John K. Olson, Judge.
Debtor Darryl Edwin Williams initiated this case by filing a voluntary petition for Chapter 7 relief on May 6, 2016. On July 5, 2016 and July 20, 2016, Debtor filed his first and second amendments to his initial Schedule C, listing property to be claimed as exempt, neither of which contained the Disputed Exemption [ECF 43 and 62]. Trustee filed an Agreed Motion for Denial of Discharge [ECF 152], signed by the Debtor, on February 10, 2017, and the Court granted that motion on March 1, 2017 [ECF 162]. The Debtor will accordingly not receive a bankruptcy discharge in this case. On December 6, 2017, Trustee noticed a Rule 2004 Examination of the Debtor (the "Examination"), which was conducted on January 10, 2018 [ECF 182]. Following the Examination, Debtor filed his third amended Schedule C, which this time did include the Disputed Exemption [ECF 183]. The Trustee subsequently filed an objection to the exemption, asserting, inter alia, that the descriptions of the underlying asset were too vague (the "initial objection") [ECF 187]. Thereafter, Florida Asset Recovery Group, LLC ("FARGL" or the "Creditor") filed a joinder into the Trustee's initial objection [ECF 191]. In response to the initial objection, Debtor filed his fourth amended Schedule C, which provided greater detail as to the asset in question [ECF 197]. At the hearing on the Trustee's initial objection, the Debtor had already filed a fourth amended Schedule C, and so the Court dismissed the matter as moot and gave the Trustee and Creditor until March 8, 2018, to object to Debtor's fourth amended Schedule C [ECF 200]. On March 7, 2018, Trustee filed an objection to Debtor's fourth amended Schedule C, and FARGL subsequently joined into that objection [ECF 204 and 206].
The NFL Class Action Settlement Agreement (the "Settlement Agreement") is an agreement between the National Football League (the "League") and its players
The Settlement Agreement provides a Baseline Assessment Program (BAP),
The State of Florida has generally opted out of federal bankruptcy exemptions,
Section 522(d)(10), in relevant part, provides exemptions for the following:
At issue here is whether the proceeds from the Settlement Agreement fall into either of these exemptions. The Court finds that the Settlement Agreement provides disability benefits which are exempt under Subsection (C). There is thus no need to assess whether the benefits are exempt under Subsection (E).
The Debtor's argument misconstrues some important aspects of the Settlement Agreement. Most importantly, Debtor conflates benefits under the Original Policies with those under the Settlement Agreement. Debtor proceeds to lay out the requirements for the NFL CBA Neurocognitive Disability Benefit, suggesting that his injuries fall squarely within its scope; however, the benefits in question are not those pursuant to the Original Policies. In fact, the Settlement Agreement explicitly carves out the Original Policies, as the Trustee outlines in her argument. Nevertheless, the Settlement Agreement establishes a new basis for contractual benefits, thereby creating a new and separate disability policy (the "New and Separate Disability Policy").
Both at hearing and in her Objection [ECF 204], the Trustee relied heavily on Chesley v. Woodard, 526 B.R. 888, 895 (M.D. Fla. 2014), which she claims is dispositive of the issue. In Chesley, the court analyzed whether proceeds from a tort claim settlement would be exempt under § 522(d)(10)(C), and provided that: "for the exemption to apply ... it must be established that (1) the proceeds are disability income benefits and (2) these benefits are under a policy." Chesley, 526 B.R. at 895. There, the court held that the benefits were not exemptible under § 522(d)(10)(C) because the Debtor did not show that the benefits were pursuant to a disability policy. Id. at 896. Similarly, the Trustee suggests that the NFL Settlement Agreement is simply resolving a tort claim, for which there are no exemptions under applicable Florida law. In her Objection, the Trustee provides an exhibit that includes all instances of the word "disability," and its relevant derivatives, within the Settlement Agreement. The exhibit includes multiple sections, which carve out and preserve the Original Policies. The Trustee gives particular weight to Section 18.5, which in relevant part provides that:
Nevertheless, the Trustee's argument fails to see the forest for the trees. The Settlement Agreement establishes a new
Most importantly, however, is the overall structure of the Settlement Agreement and the medical procedures in place to filter claims. The Settlement Agreement requires that injured parties be diagnosed by qualified medical professionals before they may be eligible for benefits. Moreover, the Settlement Agreement itself provides for a Baseline Assessment Program whereby parties may receive an initial medical screening. Contrary to a traditional tort claim settlement, whereby aggrieved parties are automatically and indiscriminately paid a lump-sum, the Settlement Agreement requires players to jump through a multitude of procedural hoops in order to gain a qualified diagnosis, after which their claim is subjected to additional differentiation and limitations. Under the Settlement Agreement scheme, compensation is never guaranteed, and there is always a possibility that players do not receive a Monetary Award. Additionally, it is important to note that the Settlement Agreement does not just include the Debtor, but hundreds and potentially thousands of former NFL players. In turn, the Settlement Agreement establishes a "policy" to adjudicate each individual claim on its merits in order to determine whether compensation is warranted. This is vastly different from a traditional class action tort claim settlement, where no matter the size of the class, payouts are fully determined ex-ante. Here, however, the amount of compensation (if any) is only fully determined ex-post, after all of the procedural hurdles have been overcome.
The fact that the Settlement Agreement explicitly carves out all other non-settlement related benefits is of little significance. It is of no concern that the Settlement Agreement carves out the Original Policies under the CBA, because it has created a New and Separate Disability Policy. Of course, the NFL would want to make the New and Separate Policy proceeds mutually exclusive from the Original Policy proceeds so as to insulate the League from automatically triggering additional claims. Indeed, the careful and repetitive language used to carve out the Original Policies is indicative of the drafters' concern for the Settlement Agreement's striking similarities to traditional disability policies. Moreover, focusing on the Settlement Agreement's intent to carve out the Original Policies misses the point: the Settlement Agreement establishes
The NFL Settlement Agreement created a new and separate disability policy through which injured parties are able to receive disability benefits. There is little to suggest that the Settlement Agreement intends to resolve a tort claim; rather, the explicit language of the Settlement Agreement as well as the overall structure suggest that the benefits are pursuant to a separately created policy, which this Court interprets as a disability policy within the meaning of § 522(d)(10)(C). Therefore, any payments to the Debtor pursuant to the Settlement Agreement are exempt under 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(C). Accordingly, the Trustee's Objection is
SO ORDERED.