MICHAEL J. NEWMAN, Magistrate Judge.
This is a Social Security disability benefits appeal. At issue is whether the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") erred in finding Plaintiff not "disabled" and therefore unentitled to Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB"). This case is before the Court upon Plaintiff's Statement of Errors (doc. 9), the Commissioner's memorandum in opposition (doc. 12), Plaintiff's reply memorandum (doc. 13), the administrative record (doc. 6),
Plaintiff filed for DIB alleging a disability onset date of February 2, 2008. PageID 207-13. Plaintiff claims disability as a result of a number of impairments including, inter alia, fibromyalgia, degenerative disc disease, and anxiety disorder. PageID 48.
After initial denials of her application, Plaintiff received a hearing before ALJ Kim Soo Nagle on June 27, 2012. PageID 67-114. The ALJ issued a written decision thereafter finding Plaintiff not disabled. PageID 45-61. Specifically, the ALJ's findings were as follows:
PageID 47-61.
Thereafter, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review, making the ALJ's non-disability finding the final administrative decision of the Commissioner. PageID 33-38. Plaintiff then filed this timely appeal. Cook v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 480 F.3d 432, 435 (6th Cir. 2007) (noting that, "[u]nder the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, [claimant] had 60 days from the Appeals Council's notice of denial in which to file his appeal").
In her decision, the ALJ summarized the relevant medical evidence in this case. PageID 52-59. Plaintiff, in her Statement of Errors, sets forth a detailed recitation of the record evidence. Doc. 9 at PageID 563-71. In the memorandum in opposition, the Commissioner offers no objection to Plaintiff's statement of the relevant medical evidence and defers to the ALJ's summary. Doc. 12 at PageID 591. Except as otherwise noted in this Report and Recommendation, the undersigned incorporates Plaintiff's undisputed summary of the record.
The Court's inquiry on a Social Security appeal is to determine (1) whether the ALJ's non-disability finding is supported by substantial evidence, and (2) whether the ALJ employed the correct legal criteria. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Bowen v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 478 F.3d 742, 745-46 (6th Cir. 2007). In performing this review, the Court must consider the record as a whole. Hephner v. Mathews, 574 F.2d 359, 362 (6th Cir. 1978).
Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). When substantial evidence supports the ALJ's denial of benefits, that finding must be affirmed, even if substantial evidence also exists in the record upon which the ALJ could have found Plaintiff disabled. Buxton v. Halter, 246 F.3d 762, 772 (6th Cir. 2001). Thus, the ALJ has a "`zone of choice' within which he [or she] can act without the fear of court interference." Id. at 773.
The second judicial inquiry — reviewing the correctness of the ALJ's legal analysis — may result in reversal even if the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record. Rabbers v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 582 F.3d 647, 651 (6th Cir. 2009). "[A] decision of the Commissioner will not be upheld where the [Social Security Administration] fails to follow its own regulations and where that error prejudices a claimant on the merits or deprives the claimant of a substantial right." Bowen, 478 F.3d at 746.
To be eligible for disability benefits, a claimant must be under a "disability" as defined by the Social Security Act. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). Narrowed to its statutory meaning, a "disability" includes physical and/or mental impairments that are both "medically determinable" and severe enough to prevent a claimant from (1) performing his or her past job and (2) engaging in "substantial gainful activity" that is available in the regional or national economies. Id.
Administrative regulations require a five-step sequential evaluation for disability determinations. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). Although a dispositive finding at any step ends the ALJ's review, see Colvin, 475 F.3d at 730, the complete sequential review poses five questions:
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4); see also Miller v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 181 F.Supp.2d 816, 818 (S.D. Ohio 2001). A claimant bears the ultimate burden of establishing that he or she is disabled under the Social Security Act's definition. Key v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 109 F.3d 270, 274 (6th Cir. 1997).
In her Statement of Errors, Plaintiff alleges that the ALJ erred in: (A) failing to properly analyze the opinion of her treating physician, Matthew Moore, M.D.; (B) omitting, without explanation, the functional restrictions opined by medical sources upon which she relies in forming Plaintiff's RFC; (C) assessing Plaintiff's work history; and (D) posing an incomplete and/or inaccurate hypothetical question to the vocational expert ("VE") during the administrative hearing. PageID 571. The undersigned finds reversible error concerning Plaintiff's second assignment of error, and therefore declines to address Plaintiff's remaining alleged errors.
With regard to the second alleged error, Plaintiff argues that record reviewing state agency consultants Eli Perenecvich, D.O.; Alice Chambly, Psy.D.; Patricia Semmelman, Ph.D.; and consultative examiner Brian R. Griffiths, Psy.D. all set forth specific restrictions which were rejected by the ALJ without explanation, despite the ALJ otherwise giving great weight to those findings. The Court agrees the ALJ failed to meaningfully explain the weight given to these non-treating medical sources and, by so acting, erroneously neglected to explain why certain restrictions were omitted from Plaintiff's RFC. PageID 56-57.
In weighing opinions of non-treating sources, Social Security regulations require the ALJ to apply the same level of scrutiny as afforded to treating source opinions. Gayheart v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 710 F.3d 365, 379 (6th Cir 2013). "A more rigorous scrutiny of the treating-source opinion than the nontreating and nonexamining opinions is precisely the inverse of the analysis that the regulation[s] require[]." Id. Simply restating a non-treating source's opinion and offering a conclusory assessment, without further discussion, fails to satisfy the requirement that the ALJ provide meaningful explanation of the weight given to all the medical opinion evidence. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c); see also Aytch v. Comm'r of Soc., No. 3:13-cv-135, 2014 WL 4080075, at *5-6 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 19, 2014).
In comparison to her lengthy analysis and critique of treating physician Dr. Moore's opinion, the ALJ conducted just a brief, conclusory review of these non-treating sources. PageID 56-57. With regard to Dr. Perenecvich, for example, the ALJ summarized his opinion and provided no explanation regarding how the opinion addressed Plaintiff's subjective complaints, or how the limitations opined by Dr. Perenecvich addressed any of Plaintiff's alleged impairments. See PageID 56. Further, although Dr. Perencevich found that Plaintiff could only stand and/or walk for 15 minutes each hour,
The same conclusory analysis is present concerning the ALJ's weighing of Dr. Semmelman's opinion. See PageID 57. The Court also notes Dr. Semmelman found that, with regard to sustained concentration and persistence, Plaintiff "retain[ed] the ability to complete 3-4 step moderately complex tasks," but also found that, because of her social interaction limitations, Plaintiff could only perform simple, routine work tasks in a setting which is relatively static with occasional contact with others." PageID 144-45. The ALJ provides no explanation as to why she disregarded this limitation and, instead, found Plaintiff capable of performing moderately complex tasks.
Significantly, Dr. Griffiths concluded that Plaintiff "would have some difficulty relating to others in completing simple repetitive tasks[,]" and that "her short term memory skills were not strong . . . and may deteriorate over extended periods of time slowing her performance in completing simple, repetitive tasks."
Based upon the foregoing, the undersigned finds that the ALJ's non-disability finding should be reversed because she failed to meaningfully explain the weight accorded the opinions of Drs. Perencevich, Semmelman, and Griffiths; and also because she failed to explain why — despite giving each of these opinions "great weight" — certain limitations opined by these medical sources were not included in the RFC finding. Cf. Rose v. Colvin, No. 2:14-CV-88, 2015 WL 1138357, at *6 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 13, 2015).
When, as here, the ALJ's non-disability determination is unsupported by substantial evidence, the Court must determine whether to remand the matter for rehearing or to award benefits. Generally, benefits may be awarded immediately "if all essential factual issues have been resolved and the record adequately establishes a plaintiff's entitlement to benefits." Faucher v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 17 F.3d 171, 176 (6th Cir. 1994); see also Abbott v. Sullivan, 905 F.2d 918, 927 (6th Cir. 1990). The Court may only award benefits where proof of disability is strong and opposing evidence is lacking in substance, so that remand would merely involve the presentation of cumulative evidence, or where proof of disability is overwhelming. Faucher, 17 F.3d at 176; see also Felisky v. Bowen, 35 F.3d 1027, 1041 (6th Cir. 1994); Mowery v. Heckler, 771 F.2d 966, 973 (6th Cir. 1985).
Here, evidence of disability is not overwhelming because the record is not clear whether Plaintiff would be considered disabled even if the omitted limitations by the consultative physicians set forth supra were included in the RFC. See PageID 104-13. Accordingly, the undersigned concludes that remand for further proceedings is proper. Upon remand, the ALJ shall analyze all medical source opinions of record, and meaningfully explain the weight reasonably accorded to those opinions.
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), any party may serve and file specific, written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations within
