lead to fire. Too, plaintiffs seek no massive data dump, just four "3-M" (Mold, Mock and Martin) files.
Subject to a protective order (the parties shall promptly confer) guarding past claimants' identities, State Farm shall disclose the four prior claims files identified by the Southhards. See doc. 62 at 13. Plaintiffs also shall be entitled to depose a State Farm Rule 30(b)(6) representative about those flies. The Court otherwise GRANTS the remainder of State Farm's motion for a protective order. Doc, 61.
Zorn, 2010 WL 3282982 at * 2 (emphasis added).
2 INSURANCE CLAIMS AND DISPUTES 5TH § 9:21A (Mar. 2012). This source cites pro-discovery cases, too. id., n. 1, it notes that:
[a] few courts have allowed discovery regarding other claims arising under similar policy wording, particularly where the information sought is limited to the type of claim asserted in the coverage litigation. Such rulings are not justifiable. Either the policy language is ambiguous or it is not. If it is ambiguous, the other claims files are irrelevant to the insured's case. And if the policy language is not ambiguous, the other claim files cannot change that fact.
Id. (footnotes omitted); see also St. Paul Reinsurance Co. v. Commercial Financial Corp., 197 F.R.D. 620, 643-45 (N.D. Iowa 2000) (information regarding other "bad faith" claims against insurer was not relevant, and thus, not discoverable by insured, which asserted "first—party" bad faith counterclaim under Iowa law, since insurer actually relied upon certain ground for denying the claim rather than denying claim pursuant to systematic scheme to rescind policies when claims were made without investigating whether there was good cause to do so; furthermore, assuming that evidence of other bad faith claims was somehow marginally relevant to the bad faith claim, discovery of information regarding such claims would be unduly burdensome in relation to the likely benefits), cited in 54 No. 1 DRI FOR DEF. 36 (Jan. 2012) (collecting cases).